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Abstract 
Who are the Jordanians? This dissertation approaches this question from the position of how: how 
is Jordanian citizenship thought of and practiced? As such this is not a study of national identity, 
but of citizenship. Al-sh’ab yureed…Much has been said about this clarion call which echoed in 
streets and squares across the Arab world in 2011/2012. Jordanians shared with their co-
demonstrators in Egypt, the Yemen, and Tunisia among others, a basis on which their claims, 
regardless of substantive differences, were made: a citizenship of their respective countries. Such 
is of interest in the context of the Arab world as scholars of twentieth century politics have 
following Hudson, acknowledged that ‘the solution’ to the absence or abject weakness of 
legitimacy from Morocco to Iraq involves the facilitating of a kind of political participation often 
identified with being a citizen. However actual examinations of citizenship remain limited. 
Explorations beyond conceiving of it as little more than a status of belonging, remain little more 
than isolated oases in a scholarly desert saturated with the sands of democratisation and 
authoritarian persistence. The dissertation that follows is an investigation into the practice and 
theory of Jordanian citizenship. Divided into three parts and six chapters, the thesis makes several 
principal arguments.  
Part one: Citizens and Subjects? Theorising on History consists of the first three chapters. 
It establishes on the one hand, what I mean when speaking of a citizenship approach, and on the 
other, assert that such an endeavour is a worthy one to pursue. Second it is advanced that 
citizenship has a specific historical pedigree in the Anglo-European context that its Arabic 
counterparts do not, which becomes problematic when these Anglo-European assumptions 
influence approaches to citizenship in the Arab world. Subsequently, there is a need to elucidate 
the historical development of jinsiyyah and muwātanah. Third, this development is contextualised 
within Jordanian political history. The historical construction of Jordanian citizenship is situated 
in its contemporary context since the ascension of Abdullah II in 1999, and the events of 2011/2012 
are rendered as direct products of the immediate decade’s political and economic trajectory.  
Part two: Citizenship in Contemporary Jordan, containing chapters four, and five. Chapter 
four, which makes use of fieldwork conducted in Jordan, uses contemporary reflections on 
Jordanian citizenship from Jordanians as a lens through which the first decade of Abdullah II’s 
reign is analysed. Both economic and political decisions are analysed in order to highlight a key 
characteristic of citizenship’s theory and practice: the absence of accountability and ownership. 
The thesis then provides analysis of the 2011/2012 uprisings in Jordan, situating them as a citizen 
search for ownership and accountability. This search is put into focus comparatively with an 
analysis of the first five discussion papers of King Abdullah II, which address directly the royal 
perceptive on the role of citizens in post-2011 Jordan. Part three: Practices Within and Between 
Jinsiyyah and Muwātanah, is composed of chapters six, seven and eight, with a focus on 
contemporary affairs in the Jordan. Three areas: the gendering of citizenship, the politics of citizen 
expression and the intersections between tribalism and citizenship, are explored. 
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Introduction 
 
The Scope of the Inquiry 
 
 1."ريغتملا وه بعشلاو ،تباث مكحلا ماظن ندرلاا يف" 
 
 
Al-sh’ab yureed…Much has been said about the clarion call which echoed in streets and squares 
across the Arab world in 2011/2012. Beginning first in Tunisia following the self-immolation of 
Mohamed Bouazizi on 10 December 2010, the uprisings against the authoritarian status quo did 
not remain confined to Tunisia, but spread both West and East. From 7 January 2011 Jordan bore 
witness to its own vision of what has become known as the Arab Spring.2 Unlike their counterparts 
in Bahrain, Egypt, the Yemen, or Tunisia, Jordanians overwhelmingly demanded reform as 
opposed to revolution. Yet, at the same time the sh’ab al-urduni - the Jordanian people - mobilising 
in demonstrations unprecedented in the Kingdom’s history in terms of their temporal and spatial 
breath, shared two realities with their contemporaries. Firstly, they occupied public space to make 
claims, which in Jordan’s case involved both political and economic demands for accelerating the 
kingdom’s reform trajectory, serious efforts to combat corruption, and an improvement of 
transparency in political decision-making. Secondly, Jordanians shared with their co-
                                                     
1 ‘In Jordan the regime stays the same whereas the people change’: Nahed Hattar, ‘Min Huwe al-Urduni?’ al-
Ḥadath, November 01, 1995.  
2 For an in-depth exploration into the epistemological significance of labelling the uprisings in particular ways see 
Lucia Sorbera, ‘Writing Revolution: New Inspirations, New Questions’, Postcolonial Studies 17 (2014): 104-108; 
‘Aādil al-Ṣafti, ‘al-Rabi‘a al-‘Arabi…Mādtha ya‘ani?’ al-‘Arabiya, August 05, 2011, 
http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/05/160884.html, (accessed April 16, 2014). 
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demonstrators a basis on which their claims were, regardless of substantive differences, made: 
citizenship of their respective countries. The events of 2011 and 2012 in Jordan, may be considered 
then, as an endeavour, on the part of Jordanians, to acquire full citizenship, accountability and 
ownership within their country.   
An immediate series of questions arise concerning epistemically: who is a citizen? Who, 
on the other, is a non-citizen? What, if any shades of grey exist between these binary categories? 
And within this, what are the implications for those residing within this in-between space? Each 
of these are deserving of substantial analysis in their own-right, and are regrettably beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. However, it is necessary to preface the subsequent substance of the 
forthcoming argument with the following elaboration on the nexus between citizen and non-
citizen. 
 
To be a citizen according to international law, is to be a person ‘recognized by a State as 
having an effective link with it’.3 Just what an effective link means in practice is the prerogative of 
each individual state to determine, leaving considerable space for differing interpretations and 
applications of the principles of jus soli (law of place) and jus sanguinis (law of blood) that 
underpin citizenship regimes across the world.4 Non-citizens meanwhile encompass a broad 
spectrum of individuals including: stateless persons, migrants, seekers of asylum, permanent 
residents, and temporary visitors. Their relationships to the state in which they reside therefore, 
are dependent on a range of differing legal regimes, some of which providing more or fewer 
privileges and applied rights than others. What they share regardless, is a common categorisation 
                                                     
3 The United Nations, the Rights of Non-Citizens (Geneva & New York: UN Publications, 2006), p. 5. 
4 The mechanics of this in the Jordanian context will be explored and problematized in the coming chapters.  
  
2 
 
of not having been ‘recognized’ by the state in which they reside as possessing the ‘effective links’ 
to the country held by citizens.5 
 
Against this backdrop, international law further stipulates that differences assigned by 
states to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, be restricted to the realm of political rights. 
And in only such cases where distinctions ‘serve a legitimate State objective and are proportional 
to the achievement of that objective’.6 Thus non-citizens, irrespective of other concomitant legal 
statuses (tourist, refugee etc.) are decreed to be free from numerous negative actions. For 
illustration, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines the principle of equality before 
the law without discrimination as valid to all.7 The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights contributes the right of workers to form unions, and unions federations, 
without interference of signatory states, of which Jordan is one.8 Additionally, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Jordan has also ratified, stipulates that ‘no one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.9 
 
However, it is the state which has the determining role in the application, and subsequent 
individual experience of, these provisions. More specifically, the political considerations of states, 
are the key determinates in the relationship of alterity between citizens and non-citizens on the one 
hand, and between citizens themselves and their state on the other. Although international law may 
                                                     
5 The United Nations, The Rights of Non-Citizens (Geneva & New York: UN Publications, 2006), p. 5. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Article 7 of the International Declaration of Human Rights available at: http://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/  
8 The Covenant is available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx; Jordan ratified the 
Covenant in 1975. 
9 Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Cultural Rights available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx  
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require the limiting of citizen/non-citizen differentiation to political rights, there are many 
instances where employment, cultural and other rights are understood fundamentally in political 
terms. In Jordan there are numerous illustrations of this, some of which will be elaborated on in 
this dissertation. One of them concerns the inability of Jordanian mothers married to, or having 
children with, non-Jordanian men to transfer their citizenship status to these children 
automatically; an ability that is legally bestowed on their male co-citizens alone. 
 
At the heart of this lies alterity, which as a concept emerges from the asseveration - 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius - the expression of one is the exclusion of another. It is the 
very social constitution of people into categories (citizen or non-citizen) and sub-categories 
(refugee, tourist, permanent resident) along with the gendered, religious and ethicized assumptions 
often associated with them; make the citizenship regime possible.10 Hence within a polity, 
citizenship exists an identity ‘within a city or state that certain agents constitute as virtuous, good, 
righteous, and superior’, which is subsequently differentiated in a number of legal, and socio-
normative ways, ‘from strangers, outsiders and aliens who they constitute as their alterity’.11 In 
this case, gendered between men and women.  
 
Challenges to the established order arise when the alterius subjects become political and in 
so doing, re-constitute their political subjectivities. Becoming a political subject may be 
comprehended as a two-step process. The first involves a repudiation of the unifying enterprise 
inherent in the creation and reproduction of citizenship regimes,  a ‘questioning’ of the various 
‘essential categories’ serving to differentiate between both levels of citizenship, in addition to 
                                                     
10 Engin Isin Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 4. 
11 Ibid, pp. 35-36. 
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those excluded outright.12 The second part concerns what to do next, mobilising to construct new 
political subjectivities via ‘solidaristic (affiliation, sociation, identification), agonistic (conflict, 
competition, resistance, tension), or alienating (exclusion, estrangement, oppression, expulsion)’ 
modes and strategies.13 Thus, comprehending whether political acts are citizen oriented, ‘requires 
the demonstration that these acts produce subjects as citizens’.14 In the instance of Jordanian 
mothers this involves challenging an established masculine epistemic construct of citizenship, so 
as to assert the equal validity of their citizenship with that of their male co-citizens. 
  
The politics of citizenship is situated at a nexus between citizens as a collective, and 
between citizens and non-citizens. This, as shall be enunciated across the coming chapters, is 
crucial if we are to understand Jordanian and more broadly the domestic conditions within Arab 
states especially since the uprisings of 2011. For scholarship, it encourages in-particular a 
departure from the well-trodden path of “national identity” and instead centre analyses on this 
interplay between citizen and non-citizen on the one hand, and the attempted movement between 
them on the part of the state and its prevailing regime. 
 
This raises the question: who is a Jordanian? There are at least two avenues one can take 
to pursue this and other related questions: national identity and citizenship. As I will enunciate in 
the literature review, the avenue of national identity has, in the Jordanian context, been meditated 
on from numerous angles, and I therefore throughout the chapters of this dissertation focus 
attention on to the practice and theory of citizenship. When approached from this direction, who 
                                                     
12 Ibid, p. 4. 
13 Ibid, pp. 31-32. 
14 Engin Isin, ‘Citizenship in Flux: The figure of the Activist Citizen’, Subjectivity 29 (2009): p. 371. 
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is a Jordanian becomes less a question of what or who, though these remain significant, so much 
as how - how is being a Jordanian citizen thought of and practiced? This is the central question of 
this dissertation. Subsequent questions emerge including: what are the limitations of citizenship in 
a semi-authoritarian constitutional monarchy like Jordan? How do Jordanians negotiate and 
mediate their relationship with the state? In order to answer questions of this nature, an 
interdisciplinary approach, which gleans from political theory – citizenship theory especially, Area 
studies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), history of ideas and political history and 
political science is adopted here. 
 
I argue that it is impossible to adequately comprehend the wave of uprisings in 2011/2012, 
their foundations, and the various futures that are and will continue to influence, without taking 
into account the ways in which citizenship is understood and practiced. On the other hand it is 
difficult to arrive at a meaningful understanding of citizenship in contemporary Jordan without an 
interdisciplinary approach. The essence of this statement may seem conventional. For some time, 
political theorists have recognised how much regimes depend on the legitimacy they are able to 
garner from their populations, in terms of both stability and longevity.15 Being a citizen, one 
assumes, grants one strong political influence. In the Arab world, scholars of twentieth century 
politics have likewise, following Hudson, acknowledged that ‘the solution’ to the absence or abject 
                                                     
15 Some pillars of the Anglo-European canon include: Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses (London: Penguin, 
1970); and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1968). More recent contributions include Larry Diamond 
(ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (London: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Michal Mann, A 
History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, vol. 1 of The Sources of Social Power  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), and The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914, vol. 2 of The Sources of Social 
Power  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Robert Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and 
Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (et al.), The Logic of 
Political Survival (London: The MIT Press, 2005). Bronwyn Winter & Lucia Sorbera (eds.), Contending Legitimacy 
in World Politics: The State, Civil Society and the International Sphere in the Twenty-first Century (London: 
Routledge, 2017). 
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weakness of legitimacy from Morocco to Iraq involves the facilitating of a kind of political 
participation often identified with being a citizen.16 On the other hand, actual examinations of 
citizenship remain limited. In Jordan’s case, the literature produced in the last thirty or so years 
coalesces several notable poles: biographies and memoirs of its kings and significant elites,17 
historical narratives of both the overarching and event focused varieties,18 studies of local politics 
                                                     
16 Michael Hudson, Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 404; see 
also Ghassan Salame (ed.), The Foundations of the Arab State (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), and Democracy 
without Democrats?: the Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994); Giacomo Luciani 
(ed.), the Arab State (London: Routledge, 1990); Nazih Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in 
the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995); Halim Barakat, al-Ightirāb fi al-Thiqāfah al-‘Arabiyyah: mutāhāt al-
Insān bayna al-ḥilm wa al-wāq‘a (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 2006); Adhan Saouli, the Arab State: 
Dilemmas of Late Formation (London: Routledge, 2012); Mehran Kamrava, Fragile Politics: Weak States in the 
Greater Middle East (London: Hurst & Company, 2016). 
17 Abdullah Ibn Hussein, My Memoirs Complete “Al-Takmilah” (London: Longman, 1951); Abdullah II Ibn al-
Hussein, Our last Best Chance: a Story of War and Peace (New York: Penguin, 2012); Marwan Muasher, The Arab 
Center: the Promise of Moderation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Asher Susser, On both banks of the 
Jordan : a Political Biography of Wasfi al-Tall (Portland: Frank Cass, 1994); Alexander Bligh, The Political Legacy 
of King Hussein (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002); Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
18 Beverly Milton-Edwards & Peter Hinchcliffe, Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy (London: Routledge, 2009); Philip 
Robins, A History of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of 
Jordan (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993); Samir Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987). 
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and history,19 along with those focused on national identity,20 political economy,21 democratisation 
(and civil society),22 as well as authoritarian resilience.23 
 
Although citizenship is implicated in each, it is rare to find in-depth analyses of its role in 
political order and legitimacy beyond conceiving of it as a status of belonging. In political theory 
                                                     
19 Peter Gubser, Politics and Change in al-Karak, Jordan: a Study of a Small Arab Town and its District (New 
York: Oxford university Press, 1973); Jordan’s tribes and their interplay with the state are prominent objects of 
analysis in: Paul Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, Jordan: the Impact of Social Change on the Role of the Tribes (New 
York: Praeger, 1984); Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2007) and The shaykh of Shaykhs : Mithqal al-Fayiz and Tribal Leadership in Modern Jordan (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2016).  
20 Inevitably the unresolved Palestinian Israeli conflict features significantly: Laurie Brand, ‘Palestinians and 
Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity’, Journal of Palestine Studies 24:4 (1995): 46-61; Efraim Karsh & P.R. 
Kumaraswamy (eds.), Israel, Hashemites and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle (London: Frank Cass, 2003); 
Dona Stewart, Good Neighbourly Relations: Jordan, Israel and the 1994-2004 Peace Process (London: Tauris, 
2007). 
21 Laurie Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political economy of Alliance Making (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994); Tariq Tell, The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2013); Jamie Allinson, The Struggle for the State in Jordan: The Social Origins of Alliances (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2016).   
22 John M. Roberts, ‘Prospects for Democracy in Jordan’, Arab Studies Quarterly 13:3/4 (1991): 119-138; Abla 
Amawi, ‘Democracy Dilemmas in Jordan’, Middle East Report 174 (1992): 26-29; Rex Brynen, ‘Economic Crisis 
and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan’, Canadian Journal of Political Science 
25:1(1992): 69-97; Beverly Milton-Edwards, ‘Façade Democracy and Jordan’, British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 20:2 (1993): 191-203; Katherine Rath, ‘The Process of Democratization in Jordan’, Middle Eastern Studies 
30:3 (1994): 530-557; Leonard Robinson, ‘Liberalization, the Islamists and the Stability of the Arab State: Jordan as 
a Case Study’, The Muslim World 85:1 (1996): 1-32; Curtis Ryan, ‘Elections and Parliamentary Democratization in 
Jordan’, Democratization 5:4 (1998): 176-196; ‘Ali Maḥāfẓah, al-Dimuqrāṭiyyah al-Muqayyidah (Beirut: Arab 
Unity Studies Center, 1999); Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: the International Politics of Jordan’s 
Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘The Limits of Democracy in the 
Middle East: The Case of Jordan’, Middle East Journal 53:4 (1999): 606-620, and ‘Civil Society as Social Control: 
State Power in Jordan’, Comparative Politics 33:1 (2000): 43-61; Richard Antoun, ‘Civil Society, Tribal Process 
and Change in Jordan: an Anthropological View’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (2000): 441-463; 
Sean Yom, ‘Jordan: Ten More Years of Autocracy’, Journal of Democracy 20:4 (2009): 151-166.  
23 Malik Mufti, ‘Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan’, Comparative Political Studies 
32:1 (1999): 100-129; Andrew Shryock, ‘Dynastic Modernism and its Contradictions: Testing the Limits of 
Pluralism, Tribalism and King Hussein’s Example in Hashemite Jordan’, Arab Studies Quarterly 22:3 (2000): 57-
79; Scott Greenwood, ‘Jordan’s “New Bargain”: the Political Economy of Regime Security’, Middle East Journal 
57:2 (2003): 248-268; Jillian Schwedler, ‘More than a Mob: the Dynamics of Political Demonstrations in Jordan’, 
Middle East Report, 226 (2003): 18-23; Michael Herb, ‘Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World’, Middle East 
Journal, 58:3 (2004): 367-384; Ellen Lust-Okar, ‘Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of 
Political Opposition’, Comparative Politics 36:2 (2004): 159-179; Anne Marie Baylouny, ‘Militarizing Welfare: 
Neo-liberalism and Jordanian Policy’, Middle East Journal 62:2 (2008): 277-303; Sean Yom & Mohammad al-
Momani, ‘The International Dimensions of Authoritarian Regime Stability’, Arab Studies Quarterly 30:1 (2008): 
39-60; Janine Clark, ‘Threats, Structures and Resources: Cross-Ideological Coalition Building in Jordan’, 
Comparative Politics 43:1 (2010):101-120; Amany Jamal, ‘Islamist Momentum in the Arab World: Jordan’s Islamic 
Action Front and Kuwait’s Constitutional Movement’, in Of Empire and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or No 
Democracy at all? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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generally, citizenship studies re-emerged with renewed fervour in tandem with the revitalised 
discussion of identity politics in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of global 
bipolarity.24 Prior to this, over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, theorists interested in citizenship 
focused on the institutional environment, framed by constitutions and legislation, and practiced 
within institutionalised processes. However, during the 1990s and into the first decade of the 
twenty-first century a shift occurred whereby the discussion increasingly became interested in ‘the 
qualities and dispositions of the citizens who operate within these institutions and procedures’.25 
Accompanying this locus movement were two auxiliary acknowledgments. The first being the 
need to adapt established models to the emerging realities of pluralistic societies, that is to say, 
what civic virtues are required to keep the polity functioning fluidly along democratic lines in the 
absence of a shared national narrative? In light of this, the second acknowledgement was that in 
order to advance democratic theory the hitherto “vote-centric” focus had to be joined with a 
deviation towards “talk-centric” approaches.26  
  
This made sense in the context of the Anglo-European polities which make-up the 
overwhelming majority of case studies used to test and develop citizenship’s typology and 
theoretical substance. In Middle East studies, the first contribution in English, to the author’s 
                                                     
24 See for example: Derek Heater, Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics, and Education (London: 
Longman, 1990); Kamal Sadiq, Paper Citizens: How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship in Developing 
Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Bart Van Steenbergen (ed.), The Condition of Citizenship 
(London: Sage, 1994); Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 2000); Toby Miller, Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitanism, Consumerism, and Television in a 
Neoliberal Age (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007); Nira Yuval-Davis & Pnina Werbner (eds.) Women, 
Citizenship and Difference (London: Zed, 1999); Ira M. Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the 
Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, Ethics 99:2 (1989): 250-274; Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the 
Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory’, Ethics 104:2 (1994): 352-381. 
25 Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman (eds.), Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000): 6; Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993) was influential in this regard. 
26 Kymlicka & Norman (eds.), Citizenship in Diverse Societies pp. 8-9. 
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knowledge, providing a nuanced rumination into the complexities of citizenship was published in 
1995. Its author, Uri Davis, considering socio-legal distinctions between Jewish and non-Jewish 
citizens of Israel, developed a typology of citizenship that used the two most common Arabic 
terms: jinsiyyah and muwātanah.27 The former he defined as ‘passport citizenship’, the purpose of 
which is to denote who is included and who is excluded from the political community. The latter 
contrastingly is rendered as ‘democratic citizenship’, the mechanism through which citizens may 
access equally the political, social, economic, and civil resources of the state.28 Using this 
typology, he advances the point that at its heart citizenship is neither ‘a fact of consciousness [n]or 
a question of identity’, but rather is ‘a certificate’ which defines an individual’s relationship to the 
state.29 Our approach in considering Jordanian citizenship contrastingly, adopts a less normative 
emphasis.  
 
Following on from this, it took a further five years for the first collaborative inquiry to 
emerge. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications, (edited by 
Nils Butenschon) remains to this day a key text for Middle East citizenship studies with its call for 
‘a back-to-basics approach’ to focus in on how political communities are constituted and 
reproduced.30 Of equal significance is Suad Joseph’s (editor) Gender and Citizenship in the Middle 
East, which eloquently approaches the problematics of citizenship theory and practice from a 
gender perspective, emphasising by way of this the significance of intersectionality in both the 
expressions and experiences of citizens. Her study identifies seven ‘empirical points of departure’: 
                                                     
27 Distinctions made between jinsiyyah and muwātanah are subject to analysis in chapter two. 
28 Uri Davis, ‘Jinsiyya Versus Muwatana: The Question of Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: the Cases of 
Israel, Jordan and Palestine’, Arab Studies Quarterly 17:1/2 (1995): p. 20. 
29 Davis, ‘Jinsiyya Versus Muwatana’, p. 19. 
30 Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassassian, Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and 
Applications (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000): p. 7. 
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nations, states, religion, family, family law, self/citizenship, and boundaries as key sites in the 
constituting of gendered citizenship.31 Despite these erudite endeavours, it was not until 2008 that 
another study took up the issue citizenship. However, unlike its predecessors, John Jandora’s 
States without Citizens: Understanding the Islamic Crisis, suggested not so much a typology of 
citizenship or a definition, filling the blanks with an almost neo-clash of civilisations polemic. The 
‘crisis’ of ‘Islamic society’ he argues, is a ramification of the ‘inability to recast indigenous 
institutions and values’ so as to bring about modernisation, and with it, a modern conception of 
citizenship, ‘from within’.32  
 
Jandora’s study is in some ways symptomatic of a period dominated by the so called War 
on Terror and the subsequent frenetic interest in secutirtisazion of politics and, consequently, 
security studies. The “War on Terror” brought into prominence once more Islamism and 
authoritarian resilience at the expense of citizenship, despite that neither authoritarian longevity 
nor an Islamist capturing of the state could be possible without the action or inaction of the 
citizenry. Gianluca Parolin’s perspicacious Citizenship in the Arab World ably reset the agenda 
from a more socio-legal perspective. Parolin’s exegesis asserts its authority in illuminating the 
history of citizenship as a legal analogy from its roots as a nineteenth century neologism to its 
present forms. Further, he elucidates the links between so-called subnational ties, such as the social 
construction of blood and how these have influenced the development of citizenship in its local 
contexts in the Middle East.33 Yet, two years after the citizens-led uprisings that were the catalyst 
                                                     
31 Suad Joseph & Deniz Kandiyoti, Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East (New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 2000): pp. 5-28.  
32 John W. Jandora, States Without Citizens: Understanding the Islamic Crisis (Westport: Praeger, 2008): p. ix. 
33 Gianluca Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation-State (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2009). 
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for the fall of regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and the Yemen, it was lamented that ‘a systematic 
overview on how to apply the concept of citizenship has so far been lacking’ in the discipline.34 
This deficiency has more recently been addressed by Roel Meijer and Nils Butenschon.35 They 
also reflect on the need to engage in theory building within an Arab context if our understanding 
of the influence of citizenship practice and theory is to advance. Adopting Jordan as its case study 
It is to this task that this dissertation offers a contribution. 
 
 
 
Why Jordan? 
 
Having once been described as composed of ‘refugees and displaced persons’, and the most 
artificial state construct imposed on the Eastern Mediterranean following the end of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom has demonstrated a degree of stability that contradicts 
its character as a country composed of ‘refugees and displaced persons’.36 Jordan’s heterogeneity 
rendered both state and nation-building a complex endeavour since the inception of the Hashemite 
project. This makes the Kingdom an apt case study for an examination of citizenship theory and 
practice in the Arab world. Two elements of this heterogeneity are especially notable, one 
territorial, and the other demographic. On the territorial level, Jordan’s boundaries have fluctuated 
since independence in 1946. The West Bank was, between 1950 and 1967, part of Jordan, yet 
currently is a disputed territory that was to constitute a substantial part of a Palestinian state in the 
                                                     
34 James Sater, Citizenship in the Middle East – Exploring a Field of Research (Odense: Center for 
Mellemǿststudier, 2013): p. 2. 
35 Roel Meijer & Nils Butenschon (eds.) The Crisis of Citizenship in the Arab World (Leiden: Brill, 2017); see also 
Roel Meijer ‘Political Citizenship and Social Movements in the Arab World’ in Hein-Anton van der Heijden (ed.) 
Handbook of Political Citizenship and Social Movements (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014): pp. 628-660. 
36 Hisham Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962): p. 181. 
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1993 Oslo Accords. The ongoing political contest over this territory continues to have decisive 
ramifications on both the country’s national identity and citizenship regime.  
 
On the level of demography, the population of Jordan could at no time in the last two to 
three hundred years be characterised as homogenous. Following the Russian expansion into the 
Caucasus since 1803, culminating in the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, what is now Jordan 
has become the home of a small but politically significant, Chechen and Circassian communities 
who while Arabised, have maintained their respective identities and modes of cultural expression. 
Further, the country has been home to Palestinians displaced by the 1948 Nakba or catastrophe, 
and 1967 Naksa, or set-back. A majority have been granted citizenship, while others are officially 
recognised as refugees, and carry different identification. The politicisation of Palestinian identity 
(both citizens and noncitizens) in the Kingdom from the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) in 1964 to the immediate aftermath of the 1970 civil war between the PLO 
and the Jordanian Arab Legion, exacerbated apprehensions and tensions not only about national 
identity, but equally about the idea of the state, its purpose, and the constituencies it is supposed 
to serve.  
 
In the wake of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, and again after the 2003 American-led invasion, 
thousands of Iraqis sought refuge in Jordan. Many remain in the Kingdom presently and were 
responsible for the upsurge in the domestic construction sector and rental prices in Amman.37 Most 
recently, since the 2011 uprisings in Syria disintegrated into war by mid-2012, Jordan has become 
one of the largest hosts of Syrian refugees. In addition to migrations, the Kingdom’s heterogeneity 
                                                     
37 Raed Omari (Journalist with the Jordan Times), interview with the author, May 2016. 
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shows itself in social practice. Historically, social organisation has been dominated socially, 
economically, and politically by a dyadic relationship between steppe and sown that has rendered 
the establishment of centralised authority difficult.38 These factors make Jordan an appropriate 
case study, through which some light can be shed on the theory and practice of citizenship. More 
so, the historical circumstances outlined above have not diminished in significance in the 
contemporary period, marked by the ascension of Abdullah II in 1999.  
 
Citizenship remains, according to lawyer Sufian Obeidat, ‘one of the complicated issues 
here in Jordan’.39 In recent years a number of occurrences have buttressed this viewpoint, and 
serve to question the applicability of Davis’ argument that citizenship has little to do with identities 
and the interests they facilitate. While each will be discussed in depth in chapters four and five, it 
serves our purpose here to outline them. One is the continuing stasis surrounding not only 
negotiations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel, but whether the two-state solution 
is practically workable and capable of realising a just settlement. In this environment some 
commentators have, it seems, sought to resurrect the watan al-badil or alternative homeland 
proposal, which would see Jordan become Palestine.40 Questions emerge regarding the fate and 
                                                     
38 Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999); Eugene Rogan & Tariq Tell, Village, Steppe & State: the Social Origins of Modern Jordan (London: British 
Academic Press, 1994); Tariq Tell, ‘Guns, Gold and Grain: War and Food Supply in the Making of Transjordan’ in 
Steven Heydemann (ed.) War, institutions, and social change in the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000). 
39 Sufiyan Obeidat, interview with the author, September 2016. 
40 Daoud Kuttab, ‘Is Confederation Viable for Jordan?’, The Jordan Times, June 01, 2016, 
http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/daoud-kuttab/confederation-viable-jordan (accessed June 01, 2016). The 
persistence of this discussion despite Jordan’s peace with Israel is underscored by an October 2017 conference held 
in Israel whose purpose was to discuss the Alternative Homeland option. See: Martin Sherman, ‘The Jordan-is-
Palestine Conference: Why I agreed to Participate’, The Jerusalem Herald, October 13, 2017, 
https://www.jerusalem-herald.com/single-post/2017/10/12/The-Jordan-is-Palestine-Conference-Why-I-Agreed-to-
Participate (accessed October 14, 2017). For a Jordanian perspective see: Jumana Ghunaimat, ‘’Owhām al-Watan al-
Badil’, Al-Ghad, September 28, 2015, http://www.alghad.com/articles/895179-ليدبلا-نطولا-ماهوأ; (accessed November 
15, 2017);  Anonymous, ‘Statement on Defending State, Identity against Israel's 'Alternative Homeland' - Retired 
Army’, Ammon News, March 05, 2010, http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=7683#.Wh_VwUqWbIW 
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status of Jordan’s population of Palestinian origin. Some will relocate to a new state, to be sure, 
but others will not. What will be the role of Amman in expediting this?  
 
Another manifestation of the importance of citizenship exhibits itself in the campaign, 
ongoing since 2007: My Mother is a Jordanian and her Citizenship is my Right, which seeks to 
end the exclusively patrilineal transferal of Jordanian citizenship. Current arrangements preclude 
female citizens from passing citizenship to their children. This results in children who are stateless 
within their self-identified nation and nationless within the state of their birth and residence, if a 
Jordanian woman has children with a non-Jordanian man. A final illustration concerns the 
influence of tribalism on citizenship. In July 2017, a Jordanian soldier was tried and convicted to 
serve multiple life sentences by the State Security Court for shooting dead three American 
servicemen. His tribe, the Huwaytāt, one of the biggest confederations in Jordan, called a 
conference attended by over five thousand of its members. The result was a provocative statement 
in which the court and its decision were castigated as the pawns of foreign interests at the expense 
of citizens.41 Of particular interest was the way that tribal affiliation, routinely labelled as a 
primordial sub-state social arrangement, was utilised conceptually as a means to project a set of 
claims about citizenship.   
 
 
 
                                                     
(accessed November 15, 2017); and Jawad Anani, ‘Jordan’s “West Bank”’, The Jordan Times, October 23, 2017, 
http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/jawad-anani/jordan%E2%80%99s-west-bank%E2%80%99 (accessed October 
23, 2017). In addition there is President Donald Trump’s so-called ‘ultimate deal’ to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, though what form it takes remains to be seen: Ian Black, ‘The 'ultimate deal'? Trump's Middle East peace 
plan is actually 15 years old’, The Guardian, May 24, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/24/israel-palestine-trump-arab-peace-initiative (accessed November 
16, 2017).  
41 For an illustration note: Dana Jibril & Shaker Jarrar, ‘Rafaḍ ‘Ashā’ri Wās‘a li-qarār al-Maḥkamah: Tadā‘iāt 
Qaḍiyah Abu Tāyeh Mustammarah fi al-Jafr’, 7iber, July 23, 2017, https://www.7iber.com/politics-
economics/tribes-demand-release-of-maarek-abu-tayeh/ (accessed July 23, 2017). 
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Theoretical Framework  
 
This dissertation adopts an interdisciplinary approach to provide an answer to the question: how 
is being a Jordanian citizen thought of and practiced? What is its theory and practice? 
Subsequently, answering this and its associated questions is undertaken with a number of methods 
that the reader will encounter throughout the thesis. One of these is historical analysis, necessary 
because understanding the historical development of Jordan’s citizenship regime is essential in 
comprehending its present. Thus I endeavour to situate our argument and analysis within the 
Kingdom’s seventy year history, while paying particular focus to the period since Abdullah II’s 
ascension in 1999. The second one is textual analysis, which is necessary because citizenship as 
an institution and a status relies on law to provide its essential structure. It is in law that the rights 
and duties of citizens to each other and towards the state are set out. Our discussion therefore 
requires textual analysis, and at times a close reading of the Jordanian Constitution (1952), the 
Nationality Law (1954), and the discussion papers produced by the King between 2012 and 2016.  
What this analysis reveals are substantial gaps between theory and practice, especially with regards 
to the legislating of citizens’ rights. 
 
Fieldwork conducted in Jordan between February and October 2016 provided substantial 
data for the analysis below. This undertaking was crucial in contextualising and directing the 
theory and historical analysis contained across the chapters. It also provided the main resource and 
inspiration for the empirical chapters in part three. While in Jordan I was a sideline witness to a 
number of significant events including raids on the Muslim Brotherhood’s Amman and al-Zarqa 
offices, the general elections in September and the tragic assassination of Nahed Hattar. Our 
analysis of history, interviews and law is contextualised with political theory, in-particular 
citizenship theory. Although making use of citizenship theory in general, I concentrate on studies 
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produced about citizenship in Jordan and the wider Arab world. A further point deserves mention. 
On the basis of my fieldwork, I made the decision not to focus on Islamist politics or parliamentary 
reform, including elections. Both of these appear across the chapters, but they do not in and of 
themselves dominate the analysis. I acknowledge the risks this poses in limiting the scope of this 
thesis. However, I found that the conversations I had about citizenship and political dynamics in 
Jordan were drawn in other directions; focusing on the practice and theory dyad. 
 
As a body of literature, citizenship theory contains within its ambit three key concepts: 
extent, content and depth. Of the three, the former concerns the construction of membership 
boundaries within and between polities. Content, meanwhile, refers to ‘how the benefits and 
burdens of membership should be allocated’. Finally, considering the depth of citizenship is to 
look at how ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ the identities of members (citizens) ought to be on the one hand, and 
on the other, whether and how differences should be accommodated.42 These elements have been 
of interest to MENA Area Studies and political scientists since King Hussien’s political 
liberalisation initiative began in 1989, an interest renewed in the wake of the 2011/2012 uprisings. 
Despite this, MENA Area Studies has been relatively slow to pick-up citizenship as a subject of 
in-depth analysis. The state of the field is such that by 2017, Morton Valbjǿrn asserted that there 
remained ‘a need for a kind of ‘modified citizenship theory’ in order to realise the potential of this 
approach’ in the context of MENA studies.43  
 
                                                     
42 Engin F. Isin & Bryan S. Turner, ‘Citizenship Studies: an Introduction’ in Engin Isin & Bryan Turner, Handbook 
of Citizenship Studies (London: Sage, 2002): p. 4. 
43 Morten Valbjǿrn, ‘Like But not the Same as…Arab Citizenship and the Jordanian Experience’ in Meijer & 
Butenschǿn (eds.) The Crisis of Citizenship, p. 198. 
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The modification in question involves tailoring the study of citizenship’s theory and 
practice to the specific conditions and historical developments of the MENA generally and the 
individual states specifically; recognising, by way of this, the distinctions and the commonalities 
of experiences both inter- and intra-regions. As shall be elucidated in our forthcoming discussion 
of the state of the art, the scholarly community is exceedingly quick to throw around terms 
citizen/s, rights and subjects among others, while simultaneously displaying a disconcerting 
wilfulness to assume what these mean in both theory and practice; thus highlighting the validity 
of Valbjǿrn’s contention, and this dissertation’s contribution. 
 
Further, such a contribution cannot be made without a reliance on the work of political 
scientists. Studies by luminaries including Larbi Sadiki, Jillian Schwedler, Curtis Ryan and Ellen 
Lust have contributed significantly to the scope of this thesis. The perspective adopted here, is 
informed by the precepts of social constructivism.44 Constructivists assert that ‘people and 
societies construct or constitute each other’ in a two-way process.45 Institutions, of which 
citizenship is one, are conceptualized as ‘relatively stable’ structures comprised of interests and 
identities that are innately cognitive and internal rather than external to actors. The process of 
institutionalization involves at its centre a social internalising of identities which encourage 
                                                     
44 Social constructivism has numerous manifestations across the natural and social sciences. For the purposes of this 
dissertation I am concerned with, and applying constructivist concepts as they developed in International Relations 
Theory (IR). While this may appear puzzling to some as I am focused on domestic politics, the degree of external 
penetration and influence in the Jordanian state from its inception, similar to its neighbors, see: Bassel F. Salloukh & 
Rex Brynen (eds.) Persistent permeability? : Regionalism, Localism, and Globalization in the Middle East 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2004); makes the application of a principally IR theory feasible. Some Jordanian analysts 
additionally speak in similar terms including Sabri Rbaihat, who comments on the principles, practices, “outward 
and inward” dispositions that go into a cultural citizenship: ‘Al-Urduniyyin…wa Ḥikāyah al-Jinsiyyah al-
Thiqāfiyah’, Al-Ghad, September 22, 2017, http://www.alghad.com/articles/2056922 (accessed September 22, 
2017). 
45 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1989): p. 36; Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization 46:2 (1992): p. 399. 
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particular sets of interests associated acutely with them.46 Hence perspective is of elemental 
importance to constructivism, which is significant if we hope to explain how citizens in the plural 
experience/practice their citizenship in diverse ways. Furthermore, comprehending citizenship as 
an institution in this manner helps bring to light the nuances between national identity/s and 
citizenship itself. One such being that whereas in a polity in which citizenship is both strong and 
stable, we may expect national identity/s to be subservient to it, in Jordan the opposite is the case. 
Citizenship is subservient to national identity. Resultantly, it is problematic to treat them as 
interchangeable, although, as shall be observable in chapters one and two, substituting or 
conflating both often occurs. 
 
Because it is not a substantive theory of politics, constructivism is flexible in allowing 
those who employ it do so unburdened by pre-packaged claims or hypotheses concerning the 
motivations behind action and the structure of politics. Thus, in order to make substantive 
reflections on political activity, constructivists need ‘to delineate who are the principal actors, what 
are their interests and social capacities, and what is the content of the normative structures.47 At 
the same time, because reality as conceived by constructivists is socially mediated, constructivist 
analyses actively invite rumination on the emergence of alternative social worlds because it claims 
‘what exists need not have and need not’.48 Contestability and the fluidity of social orders are 
therefore inherent to the way in which an examination of politics is approached. Following Klotz 
and Lynch, actors are able to, but not at all times, ‘set into motion new normative, cultural, 
                                                     
46 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it’, p. 399. 
47 Michael Barnett, ‘Social Constructivism’ in John Baylis & Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 258-270. 
48 Michael Barnett, ‘Social Constructivism’, p. 264. 
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economic, social, or political practices that alter conventional wisdoms and standard operating 
procedures’.49 
 
Despite these apparent advantages, constructivism’s application in the MENA (the Middle 
East & North Africa) remains limited, where much intellectual energy has been and continues to 
be spent on perspectives centred around either democratization, authoritarian resilience and 
increasingly, security. Hence when integrated with a citizenship perspective, constructivism offers 
an important and unique opportunity to in-effect resituate the facts of Jordanian politics, and in so 
doing offer further insights into the present and future development of the Kingdom while 
simultaneously stimulating renewed analysis of the region. In sum, this dissertation aims at 
contributing to the debate about how to theorize citizenship. In this area Andrea Teti and Abdul-
Hussein al-Sha‘abān have made insightful contributions. Proponents of citizenship theory stress 
the significance of the constitution of political environments, especially the divisions between who 
rules and who is ruled. They are therefore acutely concerned with ‘the architecture of power-
relations’ institutionalizing the distribution of power within a polity, which in turn frame the 
relationship between rulers and ruled.50 As the processes that constitute citizenship concern issues 
of interests, power, contentiousness relations and above all identities (and belonging),51 examining 
citizenship in the MENA generally and Jordan specifically is congruent with the thematic focus of 
constructivism. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
49 Audie Klotz & Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (New York: 
Routledge, 2007): p. 3. 
50 Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassassian, Citizenship and the State in the Middle East, p. 5. 
51 Keith Faulks, Citizenship (London: Routledge, 2000): p. 7. 
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Thesis Outline 
 
The dissertation is divided into three parts and eight chapters, with corresponding arguments 
explored in each. Part one: Citizens and Subjects? Theorising on History, consists of the first three 
chapters. Chapter one situates the dissertation in the field of political theory and history of ideas. 
It therefore reviews the literature of Jordanian politics in order to highlight the space in which this 
thesis’ contribution will be made. The literature, which coalesces around Jordan’s near thirty year 
experiment with democratisation and civil society development on the one hand, and national 
identity on the other, concerns citizens’ direct engagement in politics. Scholars rarely, raise 
questions about the substance of citizenship outside of the Hashemite regime’s ability to encourage 
citizens’ electoral involvement. Assumptions of this nature, however, are precarious given that the 
institutional contexts in which transactions take place are products of ‘coagulated social 
conflicts’;52 and are by nature therefore subject to change. 
 
A second argument I begin to raise in chapter one, is that citizenship as it has come to be 
known in an Anglo-European context has a specific historical pedigree that its Arabic counterparts 
do not possess. I use counterparts in the plural for two reasons. Not only to stress that each Arab 
country had its own political trajectory, and to avoid Orientalist generalizations on the one hand. 
But also because in the Arabic political discourse there are two key terms referring to citizenship: 
jinsiyyah and muwātanah. Complicating this, both analogies are employed to denote nationality, 
and thus they are readily brought into not only dialogue but conflation. One of the purposes of 
chapter two therefore is to elucidate the development of jinsiyyah and muwātanah, tracking their 
                                                     
52 Oliver Schlumberger ‘Structural reform, economic order, and development: Patrimonial capitalism’, Review of 
International Political Economy 15:4 (2008): p. 625. 
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emergence in the Arabic speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire (geographical Syria 
paramount amongst them). I explore how this development, tied not only to profound alterations 
to socio-political life in the late Ottoman Empire, but equally to the root system of the Arabic 
Language, has given these two faces of citizenship a specific context with implications for its 
practice and theory. Concerning muwātanah, my focus in-particular resides on what is believed to 
be its prime historical characteristic: representing an attachment to territory or place that is 
politicised and therein results in claim making whose validity is predicated upon that attachment. 
Regarding jinsiyyah, I highlight its existence as a designation developed in the nineteenth century, 
to distinguish between subjects that are included and excluded from the political community of the 
state. Consequently, jinsiyyah is seen to possess no consistent day-to-day application on citizens.  
 
Chapter three’s role is to historicise citizenship in the Jordanian context from the late 
Ottoman Sanjaks East of the Jordan River, to the death of King Hussein in 1999. The chapter 
encourages the reader to consider how being a national and being a citizen while related are 
nevertheless distinct, as they both call for different responses from the individual within the 
political realm. Assisting in this effort is the adoption of Tariq Tell’s enunciation of the ‘Hashemite 
Compact’, a nexus of formal and informal networks of power relationships which constitute, I 
suggest, the wider domestic context in which Jordanian citizenship operates. Of special 
significance is the role of the state in employing within the compact, the material (patronage and 
employment especially) and ideational (loyalty and family unity discourses) resources at its 
disposal. Doing so is important in highlighting how citizenship may be used as a vehicle for radical 
alterations to the Kingdom’s political architecture as evidenced during the 1950s in the lead up to 
the 1957/58 crisis, or as a linchpin in the shackling of political subjectivity, reducing its agential 
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properties. My objective is not to supply the reader a holistic summary of the Kingdom’s history, 
but to highlight those moments and events that are, essential in grasping the development of 
Jordan’s citizenship regime.  
 
Part two: Citizenship in Contemporary Jordan, containing chapters four, and five. Chapter 
four, which makes use of fieldwork conducted in Jordan, uses contemporary reflections on 
Jordanian citizenship from Jordanians as a lens through which the first decade of Abdullah II’s 
reign is analysed. Both economic and political decisions are analysed in order to highlight a key 
characteristic of citizenship’s theory and practice: the absence of accountability and ownership. I 
assert that the acceleration of economic liberalisation alongside a deceleration of political 
liberalisation since Abdullah II’s ascension has had a significant impact on the political 
subjectivity of Jordanian citizenship. The consequences of which, are examined in chapter five’s 
engagement with the Jordanian experience of the 2011/2012 uprisings. It is argued that these 
events were part of a citizen search for both ownership through a greater role in decision-making, 
and a subsequent increase in the accountability of decision-makers to them as citizens. This is 
contrasted with the first five discussion papers of the King. Published between 2012 and 2016, the 
discussion papers contain the King’s thoughts on citizenship and the role of citizens in the post-
2011 reform era. Revealed is a consistent theme of absolving present political arrangements in the 
Kingdom that have produced the existing citizenship regime, while calling on citizens to be more 
active in the formal political process.   
 
Part three: Practices Within and Between Jinsiyyah and Muwātanah, is composed of 
chapters six, seven and eight, with a focus on contemporary affairs in the Jordan of King Abdullah 
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II. Chapter six coalesces around the gendering of citizenship in the Kingdom. Through the case of 
the ‘My Mother is Jordanian and Her Citizenship is My Right’ campaign, I demonstrate that the 
patriarchal structuring of citizenship has implicit and explicit ramifications on the practice of 
citizens. Specifically, the inability of Jordanian mothers married to foreign men to transfer their 
citizenship to their children automatically. The chapter reveals the complexity of citizenship and 
its relation with national identity/s inasmuch as the prime sticking point is not gender so much as 
apprehensions about further increasing the numbers of Jordanian citizens with Palestinian origin. 
It therefore shows that the unevenness of citizenship affects the ability of citizens to hold decision-
makers accountable.  
 
Chapter seven meanwhile adopts a different approach to the problem of ownership and 
accountability. National unity as an element of citizenship becomes the chief focus with two 
discussions. The first of these centres on the assassination of Jordanian intellectual and writer 
Nahed Hattar in September 2016, with the analysis tracing the developments that led to the 
assassination on the steps of the Amman courthouse. These developments are framed with a 
parallel examination of the royal response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris in 2015, and 
Abdullah II’s sixth discussion paper which was released in the immediate aftermath of Hattar’s 
murder. The key objective is to highlight the duplicity in the Kingdom’s signalling. On the one 
hand, both the King and Queen marched with world leaders in support of freedom of expression, 
while on the other it is tightly curtailed at home.  
 
Part three closes with chapter eight, whose focus rests on the interconnections between 
tribal affiliation and citizenship as one of many identities held by Jordanians. It therein in a very 
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different way aims to depict how national identity when refract through each of these institutions 
produces results which may not in the long term be conducive to the establishment of a citizenship 
regime facilitative of democratisation. While tribalism remains a persistent feature of Jordanian 
domestic politics, the ability of a citizen to use their tribal identity to advance their interactions 
with the state, is becoming increasing tied to class, and the extent to which the state takes an 
economic interest in the citizen’s affairs. This is demonstrated by considering university violence 
on campuses across Jordan and the aftermath of the 206 elections in the Badia al-Wasat (central 
Bedouin District). 
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Chapter One  
 
1. Citizenship in the Study of Jordanian Politics: The Ubiquitous Absence? 
 
‘Maupassant often lunched at the restaurant in the Tower, though he didn’t care much 
for the food: “it’s the only place in Paris”, he used to say, “where I don’t have to see it”. 
And it’s true that you must take endless precautions, in Paris, not to see the Eiffel 
Tower’.53 
 
 
1.1. : Introduction 
 
Citizenship is an epistemological blind spot in the literature concerning contemporary Jordanian 
politics, especially with regards to studies examining the Kingdom’s democratic experience from 
1989 and the development of its national identity. But blind spot means more than simply 
unexplored. Illuminated via Barthes’ recollection of Maupassant’s dining habits, scholarly 
blindness towards citizenship, is chiefly a product of perspective in the writing about and 
knowledge production of political history. As an accepted rule, scholars must adopt a position 
from which to view her or his subject of inquiry, and subsequently, as Barthes shows, certain 
realities are revealed while simultaneously obscuring others. Following Edward Said, the act of 
critique is innately ‘situated’, angled towards illuminating ‘what situation, what historical and 
social configuration, what political interests’ are at play within a given subject of inquiry whether 
literary, disciplinary, scientific, epistemological, political, or otherwise.54  
 
What is lacking in these studies is recognition and subsequent action on the reality that 
citizenship is a contentious institution, and therefore is not one that can be easily assumed to have 
a particular universal character. Instead, citizenship is overwhelmingly perceived as being little 
                                                     
53 Roland Barthes, The Eiffel Tower, in Susan Sontag (ed.) A Barthes Reader (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 
236. 
54 Edward W. Said, The World, the Text and the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 26. 
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more than a status denoting an individual’s identification with a nation-state. This is not to be 
unexpected, given the discussion of the citizen/non-citizen nexus in international law above.  
Although it is not incorrect to identify citizenship in this way, to proceed no further carries with it 
at least two dilemmas. First, by not examining the substance of citizenship and its politics, scholars 
are neglecting an important component of the state-building enterprise. Second, the ability of 
scholars to more effectively understand the interplay between citizenship status, citizen rights, and 
duties is curtailed. Both of these points carry implications for the study of democratization and 
national identity. Regarding the former, the process of becoming democratic involves a transferal 
of decision-making from a centralized executive to the citizenry, either directly, or as is more 
common, indirectly through selected representatives. In essence citizen-subjects subjected to 
arbitrary authority of an individual or body of individuals, become subject to, on the one hand, a 
body of law that is applied equally to all, and on the other hand, to themselves owing to their 
collective role in the making of law. The nature of the relationship between state and citizens then 
is of indubitable importance in this process.  
 
While members of a citizenry might be told, or imagine that they and their fellows are 
equal, daily practices on the part of individuals may, whether or not intentional, undermine the 
possibility of citizen equality.55 The function of wasta in Jordanian society and politics is an 
example of how an individual’s pursuit of personal goals can undermine, by way of kin and class 
connections, trust in institutions and due processes.56 Consequently, citizens and the substance of 
their citizenship, is of existential significance to the feasibility of democratization. A similar 
dynamic emerges in work of scholars focused on nationalism and the question of Jordanian 
national identity. Here however, the issue is how the category of national is conflated with that of 
citizen, and in so doing, obscures the emergence of a more complete picture of how identities and 
interests intersect with existing institutional arrangements. It renders more problematic the task of 
acknowledging, following Kamal Sadiq, that the relative strength of citizenship as an institution 
                                                     
55 Jonathan Havencroft, Captives of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 171. 
56 Discussed in chapter four. For a broad study on the subject see Aseel al-Ramahi, ‘Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct 
Feature of (And Benefit for) Middle Eastern Society’, Arab Law Quarterly 22:1 (2008): 35-62; on a more localised 
and personal level, Jordanian-Palestinian journalist Farah Maraqa recalls discrimination from university professors 
because of her Palestinian origins. (Journalist with Rai al-Youm) interview with the author, Amman, September 11, 
2016. 
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influences the state’s ability to subsume competing identities within a plural political community.57 
His examination of citizenship regimes in India, Pakistan and Malaysia has also demonstrated the 
converse, that when an overarching concept of citizenship is ‘thin’, dominant national narratives 
subsume citizenship.58 
 
 
1.2. : Citizenship & National Identity 
 
When it comes to citizenship and national identity in the study of Jordanian politics, two key 
related observations can be made. Firstly, when compared with national identity, citizenship is a 
peripheral subject of inquiry that is subsumed within national identity itself. More studies have 
been composed on the questions of national identity in Jordan than citizenship. However, 
citizenship as an analogy is ubiquitous because it is impossible to speak of state-based political 
communities without referring to citizens. As such, citizenship is utilized overwhelmingly as a 
status referring to the association or connection between individuals and the nation-state in which 
they reside, and are legally tied. Subsequently, it is assumed to possess a universal face, whose 
features are not dramatically altered according to the various socio-political contexts in which it is 
developed, understood, and practiced. 
 
Our second observation is the frequency with which scholars and analysts interchange 
citizen with national on the basis of their mutual existence within the nation-state. On one level 
this conflation is natural, but means that in the sphere of academic enterprise, uncritically swapping 
between the two concepts is problematic if accepting Benedict Anderson’s analogy of the nation 
as an imagined community. To be a national by extension is fundamentally an act of the imaginary. 
Citizenship however is not an imagined concept, but is rather based at the very least in legal 
stipulations. To be a citizen (as I claim in detail in chapter two) is not, ergo, above all else, an act 
of imagination. 
 
                                                     
57 Kamal Sadiq, Paper Citizens, p. 17. 
58 Ibid, pp. 19-21. 
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To begin with, there are a number of studies which coalesce around national ideologies and 
their construction by the Hashemite monarchs. In doing so, they in their distinct manner enunciate 
the top-down production and dissemination of the nation onto the population at large. Alexander 
Bligh is explicit in asserting that Jordan’s ‘laboratory approach’ to national ideology formulation 
was ‘imposed from above by the king as a necessary tool in creating cohesion and a center of 
identity among his own citizens’.59 Adnan Abu Odeh by contrast, argues it is far more complex 
than this, because East-Bank or Trans-Jordanian nationalism is not diametrically tied to the 
interests of the Hashemite project.60 Calling into question Bligh’s selection of what he calls the 
‘strategic junctures’ of Jordan’s history.61 A triumvirate stand out: the ‘mutual alienation’ between 
the regime and so-called ‘West Bankers’ after 1963; the necessity for the regime to construct ‘a 
coherent national ideology as the basis for the East Bankers to be united for further challenges’; 
and the changing geopolitics of Palestinian representation; especially concerning the Arab 
League’s sanctioning of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people after the 1974 
Rabat summit.62 
 
All of these strategic windows were open from the 1960s onwards, and reflect Bligh’s 
positioning of the 1960s as the critical decade in the evolution of Jordanian nationalism. 
Essentially, the unionist model of Jordan including Palestine came under existential threat from 
the emerging Palestinian nationalism represented by the PLO.63 Thus attention needed to be 
pivoted towards a national narrative spatially situated on the East-Bank. ‘The main motive’ 
overwhelmingly therefore underpinning the development of Jordanian national identity, ‘has been 
the acute need to define relations between the East Bank and its citizens, and the West Bank lost 
to Israel in 1967’.64 An implication being that had there been no Israeli occupation of the Western 
side of the Jordan River post-1967, the imperative would not have existed to re-model Jordanian 
identity. Conspicuous is the absence of non-Hashemite voices and narratives in the construction 
                                                     
59 Alexander Bligh, The Political Legacy of King Hussein, pp. 5 and 75 
60 Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process 
(Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), pp. 13-24. 
61 Alexander Bligh, The Political Legacy of King Hussein, p. 4. 
62 Ibid, p. 73. 
63 Ibid, p. 75. 
64 Ibid. 
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of national identity, marking an epistemological, not to mention historical blind-spotting, of non-
Hashemite local discourses.65    
 
Instead, the entire enterprise appears innately Hashemite without any substantial input from 
East Banker identification with their land and patterns of life. This is not to deny the centrality of 
Hashemite identity making, but rather is meant to highlight that although it is important, it is not 
the only significant voice. Some, including Abu Odeh respond with a triangulate focus on the 
relationships between Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian national narratives.66 Marc Lynch provides 
another, demonstrating that following Hussein’s 1988 decision to disengage from the West Bank, 
the Jordanian public sphere began in-earnest a process of debate over the essence of Jordanian 
nationality. Although both Bligh and Lynch emphasise the role of Hussein in managing this 
evolution, the former’s nucleus of attention restricts him to the period of martial law, whereas the 
latter’s appraisal considers the post-martial law dynamism of the 1990s. A more dialogic process 
is revealed. Lynch’s study argues against rationalist analogies of Jordanian politics, arguing they 
do not possess the conceptual depth required to illuminate the multifaceted dynamics of Jordanian 
politics specifically and Arab politics more generally.67 A manifestation of this is the conventional 
assumption that King Hussein’s decision making was impervious to domestic political forces.  
 
By contrast, he challenges this position, or at least contextualises it within the public 
sphere.68 For our present purposes then, what is the role of citizenship as opposed to nationality in 
this milieu? Neither Lynch nor Abu Odeh expend time ruminating on this question, but conflate 
terms including citizen, Jordanian, and actor. Conflation is similarly evident in Betty Anderson’s 
Nationalist Voices in Jordan. With less of emphasis on regional strategic factors, or national-
international distillations via public spheres, and more on the internal production of the narrative 
of the nation, Anderson does not repudiate the top-down essence of the national project. She argues 
that ‘the lesson to be learned is that Jordan could not exist without the Hashemites’.69 Yet the 
subtle, and perhaps paradoxical, caveat to this is that while the ‘Arab street’ performs ‘no role’ in 
                                                     
65 Tariq Tell, The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan provides a thorough repudiation of this. 
66 Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, p. 
271. 
67 Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres, p. 4.  
68 Ibid, p. 21. 
69 Betty S. Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan, p. 2. 
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the story of Jordan’s development, it nevertheless is ‘precisely this ‘Arab street’ that holds a key 
to understanding’ both Jordan and the wider Mashriq.70 
 
At the heart of this argument is the role of education, with the rationale being twofold. On 
the one hand, in order to make the concept of the nation-state acceptable to Kings Abdullah I, Talal 
and Hussein, they needed ‘to manufacture institutions and a narrative inextricably connecting 
Jordanians to a state ruled by them’.71 As Gramsci notes, education functions to disseminate 
narratives and the hegemony required to maintain them. He posits that all relationships of 
‘hegemony’ are innately educational in nature.72 Thus Anderson refers to how textbooks developed 
under the reigns of Abdullah I and Hussein instructed students ‘to look to Kings ‘Abdullah and 
Husayn as the generators of state largesse; to thank ‘Abdullah and Husayn for protecting the rights 
of Palestinians; and to reward ‘Abdullah and Husayn with their loyalty’.73 Hence, similar with 
Andrew Shryock, Anderson advances the idea that the Jordanian Hashemite state is predicated on 
a ‘dynastic modernism’ which sees the reigning monarch developing and sustaining particular 
relations with the various constituencies in the Kingdom;74 that is to say, a relationship on a 
collective rather than individual or legal basis. It does not seem too surprising then that the 
Constitution should lay stress on the family rather than the individual citizen as the foundation of 
Jordanian society. A further point needs to be made here on the conflation between the state and 
the individual of the King, encouraging the idea that the Hashemites, embodied in the form of the 
monarch, are Jordan, thus when Jordanians give loyalty to the King they give it simultaneously to 
the state. Conversely one cannot be loyal to the state or the country without giving loyalty to the 
monarch. 
 
Success in sustaining this arrangement, suggests Anderson, is determinant upon the ability 
of the Hashemite monarchs to fulfil the needs of ‘a population that has demanded that its concerns 
be addressed. Jordan was not a blank slate in 1921, and the Hashemites succeeded because they 
                                                     
70 Ibid, p. 8. 
71 Betty S. Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan, p. 2. 
72 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell-Smith 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), p. 350. 
73 Betty S. Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan, p. 2. 
74 Andrew Shryock, ‘Dynastic Modernism and its Contradictions’. 
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recognized that’.75 An interesting question emerges here: what is this population? Anderson is 
right to subtly connote that it is not the entire population that is ‘behind’ the monarchy, but little 
of her analysis actively addresses what sectors are, or are not. Furthermore, has this population of 
supporters changed in the intervening years, and if so has the regime adapted its tactics and strategy 
accordingly? These are not insignificant when one considers that the exact nature and method of 
any transferal of loyalty referred to above, will foreseeably depend on the communities involved 
and their own specificities with regard to their attachment to Jordanian territory on the one hand, 
and the Hashemite monarchy on the other. Hence differences emerge not only between generalized 
categories of the population including tribes, Jordanians of Palestinian origin, Chechens and 
religious minorities, but equally within them as well. Without defining citizenship, Bligh, Lynch, 
Abu Odeh, and Anderson use the term to refer vaguely to a population of inhabitants. 
Subsequently, they appear fixated on the idea that Jordanians are Jordanians because of their 
identification with an ideological construct that facilitates the establishment of a Jordanian nation. 
In order to draw out the implications of this it is relevant to think of the nation-state as a two part 
equation.  
 
The nation constitutes a collective body of people linked by an ideology that is sufficient 
enough to render the expanded ‘imagined community’ legitimate in the minds of the majority of 
members. The state is the institution through which the nation, first, organises itself on the 
domestic level via institutions and law; second, institutionalises the national into this system, 
creating the scaffold of citizenship; and third, represents itself and participates with other nations 
in the international sphere. Therefore, you can have nations without states and states without 
nations dependent on one’s definition. Subsequently, and despite the difficulty, there is a need to 
epistemologically separate citizenship from nationality. This is no easy task. Massad highlights, 
Jordanian law positions the two as a dyad ‘imbricated in each other so much that a person cannot 
inhabit one without inhabiting the other’.76 His 2001 study Colonial Effects: the Making of 
National Identity in Jordan examines the constitutive role of the law and the military in the 
structure of the Jordanian state and the ideology of Jordanian nationalism. They are therefore 
implicated in the construction and persistence of this dyad. His interest in these two pillars is 
                                                     
75 Betty S. Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan, p. 205. 
76 Joseph A. Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001), p. 44. 
  
33 
 
influenced by their instrumentality to imperial powers, and later, post-colonial ruling elites, as 
mechanisms of control and domination.  
 
These two institutions, their evolution and manipulation at the hands of ruling elites have 
a resonating impact, not only in terms of their structuring effects, which Massad with a fecund turn 
of phrase refers to as elasticising the nation.77 But furthermore, institutions shape the parameters 
of the collective imaginary in the colonial/imperial state, and therefore contribute to the shape of 
political organisation of the successor state.78 Achile Mbembe’s remarks bring us back to 
citizenship as an institution capable of framing individual and collective imaginary. Yet, 
enunciating in a direct manner, links or relationships between national identity and citizenship 
remain rare in the Jordanian context. Stefanie Nanes’ provides a much-needed intervention into 
this scholarly blackspot, illuminating the importance of linkages between competing narratives of 
national identity and the practice of citizenship. Writing almost ten years after the ascension of 
Abdullah II, she argues that citizenship resides at the centre of domestic contestation in the 
Kingdom, claiming ‘Jordan struggles to adjudicate between the competing demands of national 
identity and the universal equality embodied in the modern concept of citizenship’.79 Her 
connection is made possible via her definition of citizenship entailing: 
 
‘Passive and active membership of individuals in a nation-state with certain universalistic 
rights and obligations at a specified level of equality […] Individuals, not groups, bear 
citizenship. But individuals can only realize their citizenship as a member of a group. 
Currently, the nation is the primary identity group through which individuals can realize 
their citizenship’.80 
 
Extrapolating from this, the nation appears as the field on which the game of citizenship is 
played, determining and influencing among other things, the contours of the game, who, and how 
many can be involved. Correspondingly, ‘the ‘nation’ aspect makes identity, individual and group 
                                                     
77 Ibid, pp. 222-278. 
78 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (London: University of California Press, 2001), p. 43. 
79 Stefanie Nanes, ‘Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot: Citizenship and National Identity in Jordan’, Nationalism 
and Ethnic Politics 14:1 (2008), p. 86. 
80 Ibid, p. 94. 
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level, central to citizenship’.81 Indeed as Massad reflects, an exclusivist citizenship regime has 
been an important mechanism in delineating between Jordanian and Palestinian nationalisms on 
the East Bank in the decades following 1948.82 Yet at the same time, citizenship as a legal tool 
simultaneously served the Hashemite kings in laying the foundation of a nominally level citizen 
order in which all regardless of origin or socio-economic position had to equally recognise the 
supremacy of the reigning monarch. This is not the same however, as these same citizens being 
equal to each other by virtual of a shared subjection to political authority. Therein it becomes 
possible to manipulate the citizenship order without altering the letter of the law. Developments in 
electoral dynamics following the 1988 administrative disengagement from the West Bank are 
demonstrative. Prior to disengagement, parliamentary seats and electoral districts were divided 
between both banks, as befitting both the constitutionally sanctioned borders of the state and the 
specifications of who is recognised as a citizen in the Nationality Law of 1954. With administrative 
disengagement the districts and associated seats were removed from the West Bank and 
reapportioned on the East Bank. Yet, neither the constitutionally recognised borders (dated from 
1950 when Jordan controlled the West Bank), or the Nationality Law were amended.  
 
Thus after disengagement, the West Bank remained part of the Jordanian Hashemite 
Kingdom, and many of the territory’s residents would arguably count as members of the 
Kingdom’s citizenry. Subsequent moves to ‘denationalize’ Jordanians of Palestinian origin 
residing in the West Bank, including the removal of parliamentary representation are technically 
illegal.83 Hence, while for ease of comprehension, it is logical to draw distinctions between 
Palestinian and Jordanian nationalisms when discussing citizenship, the changing character and 
relationships between them needs to be kept at the forefront. ‘The lesson’, Abu Odeh reminds us, 
‘from the eight-decade tragic experience’, is that the nationalisms, including the Israeli variant, 
‘are locked in a symbiotic relationship’.84 Nanes meanwhile distils the pre-eminent identities into 
two main narratives, one, a closed, unitary and cultural Trans-Jordanian nationalist vision, and the 
other, a pluralist and contractual one. For the first of the two identities, Jordanian and Palestinian 
                                                     
81 Ibid, p. 94. 
82 Joseph A. Massad, Colonial Effects, p. 222. 
83 Ibid, pp. 261-262. 
84 Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, p. 
272. 
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categories are taken as ‘exclusive of each other’. Leading Nanes to argue that the essential problem 
is the presence of ‘too many (disloyal) Palestinians in Jordan’, facilitating a corresponding 
‘crowding out of the original Jordanian nation’.85 Adherents of the plural narrative contrastingly 
do not conceive of demography in such problematic terms, instead locating the locus of 
contestation in the existence of a ‘discriminatory state’ and a subsequent dearth of citizen 
equality.86 
 
The image of contention that emerges from her analysis, builds on the perspective of 
Hudson, whose own reflection on Jordan’s legitimacy deficient more than thirty years prior 
emphasised the problem in political rather than social terms.87 Where Nanes’ approach diverges 
from her predecessors is in her treatment of the issue as one of citizenship, just as much national 
identity. A point raised perfunctorily by Abu Odeh observing that by granting citizenship to 
Palestinians in 1950, Jordan had proceeded ‘halfway’ towards ‘absorbing them’ into the fabric of 
the Jordanian political community.88 A more thorough illumination of the normative elements is 
necessary here. Nanes argument contextualises citizen practices within a Jordanian public sphere 
shaped, by three conceptual mechanisms: choice, the melting pot and loyalty.89 For hard 
nationalists subscribing to an exclusivist Trans-Jordanian vision, there is only one choice for 
determining loyalty. Citizens in order to be recognised as loyal must adhere to the prevailing 
national narrative. This naturally contrasts with the view of pluralists, who argue citizens can be 
loyal to the state while holding numerous identities including national identities.90 
 
Both therein have a similar perspective on the role of choice and the importance of loyalty, 
with differences, revolving around the concept of the melting pot. Rhetoric from Trans-Jordanian 
nationalists, argues Nanes, conveys a view of history in which ‘Jordan was a melting pot until 
1948, when Palestinians caused it to overflow’.91 Prior to this point in time, the melting pot was 
able to absorb the territory’s multi-religious, multi-ethnic (Chechen, Circassian, Muslim, Christian 
                                                     
85 Stefanie Nanes, ‘Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot’, pp. 96-97. 
86 Ibid, pp. 96-97. 
87 Michael Hudson, Arab Politics, p. 216. 
88 Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, p. 
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etc.) populations, who for their part acquiesced to becoming “Jordanized”.92 The more flexible 
pluralist position rejects this narrative, advancing instead that the melting pot is still in existence, 
and has continued to absorb additional populations, most recently at Nanes’ time of publication, 
Iraqi refugees. Referring to the constitution pluralists including Oraib al-Rantawi and Mohamed 
Husseiny, argue that citizen status is based in law, and thus is neutral with regard to national 
narratives providing it is applied in the spirit with which it was written.93 Law then acts as the 
guarantor of the melting pot irrespective of additional identities.  
 
Her strengths notwithstanding, there are two central limits to Nanes’ analysis. Firstly, at no 
point in her discussion does she address the watan al-badil (the alternative homeland) concept. As 
a political idea, the analogy’s fundamental premise is that because the East Bank initially formed 
part of the British Mandate of Palestine; and because of demographic realities east of the Jordan 
River post-1948, the Kingdom of Jordan is in actually Palestine. Precluding any need for 
Palestinians to liberate any territory occupied or controlled by Israel.94 In the absence of this, and 
the wider Israeli factor from her argument, Trans-Jordanian nationalism, which is itself a broader 
train of thought than Nanes gives credit to, appears paranoia at worst or purely material at best. By 
material I am referring to concerns held by many Jordanians about the evolving nature of the 
Hashemite Compact in its interaction with neoliberal economic policies and governmentality. On 
this basis, it becomes possible to argue that comprehensive ‘moves towards equal treatment of all 
Jordanian citizens threatens the privileged political position of Transjordanians, who feel that as 
the original Jordanians the state belongs to them’;95 without any recognition that there is a 
concomitant, larger regional game at play. This is brought to light in the Manifesto of the National 
Committee for Retired Army Personnel. Published in 2010, the document disseminated in the 
Jordanian media makes six stipulations concerning the threat posed by Israel to the existence of 
Jordan in the form of the alternative homeland doctrine.96  
                                                     
92 Ibid, p. 100. 
93 Oreib al-Rantawi (Director al-Quds Center for Political Studies) interview with the author, Amman, September 
19, 2016; and Mohammed Husseiny (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development) interview with the 
author, Amman, September 29, 2016. 
94 Historically, the Revisionist Zionism of Revisionist Party founder Vladimir Jabotinsky in the 1920s laid the 
foundation for the watan al-badil in Zionist, latter Israeli political circles. See discussion on revisionist Zionism in 
Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 6th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2007), pp. 122-123. 
95 Stefanie Nanes, ‘Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot’, p. 92. 
96 National Committee for Retired Army Personnel, ‘Statement on Defending State, Identity against Israel's 
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Owing to international (especially from the United States) and regional (Israel and 
increasingly the Gulf States) pressures, the authors argue ‘the Jordanian Kingdom now faces 
concerted pressure to bestow citizenship on all Palestinians within its borders, which would in 
effect create an alternative Palestinian homeland on the East Bank’.97 In terms of where this 
intersects with Nanes, the Manifesto conveys ‘the root cause’ of successive government weakness 
in combating the encroaching threat to reside ‘in the policies of privatization and the liquidation 
of the public sector that have been pursued in the last decade, and that have led to the growing 
power of business interests and those who truck in corruption and shady financial dealings’.98 In 
other words they frame governmental support levels for the private and public sectors not in terms 
of ethnicity but class. Although Nanes invokes class, it nevertheless remains peripheral in the face 
of identity politics. 
 
The second limitation concerns her understanding and application of citizenship. To 
reiterate, it is proposed that to be a citizen ‘entails both active and passive membership’ with a 
corresponding mutual set of demands for both ‘participation and compliance’ in a context of rights 
and obligations.99 Her rendition is thus situated squarely in the canon of modern citizenship 
developed from the foundation set by T.H. Marshall. Yet as citizenship and its associated politics 
are established, negotiated and contested in Arabic, it cannot be automatically assumed that it will 
possess the same history and qualities of citizenship as expressed in English via its European 
heritage (Greek, Latin and French in-particular). 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=7683#.WhNenFWWaUm (accessed November 21, 2017). Owing 
to its publication date, we are not criticising Nanes for failing to reference the Manifesto, but rather suggest that the 
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1.3 : Democratisation Part I The Liberal Window? 
 
King Hussein’s decision in 1989 to initiate a dual program of political and economic liberalization 
has in the years since, resulted a flurry of analytical productions coalescing around democracy, 
democratization, civil society, the analogy of the nation, and idea of the state. Many of which as I 
elaborate below are snapshots from the standpoint of power, and therefore at best give a mere 
peripheral glance towards citizens and citizenship. Accordingly, they share a bias towards 
monarchical agency. Such is concerning given that in a post-colonial state context, citizenship 
‘emerges as a key category, a hinge that connects the state and society’.100 Valerie Yorke provides 
an early illustration of this approach. Arguing that the socio-economic crises of the mid-1980s 
constituted the end of an era and the subsequent dawning of a new political order, she writes that 
the late King Hussein’s objective was to ‘buttress Hashemite legitimacy and to consolidate the 
state, through developing Jordan's political structure and thus encouraging popular identification 
with the state’.101  
 
Significantly, this process did not seem to include a reforming of the relationship between 
the individual and the state, reflected in the identification of Jordanians as subjects rather than 
citizens. In articulating Hussein’s objective in terms of developing a ‘new partnership with his 
subjects’,102 Yorke elucidated the prevailing perspective, of the nature of Jordan’s political order, 
as one characterised pre-eminently by a seemingly in all but name absolute monarch. Whose 
control of executive functions enabled an actualised lording over the lives of his subjects, whose 
relationship to him, and more critically to each other, is typified by a vertical relation to power. At 
the same time, she does outline that the new partnership in question ‘would be based on a new 
political balance’ that would see a return to the 1952 constitution, that in return, would guarantee 
the continuation of Hashemite rule.103 Two conceptions regarding political order are observable 
here. One is the personal order shaped by the monarch’s possession of his subjects, denoting a 
vertical hierarchy of relationship and power between the ruler and the ruled. The second is 
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altogether more institutional and therefore less personalised in nature, referring to the desire of 
Jordanians to see their country’s political system re-ordered in alignment with the Constitution.  
 
This is important in entailing a shift from the former (personal) to the latter (institutional). 
The Constitution is deeply respected by political and civil society actors and activists in Jordan, 
who recognise that it contains of a broad spectrum of rights that are accessible through their status 
as citizens not as subjects.104 Simultaneously there is an acknowledgment that the application of 
these rights does not meet the stipulations of the Constitution.105 The practice citizenship by the 
state, its meeting of obligations to citizens, is therefore incomplete. It may be said that this is the 
result of a regime determined to maintain Jordanian subject-hood at the expense of citizenship. 
Such is lost to Yorke because her top-heavy approach does not provide necessary space for 
citizenship and citizens to be discussed. Consequently the more profound and interesting 
characteristic of her so-called new political order: the evolution of the citizenry in an era of 
globalisation – is absent. 
 
Similarly Rex Brynen in an influential 1992 essay provides a limited, although more 
enlightening, top-heavy examination of citizenship. He begins with a distinction between political 
development in rentier and non-rentier states. In the latter he argues with reference to so-called 
Western experience, that the institutions and practices of liberal democracy evolved ‘in struggles 
of citizens and social classes against the extractive power of the state’.106 He then proceeds to 
assert how in a rentier context, class emergence capable of such action did not emerge as an 
outcome of socio-economic development.107 The chief reason for this concerns the nature of the 
social contract in each of the dichotomous examples, and the subsequent logic that differences 
between them will induce different forms of political relationships. The social contract in the 
rentier context in essence stipulates that ‘the state is expected to provide a certain level of economic 
security, in exchange for which society grants state leaders considerable political autonomy’.108 
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Therefore citizenship in such circumstances has an innate economic significance, constituting ‘the 
most important economic resource’ of the individual citizen.109  
 
Changes in the capacity of the state to provide economic benefits will subsequently call 
into question the social contract. However despite referencing emergence of a post-rentier order 
in Jordan, Brynen pays little attention to how this could evolve both in terms of citizen-to-citizen 
and citizen-to-state relations. Similar with Yorke, he enunciates an image of a monarchical regime 
that is determined to maintain the fundamentals of the old rentier-based order in a period of 
uncertainty and transition. Besides demanding economic assurances, the citizenry appears to have 
few specifically political objectives. Although Brynen goes further than Yorke in elucidating the 
character of citizenship, his argumentation suffers from the absence of any in-depth discussion 
regarding what citizenship means in theory and in practice. It therein emerges as little more than a 
status, and a passive one at that, through which individuals enter through the door of the state in 
order to access benefits; with the trade-off being a relative absence from political life and more 
importantly, decision-making. Ruling elites therefore appear able to exercise autonomy in 
governing according to their interests, and transparency, accountability and active citizen 
participation in government not being part of the bargain.  
 
Yorke and Brynen are primarily concerned with capturing the essentials of the emerging 
new order and the requisites for democracy within states in the MENA generally and Jordan 
specifically. Beverly Milton-Edwards contrastingly, declares an interest in the typologies of 
democracy in the region, or more acutely the absence of them.110 This interest leads her to advance 
S.E. Finer’s conception of ‘façade democracy’,111 to Jordan’s political liberalisation post-1989. 
Through which, it is asserted that the fundamental power balance within the state’s institutions on 
the one hand, and between state and society on the other ‘remains unchanged’.112 So-called 
democratic reform accordingly is an elaborate smokescreen designed to impede, rather than 
expedite a new domestic political order. There is therefore for Milton-Edwards a necessity to 
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‘understand democratization’ as it appears in Jordan, in order to illuminate whether it will shift 
towards or away from Finer’s façade model.113 
 
Undisputedly, this is an endeavour deserving of analysis. Yet it is intriguing how little 
citizenship enters into the subsequent discussion despite the key research question being: ‘is a full 
liberal democracy on the agenda in Jordan or are the current reforms designed to strengthen and 
bolster the monarchy as the most important political institution in the kingdom?’114 Any movement 
towards liberal democracy would by definition entail a strengthening of citizen participation in the 
political system. To this end, although she spends time discussing the participation of major 
collectives including Islamists and Leftists; the more interesting observation is that the social facets 
of democratisation did not seem to be keeping pace with the political equivalents. Citizenship does 
not factor into the examination of these social facets. Instead emphasis is given to the Islamist 
movement as something of a cultural impediment to democratisation.115 The political community 
of citizens is thus divided into clusters of collective actors, and we are left to wonder what if 
anything exists and operates on the level below the collective actor. 
 
Comparable with façade democracy, Glen Robinson developed the analogy of ‘defensive 
democratization’ to better enunciate how political liberalisation may be used by rentier states as a 
pre-emptive strategy to maintain the status quo rather than alter it.116 Thus his study analogous to 
those previously examined is chiefly concerned with democratization as a top down process. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, he employs citizen as a category or status to refer to Jordanians, with no 
definition or theorising of the term provided.117 As in the previous cases this is a glaring absence 
if it is accepted that democracy will change according to context. How it will do so is shaped by 
the nature of state-society relations that influence, firstly the relationships between individuals 
associated with the nation-state (that is to say citizens); and second, the subsequent kinds of 
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collective mobilisations or repertoires available to citizens at any given time with which to pursue 
collective political agendas.  
 
But a focus away from these issues enables Robinson to situate defensive democratisation 
in the context of fiscal crises within ‘the state, not society’.118 That is to say that as a policy 
response, democratisation has little to do with citizens as political actors, and more to do with 
holding the winning coalition supporting the political status quo, together. This however I would 
argue, shares with other top down analyses, insufficient manoeuvrability in accounting for the 
reality that while democratisation or political liberalisation may be intended as a regime oriented 
solution to state crises, it may act as an unintended catalyst for societal changes that will inevitably 
impact the state. It is a question of perspective, of how analysis positioned in one location will 
illuminate certain dynamics at the expense of others. Robinson’s conclusion regarding the threat 
posed by the Wadi ‘Araba peace treaty with Israel to Jordan’s future democratic trajectory is 
illuminative. He posits that unless peace acts as a panacea to Jordan’s economic deficiencies, it 
will produce further disgruntlement and therein empower the Islamist movement in the 
Kingdom.119 
 
Interestingly, he links the rise of Islamism in Jordan not to increased religiosity, but to 
Palestinian identity and its place in the Kingdom. This identity is pitted against a parallel East-
Banker Jordanian identity, with a clear delineation made between the two. The element regarding 
these two identities that Robinson is at pains to emphasise is the inevitability of how ‘Palestinians 
in Jordan will be forced to choose in some significant ways between being ‘Jordanian’ and 
‘Palestinian’.120 The danger to social harmony this will cause is as follows, ‘to choose a 
fundamentally Palestinian identity will be to lose certain rights in Jordan’, and yet ‘to choose a 
fundamentally Jordanian identity will be to relinquish both national claims to Palestine and 
concomitant political activity’.121 Into this fragile ideational space, the significance of the Islamists 
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is that they, led by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, is the only political entity whose identity 
can overcome having to choose between attachment to Palestine to Jordan.122 
 
Nowhere in this examination is citizenship itself problematized and ruminated on. There is 
no discussion of how the construction of citizenship may be able to mitigate between competing 
elements of national narratives. The idea that national identity and citizenship are separate albeit 
connected is not considered. Assumptions are thus made about the identities of Jordanians to each 
other and to the state which do little to reveal the dynamics of the relationship between them. The 
top down perspective towards political liberalisation and its future trajectory then, obscures the 
agency of citizens, who appear to be little more than economic agents seeking maximum pay-off 
advantage from the state. Little reflection is therefore given to the notion that economic 
expectations might be directly related to expectations as to the role of the state itself, and by 
extension, to the kind of political subjectivity that is being produced and experienced via Jordanian 
citizenship.  
 
The importance of caution about relegating citizen political activity to the periphery is 
illuminated by Katherine Rath, who notes that even before independence, Jordanians took an active 
interest in shaping their political system, with the objective of establishing a space for 
representation and institutional accountability. The National Pact (Mithaq al-Watani) of 1928 is a 
case in point, reflecting the penchant for limits on monarchical control of the domestic political 
order, stating that parliamentary elections ought to be founded on the ‘true representation’ of the 
public, and enshrining political accountability as a principle of action.123 However it is equally 
important to recognise that during periods of economic prosperity, demands for the application of 
democratic possibilities entailed by the constitution, ‘were not widely voiced, and the popular 
pressure was not as strong as to create a serious problem for the leadership’.124  
 
When prosperity began to stagnate, unrest quickly emerged as evidenced by the uprisings 
in 1989. Though necessary to reflect on the economic demands raised by demonstrators in Karak, 
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Tafileh and Ma’an during 1989,125 it is critical to do so without neglecting the political nature of 
them and their advocates. The Karak Statement exemplifies this. The Statement, procured by the 
leaders of the Karak protests made a series of demands on the regime. Chiefly: the resignation of 
the Ziad al-Rifa‘i government, the establishment of a national government capable of being 
‘accountable and responsive to the demands of the people’, proceeding with free and fair elections, 
conducted under a new ‘modern and democratic’ electoral law; address corruption and be 
‘accountable’ for the ‘embezzlement of public funds’; cancel the enacted increases to fuel and 
commodity prices; and support at an official level the Palestinian Intifada and the ‘national rights’ 
of the Palestinian people.126 
 
The Karak Statement therefore appears reflective of Rath’s contention that Jordanians at 
the dawn of the 1990s felt they ‘had a right to participate’ in their country’s decision-making 
processes’.127 Importantly, the regime’s response plan contained a number of post-elections 
legislative changes that sought to delimit the influence of the Palace. For example, by 1990 the 
Mukhabarat’s (referred to formally as the General Intelligence Directorate or GID), practices of 
confiscating, withholding and certifying passport renewals, long undertaken during martial law 
were suspended.128 This should not be a surprise when taken in the context of the shifting nature 
of Jordanian society since independence, and the subsequent changing foundations of political 
legitimacy. To elaborate further, ‘the transformation of traditional society (Bedouin, tribal) to a 
modern society has entailed an erosion of the traditional base on which legitimacy of the 
Hashemite monarchy was founded’;129 necessitating the construction of new foundations of 
legitimacy. A considerable pillar of this legitimacy base was popular expectations regarding the 
moral economy of the state. Speaking of this, Robinson argues that material factors were more 
important as catalysts to the 1989 riots than questions of political participation.130   
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Axiomatically alterations to the economic outlook would produce political ramifications. 
Curtis Ryan is elucidative in this manner, noting that while the liberalisation program was enacted 
to address an economic crisis, it also ‘set off a corresponding political crisis’.131 That this crisis 
may have something to do with the substance (or the lack thereof) of citizenship in the Kingdom 
is not addressed directly. Instead, Ryan highlights the agency of the regime, stressing that from its 
then current location ‘at a crossroads’, it has ‘as least two paths to choose from’: the first ‘a return’ 
to the liberal democratic project, the existence of which has been eloquently critiqued by Milton-
Edwards and Robinson, and the other, being to persist in undermining the democratic opening.132 
Although true in-so-far as the regime did and does have agency, little reflection is given to citizen 
agency, or role at the crossroads. 
 
Yet, between the lines there is evidence of the role of citizenship as a factor of emerging 
significance. For illustration, Ryan reflects on the regime’s unwillingness to accept dissent from 
the public sphere in the wake of the 1994 Wadi ‘Araba peace treaty with Israel, labelling it an 
‘ominous’ sign for the future of political liberalisation.133 Dissent and public mobilisations 
attached with it threatened the regime’s control over steering the foreign (and in this instance 
simultaneously the domestic) policy trajectory of the country. Ryan eloquently makes the 
connection. It is possible however to proceed a step further, in order to ruminate on what a regime 
crack-down on a publically pronounced policy alternative signifies. Marc Lynch’s borrowing of 
Habermas’ public sphere theory is revealing at this juncture. Lynch argues that since the 1988 
disengagement with the West Bank, Jordan has experienced an inward turn in its public sphere, as 
debates, which in the preceding decades coalesced around Arabism and confrontation with Israel, 
began to revolve around questions of Jordanian national identity.134 
 
By public sphere Lynch is referring to ‘the site in which members of a society exchange 
justifications and arguments oriented toward establishing a political consensus’.135 It is therefore 
distinct from public opinion which ‘implies an external constraint’ that is not the product of public 
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deliberation, but rather is more of ‘an objectively existing quantity’.136 As an identifiable site of 
action, Lynch accepts Benhabib’s explication that ‘the public sphere comes into existence 
whenever and wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a 
practical discourse, evaluating their validity’.137 Several things about this comprehension of the 
public sphere are apparent. First it is a space which in order to function requires participants who 
are able to, through agency, voice political arguments. Second, these arguments should be diverse 
enough to produce the necessity for deliberation and contestation.  
 
It is in the process of back and forth debate, to borrow from Mansoor Moaddel, which gives 
the public sphere its validity and capacity to change identities and interests through the 
establishment of a societal consensus over a given issue.138 Third, the notion of societal consensus 
refers not to a ‘fully hegemonic discourse’, but to a situation in which the participants are accepting 
of an outcome reached via ‘legitimate procedures’.139 It does not mean that debate and 
disagreement did not occur, but rather, that society at large accepted decisions made in their best 
interests. Fourth, the participants involved must belong to a society, not necessarily a nation-
state.140 Resultantly citizens and citizenship, which are intimately associated with the construct of 
the nation-state, are not central analytical frames to Lynch’s study. On the one hand this is 
understandable given that each level of public sphere (sub-state, state, transnational etc.) ought not 
to be conceived of as distinct and autonomous, but as interconnected. Yet on the other hand, 
examining the contested nature of Jordanian national identity without factoring in citizenship as a 
form of identification tied innately to the Jordanian state risks overlooking the intersections 
between the two; of how national identities are not synonymous with citizenship in a basic sense 
of rights and obligations. 
 
The intersections between identity and citizenship are explored by the Jordanian writer 
Nahed Hattar, whose mid-1990s article ‘Who is a Jordanian?’ (Min Huwe Urduni?), is an 
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exemplary and controversial illustration. In the article, Hattar observes the fluid nature of 
Jordanian identity, commenting that who is considered a Jordanian seems to change, whereas the 
regime remains the same;141 indicative of the manipulation of identities and institutionalised 
relations by the regime in ways expedient for its survival. The union of the two banks, and its 
peoples both Palestinian and East Banker, once proclaimed as an indivisible foundation of the 
kingdom since 1950, was now shown to be dispensable. This policy divergence from prevailing 
convention has, as Anis Kassim affirms, the question citizenship at its core, equally as much as 
more abstract notions of national identity.142 If the now formerly Jordanian citizens of Palestinian 
origin residing on the West Bank could overnight become Palestinians without any citizenship, 
argues Hattar, could not similar manifest itself on the East Bank?  
 
That king Hussein felt compelled to pen a rebuke of Hattar’s argumentation highlights the 
contentious nature of these discussions generally, and Hattar’s article specifically. It is in 
illuminating the realities of the contested natures of Jordanian identities, and their place in wider 
regional debates regarding pan-Arabism that the value of Lynch’s exegesis is readily apparent. 
Critically, these were, and are not mere abstract occurrences, but taken in the context of Jordan’s 
political and economic liberalisation process are seismic as catalysts for changing perspectives and 
expectations. To quote Ryan: 
 
‘The IMF economic adjustment programme again became a source of tension in August 
1996 when the government dropped its long-standing bread subsidy, triggering riots from 
the south of Jordan to some neighbourhoods of Amman itself. As the smoke cleared, both 
government and opposition retrenched and if anything the gap between them had become 
wider. But the 1996 'bread riots' were not just about bread. Rather, they signalled public 
anger over a host of issues that did not disappear once the overt political unrest had been 
quelled by the Jordanian army. These issues included disillusionment with the Jordanian 
economy, with normalized relations with Israel, and with the political liberalization 
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process itself. Yet four years of political opposition in parliament had not managed to 
change the regime's stances on any of these large policy issues’.143 
 
In other words, Jordanians could see that the decision-making process had not changed 
despite the opening provided by improved representational politics. As Ryan denotes bread alone 
was not the sole issue at stake, but the status of Jordanians as citizens was as well. The regime’s 
unwillingness to accept the principle of uncertainty in its democratic experiment indicates an 
attempt to keep the population disengaged from politics as citizens, and instead encourage 
participation through other forms of identity, specifically that generated by kinship/tribal 
affiliation. The 1992 changes to the Electoral Law, rescinding the principle of multiple votes, and 
instituting the Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV), is one example. 
 
This process is arguably most perspicaciously described by Jordanian historian Ali 
Maḥāfẓah as ‘restrained democracy’ (al-Dimuqratiyyah al-Muqayyidah). In his treatise of the 
same name, the first decade of Jordan’s democratic opening is examined, and the state of the 
domestic economy towards the end of the 1980s is positioned as the key driving force behind 
Hussein’s decision to liberalise the political and economic spheres. He constructs a detailed 
argument regarding the question of why the democratic trajectory of the Kingdom was restricted. 
To this end, aside from structural economic challenges, Maḥāfẓah identifies five pre-eminent 
political challenges that impeded the development of democracy in the Kingdom: national unity; 
the absence of a separation of powers, with the Executive domineering over the Legislature and 
the Judiciary; corruption and weak institutional accountability; compounded by the weakness of 
political parties and civil society; and lastly, the challenge of implementing at a respect for Human 
Rights at a policy level.144 In so doing Maḥāfẓah does a better job than most in bringing some 
balance to bear on discussing the agency of the regime, and of various Jordanian communities 
responding to government policies and the frantic regional environment.   
 
The first of these challenges at once reveals the utility and limit of Maḥāfẓah’s analysis. 
On the one hand he explores the contention between national identities (Jordanian and Palestinian) 
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in a manner that is both practical and abstract, linking the battle of ideas to the continual blocking 
out of Jordanians of Palestinian origin from positions in the army, security apparatus and other 
state based institutions.145 On the other hand he does not necessarily see citizenship as being both 
a concept capable of restoring balance between these identities and a mechanism for the institution 
of Human Rights in the Kingdom. Among the first studies to suggest as much were Nils 
Butenschon, Uri Davis Uri and Manuel Hassassian Manuel’s volume Citizenship and the State in 
the Middle East: Approaches and Applications, and Suad Joseph’s Gender and Citizenship in the 
Middle East. Both published at the dawn of this century. With respect to the first of these, 
citizenship’s value to the twin processes of state and nation building resides in how its structure is 
implicated in the provision of rights and in the state’s very capacity ‘to create political loyalties 
and manage communal conflicts’.146  
 
This capacity is linked to the forms contractual relations between ruler and ruled take in a 
given political community, concerning which Butenschon refers to three: singular, plural and 
universal.147 A fundamental point, underscored in Bryan Turner’s chapter in the volume is ‘the 
triumph of gesellschaft over gemeinschaft’.148 By extension establishing a political community 
grounded on active citizenship ‘involves a civic culture within which there is a strong sense of 
moral obligation and commitment to society’.149 In light of the above discussion it takes little 
imagination to see the significance of Turner’s extrapolation for Jordan for the citizenship 
perspective invites us to meditate on what kind of society has been and is being fostered. The 
second study mentioned above, edited by Suad Joseph addresses a glaring deficiency in the state-
of-the-art: the gendering of citizenship. She therefore seeks to elucidate the privileging of the 
masculine citizen construction observable via seven planes: nation, state, religion, family, family 
law, the self and citizenship dialectic, and boundaries.150 Which again asks about what kind of 
society is being produced and reproduced. 
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Through these planes, a key contribution of her analysis is the illumination of consequences 
and implications. How the particular intersections of the seven produce certain results. For instance 
if states in the MENA ‘emerged less’ as a form of local class formations, than as an outcome of 
the collapse of empire,151 then assumptions grounded on models and historical experience from 
Anglo-European political theory, (including many of the above examined analyses!) should be put 
under the microscope. This is especially regarding divisions between the state and civil society, 
religious institutions, and kinship networks on the one hand, along with the corresponding 
distinction between public and private spheres on the other. The extent to which they are inter-
connected through laws, customs and norms will encourage particular modes of citizenship and 
ergo of political subjectivities.152 
 
  
1.4 : Democratisation Part II a Post-Democratic Turn? 
 
In part one, I revealed in a substantive way the manner by which democratisation studies and the 
theorists who produced them treated citizenship as a concept. Demonstrating how this ‘demo-
crazy’ literature conceived of citizenship as a given reality in political life, rarely if ever 
comprehending it as more than a status synonymous with being a national of a nation-state. With 
few exceptions they Followed the well-trodden trajectory of either orientalist, ethnographic, 
anthropological, political-economic, or rentier-state theoretic analyses of citizenship that all shared 
conceptual unity in the passivity of citizens.153 In the early part of the century scholars began to 
meditate more thoughtfully and consistently on the limitations of democratisation efforts in the 
MENA; the ‘demo-crazy’ tide had begun to recede. However what remained was a bias towards 
regime arranging of socio-political life.154 Wiktorowicz for example, investigating Jordanian civil 
society, argued that the spaces in which civil society organisations were able to legally function 
limited their opportunities to operate as conduits for opposition. Asserting that organisations once 
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established were ‘embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes’, allowing the 
security apparatus led by the Mukhabarat, to monitor their operations and where necessary 
regulate their activity and personnel.155  
 
Within such an environment it becomes increasingly difficult to see a top-down model of 
political liberalisation producing a democratic system in which power is recycled at regular 
intervals, whether liberal in philosophical underpinning or not. The question inevitably turned 
towards analysis of authoritarian resilience in the face of pressures to democratize.156 Recognising 
that the types of authoritarian governance being observed were not synonymous with previously 
developed typologies, scholars began to advance ideas of hybridized polities, exhibiting features 
of authoritarianism and democracy. New questions emerged concerning the specificities and 
commonalities of these systems.157 For Jordanian studies these trends emerged analogously. In the 
wake of the 2003 parliamentary elections, Curtis Ryan and Jillian Schwedler for instance labelled 
Jordan ‘a new kind of hybrid regime’ in which democratic language retains a normative 
significance even while the democratic window continued to close.158  
 
A series of studies from Ellen Lust on the opposition management strategies of King 
Hussein further developed these insights, assiduously illuminating how the adapting nature of the 
Hashemite regime has informed the formation of institutions, democratic or otherwise.159 This she 
ventures is brought about through ‘structures of contestation’ (SoC), which serve to ‘shape 
relations among different opposition groups, as well as between these groups and the 
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government’.160 Three models of SoC: ‘inclusive-unified’, ‘exclusive-unified and ‘divided’ 
predominate. In the first of these, all currents in society are able to participate in formal processes, 
notably elections, and their participation is closely monitored. Contrastingly, within an exclusive-
unified system, all collectives are barred from participation. Between these two, the divided SoC 
splits the opposition between those included and those excluded from formal participation.161 On 
a contextual level resultantly, regimes have the greater ability to construct and sustain because in 
a hybridized system, the locus of political authority remains fixed in the circles of the few at the 
expense of the many. In this way a Kingdom like Jordan can host regular elections – eight since 
1989 – and therefore make claims to be democratizing, while ensuring as much as possible that 
the security of the regime is not at stake.   
 
A central advantage of Lust’s SoC perspective is that is partially addresses why 
authoritarian regimes have been able to withstand external and internal pressures to loosen their 
constriction of politics. While it may be a readily logical assumption economic crises will by their 
nature increase the probability of instability and therefore precipitate reform; Lust advocates 
caution, pending examination of opposition – regime dynamics: 
 
‘In a divided environment moderates who previously challenged incumbent elites may 
choose not to continue to do so when radical groups join, even if incumbents have not 
accommodated their demands. In an undivided political environment opponents remain 
willing to mobilize as crises continue. Loyalists do not fear the inclusion of radicals in their 
unrest… Thus, as the probability of success increases in an undivided political 
environment, a moderate group that has previously challenged the government will 
continue to do so, regardless of the radicals' strategy’.162 
 
A corresponding limitation of the approach vis-a-vie citizenship however is that Jordan’s 
political community is conceptually divided into either: a regime pulling the strings, aggregated 
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organised collectives within the opposition, or disorganised ‘masses’.163 Under such notional 
circumstances, the agency of citizens is not taken into consideration nor the possibility for 
alternative forms of contestation given much thought. Nor is the connection made between the 
model of citizenship and the existence of these numerous disaggregated collective actors. Having 
said that, the search for alternatives is not a stated research agenda for Lust-Okar, and subsequently 
I am circumspect in offering this critique. Her work does demonstrate though, why the uprisings 
beginning in 2011 mark an epistemological turning point in the history of scholarly knowledge 
production on MENA politics. Precisely because insightful analyses of this sort could not at best, 
predict the events, and at worst, could not foresee a moment in time in which the ordered 
arrangements of politics in the states of the MENA could be brought asunder in such a profound 
manner. An under-considered variable it seems was the ability for citizens to mobilise and, no 
matter how fleetingly, aggregate their identities and interests outside of the formal sphere with the 
effect that they did.     
 
The shackled nature of democratic processes in Lust’s work gives rise to questions 
concerning the philosophical substance of democracy itself within an Arab context. In this respect, 
Larbi Sadiki’s the Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses, is nearly 
unrivalled in its philosophical scope and advocacy for a de-foundationalised understanding of 
democracy; one whereby ‘Arab understandings of democracy need no longer be grounded in 
Western foundations’.164 At stake, argues Sadiki is not only intra- and inter-state stability in the 
region, but more profoundly, the very capacity for the citizen to emerge and consolidate popularly 
constituted legitimacy as a form of governance. Overriding therefore, the conventions of 
aḥādiyyah (homogeny) and sulṭawiyyah (hegemony), that has pre-dominated since liberation 
movements ended direct external dominance.165 Expressed in another way, if democracy is to usher 
in an epoch of ‘active citizenship’ it must necessarily be detached from assumptions and 
expressions, whose historicity is particular to Anglo-European sites of political action.166 His 
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exegesis hence challenges assumptions in the literature either implicitly or explicitly championing 
the necessity for a liberal model of democracy in the region.  
 
Timothy Mitchell illustrates this perspective in the search for a ‘universal process of 
change’ capable of governing and guiding ‘the politics and history of non-Western regions, such 
as the process of development, democratization, globalization, or the introduction of free 
markets’.167 All of which have been nourished intellectually by liberalism, propelling the 
discussion into the territory of the politics of knowledge production. Concerning which Robert 
Bates has noted how MENA scholars in order to be more widely read are encouraged to fit their 
analyses within established consensuses and paradigms.168 Instead, Sadiki calls for a pivot from 
text to context and, from test to contest, in which, ‘the challenge’ for scholars, Arab democrats of 
all persuasions, and Islamists is for the two concepts of democracy and Islam to engage ‘each other 
in conjunction and not in disjunction’.169 While representing an intellectual peak, Sadiki’s voice is 
not a lone prophet in the wilderness. Lisa Anderson later argued via her own review of American 
political science literature on democratisation in the MENA, ‘the parochialism of American 
theories of democracy went largely unchallenged by “hard cases” while the dynamics of politics 
in the region went largely unexplained by applicable theory’.170  
 
Hence, by 2010 the momentum of the scholarly pendulum was already swinging towards 
post-democratisation and its implications before the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi 
changed the geopolitical face of the MENA.171 More than that however, Oliver Schlumberger 
makes a poignant reflection that not since Hudson has an inquiry into the nondemocratic sources 
of legitimacy in the Arab world been conducted in an ‘encompassing manner’.172 By this, he 
specifies four questions: who are the targets of claims to legitimacy, what are the possible and 
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actual sources of legitimacy in context, by what practices is a legitimate order achieved, and how 
is legitimacy to be measured?;173 therein bringing the discussion closer to citizenship. Questions 
of this nature suggest a shared opinion amongst scholars that perhaps after more than thirty years 
(variances between countries taken into account), of liberalization, the so-called fourth wave of 
post-Cold War democratic evolution was not going to materialize in a region which appeared to 
be locked in a de-politicised miasma to nowhere.174  
 
Yet it must be said at this juncture that a substantial portion of the literature under this 
umbrella, displayed a significant emphasis on regimes and the formal political sphere of 
institutions including elections, parliaments and, to a lesser extent, the military.175 It is perhaps for 
this reason, that scholars subscribing to a post-democratisation view of the region were just as 
surprised with the events of 2011 as everyone else; highlighting the perspective’s limitations. In-
particular myopia in overstating the resilience and adaptability of authoritarian regimes, coupled 
with neglect of political activity underway outside or at the margins of the formally 
institutionalised domestic political sphere.176 Into this environment valuable insights are to be 
garnered from political sociology. In-particular Asef Bayat has provided some much-needed 
counterbalance, illustrating the advantages of extending the notion of politics and what it means 
to be political into what he labels the everyday.177 
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Chapter Two 
 
2. What is Citizenship? 
  
‘Who is a citizen? And, whom should we call one? Here too there is no unanimity, no 
agreement’.178 
 
‘That which includes must by definition exclude’.179 
 
 
2.1 : Introduction 
When one encounters the analogies of citizenship and citizen in the literature concerning Jordanian 
politics specifically, and the region more generally, the encounter is dominated by assumptions as 
to what these designations mean in practice and theory. From the outset, this is problematic for 
three cardinal reasons. First, citizenship as it is comprehended in languages such as English and 
French, among others contains within it a dyad of rights and obligations, including the element 
that citizens partake in government. Despite the numerous shifts in political organisation from the 
period of classical Athens to our own time, citizenship traversed this space still clutching onto this 
attribute. An immediate question therefore is what assumptions underpin analyses of citizenship 
in the Arab world and Jordan specifically?  
 
Second, although citizenship and its plethora of associations situate themselves 
conveniently in English under a single rubric, the same cannot be said of its counterpart(s) in 
Arabic. In contemporary discourse two words are used in reference to citizenship: jinsiyyah and 
muwātanah, both of which are capable of, and regularly are translated into citizenship, producing 
a conflation of the two. Complicating this further is the question of nationality. As will be 
enunciated although jinsiyyah denotes nationality in legal terms, muwātanah carries many of its 
socially constructed attributes. While they exist in a dialogic relationship, conflating them in the 
act of translation results in a dual obscuration of their distinct root-based properties on the one 
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hand, and the resulting power-relations that they frame on the other. Third, the failure of political 
science to adequately take stock of citizenship’s unique lingual foundations and expressions risks 
the fostering of an implicit presumption that it (citizenship) has enjoyed a similar history in the 
Arab world as it has in the Anglo-European context. Despite the fact that, at the same time, 
scholarship has in some sectors persisted in reproducing orientalist perspectives, underscoring the 
seemingly irreconcilable dissimilarities between so-called East and West. 
 
Subsequently the aim of this chapter is innately to compare and contrast. I begin by asking 
what is citizenship in an Anglo-European scholarly context? It is important to do so, given the 
ready ease with which non-Arab scholars especially, make assumptions about citizenship in 
Jordanian politics. Examples of which were provided in chapter one. This is followed by an 
analysis of how jinsiyyah and muwātanah developed out of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. 
Through which, I emphasise and situate the historicity of citizenship and citizens as designations 
in Arabic discourse. This is necessary because none of the four main theories of citizenship of the 
Anglo-European canon: liberal, consensual order, participatory Republican or postmodern 
pluralism,180 take the potential for Arabic specificity into their accounts. In so doing contemplating 
the production of an understanding of citizenship that has at is centre the dialogic relationship 
between jinsiyyah and muwātanah, without reducing their distinct characteristics. In the final 
section, I advance that at the relationship’s heart, is a three-way act of claim-making on the part of 
citizens, non-citizens and the state. Hence, part of the current research agenda is to contribute to 
the ongoing endeavour to, paraphrasing Isin, de-orientalise the citizen and their practice of 
citizenship.181  
 
 
2.2 : What is Citizenship? 
 
Citizenship is above all a social construction, fluid and nebulous as a vessel of rights and 
obligations alongside the embedded paradox of its simultaneous exclusivity and universality. Its 
historicity in the Anglo-European sense is Greco-Roman, deriving from the Greek terms polis and 
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polites, and the Latin civitas (city-state) and civis (an individual member of the civitas). In both 
classical Greece (predominantly Athens) and Rome of both Republic and Empire, citizens, were 
considered to be complete members of their polis/civitas community, with the right to partake in 
the process of government.182 Owing to the passage of time between Athens, Rome and the twenty-
first century, accepting citizenship as a signifier of the individual’s ‘full membership’ into the 
society in which they exist,183 forces us to recognize its fluidity. It has never existed in a single 
form. Ergo, a more advantageous stratagem is to take up a critique of citizenship as membership 
within a political community, and the politics that surrounds it.184 
 
Examining the politics that orbit around citizenship (and citizen practices), referred to by 
Nils Butenschon as ‘any area of social interaction where citizenship comes into the picture as an 
instrument of power distribution’, enables an analysis of politics to occur that is both spatially and 
temporally sensitive. Spatially, because the field of inquiry becomes sufficiently broad enough to 
encompass potentially diverse range of actors both citizens and noncitizens, operating within 
societies. When societies are understood as being ‘constituted of multiple overlapping and 
intersecting sociopatial networks of power’,185 it is subsequently easier to appreciate how even 
within a single polity, substantial differences in the practice and theory of citizenship on the part 
of citizens may emerge.  
 
Temporally, approaching citizenship from the perspective of its politics facilitates a greater 
respect for, and opportunity to integrate, its conventional and critical streams together. 
Conventional citizenship studies follow the model established by T.H. Marshall, for whom 
citizenship ‘is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community’ whose nature, by 
implication of his focus on England is inherently national and state bounded.186 The centrality of 
the nation in the constituting of the citizen is further enunciated in Marshall’s contention that 
although the community of those identified as citizens share equally in rights and obligations, 
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‘there is no universal principle’ determining the exact make-up of these dialogic elements.187 That 
is to say there is no supra-state consensus on an organising principle. Conventional citizenship 
studies then, ‘typically begin with citizenship defined as rights, obligations, and belonging to the 
nation-state’, with three rights ‘civil, political, and social’ and three obligations ‘conscription, 
taxation and franchise’ awarded particular significance.188 The state (specifically the nation-state) 
is the key institution, because it is the nation-state that makes possible citizenship as a status of 
membership in its internal political community.  
 
Fundamentally, this is due to the reality that at some level all citizen rights are legislated, 
within the halls of government, whether through deliberation or executive orders.189  Thus the 
nation-state is the significant landscape on which citizenship exists because in modern times the 
legal and the political have been encapsulated within it. Contemporary globalization - 
notwithstanding Isin and turner’s request to bear in mind its historical counterparts – is in rather 
novel ways altering this capacity of the state.190 Thus critical theories of citizenship do not 
repudiate the importance of the nation-state, but approach its role in the constitution of citizenship 
orders from different perspectives. One of the issues this raises is the historical and present 
conflation between.  
 
While this reality owes much to the concomitant emergence of nationalism with the modern 
nation-state in the Anglo-European context,191 a similar dynamic is observable in Arabic discourse 
as well. The significance of the development cannot be understated. Conventional analyses either 
implicitly or explicitly assert that citizen rights ‘are predicated on a fundamental right of equality 
before the law regardless of belief, background or origin that governs the relationship between 
citizens and their states’.192 Therefore, issues of legitimacy are concerned with tangible reciprocity 
or its absence, as Michael Hudson as capably illustrated.193 Nationalism however orients questions 
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of legitimacy towards more abstract notions of the imagined communities and solidarity in which 
what matters is the individual and the collectives’ ability to fit into a pre-existing bounded 
institutional assemblage of the state.194  
 
Analyses adopting a critical perspective however problematise the assumptions on which 
their conventional counterparts rely, by introducing into the discussion two prime interpolations. 
First, critical theorists take into account the emergence of new rights (sexual, environmental etc.) 
which are taken as evidence that citizenship is a site of contestation and therefore more unstable 
than conventional studies allow.195 Via this evaluation, critical perspectives illuminate how 
citizenship’s embedded paradox of particularity and universality functions not only on the level of 
inside-outside disparity, but simultaneously on a level of internal differentiation. It is not just a 
matter of variances between citizens of different states, but profoundly, one of how citizens of the 
same state experience citizen hierarchies. Ira M. Young argues that this is part of citizenship’s 
historical legacy, especially though not limited to the matter of gender. Explaining that for the 
early theorists and advocates of republican citizenship in Europe and North America, the duality 
of liberty for some and exclusion for others was not contradictory ‘because the idea that citizenship 
is the same for all translated in practice to the requirement that all citizens be the same’.196 As this 
is ontologically impossible, citizenship’s homogenising capacity has created a social architecture 
that legitimates social inequality, concomitant with its facilitation of equal membership within a 
state.197  
 
Second, critical analyses consider how rights whether traditional or new, are increasingly 
– thanks to globalisation – being negotiated either through or with assistance from transnational 
and international institutions including the United Nations and the Council of Europe, and regional 
or devolved bodies within states.198 A resultant cardinal implication being the critique of 
citizenship thought to operate solely on the level of the nation-state. This extends to conceiving of 
citizenship purely in terms of it being a pastiche of rights and obligations. Rather, as critical 
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theorists argue, it must be additionally defined ‘as a social process through which individuals and 
social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights’.199 Consequently, if one were to 
speak, however tentatively, of a principle guiding critical analyses of contemporary citizenship 
regimes it could be that a number of significant social issues in our contemporary epoch (from the 
status of indigenous communities, sexual minorities, migrants and the environment) ‘have 
increasingly been expressed through the language of rights and obligations, and hence of 
citizenship’.200 Ergo, while each of these have materialized across the breadth of human history,201 
the onset of globalization has brought renewed focus to them as the hegemony of liberal 
internationalism, Fukuyama’s “end of history”,202 and American unipolarity continue to fragment.  
 
What emerges is less a repudiation of conventionalism, and more a pronouncement that a 
more profound flexibility of theory is required to take stock of diverse practices. Accordingly, 
diligence in the balancing act between conventional and critical understandings of citizenship is 
important for the sensitivity it engenders towards the subjective realities of citizens. Or following 
Balibar while the citizen is not synonymous with the subject, the citizen is a subject, especially as 
their capacity to access rights is, in the modern context, predicated on their subjection and 
obligations to the nation-state.203 Hence, in contrast to subjects or slaves ‘whose statuses imply 
hierarchy and domination’,204 citizens enjoy a privileged position of latitude vis-a-vie the networks 
of power in which they are situated. It cannot be overstated that this relationship between 
citizenship and the nation-state is only symbiotic insofar as it exists in our modern and 
contemporary epoch.205 Furthermore, the advent of globalisation has, if not weakened, at the least 
transformed and is transforming the role and functions of the nation-state in politics.206 Taking 
both the present moment and a sense of history into account, it is instrumental that citizenship is 
approached, not from a statist, but a constitutive position.  
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In this regard Keith Faulks offers a pertinent conceptual toolkit consisting of a triumvirate 
of content, extent and depth. If citizenship acts as a vessel of obligations and rights, then content 
is associated with questions concerning what ought to be the balance between the two, and what 
trade-offs are involved in negotiating and altering citizenship’s substance in an identified 
context.207 Extent then denotes the who; who is included and excluded from possessing and/or 
accessing citizen rights, and according to which criteria is this mediated?208 The function of 
exclusion in citizenship cuts in at least two directions. The first, readily apparent when being 
citizen of a nation-state is examined, is associated with the external other. That is to say the non-
national who nevertheless is a national of another state. In this manner, the key difference between 
a Jordanian and a Syrian is, for illustration, their association with two distinct nation-state 
constructs. Observers of the Arab world and its history will automatically detect an 
epistemological weakness with this level of differentiation between citizens of two (Arab) states. 
Because of the presence of supra-nationalism in the region dating from before the imposition and 
later consolidation of the nation-state system; the very idea of a national community being 
territorially bounded in as many as twenty-two Arab states has historically struggled for 
perchance.209 Resultantly, pertinent queries may be raised concerning the utility of citizen-to-
citizen distinctions based primarily on the state. 
 
The frame is further complicated when considering the interjection of non-state affiliated 
actors in the form pre-eminently of refugees and displaced persons across the breadth of the 
kingdom’s history. Among them the Palestinians occupy cardinal significance. Like the Kurds, 
Palestinians globally constitute a national community without a state, who therefore exist either as 
citizens or non-citizens of other nation-states. In Jordan both are applicable as there are Jordanian-
Palestinian citizens of the kingdom in addition to a population of non-citizen Palestinian refugees. 
Therefore, when investigating from a citizen perspective, the politics of being Palestinian and 
practicing Palestinian identity in Jordan – let alone the differences of citizen practice between other 
members of the Jordanian citizen community - I am not referring to external outsiders, the 
barbarians to the Greeks of antiquity, but rather to individuals and collectives who are inherently 
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immanent. Conceptualising the function of exclusion within citizenship invariably therefore 
requires a second approach to take stock of citizen differences within the nation-state. 
 
Engin Isin’s study on alterity in the construction of citizenship regimes underscores as 
much. One of his founding contentions is that conventional comprehensions of citizenship begin 
from the position of a citizen/non-citizen dichotomy, directed by a ‘logic of exclusion’ predicated 
on two assumptions. Firstly that outsiders or non-citizens as a category ‘pre-existed citizenship 
and that, once defined, it excluded them’; and additionally, that those who are excluded are 
endowed with an innate negativity, which consequently renders their exclusion ‘irreconcilable’ 
with citizenship.210 On the contrary, Isin proposes that profitable insights are to be gained from 
approaching citizenship from the outside, or from the perspective of its alterity. In this manner, 
otherness emerges ‘as a condition of citizenship’, therein positing a simultaneous emergence of 
the two.211 In evidence here are echoes of Mann’s intersecting and overlapping power networks 
and constructivism’s mutual constitution. While the distinction between these standpoints seems 
perhaps too subtle to warrant elucidation, the dialogic essence of Isin’s analysis accentuates in a 
far more profound manner how citizenship ‘requires the constitution of these others to become 
possible’.212  
 
I now return to Faulks and his third facet of citizenship, depth, which unlike content and 
extent is more problematic in its qualification as a consequence of its subjectivity. To the point, 
when asking questions about citizenship’s depth or thickness, several key questions emerge: ‘how 
demanding or extensive should our identity as citizens be’ on the one hand, and on the other, when, 
if at all should our identity as citizens take precedence relative to the others with which we 
identify?213 This question as to the depth of individual as well as collective identifications, and the 
gravity of obligation they possess, is of the three components, the one where the influence of the 
nation-state is most profound. Such is a ramification of the nation-state existing as a site bearing 
witness to the interplay between ideological expressions of nationalism on the one hand and 
principles of citizenship on the other. Unease embedded within their interactions thus necessitates, 
at least in theoretical terms, disentanglement. Citizenship by way of its mix of rights and 
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obligations carries with it a promise of reciprocity on the part of the state, or whatever political 
authority it is associated with. As an institution then, citizenship ‘is grounded in the guarantee of 
legal and political protections from raw coercive power’.214 Nationalism, and its accompanying 
category the national, do not in any politico-legal fashion convey anywhere near the same 
theoretical assurances. Instead it makes appeals to individual members (nationals) on the basis of 
primordial and communal notions of solidarity alongside ‘sentiments of soil and blood’.215 
 
 
2.3 : Situating Citizenship (Jinsiyyah & Muwātanah) Historically 
 
Having considered the fundamentals of citizenship from an Anglo-European perspective I now 
proceed to the Arab world in order to illuminate differences and similarities. The 19th century and 
the Ottoman Empire’s endeavours to address the challenges that emerged throughout it (especially 
from 1860 onwards) had indubitable, albeit unintended, structural influences upon developing 
comprehensions of citizenship in Arabic discourse. A discourse that had hitherto coalesced around 
the vertical power configuration of ruler and the ruled.216 Ottoman political organisation was in 
some respects dualistic, with government and territorial divisions providing ‘a framework of 
order’, while the composition of rights and duties delineating the relationship between Istanbul 
and its subjects was predicated on the Shari‘a.217 Within the social architecture facilitated by these 
two, the mosaic of communities in the Empire were categorised differently. Muslim subjects for 
illustration served in the military unlike their Christian and Jewish neighbours, but were exempt 
from some of the taxation regimes these communities were required to pay. There were distinctions 
between Muslim members of the empire as well.  
 
Perhaps the most important in terms of military organisation, was that between the ‘askar, 
historically a military caste from which was derived the governors and ruling administrators of the 
Empire, and the ra‘ayah (subjects).218 Such is indicative of the integration between so-called 
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religious and secular structural elements in the Empire. Ra‘īyah/ra‘ayā Parolin explains 
collectively denotes the people who exist ‘under’ an identifiable political authority. Yet even as a 
referent to people with centuries of utilisation, the analogy is a neologism insofar as it initially 
applied (and still does) to herds of livestock.219 Unsurprisingly, the human rulers of this human 
flock are described as ru‘āt or shepherds.  
 
The two imply a relationship of dependency and submission on the part of the ra‘ayā, and 
of top-down benevolent guidance from the ru‘āt. Apart from submission, ‘each community was 
free to live in accordance with its own beliefs and customs’ as long as these did not conflict with 
the Shari‘a’s provisions, or threaten Ottoman dominance.220 Subject communities therefore 
evolved, according to Albert Hourani ‘regional’, ‘religious’ and ‘functional’ characteristics.221 The 
control and unity generated by this institutionalisation of communal differentiation would come 
under increasing pressure as the century continued. Ergo, Roger Owen reflects how the Empire 
became increasingly concerned for its territorial integrity on the part of interference from ‘a Europe 
driven on by the influence of the two great revolutions that it had experienced at the end of the 
eighteenth century: the political revolution in France from 1789 onwards and the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain’.222 He does not however consider the implications of these two 
revolutionary processes on the development of citizenship in the MENA, which is a glaring 
deficiency in an otherwise landmark exegesis of nation-state emergence in the region post World 
War One.  
 
Parolin contrastingly argues that decision makers in Istanbul ‘felt urgent need of a secular 
membership bond to do away with capitulatory privileges’ and to better strengthen centralised 
control over the non-Turkish territories.223 An important milestone in this regard, despite its 
ultimate failure, was the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869, under whose terms all subjects 
regardless of religious affiliation were recognised as equal members of the same political 
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community. Inevitably, this in-conjunction with contemporaneous (the printing press) and future 
developments (the Young Turks movement) facilitated the expansion of nationalism; specifically 
Arab nationalism and smaller more territorially bounded nationalisms across the MENA. 
However, what remained underdeveloped was a thoroughly conceived model of citizenship. 
Historical precedence is significant here. A reading of Egyptian historian al-Jabarti’s reflections 
on Napoleon’s invasion/expedition into Egypt in 1798, for example reveals his utilisation of 
sītwayān, a transliterated form of citizen in French (citoyen) as a prefix when referring to French 
individuals ‘for lack of a better alternative’.224 Symptomatic that the term now employed to 
designate citizen (muwātin) did not yet exist.  
 
The absence of alternative expressions was not so much due to the paucity of terminology 
so much as their inability to capture the essence of citizenship as it was being observed in the 
European context. Ami Ayalon observes that Arab travellers to Europe during the nineteenth 
century found that although ra‘ayah could be applied appropriately categorising the subjects of 
monarchs in Austria or Russia, its carrying capacity as a vessel of meaning evaporated in cases of 
constitutional monarchies. Tahtawi’s lingual constructions of sawt al-ra‘iyyah (the subject’s vote) 
and wukalā’ al-ra‘iyyah (the deputies of the subjects) for example appear contextually 
incongruous at best and self-contradictory at worst.225 It may be appreciated then the argument 
that the designations of citizen and citizenship in a legal and political sense, were ‘alien to the 
traditional Arab-Islamic political discourse’.226 Yet only insofar as these terms and their role in 
shaping political regimes and behaviours, developed and have subsequently been comprehended 
in an Anglo-European historical context. Resultantly in the face of challenges to established 
models of political organisation and mobilisation new conceptions needed to, and were developed. 
Linguistically Ayalon refers to this as ‘interference’, a circumstance in which a given language, in 
this case Arabic, ‘finds itself inadequately equipped’ for naturalising ideas and analogies ‘current 
in that of another society’ and subsequently, language.227 Because of its morphology and historical 
richness, Arabic’s linguists and advocates rose to the challenge by redeveloping outdated terms, 
and broadening the application of others. 
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Aside from ra‘īyah/ra‘ayā, Parolin Identifies three other contemporary terms: 
tābi‘/atbā‘(follower/s), jinsīyah (nationality), and muwātin/muwātinun (citizen/s) as being 
particularly significant.228 Within Ottoman discourse, tābi‘/atbā‘ conveys a disproportionate 
balance of power in the relationship between ruler and ruled, and as such shares characteristics 
with ra‘īyah/ra‘ayā. It was however more malleable to interference, having acquired over the 
course of the nineteenth century a legal-diplomatic character in order to be utilised as a translation 
for the French sujet or subject.229 In contrast to both of these, jinsīyah entered the political 
vocabulary in response to a newly emerging model of political organisation: the nation-state. 
Accordingly, jinsīyah whose derivation jins, details the process of categorisation, race, species, 
and later gender designations, came to be ascribed to nationality.230 A pivotal detail needs mention 
here, that jinsīyah refers to nationality as a concept not to individual nationals.  
 
There is no active participle for citizen that is extracted from either jins or jinsīyah, which 
seems to correlate with how Bryan Turner understands passive citizenship as a status ‘cultivated 
by the state in terms of a limited number of entitlements’ without any associated political 
activism.231 The third of the nomenclature, muwātin, as a political categorisation was born out the 
fissure between the end of empire and the dawn of its nation-state successor.232 It was during the 
period bordered roughly by the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876) and the nationalistic Turkification 
policies of the Young Turks post-1902, that it and its associated ideology Arab nationalism 
(specifically Syrian nationalism) rose at the intersection of the metamorphosing structure of 
Ottoman politics, and the diffusion of nationalism in the region from Europe. An indication of its 
usage at least amongst the intellectuals of the Arabic Renaissance or al-Nahda is its inclusion in 
Butrus al-Bustani’s encyclopaedic Moheet al-Moheet. Al-Bustani’s text is significant in how it 
situates muwātin within the lexical web of the root w-t-n, and thus denoting how its meaning 
comprehended at the time was linked to an individual’s attachment to and association with 
territory.233  
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Muwātin in its initial conception appears to convey greater similarities with nationalism 
and the national, than to citizenship and the citizen, insofar as al-Bustani did not attach to this 
analogy equilibrium between obligations and rights. A dialogic structure which has been integral 
to citizenship regimes across time regardless of the circumstances of the polities in which it 
occurs.234 Without a new model of political organisation yet in place to supersede the notion of 
empire, a female or male child of the nation (ibn, ibna al-watan) remained part of a collective, and 
hence their access to rights and freedoms hinged on that collective rather than individual agency.235 
In Craig Calhoun’s words, a ‘process of individuation’ had not yet occurred.236 Subsequently, it is 
revealing and not unsurprising that al-Bustani does not record muwātanah (citizenship) in his 
dictionary.  
 
Indeed, it has been argued that the analogy did not enter conventional practice until the 
twentieth century, and even then, its usage in legal circles has been limited. Nowhere in Egypt’s 
1971 constitution for example could Muwātanah be found until it was introduced by a 
controversial 2007 amendment.237 It remains absent in Jordan’s constitution, even after its most 
recent amendment in 2016. Ergo, although by the end of the nineteenth century concepts of a 
nominally secular nationality and attachment to a cultural political community were in evidence; 
an ‘évolution psychologique’ was required if a notion of ‘full citizenship’ was to be established in 
the Arab world.238  
 
 
 
2.4 : Jinsiyyah and Muwātanah - Citizenship as a Dialogic Structure 
 
The preceding exegesis has inferred the following. Jinsiyyah is a designation denoting a national 
community from the perspective of the top down. I suggest the appropriateness of this position in 
that: firstly, its root which is examined further shortly, has no connection with either similar pre-
existing analogies including ummah, or with feelings of attachment to place, which were being 
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expressed through derivatives of the root w-t-n. And Secondly, its entry into politico-legal 
convention was a direct response to exposure to Europe’s experiments with nationality and the 
nation-state.  Muwātanah meanwhile has a more convoluted pedigree, as its active participle, the 
muwātaneen, predate it, as a reference to the Moheet al-Moheet confirms. Unlike jinsiyyah, it 
conveys a sense of attachment to, and communally shared feelings for a territorial space. I argue 
in the following sections that jinsiyyah and muwātanah must be considered together if a more 
substantive comprehension of citizenship in Jordan and the Arab world is to be acquired. In essence 
they constitute a dialogic structure that cannot from a scholarly perspective be separated. 
 
Jinsiyyah and muwatanah, may both be translated as citizenship and each denote something 
of its substance. Yet, they do so in radically different ways, owing before anything else, to their 
roots. Jinsiyyah is derived from the root j-n-s (س ،ن ،ج), which in its second verbal form denotes a 
process of assimilation, naturalisation and or classification.239 Significant here is the question that 
if the j-n-s root is concerned fundamentally with issues of categorisation, what power-relations are 
embedded in the process of interpretation and selection. Who gets to choose the classifications in 
general terms and citizens versus non-citizens specifically?  
 
The answer is to be found in the nation-state. Every Jordanian citizen has an identity card, 
on which is written, among other things, their national identity number, name, family and 
citizenship status under the rubric of jinsiyyah not muwātanah. It becomes possible to extrapolate 
that jinsiyyah is the prerogative of the state, and is applied in order to distinguish between citizens 
and non-citizens (ajānib), or more specifically, between nationals and foreigners.240 Therefore it 
carries a top-down ‘legal and political association’ that is tied to, yet simultaneously distinct from 
muwātanah.241 Into this context, the concept of tajannus, or naturalisation is revealed not so much 
as a process by which an individual recognises their own entrance into a new community of 
citizens; but rather, the state’s recognition and acquiescence to this occurrence. Hattar’s 
observation then that Jordanians as a category change while the regime remains the same seems 
well founded.   
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Muwātanah meanwhile, comes from a different root altogether, and its lexical archaeology 
reveals differing aspects of citizenship resultantly. In-particular ones that are indubitably less 
associated with the process of official categorisation and the in-and-out bordering of individuals. 
Its root w-t-n extending on our previous consideration of al-Bustani, refers in its verbal forms to 
reside (I), settle in a place (II & V), and to become acclimatised or naturalised to a locality (X).242  
As a noun, watan signifies the ‘homeland’ and nation, and unsurprisingly then, wataniyyah in 
political usage is adjunctively equitable with nationalism.243 This is not to be confused with 
Qawmiyyah, which is based on the awareness of the Ummah, a broader community of worshippers, 
which is significantly, not bound to smaller geographical units.244 Or following the broader 
spectrum of Adnan Hussein, wataniyyah denotes the muwātin’s (citizen’s) conveying of ‘feelings 
of attachment to the nation’.245 There is a point of conceptual overlap, as both root structures are 
carriers of both nationality and citizenship. However because jinsiyyah has no active participles 
accompanying it, it is the individual muwātin/muwātineen, who reside in, and are connected to an 
identifiable territory that express thorough this connection nationalist feelings.  
 
Jordanian historian Ali Maḥāfẓah elaborates that although ‘the watan refers to a place of 
residence’, its political meaning, is broader than its literal definition, encompassing both ‘the 
geographical space that individuals feel to be their own’, and a connection of both sentimentality 
and interest.246 The watan, he continues, ‘is a network of different connections between residents 
in the designated geographical space’.247 These connections and feelings of ownership are 
mediated through the social construction of the community. An individual muwātin participates as 
part of a collective more than as an atomised individual. Hence, although muwātin as a discernible 
category ‘relies on a relation with a place’ more than a political authority, it ‘does not immediately 
entail the ideas of a status and rights enjoyed by the subject’.248 This is critical inasmuch as it 
constitutes a pillar of Ashwāq ‘Abbās’ crisis of the contemporary Arab state, whose ‘weakness of 
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legitimacy is tied fundamentally to the conditions of its genesis’.249 Emergent then, is the central 
role of nation- and state-building in developing and reproducing what Bosniak refers to as ‘the 
common substantive core’ of citizenship as membership of the political community within its 
borders.250 It becomes clear then, how citizenship regimes across states develop different 
characteristics contingent on their respective nation and state building trajectories. However, 
identifying this core is challenging in the context of the Arab world because, citizenship rests on 
two seminal lingual foundations: muwātanah and jinsiyyah.  
 
 
2.5 : Muwātanah, a Democratic Character? 
 
Muwātanah in the 21st century is more nuanced, and a vessel of greater normative carrying capacity 
than a reference to its lexical foundations suggest, although it remains in an ‘embryonic’ stage.251 
A number of Jordanian former politicians and civil society activists interviewed by the author 
equate muwātanah with democratic practices and principles; and more profoundly, frame these in 
terms of the individual citizen. Former senator, and director of the non-government organisation 
(NGO) Sisterhood is Global Institute Asma Khudar, argues for illustration that muwātanah is both 
a ‘legal and social relation’ enacted between the state and the individual’ recognised as a citizen.252 
Similarly, Mohamed Husseiny, director of the Identity Centre for Human Development, 
emphasises the individual and legal character of muwātanah, articulating it as ‘the relationship 
between the state and the citizens, and between the citizens themselves’.253 Extrapolating from 
these perspectives, readily observe citizenship’s progression from an individual and collective 
attachment to territory, to a socio-legal relationship between an institution – the nation-state – and 
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individual citizens on the one hand. And on the other an analogously socio-legal relationship 
between citizens themselves as individual members of the state constituted political community. 
 
Both Khudar and Husseiny allude to the psychological shift through which collective 
notions of belonging to a political community have been altered to begin to accommodate the 
individual as a base unit of that community. Stress must be placed on the reality that the process 
is both relatively young in historical terms and ongoing. It is young because whereas as the Anglo-
European experiment with the nation-state as a defined entity, and with citizenship, has been 
ongoing for at least three hundred years, the Arab world has had but one hundred years with which 
to grapple with this particular model of political organisation. It is ongoing, not only because from 
a constructivist perspective, all social realities are forever being constructed, reproduced and 
challenged, but more importantly, because the foundational unity of the Jordanian state is a 
collective as opposed to individual actor: the family. Article 6 Paragraph 4 of the constitution is 
unequivocal in establishing that it is the family that is the basis of society.254 
 
The entry of the individual actor into comprehensions of citizenship means that it is 
possible to speak of mutual rights and obligations that are tied, inextricably, to this actor without 
communal mediation. Hence, Husseiny’s identification of the state having the responsibility to 
treat all citizens equally, and to respect their innate freedoms and human rights, is an indication 
that being a Jordanian is a sufficient basis to be able to expect equal treatment.255 Expressed 
differently, being recognised as a citizen is the satisfactory condition on which the individual in 
question may make a claim on the state as an institution that is obligated to respond. Journalist 
Rana Sweiss advances this a step further, stating that citizenship by principle must endow 
Jordanians with a sense of ownership in their relationship with the state, including their 
involvement in the decision-making process.256 Such illuminates muwātanah’s aptitude to accept 
into itself normative considerations from its wider social landscape, in this case democratic notions 
concerned with rule of the people. That muwātanah is being associated by Jordanians with 
democratic values, demonstrates the need to conceive of citizenship as a dual, Janus-faced entity.  
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When Ali Batran, manager of the Ammon Centre for Human Development laments ‘there 
is no muwātanah in Jordan’,257 he is not suggesting that citizenship does not exist, for the simple 
reason that jinsiyyah indisputably does, and therefore there is a category of people who are 
Jordanian citizens. That is to say they are recognised to be Jordanians by the state. The implication 
is that there is a deficiency or imbalance in the current composition of Jordanian citizenship as it 
is practiced by Jordanians. ‘Abbās enunciates analogously, that the precariousness of state 
legitimacy is ongoing due to its inability ‘to function as a vehicle for policy reflecting the public 
and national interest’.258 It is consequently easy to recognise how democracy and citizenship 
(muwātanah) have come together into dialogue. There is certain logic to this, following Balibar’s 
distinction between the subject and the citizen-subject as being one whereby the former has no 
ability to shape power relations, whereas the latter does.259  
 
Uri Davis applies an analogous perspective with his differentiation between jinsiyyah and 
muwātanah. With the former rendered as ‘passport citizenship’, and the latter ‘democratic 
citizenship’.260 By passport, Davis means a ‘document issued by the recognized authorities of a 
recognized state to citizens (and only to citizens) for the purpose of travel outside the boundaries 
of the state’.261 The right or perhaps more accurately, privilege of travel abroad, is one half of a 
dyadic structure, with the other being the concomitant ‘right of abode’.262 Thus only those who 
have the right to abode (jinsiyyah) have the subsequent capacity to cross back and forth across 
state borders. Defining jinsiyyah in this manner ties it directly to the institution of the nation-state, 
which monopolises the capacity to authorise the individual certificate holder’s right of residence. 
Accordingly, Davis argues that it is jinsiyyah which constitutes ‘the guts’ of citizenship.263 Insofar 
as it is the institutional mechanism through which populations are brought into the political 
architecture of the state, and thus become recognised as citizens there is merit to Davis’ position.  
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His desire to draw distinctions between the two obscures their interconnectedness, one 
which as shall be elaborated in the next section, a relationship that can be better illuminated 
through a focus on the functions of claim-making inherent in both. In contrast to jinsiyyah, 
democratic citizenship (muwātanah) is positioned as the vehicle through which the individual 
citizen’s right, again perhaps privilege is more precise, to ‘equal access to the civil, political, social 
and economic resources of the state’ is made available.264 Utilising his distinction between the two 
faces of citizenship, enables Davis to irradiate structural divisions between Jewish and non-Jewish 
(Palestinian) citizens of Israel: 
 
‘In Israel a different refinement has been introduced, namely, the legal distinction between 
the Jewish citizens of the state who have Muwatana ("democratic citizenship" representing 
the right of equal access to the civil political, social and economic resources of the state, 
including Jinsiyya, the right of abode) versus the non-Jewish (Palestinian) citizens of the 
state who have the same Jinsiyya citizenship rights as the Jewish citizens, but not the same 
Muwatana citizenship rights’.265 
 
In effect, Davis employs the two terms as a dual-tiered structure, and in so doing is able to 
argue that within a single polity, in this case Israel, all citizens can share in jinsiyyah, but only 
those who fulfil a precise criterion are granted the ability to share muwātanah. However I have 
some concerns regarding the general applicability of Davis’ definition. Firstly, given our 
discussion to date about the historical development of citizenship in the Arab world, it is 
conceptually difficult to swallow a definition of muwātanah that is so evidently skewed towards a 
particular normative outlook on political organisation, particularly one which bears no affiliation 
to the term’s root foundations. Furthermore, what is meant when discussing democracy and 
democratic as an adjective for citizenship? A derivative of this is if a democratic discourse is going 
to be employed for analytical purposes, is its application being sufficiently sensitive to the wider 
socio-political context? Generally, scholarly communities in both area studies and political science 
and theory have philosophically been found wanting in this regard.266 
 
                                                     
264 Uri Davis, ‘Jinsiyya Versus Muwatana, p. 20. 
265 Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
266 This is a point laboured by Larbi Sadiki. The Search for Arab Democracy and Rethinking Arab Democratization; 
Elections Without Democracy (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2009). 
  
75 
 
In response, Larbi Sadiki calls for explorations, not into the feasibility of democratisation 
in the region, but more significantly, into ‘the potentiality of democratic knowledge’ and its 
regional diffusion.267 His is something of a lonely voice in the wilderness, which is all the more 
surprising given the incontestability of the postulation that democracy as a mode of government 
cannot hope to exist ‘without a cumulatively attained theoretical and practical “toolkit” of 
democratic knowledge’.268 A similar call may be heard in Andrea Teti’s critique of the post-9/11 
state of the literature in MENA area studies. ‘Rather than aiding inter-field reconciliation’, he 
reflects, the recent history of ‘interdisciplinarity’ suggests its association ‘with the legitimization 
of mainstream standpoints, policing those very boundaries they supposedly undermine, and 
disciplining dissent by delegitimizing epistemological alternatives’.269 Diligence is subsequently 
required when proverbially sailing into democratic territory. With this in mind, Sadiki denotes 
democratic knowledge as ‘the intellectual and practical capacities, skills, ethics whose primary 
cognitive weight lends itself to democratic learning, and civic habituation and socialization via an 
open-ended, constructivist, interactive, cross-cultural but also reflexive process, across time and 
space, cumulatively and collaboratively’.270  
 
 
So where as some observers of Jordan (and the region) lament the lost opportunities of the 
2011 uprisings,271 claim the arrival of a ‘Winter’,272 or re-articulate the strategic rationale behind 
authoritarian resilience,273 Sadiki fashions an alternative. Instead of looking to the presence or 
absence of systemic changes to government and governance styles post-2011, these same uprisings 
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need to be framed as episodes of citizen engagement with, and updating of, the state of local 
democratic knowledge. Significantly, within this context, democracy must be conceptualised in a 
de-foundational manner,274 for it can only become knowable ‘within contexts of history, 
geography, language, culture and power relations, local and global’.275  
 
By accepting Sadiki’s postulation as valid it is imperative to approach Davis’ translation 
of muwātanah and its subsequent dialogue with jinsiyyah with respectful caution. Davis himself 
may be perfectly capable of further defining what he means be democracy and democratic, but it 
is fair to say that some of his readers and policy makers are not, blinded as they are by a normative 
conflation between democracy and liberal democracy. The scholarly community itself is not 
immune to this myopia. To demonstrate, Rainer Bauböck in his preface to Parolin’s 2009 study 
argues ‘the gap between a liberal democratic concept and present legislation in these countries still 
remains very wide and difficult to bridge. Yet bridged it must be, because in a globalising world, 
citizenship is no longer a matter under exclusive control of sovereign states’.276 Within statements 
such as these the perceived superiority of liberal democracy rings loud and offers a double 
obfuscation. It first chokes the reality that ‘there are plural knowledge systems’, giving birth to a 
plurality of power relationships within societies.277  
 
In so doing, the hubris of liberal triumphalism obscures the path towards Sadiki’s aphorism 
that good government must exist within local knowledge systems, some of which depending on 
context, have historically had nothing to do with explicitly liberal epistemological communities. I 
do not mean by this to suggest that commonalities between liberal theory and the various schools 
of Arabic Islamic social and political theory do not exist. Andrew March’s perspicacious Islam 
and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus is exemplary in elucidating 
the harmonies of both.278 
 
Furthermore, following Sadiki, a localised knowledge system or makhzun, is fluid site 
where communities across generations ‘transmit’ and crucially ‘supplement’ social knowledge in 
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order to optimally ‘manage change over time and space’.279 Parallels developed in Arabic attest to 
this. Returning to watan, Sha‘abān illustrates that it refers to ‘a group of specific human, cultural, 
and material relationships existing within a framework of horizontal and vertical identities’. It is 
conceivable that overtime these relationships will form oral and literal databases of social 
knowledge within which the keys to solving past, and hopefully, future problems of social 
organisation reside. The origin of the information in these databases is not necessarily local 
however. It could well be that liberal analogies are adopted into a makhzun. Indeed the conceptions 
of citizenship reflected by Khudar, Sweiss, Batran and Husseiny demonstrate as much. The 
fundamental variable is that the process of adoption be internal, rather than external, to the social 
networks that are linked into the localised knowledge repository.  
 
This reveals a shortcoming in Davis’ model. While to his credit, he does not speak in terms 
of liberal democracy, he doesn’t, at the same time, engage in problematizing the multi-faceted and 
context dependent nature of democracy and what this means for his translation of muwātanah.280 
It is apposite to emphasise the time frame here. It is easy to criticise Davis for the limitations of 
linking his definition of muwātanah with democracy in a region where there is a dearth of 
democracy. Yet this needs to be tempered with recognition as to the level of optimism amongst 
scholarship circles concerning the potentiality for democratisation in the region post 1989.  
 
A third concern and one associated with Sadiki’s call for greater democratic knowledge, 
involves wider applicability. Despite how problematic it is to place Israel, an ethno-religious state, 
together with democracy in the same adjective sentence, Israelis do enjoy elements of democratic 
practice and principles that citizens of neighbouring states including Jordan do not possess. It is 
possible for Davis to assume the existence of a level of democracy sufficient enough to float his 
definition of muwātanah. In a region where nothing democratic can be taken for granted, relying 
on an assumption of this nature makes for tenuous analysis. Fourth, his choice of case study has 
certain specificities that are not present in Jordan, or other regional contexts, and accordingly, 
questions emerge as to whether his distinctions are applicable. Notably, Israel is a settler-colonial 
society with one population (Israelis) seeking to usurp another population (Palestinians). 
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Categorising key distinctions between their citizenships, especially considering Israel’s existence 
as an ethno-religious state, is subsequently somewhat straightforward. The same cannot be said 
for Jordan even if one wanted to reproduce the conventional languid argument that speaks of a 
chasm between Jordanians of Palestinian and East-Bank origins. It is true that the state treats 
members of each community according to the needs of the regime. But to generalise this treatment 
without regard for its fluid nature and specificities is altogether otiose.  
 
The question of whether one can generalise or not brings another concern to the fore: that 
of gender. In categorising jinsiyyah and muwātanah according to a Jewish and non-Jewish binary, 
Davis sidelines intersectional experiences of citizenship holders. As has been well documented by 
critical theorists, from an external position it is feasible to establish in some but certainly not all 
polities, that women enjoy the same citizenship status as their male counterparts.281 Nevertheless, 
as long as a woman has to exercise the rights acknowledged to her via citizenship within the 
framework of patriarchy, it becomes incredibly dubious to argue substantively that her citizenship 
is equal to that of her male counterpart.282 Certainly, adopting Davis’ case-study, it could not with 
any seriousness be argued that all female Jewish – therefore holders of jinsiyyah and muwātanah 
– citizens of Israel share equally in both of these among themselves and their male counterparts. 
 
In light of the above, caution is required in order to avoid converting an association between 
muwātanah and democratic norms into an equation. It is necessary to embark on a deeper analysis 
into the inner workings of their relationship. Central to this is claim-making, which not 
coincidentally, is fundamental to both democracy and citizenship. Bryan Turner notes ‘the first 
thing to emphasize about citizenship is that it controls access to the scarce resources of society’.283 
Consequently, those who possess it make claims on those in power to access these resources, and 
do so in a competitive fashion owing to their scarcity. Simultaneously, non-citizens who exist 
within the sphere of the same political power structures additionally make claims for citizenship 
that they may be able to subsequently lay claim to society’s resource pie.  
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Engin Isin consolidates these dynamics under the rubric of citizenship’s alterity, whose 
logics ‘embody differentiation and distinction, not only as strategies of exclusion, but as strategies 
of elective affiliation, recognition, incorporation, and congregation’.284 At the heart of which are 
the claims individuals and communities make on each other within the context of fluid yet stratified 
power networks. Approaching citizenship as a dialogue between jinsiyyah and muwātanah through 
a focus on claim-making enables us to desaturate from our analysis (and subsequent knowledge of 
citizenship) assumptions concerning democracy, while still recognising its position in the 
relationship. One immediate benefit will be a disentangling between Anglo-European theoretical 
expectations regarding the functions of citizenship, on the one hand, and a more sensitive 
appreciation of citizenship’s development “on the ground”. On a more profound level, 
disassociating ourselves from a reliance on the democratic adjective opens the space for further 
insights into the location of muwātanah and jinsiyyah at the nexus of power relationships. Most 
notably but not limited to between individuals (citizens) and the state; at whose heart I propose are 
the processes and acts of claim-making. 
 
 
2.6 : Muwātanah & Jinsiyyah - Claim-making and the Citizen-Subject  
 
I contend here that citizenship in Jordan can be (more) optimally ruminated on if conceptually 
muwātanah and jinsiyyah are conceived of as being two faces of the one concept. Simultaneously, 
I accept the immediate difficulty of this request owing to the non-existence in contemporary 
discourse of a term that could bring the two under its umbrella. However persistence will yield 
advantages of an improved understanding. Specifically, by considering them as two parts of the 
single whole I conceptually bring them together, facilitating an appreciation of their dialogic 
essence. This crux it is asserted here is anchored in claim-making and the contentious politics that 
consequently arise when these claims clash. It is necessary to begin with a brief note on 
categorisation, in-particular when categorising something or someone a claim is made to know 
something about it/them. More than this the process both creates an image of the subject being 
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described/comprehended, while at the same time destroying alternative visions of what that subject 
might be.285  
 
Consider muwātanah as being indicative of an individual’s status as a resident of a territory, 
recognised socially. Through this residence, a citizen (muwātin) makes claims on the existing 
structures of political organisation via their connection with said territory. When an individual’s 
attachment to, and place within, a territorial space and its accompanying human networks is 
recognised and reproduced socially; there is an implicit acknowledgment that this social reality 
exists while others do not. I can claim that I am from city A, and accordingly imply I am not from 
city B. I then substantiate this claim on the grounds of my socially performed attachment to the 
space of city A, which in turn demonstrates my familiarity with it. Because the performance is 
social, it receives either support or derision from the social networks in which I am embedded. 
Assuming it is the former and not the latter, I can then make claims on the power networks present 
upon the territorial space in which I exist. 
 
Simultaneously, the state, engages in its own process of claim making via jinsiyyah. When 
a state grants recognition that an individual belongs to its associated political (national) 
community, a claim is made over that person and their character. Including among other things, 
criteria of expectations concerning behaviour deemed acceptable and non-acceptable. Coercion is 
critical here in encouraging acceptable behaviour, in-particular the threat of violence. Historically 
treason and other such crimes of betrayal have fallen into this set, and their strength, aside from 
the physical destruction of the individual/s, resides in how as part of the method of citizen 
recognition the possibility of alternatives is destroyed or weakened to the point of appearing 
invisible. Borders are produced, demarcating those inside from those outside, constructing and 
defending a dominant narrative as to who are the citizens.  
 
A key distinction to be made is that although jinsiyyah may well denote a state sanctioned 
right of abode, it does not necessarily involve the act of abode and the claims that emerge from 
this practice. This is why it becomes possible for muwātanah, and not jinsiyyah to act as a vessel 
for social norms, whether democratic or not. Drawing attention to the distinction between the right 
and act of abode facilitates greater appreciation of the multifaceted experience of citizenship in an 
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intersectional world. This is not a repudiation of Davis so much as an endeavour to elucidate his 
distinction between the two further by bringing them into a dialogic relationship. The distribution 
of power within this relationship is instrumental in producing outcomes. Nicolas Onuf sheds light 
on this arguing human agents author and enforce rules, which being both ‘constitutive and 
regulative’ inform agents ‘how to play the game’, in order to ‘secure and ensconce advantages 
over other agents’.286  
 
‘Differential success’ in this endeavour means that although advantage is never permanent 
in a static sense, the asymmetries that are produced as a consequence of the authoring and 
deploying resources for the maintenance of rules, induces a disadvantage on agents seeking to 
reverse or alter the circumstances.287 Via extrapolation it is perceivable that individuals and 
collectives are a battle ground as the forces and power networks of both jinsiyyah and muwātanah 
promote the construction of differing images of the citizen, who is subject to these forces. The 
reality of subject status highlights the difficulty in maintaining one of the central assumptions 
concerning citizens and citizenship in the MENA elucidated in the literature review: the 
ontological nature of the citizen. There is a tendency, linked generally with the modernist 
predilection for progress to conceive of the citizen within the modern state as a product of a linear 
evolutionary process that has resulted in the retreat of the subject. Ayalon illustratively connotes 
subject with ‘subordination to a monarch’.288  
 
Yet Balibar encourages a reconsidering of this paradigm of progression and ‘teleological 
transformation’.289 Advancing instead a conceptualising of modernity as being ‘defined by the 
overlapping and contradictory processes of becoming-citizen of the subject and the becoming-
subject of the citizen’.290 All citizens are subjects insofar as they are subject to a locus, or loci of 
power. It is the nature of this power and subsequently the substance of the associated relationship 
that is seminal in efforts to distinguish between them. The analogy of representation is worthy of 
identification. Returning to Balibar: 
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‘Initially, representation is a representation before the Prince, before Power, and in 
general, before the instance of decision making’ [however] ‘representation of the 
sovereign in its deputies, inasmuch as the sovereign is the people is something entirely 
different’… [it] is ‘the act of representation par excellence: the choice of those who govern, 
the corollary of which is monitoring them. To elect representatives is to act and to make 
possible all political action, which draws its legitimacy from this election’.291  
 
To be a subject in the classical sense then is to be subject before a power that is often 
embodied in a single authoritative being. Citizens however, are not so much separate from the 
locus of power that governs their lives, as they are collectively the source of this power. They 
cannot be a subject before power it in quite the same manner owing to their agency’s role in 
constituting that power. Having said this, I do not wish to imply any linearity here. To illustrate, 
in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, each of the subjects has engaged in the submission of their wills 
for the sake of commonwealth, and are collectively therefore, the author of the regime.292 Their 
agency therefore reveals them as more than abstract subjects. Simultaneously, they are not citizens 
insofar as they have no legitimate recourse against decision-making, but must persist in the 
reproduction of an established power relationship.  
 
On the one hand Hobbes’ exposition of the relationship between ruler and ruled ‘breaks 
with the assumption that the ruler and the state are indivisible’; while on the other, the resulting 
model ‘might, at best, be termed subject-citizenship’ as the aim is the security of order as opposed 
to the protection of individual rights or civility.293 Injecting Hobbes into the discussion at this stage 
is pertinent insofar as Hobbes was one of the first to identify the role of individuals, rather than 
collectives in the constitution of state power. Furthermore, his exegesis demonstrates how during 
the early moments of the development of citizenship in relation to the nation-state, a degree of 
subjection was intimately present. Ergo, centuries later, Balibar is able to critique the degree of 
subjection facing the liberal citizen, whose ‘freedom is a narrow and uncertain path between the 
Charybdis of penalization and the Scylla of medicalization’.294  
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It behoves scholarly enterprise interested in citizenship to therefore persist in 
problematising the location of the citizen-subject that has emanated from the bones of Hobbe’s 
agential subject, via the changing function and location of power in political relationships. Rather 
than generalise about what power is and is not within a social setting, it is appropriate to dedicate 
some time to a consideration of what power is. Pamela Pansardi, augmenting Amy Allen’s 
extrapolation of power-to, power-with and power-over,295 is a useful tangent of inquiry in this 
regard. While Allen’s triumvirate is developed to address an aperture within feminist theory 
specifically, Pansardi argues that they can be taken to constitute faces of a single concept of 
power.296 The result, for our own immediate study, is that the utility of Allen’s initial development 
becomes available to wider application.  
 
Power-over is ‘the ability of an actor or set of actors to constrain the choices available to 
another actor or set of actors in a nontrivial way’.297 Thus while exercising power-over someone 
or something does not have to fit within strategic imperatives or goals for Allen, it nevertheless 
must have a substantial effect. The parameters then are established vis-a-vie the effect of constraint 
over action. By extension, the removal of explicit intent means that Allen is able to disaggregate 
power-over from domination, which she considers to be an ‘application’ of power-over, not power-
over in its entirety.298 Such is predicated on her recognition that an individual having power-over 
another is not in isolation sufficient to construct a negative relationship between them. While all 
cases of domination require power-over, not all cases of power-over involve domination.299 
Conceptually, this dissection of domination from power-over is crucial for the nuanced study 
citizenship. The two are simply ‘incompatible’, for where domination ‘seeks to deny us recognition 
as an autonomous individual, capable of self-governance’,300 citizenship functions in an opposite 
fashion. 
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Correspondingly, Pansardi discerns the division between power and domination ‘lies in the 
level of asymmetry of the social relations that the latter entails’.301 She advances that domination 
is a condition determinate on the modalities of power’s distribution within an identified set of 
social relations, rather than being a distinct variety of power. In contrast, power-to connotes ‘the 
ability of an individual actor to attain an end or series of ends’.302  Being defined in this manner, 
some theorists have proceeded to separate power-to from social realities,303 a separation rejected 
by Pansardi due to the risk of seeing power-over as a relational aspect of power, and power-to as 
a more individually dispositional aspect isolated from social realities.304 Conceived socially, it 
becomes possible to identify resistance, as a sub-category of power-to, analogous with the 
conceptual relationship between domination and power-over. In this context, resistance is 
understood as the capacity ‘of an individual actor to attain an end or series of ends that serve to 
challenge and/or subvert domination’.305  In other words the status quo power-over relationship 
between the actor in question and the actor/s in which they are in relationship with. 
 
Illuminated is power-to as an innately individual pursuit. Collective action therefore 
emerges via power-with. Power-with is ‘a collective ability that results from the receptivity and 
reciprocity that characterize the relations among individual members of the collectivity’.306 That 
said, it would be incorrect to equate power-with with solidarity, which is more appropriately 
understood as but one of the ways in which power-over can be exercised.307 Solidarity, especially 
in the internet age, if it is to be taken seriously, should be comprehended in a context specific 
manner. It may be possible to demonstrate so-called keyboard solidarity, but this should not in all 
cases be understood as part of ‘the ability of a collectivity to act together for the attainment of an 
agreed-upon end or series of ends’,308 which rests at the centre of power-with. 
 
The key distinction to be made between Allen and Pansardi, is that while Allen conceives 
of power-to, power-over and power-with as situational features, Pansardi endeavours to fuse them 
                                                     
301 Pamela Pansardi, ‘A Non-normative Theory of Power and Domination’, Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy 16:5 (2013), p. 629. 
302 Amy Allen, The Power of Feminist Theory, p. 126. 
303 Keith M. Dowding, Rational choice and political power (Aldershot: Edwan Elgar, 1991). 
304 Pamela Pansardi, ‘Power to and Power over’, pp. 77-78. 
305 Amy Allen, The Power of Feminist Theory, p. 126. 
306 Ibid, p. 126. 
307 Ibid, p. 127. 
308 Ibid, p. 127. 
  
85 
 
into a single conception of social power. Her proposition being that both power-to, and power-
over, are ‘best understood as two different aspects of a single, unified concept of power, which is 
intrinsically social’.309 From this perspective then, Allen’s exegesis is torn between ‘the need’ to 
advance an understanding of power that is concomitantly ‘formal’ as well as ‘politically relevant 
and, more specifically, feminist’.310 In contrast, Pansardi seeks to overcome this embedded tension, 
reasoning that despite their definitional divergences, they nevertheless ‘denote the same category 
of social facts’.311 
 
Power understood in this manner provides potent ammunition in enunciating some of the 
dynamics on the historical continuum between subjectus and subjectum.312 The subject or 
subjectus, is subjected to an authority, that he/she does not have power-over in any reasonable 
form, and an at best curtailed power-to pursue objectives with the goal of altering the means of 
reproducing established stratified power relations. However the citizen is not the subjectum insofar 
as the subjectum can be taken to epitomise an equality of power relations. In the process of 
becoming a citizen, being in possession of rights is crucial, for ‘the idea of the rights of the citizen, 
at the very moment of his emergence, thus institutes an historical figure that is no longer the 
subjectus, and not yet the subjectum’.313 The citizen cannot completely escape being a subject, but 
rather is endowed with particular capacities vis-a-vie his/her: power-to address authority however 
it is manifested, and via various models of collective action (power-with), enact power-over this 
authority. 
 
However one should not at any point conclude that citizens across or within polities possess 
the same grade of power-to and power-over. Even within polities the intersectionality of 
experience and the social construction(s) of citizenship must be considered in order for analysis to 
proceed beyond abstract philosophy into the realm of political reality. American writer James 
Baldwin in a brilliant commentary on race relations in twentieth century America captures its 
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essence. From his perspective as an African-American growing up in Harlem New York, Baldwin 
reflects on the transition from childhood by his friends, and in doing so, enunciates the reality of 
the subject-citizen:  
 
‘My friends were now “downtown”, busy, as they put it, “fighting the man”. They began 
to care less about the way they looked, the way they dressed, the things they did; presently 
one found them in twos and threes and fours, in a hallway, sharing a jug of wine or a bottle 
of whiskey, talking, cursing, fighting, sometimes weeping: lost and unable to say what it 
was that oppressed them, except that they knew it was “the man” – the white man. And 
there seemed to be no way whatever to remove this cloud that stood between them and the 
sun, between them and love and life and power’.314     
 
Baldwin’s passage enunciates a necessary metaphorical flourish: ‘this cloud that stood 
between them and the sun’. The “they” he refers to are the millions of American citizens of whom 
Baldwin’s friends are emblematic; the “cloud” meanwhile, more than signifying the abstract white 
man, is a regime of power (one that is inherently white), that structures the citizenship regime 
within the country. Its impact, as experienced by African-American citizens being to shadow them 
from the direct light of the “sun”, and hence from practicing power-to and power-over the system 
as citizens of the state. Among other things, Baldwin’s observations challenge Balibar’s contention 
that ‘what radically distinguishes him (the citizen) from the subject of the Prince is his participation 
in the formation and application of the decision: the fact that he is legislator and magistrate’.315 
Consequently, unlike the subject, the citizen participates in the production and reproduction of the 
political community, rendering for Balibar the analogy of the passive citizen ‘a contradiction in 
terms’.316  
 
Yet it is important not to weigh Balibar’s exposition disproportionately. By way of 
counterbalance Baldwin is adamant in explicating how ‘it must be remembered that the oppressed 
and the oppressor are bound together within the same society; they accept the same criteria, they 
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share the same beliefs, they both alike depend on the same reality’.317 Both the oppressor and the 
oppressed in this context are citizens of the same nation-state, which echoes Davis’ dual-level 
model of citizenship in which Jewish Israelis possess both jinsiyyah and muwātanah, whereas their 
non-Jewish citizen counterparts hold jinsiyyah but are denied muwātanah. The experience of 
subject-hood is diametrically different as a ramification of the intersections of their experience and 
practice of citizenship. To what do citizens remain subject to, and by extension when can it be said 
that the balance between citizen and subject statuses is balanced/imbalanced? According to 
Balibar, subjects exist in ‘a relation of obedience’, but crucially, one that is not synonymous with 
compulsion, although the authority’s power-to compel is inevitably present.318 To clarify further, 
a relationship ‘is established not only between a chief who has the power to compel and those who 
must submit to his power, but between a sublimis, “chosen” to command, and subditi, who turn 
towards him to hear a law’.319  
  
For our purposes, the final part of this sentence is perhaps the most noteworthy in implicitly 
denoting where the change between the abstract subject and the citizen-subject occurs. In it Balibar 
contends that the subjects (subditi) turn towards the chief, who embodies political authority within 
the community, in order to hear the law. That is to say the chief acts as an intermediary between 
subjects and a law which historically was divinely bestowed and thus beyond negotiation and 
compromise. In this way the chief becomes the embodiment of the law, and subsequently the object 
of obedience. Brought into focus by Baldwin’s imagery of the cloud before the sun, one sees that 
the cloud (the chief) over time conceives of himself as the sun. Predicably therefore throughout 
human history emperors have established worship cults of themselves, and have claimed lineage 
from the demi-gods of Olympus; Pharaohs have stylised themselves as gods upon the earth.   
 
It was established in the introduction that while my focus is on a particular community of 
citizens and non-citizens tied to Jordan, I simultaneously recognise the fallacy of framing this 
community and society as a systemic totality. Instead, I am sympathetic to Mann’s argument that 
societies are constructed of overlapping and intersecting networks of power. A problem therefore 
                                                     
317 James Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012), p. 21. 
318 Etienne Balibar, Citizen-Subject, p. 27; Hobbes’ insightful dictum ‘covenants without the sword ae but 
words, and of no strength to secure a man at all’ is a relevant point of reflection here. See Thomas Hobbes, 
Leviathan, p. 223. 
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arises in Balibar’s reduction of subditi and their chief, which implies the existence of a single locus 
of power. Though serving a theoretical purpose it must be expanded to include multiple sometimes 
competing loci of power, especially in Jordan. In the absence of centralised authority capable of 
sustaining direct control over a population, other forms of organisation and belonging persisted 
and at times changed the status quo. This is especially true in Jordan where direct control rarely 
penetrated the steppe east of the Jordan River until the establishment of the Trans-Jordanian 
Emirate.320 Both inside and outside of the main settlements: Karak and Salt, socio-political 
organisation was structured primarily via kinship networks. By which I mean that the structure of 
society coalesces around ‘distinct, self-ruling groups’, with membership to these communities 
based on descent whether real or imagined, to a common ancestor. Connections between members 
of these groups were therefore personal more than territorial in nature.321 Hence upon the creation 
of the nation-state, whose category of membership – citizenship – was eminently territorial rather 
than personal, the seeds of competition between these loci in-particular were sown. 
 
The constitution of the relationship between ruler and ruled, whether sublimis - subditi or 
otherwise cannot be assumed a priori. And the consciousness of Balibar’s subject appears 
restricted to the extent that he/she cannot pronounce, let alone advocate their being, their identities 
and interests in the web of social relationships within which their subject status has been 
constructed and sustained.322 But the subject-(citizen) who emerges from the pages of Baldwin, let 
alone Hobbes, is of a different calibre. He/she not only knows and is aware of their structurally set 
limitations as citizens, but furthermore understands that this sine qua non is of no benefit to their 
interests.  
 
There emerges implicitly from Balibar’s argument a suggestion that citizenship as a 
concept has a unitary quality that cannot be subtracted from, and hence there must be equilibrium 
between the citizen’s passivity as expressed through obedience to law, and their activity as 
manifested in the legislative involvement. I argue into this context that it is important to be flexible 
in conceiving of citizenship as existing perpetually on a spectrum with a number of markers that 
can indicate, without completely categorising the kind of citizenship being practiced at a given 
                                                     
320 Tariq Tell, The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan, pp. 28-30. 
321 Gianluca Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World, p. 33. 
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moment. Marshall’s three stages: civil, political and social, constitute three such markers. 
Flexibility is important for the following reasons. First, Balibar’s exegesis is, dependent upon the 
European experience of the citizen-subject. Our study conversely is interested in the citizen-subject 
within a non-European context, and specifically one in which the role of the citizen legislator in 
the exercise of political power and its distribution remains limited.323 Second, because power 
distribution and the contest over access to it are integral to citizen practices and capacities, it is 
worthwhile to explore how these dynamics are performed.  
 
This exploration is better served comprehending citizenship as elastic however durable 
entity demarcating between the citizen and its alterity: the non-citizen. Through which, the lines 
of inclusion versus exclusion may be tentatively drawn. Such is central to the back to basics 
approach advocated by Butenschon. Third, citizens are conventionally assumed through their 
identification with a nation-state. This identification however does not necessarily mean that they 
are endowed with Pansardi’s three faces of power, as Baldwin’s exegesis on the condition of 
African-American citizens clearly illustrates. 
 
2.7 : Conclusion  
 
The chapter has endeavoured to provide a nuanced analysis of citizenship that can be applied in 
the coming case-study chapters. I advanced an understanding of citizenship that sees jinsiyyah and 
muwātanah historicised in terms of their development from the nineteenth century forward, and 
their fundamental constitution examined. This examination has involved a consideration of the 
two analogies and their roots in order to elucidate webs of meaning attached to them. Doing so has 
enabled sensitivity concerning the role of democracy in understandings of citizenship in the 
Jordanian context. The significance of which is that assumptions regarding citizenship’s meaning 
are avoided before adequate analysis of its application and practice has been conducted. 
 
Additionally, the analysis included deliberation on how the philosophical matter of 
citizenship can be better understood. Balibar’s rendering of the citizen-subject was especially 
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pertinent in this, demonstrating how rather than being a linear development, the subject has never 
truly left the political sphere, rather it has become a hyphenated entity with the citizen. Through 
which I suggested that citizenship exists on a continuum, and more to the point is innately 
intersectional. Doing so has highlighted the fluid and contestable nature of citizenship.   
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Chapter 3 
 
3. Historicising Jordanian Citizenship 
 
‘We have something called Jordanian citizenship but its definition to tell you the truth no one could 
answer that…you have a diverse society but no specific definition of who is Jordanian’.324 
 
 
3.1 : Introduction 
 
The previous chapter shed light on the distinct character and close relationship between 
muwatanah and jinsiyyah, showing the alternating between intersections and different historical 
developments of the concepts in the Arab World. It addressed the history of muwātanah and 
jinsiyyah from the position of the history of ideas and corresponding political thought. Our task 
now turns to the historical permutations that have produced contemporary citizenship in Jordan, 
for it is history that, in the words of Ibn Khaldun, 'shows how changing conditions affected (human 
affairs), how certain dynasties came to occupy an ever wider space in the world'.325 To do so this 
chapter covers six key periods, together spanning nearly a century of modern Jordanian history 
from the Karak protests of 1910 to the close of the century in 1999. 
  
It begins with the pre-Mandate dynamics of social organisation in Ottoman Transjordan 
and their relation to centralised authority. A centralised authority has historically been a key factor 
in the evolution of the citizen-subject, and thus it is imperative to examine the influence of Ottoman 
penetration on this process in the geopolitical locality of Jordan. Through which it becomes 
possible to elucidate whether any continuities are recognisable as the territorial entity socially and 
geopolitically advanced from sanjak, to mandate, to emirate, and to state. Attention then proceeds 
to the Mandate epoch (1920-1946), with a focus on domestic contestation over the emerging new 
political order on the one hand, and the influence of foreign intervention in the state-making 
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process on the other. Both are particularly relevant in the treatment of Jordan’s Bedouin. A 
mediation on the decade succeeding independence in 1946 follows, with attention again allocated 
to internal and external pressures and relations. The Palestinian Nakba of 1948 which saw both 
Jordanian occupation of the West Bank and the settlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees 
and displaced Palestinians in the Kingdom (both East and West Bank) are among the most 
significant factors; owing to their far-reaching effects on both state and nation building in Jordan. 
On such manifestation of this are the elections of 1956, still referred to by Jordanians as the freest 
in the Kingdom’s history. The elections along with the ensuing political crisis of 1957-1958, whose 
resolution saw the contraction of the electoral experiment and the imputation of martial law and 
royal rule, are a central concern. 
 
In association, I examine how post-crisis Jordan took a not insignificant shift towards the 
country’s tribes as political actors critical to the sustainability of the monarchy. During the 1960s 
tribal support was instrumental in the wake of the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) in 1964 and its settlement in Jordan with increased ramifications following 
the Six Day War in 1967. Building on this relationship between PLO and the Jordanian state, 
consideration turns towards those developments occurring between the 1970 civil war and King 
Hussein’s decision to disengage administratively from the West Bank in 1988. Finally, the chapter 
courses over the last decade of Hussein’s reign in which several pronounced developments 
occurred on domestic and international fronts. These include the twin processes of political and 
economic liberalisation in 1989, the pursuit and acquisition of peace with Israel in 1994, and the 
subsequent tightening of the political window from that moment onward. 
 
In order to frame the subsequent historical analysis in terms of citizenship, I utilise the 
quadripartite typology of Jordanian citizenship developed by Morten Valbjørn, whose models 
operate (sometimes simultaneously) across different epochs. The first of these, is an ‘Arab-Islamic 
Hashemite model’ whose parameters were not territorially defined, but required that those within 
its orbit be loyal to the Hashemite throne regardless of residence or occupation.326 Arising 
alongside this first model, the second, ‘Transjordanisation’, is innately more territorially bounded, 
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expressing a ‘resentment’ of the prominent position of foreign actors in the developing polity, with 
a special focus on non-Jordanian Arabs and the British. This was a symptom of its chief guiding 
principle that the state’s first priority was to act in the interests of trans-Jordanians.327 Resultantly, 
one of its more interesting notions when compared to the first model is the sense of hierarchy 
embedded within it, whereby although the political community need not be homogenous there 
ought not to be any doubt over whose interests the state should in policy-making prioritise.328  
  
Integrating some of the elements of both of these is the third: ‘United Arab Kingdom’ 
(UAK) analogy. Unlike them however, the state’s role is envisaged as a facilitator of compromise 
between constituent groups. Citizenship ‘becomes an indirect relationship between the citizen and 
the state’ because it is the group to which a citizen belongs that ‘determines the nature’ of the 
individual’s relation with the state.329 In practical terms this model faded into relative 
insignificance following the loss of the West Bank in 1967, and the subsequent administrative 
disengagement in 1988. As an organising principle however, the idea that the individual’s ability 
to interact with the state is predicated on their subnational collective identity remains relevant even 
until the present.330 Last in Valbjørn’s typology and the latest chronologically is ‘Jordanisation’.331 
It is an aggregation of the previous three, combining loyalty to the Hashemite position in Jordan 
with the territoriality of trans-Jordanisation, but without the citizen divisions - implicit or explicit 
- that are components of it or the UAK models. Ergo, the political community framed by territorial 
borders ‘constitutes the universe within which every person is considered equal’.332  
 
Unsurprisingly, this mode of citizenship finds its pre-eminent expressions in the narrative 
slogans (Jordan First and We are All Jordan especially) of Abdullah II. Yet herein resides its 
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weakness, for as an aggregation of various contradictory currents, Jordanisation is open to 
interpretation and contestation from multiple simultaneous angles. The existence of various 
models occasionally concomitantly, other times distinctively, suggests that at the heart of each is 
political expediency.333 Greater appreciation of this can be advanced with what Tariq Tell refers 
to as the ‘Hashemite Compact’.334 
 
 
3.2  : The Hashemite Compact - Definition and Considerations  
 
Throughout this chapter and beyond, when referring to the Hashemite compact I am advancing an 
understanding adopted from Tariq Tell’s 2013 study The Social and Economic Origins of 
Monarchy in Jordan. In it he defines the compact in terms of a ‘nexus of formal organizations and 
informal institutions, ranging from a militarized welfare regime to dynastic patronage networks’ 
exchanging ‘loyalty for economic security’.335 His choice in opting for compact over contract is a 
deliberate one. The former is conceptually and hermeneutically far more flexible and, in political 
terms, vague in contrast with the latter, which refers to an altogether more explicit set of 
stipulations. In a contractual setting, any obligations signatories possess towards each other in 
practical terms, is transparent and categorical. A social compact contrastingly captures ambiguity 
and subjective application of obligations and benefits more appropriately, precisely because there 
is no necessity for an explicit detailing of its terms.  
 
Furthermore, a compact may be substantially larger than an agreement between two or 
more agents, an epistemic element of prime importance in social relations in Jordan. For instance, 
although Jordan was and is ‘no more artificial than the other entities that emerged from the post-
Ottoman carve up of the Fertile Crescent’, Tell posits that, unlike its equivalent successor states 
Syria, Palestine and Lebanon, the Mandate and then Emirate of Transjordan ‘lacked a center’ of 
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the variety ‘provided by old imperial capitals, religious centers, or confessional havens’.336 
Arguably then, the Jordanian variant of the social compact functioned as more of a lynchpin to 
both state as well as nation building. It is necessary to keep in mind the role these centres perform 
in the crafting of social spaces and centres on which individuals and collectives develop and 
reproduce their sense of self. This is a key way of how territory and attachment to it is imbued 
with a meaning that may be subsequently politicised in various ways with corresponding 
implications. 
 
An absence of a socio-political locus of gravitation is therefore both advantageous and 
problematic for political elites. For the Hashemites it was advantageous because it enabled the 
creation of a new socio-political centre, one that bound the idea of first Transjordan, and later the 
Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom to the Hashemite family in a way that made it difficult for any 
emerging competing alternative to dislodge. A facet their cousins in Iraq never enjoyed. From this 
then, the security dimension of the compact becomes manifest. Following Kaplan, a state ‘whose 
citizens share common ideas about who they are and how they should work together are far more 
likely to enjoy the state legitimacy and good governance necessary to spur and sustain economic 
and political development’.337 There are parallels between Kaplan’s assertion and Barry Buzan’s 
‘idea of the state’, which chiefly concerns the question/s of purpose, an idea that ‘lies at the heart 
of the state’s political identity’, including those pertaining to why it exists, and what its relationship 
to the society within it is.338  
 
Hence, the compact composed the glue of the state’s ‘infrastructural power’ defined by 
Michael Mann as ‘the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to implement 
logistically political decisions throughout the realm’.339 Infrastructural power thus underlines a 
regime’s social control over the population within its territory. Migdal’s rendering of social 
control, ‘the successful subordination of people’s own inclinations of social behaviour or 
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behaviour sought by other social organizations in favour of the behaviour prescribed by state 
rules’,340 is especially pertinent here for its illumination of compliance, legitimation and 
participation as key indicators. Compliance concerns the methods by which the state has its 
population conform to its regime. This can take a number of forms but may be reduced to a 
combination of carrots and sticks: rewards for complying and coercion for disobedience. 
 
Evidently, in a world of incomplete information, the success of a carrots and sticks 
combination is a matter of degree. Migdal makes an astute observation that success rests 
considerably on the state’s ability to judiciously distribute available resources and to monopolise 
this process.341 Participation is the second indication of social control, and is acutely concerned 
with the involvement of the population, or rather members of that population within the state’s 
organisational apparatus. Specifically, ‘participation denotes repeated voluntary use of and action 
in state-run or state-authorized institutions’.342 Thus it concerns not only mass political 
participation, in the form of elections for example, or select involvement of certain groups in 
government enterprises, as with the Bedouin tribes being drafted on-mass into the Arab Legion.343 
Rather, it is epistemologically broader, encompassing all forms of interaction from a citizen 
population within the ambit of the state. The third and final indicator legitimation, advances 
beyond the previous two in terms of its strength, referring to ‘an acceptance, even approbation of 
the state’s rules of the game, its social control as true and right’.344 Conceptually it is constructed 
on the pillars of compliance and participation as it is conceivable how in the absence of either of 
these, legitimation is unlikely to be produced and reproduced socially. 
 
Resultantly, the Hashemite compact cannot be solely rendered in terms of material 
transactions, although these are invariably fundamental to it. Rather greater utility is to be found 
in excavating deeper, to uncover their inherent value in their social existence. If the world is 
innately social, material entities are given meaning within the context of social worlds constructed 
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by people who inhabit them. In this manner rules convert material substances into resources for 
agential use.345 Pertaining to Jordan, Tell conveys similarly, that resources available to and 
distributed by, the state are ‘gauged by the communitarian norms of a moral economy geared to 
insuring the minimal livelihoods of households that survive in an environment marked by 
uncertainty and conflict’.346 
 
 
3.3 : Late Ottoman Jordan – Centralisation and the Foundations of a Citizen Order 
 
Before the imposition of the British Mandate over what is now known as the Jordanian Hashemite 
Kingdom in 1920, the territory in question was part of the Ottoman Empire, and had been since 
the cessation of the first Ottoman-Mameluke war in 1491. However, this did not imply that 
anything resembling a nation-state shaded model of sovereignty existed. Michael Mann has argued 
persuasively that the nature of logistics and centralised political reach in pre-industrial societies 
meant that formally controlling all aspects of territory beyond key supply or logistical routes was 
in practice impossible, until technological advances from the telegraph onwards were devised. A 
tangible consequence was the innate limit placed on ‘authoritative power’.347 There is substance 
to Haim Gerber’s reflection that Ottoman law based rule was ‘never firmly established’ in the 
geography between the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers.348 Yet from the 1850s onwards endeavours 
were made to bring Transjordan into the Ottoman fold more concretely. And in 1867 
administrative structures were enlarged by the governor of Damascus to incorporate the districts 
of ‘Ajlun and the Balqa’, to be joined by Karak and Ma’an in 1893.349 However these 
administrative units did not extend eastward beyond the historical pilgrimage route to the Hijaz, 
later delineated by the Hijaz railway; meaning that tribal continuity persisted comparatively 
unchecked on the frontiers and beyond. 
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Fluctuation and disparity of Ottoman influence between settled communities, west of the 
pilgrimage route and the Bedouin pastoral dirah to the east is significant for later developments in 
Jordan for at least three reasons. Firstly, local forms of social and political organisation endured 
alongside an overarching albeit it loose Ottoman framework. Karak is particularly exemplary in 
this regard, with its socio-political life dominated by tribal dynamics,350 manifested in the Western 
(gharaba) and Eastern (sharaqa) alliances headed by the Tarawneh and Majali families.351 
Secondly, local familiarity with a loosely applied central authority facilitates foreseeable 
circumstances, whereby attempts to impose more rigid centralisation were resisted. Compounding 
this was the reality that the tribes in effect provided systems of justice, taxation and land usage 
alongside the capability to apply coercive force. Thirdly, the people of Transjordan, and their elites 
in-particular, had experience with external authorities, and their attempts at enforcing 
administrative centralisation upon them. This goes some way in helping us recognise that the calls 
for parliamentary rule which emerged out of the Balqa’ Movement in the 1920s were not a thought 
bubble, and indeed could be interpreted as an effort to maintain pre-existing local autonomy. All 
of which challenged the centralising tendencies of the Ottoman state during the Tanzimat era of 
the mid-nineteenth century.352 It is worth postulating in theoretical terms here furthermore that 
these three provisions continued to constitute a challenge to the centralised authority of the post-
Ottoman order in Jordan.  
 
With this at the forefront of our minds I now turn attention to the Karak revolt of 1910, 
which serves to place the previous discussion in a context preceding the Mandate’s establishment. 
Not an isolated event, the Karak unrest followed on the heels of other provincial uprisings in the 
Jabal Druze district of the Damascus Vilayet in May 1909.353 All three were direct consequences 
of Istanbul’s consolidating endeavours. In the Karak case, the revolt developed from three stimuli: 
taxation, population disarmament and the threat of conscription. Taxation had been both expanded 
and its rates increased since 1900, and besides being an inconvenience was problematic for some 
Karakis, who additionally made protection payments to Bedouin tribes.354 By 1910 a plan to curb 
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the availability of breech-loading rifles had surfaced, and in practical terms involved a prohibiting 
of firearms possession in the town.355 Local disconcertion, which had already been growing as a 
consequence of the tax regime, rose again justifiably out of fear of raiding parties from the district’s 
Bedouin neighbours, particularly the Huwaytat to Karak’s south.356 Disgruntlement was 
compounded by the accompanying request by the Damascus-based governor to carry out a census 
of the male population in preparation for conscription. It is this threat, according to Gubser, that 
‘was the major concern and real cause of the revolt’, because similar to the partial disarming of 
the population, conscription would weaken the defensive capacity of urban and semi-urban 
residents against Bedouin raids.357 
 
The uprising itself broke out on December 5, 1910, when armed rebels led by the Majali 
infiltrated the town and made their way to the local governor’s house.358 Manifestations of 
Ottoman centralisation in Karak were attacked and occupied by the revolting forces, most notably 
the Ottoman Bank, Municipal building and the main mosque.359 In the municipal building the 
rebels burnt all registration papers that had been collected as part of the census and land registration 
processes, therein attacking the administrative and bureaucratic means of Istanbul’s penetration of 
society.360 Ottoman officials and gendarmerie that couldn’t seek refuge in the citadel were 
similarly targeted and held either for ransom or insurance against possible retribution from 
Damascus (Istanbul) or killed. The revolt spread across southern towns including Tafilah, Ma’an, 
Aqaba, and Qatrana, where interestingly the Hijaz railway stations in these latter three localities 
were torched as symbols of Ottoman control and penetration.361 The revolt ended some ten days 
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later when, on 14 December, Ottoman reinforcements entered Karak to restore order and military 
rule. 
 
Rogan surmises that the presence of Sami Pasha Faruqi’s army in the Hawran while the 
revolt was being planned and enacted made it ‘inconceivable’ that the rebels thought they could 
get away with their actions.362 Given the rationale for revolt discussed above, the sentiment lends 
weight to Tariq Tell’s characterising of the revolt ‘as the dying spasm of the local order, a doomed 
attempt of a tribal system to defend itself against an encroaching state’.363 A key explication here 
is dying, and it is pertinent to condition the notion of an impending death. Because what is 
witnessed through Tell’s exegesis is a pre-existing network of social organisation (the tribe) and 
its associated social and political norms, coming into direct contact and competition with, the 
centralising organisational power of the state, who thanks to contemporary technology (the 
railway, telegraph communication etc.) can penetrate into the corners of demarcated geography in 
a manner more holistic than at any other period in history. 
 
But this centralisation had its limits, especially on the Syrian/North Arabian steppe. Large 
tribal confederations, including but not limited to the Huwaytat, Shammar, ‘Adwan, Bani Sakhr 
and ‘Anaza, threatened Ottoman control of trade and logistical routes. Even the annual Hajj 
caravans from Damascus to Mecca were occasionally pillaged.364 Tell’s reading of Jordanian 
history during World War One further testifies to necessity of flexibility in establishing and 
maintaining centralised control East of the Hijaz railway. The Ottoman Fourth Army had been 
based in Jiza south of Amman since at least 1914 in the wake of the 1910 uprising, and their 
presence in the Western reaches of the Bani Sakhr’s traditional Dirah or territory meant that the 
tribe’s loyalties could be monitored once the Hashemites in the Hijaz, and the British West of the 
Jordan River began to show their geopolitical hands. Although, beyond the centralising power of 
the Ottomans in their lands east of the railway, the seasonal patterns of the nomadic Bani Sakhr 
meant that in summer they had to return to the Western side, into the sphere of the Fourth Army, 
who could if necessary threaten a denial of access to their summer pastures.365 
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In the absence of territorially rigid states, this arrangement ensured a nominal degree of 
acquiescence to a central authority, this case in Istanbul via Damascus. However, with the 
establishment of the Trans-Jordanian Mandate in 1920 and later the independent kingdom in 1946, 
such was no longer tenable. If anything, the so-called modern nation-state, wherever it is to be 
found, is predicated on a near pathological obsession with borders, sovereignty and control, both 
on the perimeter and within the body politic itself. Bedouin, whether nomadic or semi-nomadic, 
whose seasonal movements did not correspond with the state division of Bilad al-Sham therein 
constituted a threat to this matrix. Thus a top-down driven project of sedentarisation was enacted 
in order to preclude any need of crossing borders.366 
 
But this did not mean that the Bedouin image was dismantled alone. It was rather 
reassembled ‘in accordance with nation-state criteria’.367 Hence, the spasm of the dying local order 
evoked by Tell is dying insofar, as its existence as an autonomous network distinct from the 
influence of the modern technologically endowed state was coming to an end. Distinction is the 
prime variable here, for Tell along with other astute observers of the MENA are not so quick to 
declare the end of such modes of social organisation. Nor do they infer by implication that 
orientalist accounts of regional exceptionalism are binding.368 There is no white dwarf hurtling 
towards a black hole. Instead, one finds integration. Hourani posits that the introduction of new or 
imported ideas, institutions or other such entities into a society do not automatically ‘change it into 
something other than itself’, but may be ‘absorbed into and adapted by a society which still 
continued to exist and to move in its own way’.369 
 
Even before the drawing up and social infilling of nation-states, this altogether natural 
process was observable at the very least with the periscope of hindsight. Tell elaborates for 
instance, on the Bedouin irregulars in the Hashemite army as having ‘stamped the Arab Movement 
                                                     
366 The Ottomans were the first to implement policies of forced Bedouin sedentarization. The 1858 Land Law was a 
crucial legislative mechanism owing to the fact it did not recognise and therefore legitimise ‘traditional’ claims over 
land. Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire, pp. 1, 18 & 188. 
367 Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects, p. 73. 
368 See for example Hisham Sharabi’s critique. Hisham Sharabi (ed.), Theory, Politics and the Arab World: Critical 
Responses (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
369 Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East, p. xvii. 
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with a tribal character’ ensuring ‘that whatever the motives of its instigators, the form and content 
of the Arab Revolt reproduced traditional patterns of political change in the rural hinterlands’.370 
It would be a surprise if this had no influence on state, and through this, citizen development in 
Jordan following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
3.4 : The Mandate & Emirate of Transjordan 
 
So far, it has been seen that in the face of an encroaching power whose coercive capacity could 
not be matched through open confrontation, local actors (urban and rural) sought to engage in a 
process of mitigation and negotiation. I argue below that this process of negotiation persisted, 
albeit within a more claustrophobic geopolitical space, created by external actors and events whose 
role in the geographical demarcating of Jordan and the wider Mashreq are well known. The April 
1920 San Remo conference of the League of Nations laid the international legal foundations for 
the French and British Mandates over Jordan along with the other former Ottoman territories in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. Ratification took place in July 1922.371 This interval is climactic, 
because it gave the British and Abdullah bin Hussein (later King Abdullah I) time to evaluate the 
strategic intersections of their geopolitical interests;372 resulting in Britain’s decision in 1921 to 
divide the unratified Mandate of Palestine in two from the Jordan River. The division was inserted 
into the Mandate via Article 25 which appeared in the final ratified text: 
 
‘In the territories lying between the Jordan [river] and the eastern boundary of Palestine 
as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council 
of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this 
Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions’.373  
                                                     
370 Tariq Tell, ‘Guns, Gold and Grain’, p. 43. 
371 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 109. 
372 Jamie Allinson elaborates: ‘the British had no particular concern with the area that became Transjordan, but they 
were fundamentally concerned with what lay around it. To the east, the bountiful oil fields of Iraq had to be secured 
and exploited. To the west, the Mediterranean pipeline at Haifa would export the product’. Jamie Allinson, The 
Struggle for the State in Jordan, p. 70. 
373 Article 25 of the Palestine Mandate cited in Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 110; 
questions over the meaning of ‘postpone or withhold’ have fuelled arguments on the Israeli right about the illegitimacy 
of Jordan as Jordan and the legitimacy of Jordan as Palestine, therein identifying the Kingdom as a solution to the 
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Transjordan was born, and placed under the stewardship of Emir Abdullah, whose arrival 
in Ma’an in November 1920 precipitated the end of a period of experimentation with local 
government in Karak, ’Ajlun and the Balqa’.374 This experiment of self-government is evidence 
as to the existence of politically minded local elite who were active rather than passive recipients 
of external power politics. The Umm Qays conference held on September 2 1920, at least two 
months before Abdullah’s arrival is further demonstrative. The meeting involving local shaykhs, 
Syrian nationalists (Istiqlalists), and Major Somerset (future Lord Raglan), shared a striking 
similarity with endeavours on the part of local leaders to negotiate with their former Ottoman 
governors. Encouraged by the presence of the Istiqlalists and their agenda, the assembled 
‘demanded’ following Tell’s account, that Somerset in his capacity as present representative of the 
British government accept a series of nationalistic provisions, including the unification the Karak, 
Ajlun and al-Balqa’ governments into a single jurisdiction under a designated ruler, and ‘a 
guarantee that Trans-Jordan would be excluded from Zionist colonization’ underway west of the 
Jordan River.375 At the conclusion of the meeting, Somerset’s signature marked what has become 
known as the Umm Qays Treaty, a symbol of indigenous political nous. 
 
 
Be that as it may, part of Abdullah’s centralising mission was to preclude such local 
initiatives for at least two interdependent reasons. Firstly, his geopolitical ambitions extended 
beyond the borders of the emirate, and thus he was not too concerned with the construction of a 
unitary Jordanian identity, because such would contradict his larger pan-Arab kingdom aspirations. 
Any doubts concerning Abdullah’s wider pan-Arab, or pan-Syrian ambitions should be expelled 
by a glance at the personnel he brought into his governing arrangements. Of the eight chairmen 
who chaired the eighteen governments in operation between 1921 and 1946, none were native to 
the emirate of Transjordan.376 Aside from this more philosophical reasoning, a more tangible 
                                                     
Palestinian question. See for illustration Raphael Israeli “Is Jordan Palestine?” in Efraim Karsh & P.R Kumaraswamy 
(eds.), Israel, Hashemites and the Palestinians, pp. 49-66. 
374 Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire, p. 241. 
375 Tariq Tell, The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan, pp. 57-58. 
376 Mohammed Torki Bani Salameh & Khalid Issa El-Edwan, ‘The Identity Crisis in Jordan: Historical Pathways and 
Contemporary Debates’, Nationalities Papers 44:6 (2016), p. 988; writes that three were Syrian, three Palestinian and 
one Lebanese.  
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rationale for the reliance on non-local staffing was necessity brought about through limited 
resources. Philip Robins makes the evaluation that ‘Abdullah’s instinctive initial course was one 
of expediency: appease the larger, well-organised tribal groupings in order to harness or at least 
neutralise the powerful; ignore or tax the weaker, socially inferior, more sedentary communities 
in order to expand the income base with the purchase of influence in Syria in mind’.377 Utilising 
foreign expertise therefore theoretically served both to keep Abdullah’s finger on the wider Syrian 
pulse and to ensure that he did not rupture local dynamics too obtrusively. Thus, there is little 
reason to suggest as Sharabi seems to imply that East Bank inhabitants whether notables or not 
would possess some innate feeling of loyalty to the Hashemite regime.378 
 
Tell’s elucidation of the 1922 Balqa’ Movement (harakat al-Balqa’) puts to bed any 
thought as to the existence of uncritical loyalty to the new emir. Experiencing considerable public 
sympathy beyond the Balqa’ region of North Western Jordan, the revolt of clans associated with 
the ‘Adwan tribe was at its heart a series of demonstrations against Abdullah I’s method of 
patrimonial government. This although capable of fostering firm relations with certain elites in the 
towns and on the steppe, had simultaneously disenfranchised a substantial part of the wider 
population within the state.379 Given this, an immediate catalyst for the Movement was the King’s 
granting of lands and access to state resources to the Bani Sakhr, as a reward for their service 
against the forces of the Saudi Ikwan.380 The ‘Adwan who had historical claims to this land, 
responded with an armed march on Amman that was halted with British Royal Air Force (RAF) 
support at al-Suwaylih. Accompanying the ‘Adwan revolt were loud voices calling for the 
institution of parliamentary (niyābi) rule,381 which was ostensibly recognised as a way of curbing 
the arbitrary governing style of the monarch. To be clear, democratic governance according to 
contemporary standards was not the objective, but rather a renegotiation of the Emir’s balancing 
of social forces. 
 
                                                     
377 Philip Robins, A History of Jordan, p. 23. 
378 Hisham Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East, pp. 181-184. 
379 Tariq Tell, The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan, p. 68. 
380 Ibid, pp. 67-68. 
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Events in the Balqa’ highlight a second reason for delimiting local governance initiatives: 
as a foreign emir with limited financial resources, Abdullah (and his British supporters) were 
conscious of the need to overcome competing alternatives to the mandate in the most cost-effective 
manner. Co-opting local social forces involving a working ‘through what they perceived as 
indigenous Arab social practices and institutions such as “the tribe”, retrenching or even creating 
relationships of power and patronage on that basis’ was axiomatic.382 In essence then, the old order 
was not completely destroyed, but was remodelled in order to suit the immediate interests of 
mandatory governance. One significant consequence concerns Jordan’s steady integration into the 
world economy and its relationship with capitalist modes of production. Pointedly, capitalism 
‘neither evolved mechanically from the modes of production’ existent locally, ‘nor did it 
completely dissolve these modes’. Rather it ‘sometimes coexisted with such modes and sometimes 
buttressed and prolonged certain of their aspects’.383 One such aspect was the power of prominent 
individuals and shaykhs within the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, who historically maintained 
their social positions via the distribution of wealth obtained from the economy of the tribe’s dirah, 
raiding and extracting khuwwa.  
 
During the mandate however military energies exercised through raiding, and fiscal 
sustenance acquired from khuwwa were replaced with an external subsidy ‘from the colonial power 
administered through the armed forces’.384 There were several developments in this process, 
funded as part of the 1923 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, which initially allocated 150,000 Pounds 
annually for the purpose. The first organisation which sought to use the military as vehicle of 
popular integration with the state was the establishment of the Mobile Reserve Force by Frederick 
Peake in 1920, joined by Abdullah’s Arab Legion in 1921, the Trans-Jordanian Frontier Force 
(TJFF) in 1926,385 and finally in 1930 John Bagot Glubb’s Desert Patrol. It is Glubb’s project 
which proved decisive as the premier mechanism of convincing the Bedouin that centralised 
authority was not always the enemy.386 The process of integrating the Bedouin into the military 
                                                     
382 Jamie Allinson, The Struggle for the State in Jordan, p. 82; Stephanie Nanes, ‘Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting 
Pot’, p. 89. 
383 Nazih Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, p. 41. 
384 Jamie Allinson, The Struggle for the State in Jordan, p. 87. 
385 The composition of which was overwhelmingly “Palestinian”. See Jamie Allinson, The Struggle for the State in 
Jordan, p. 72. 
386 Ibid, p. 71. 
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was made easier by the subsistence crisis facing two of the most significant confederations: the 
Huwaytat and the Bani Sakhr over the course of the 1930s. And it was these two tribal groupings 
that Glubb first applied his take on the Sandeman model of ‘humane imperialism’.387 Weak winter 
rains over successive years combined with the new reality that only fifteen of the sixty permanent 
wells in the southern steppe region around the Sirhan and Sahib Valleys remained in Mandate 
Transjordan - the rest now located in inaccessible Saudi Arabia - reduced the Bani Sakhr, Huwaytat 
and Sirhan confederations to a state of malnourishment.388  
 
An old model of behaviour then was not so much dismantled as its vitality rechannelled 
and put in the service of the developing state construct. Ergo, during this period ‘the armed forces 
shaped a channel to reinvigorate the vertical loyalties of such groups as the Huwaytat and the Bani 
Sakhr’,389 and transferred them to the state embodied in the Emir. This transferral became stable 
and reliable due to the removal of tribes’ independent earning capacity with the end of raiding and 
khuwwa extraction, resulting in economic dependence. It was the mandate and then the state proper 
which was positioned advantageously to define the socio-political role of tribes within the wider 
state network.390 A critical effect was to tie the Bedouin, and later other sectors of society, to a 
wage economy dominated by the state’.391 That this was a profound development is attested to by 
economy analyst Bashar al-Khatib, who argues this dependency persists well into the twenty-first 
century and been exacerbated by contemporary economic challenges and resolute 
unemployment.392  
 
 
 
                                                     
387 Ibid, p. 90. A model of integration into the colonial apparatus first practiced by Robert Sandeman in North West 
India, in which tribes are taken as natural entities whose pre-colonial traits are appropriated and redesigned in the 
service of the new centralising authority.  
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389 Ibid, p. 83. 
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3.5 : Regime Consolidation & Domestic Contestation 1946-1958 
 
It is in the first decade of Jordanian independence that many of the dynamics regarding the 
citizenship regime, which are familiar to contemporary observers of Jordan, began to materialise 
in consolidated form. Notwithstanding obvious differences resulting from differing global and 
regional conjunctures in the two periods, recurring patterns in the Jordanian political economy 
between the late 1940s and the early 2000s are observable. For example government policy vis-a-
vie employment within the public sector was already becoming an issue for many Jordanians 
during the 1950s. Although selective allocations provided thousands of opportunities ‘for migrant 
workers and Bedouin tribesmen…[it] left large proportions of the population, particularly the 
Palestinians, without employment’.393 Wealth disparities between not so much classes as those 
with closer linkages to the state dominated wage economy than others exacerbated discontent with 
political performance. One may also read parallels with the Kingdom’s contemporary struggle to 
provide employment for its burgeoning population of displaced Syrians in a not too dissimilar 
light.  
 
Furthermore, Jordan’s first decade of independence is significant in emphasising the 
fundamental role of national narratives in organising (and controlling) the social energies of 
Jordanians. Specifically, the state under first Abdullah, then briefly Talal before the ascension of 
Hussein, sought in essence to create a hybrid nationality coalescing around four prime facets: ‘first, 
the monarch as the father of the larger Jordanian family; second, the Hashemite commitment to 
Arabism as evidenced by their leadership of the Arab Revolt; third, the regime’s stated 
commitment to Palestine, particularly its defence of Jerusalem in the 1948 war, continued 
Hashemite support of Islamic holy places and its providing a haven for Palestinian refugees; and 
finally, the unity of the two banks and the two peoples’.394 This was of course the decade of pan-
Arabism, and it was this trans-state nationalism which unified opposition to the regime, embodied 
in the Jordanian National Movement (JNM), rather than a territorially bounded Jordanian 
                                                     
393 Betty Anderson, ‘Domestic Influences on Policy-Making: the History of the Jordanian National Movement’, in 
Tariq Tell (ed.), The Resilience of the Hashemite Rule: Politics and the State in Jordan 1946-67 (Beirut: Centre 
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nationalism.395 Although Arab nationalism so far in the twenty-first century can be said to no 
longer possess the same political weight and gravitas, the second part of the asseveration remains 
valid. By this I am chiefly referring to the importance of getting the mixture right in a national 
narrative, so that its probability of reproduction is enhanced.  
 
Reflecting on the composition of 1950s Jordanian nationalism, Betty Anderson argues its 
core components were acquiescence to Hashemite rule (and its peculiar brand of Arab 
nationalism), combined with an ‘ideological orientation’ towards Anglo-European states, 
especially Britain.396 Therefore, and this is the essential point with lessons for Abdullah II’s Jordan, 
those citizens who disagreed with this model needed to draw on a different understanding of the 
nation, and therein question the supposed naturalness of the Hashemite project. Connected with 
this, and in terms of institutionalised politics, the period elucidates the genuine fear and recognition 
on the part of the Palace that a parliament responsive to the public is more than a potential threat. 
Hence, this period stands as an illumination of how citizen engagement, the utilisation of 
muwātanah, may, given the right conditions, operate as a threat to authoritarian sensibilities.  
 
The Palestinian Nakba, which resulted in the establishment of Israel in that same year, has 
had a titanic effect on the development of Jordanian citizenship, to the extent that its impacts 
resonate in contemporary Jordan. At the time two ramifications were of particular note, one 
geographic, another demographic. Regarding the former, the state witnessed an increase in its 
territorial size, now encompassing the West Bank including Jerusalem’s Old City. The expansion 
embodies something of a partial reversion back to the initial British Mandate over Southern Syria, 
in which Palestine and Transjordan were amalgamated. Its prominence in the subsequent evolution 
of the Jordanian political community is tied to the ways in which meaning is imputed on territory 
and then politicised.397 Specifically, state expansion, later consolidated through the unity of the 
two banks in 1950, facilitated a continuation of Abdullah I’s vision of a pan-Arab kingdom 
promised to his father Sharif Hussein over the course of his correspondence with Henry 
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MacMahon.398 This Hashemite vision necessitated the creation of a political subjectivity, which 
necessarily had to exist and operate beyond the territorial limits of the East Bank. Indicative of 
Valbjǿrn’s first (United Arab Kingdom) and third (Arab/Islamic/Hashemite) typologies.  
 
With respect to narratives informing citizenship, territorial expansion across the Jordan 
River made possible the creation of the notion, often repeated by King Hussein, that Jordan is 
Palestine and Palestine is Jordan.399 Binding this equation together was the loyalty and dependency 
of the population on the Hashemite throne, carried via jinsiyyah, the mechanism of top-down 
categorisation and delineation of the political community. Such enabled Abdullah I and Hussein 
to tap into widely held pan-Arab views, while simultaneously not denying the existence of local 
attachments. Contrastingly, to have laboured in the construction of a citizenship regime grounded 
(literally and figuratively) in the muwātanah of either East or West Banks of the Jordan River, 
would have risked the following. First, a collapse of the expansionist Hashemite vision as a 
ramification of its territorial shackling to the East Bank, second, an explicit alienation of some 
communities brought under the Hashemite umbrella, and third, accelerated the development of 
competing narratives as the architecture of the state, especially the place and function of monarchy 
could be more readily criticised. Accordingly, the 1952 Constitution promulgated in the reign of 
Talal, in-conjunction with the 1954 Nationality Law (Law No. 6), institutionalised a fluid 
conception of citizenship indubitably tied to the monarchy as the common denominator. 
 
 
3.5.1 : The Constitution 
 
As a framing device that structures the politico-legal architecture of the nation-state, constitutions 
shape the institutions and functions of government. And the form of government invariably, so 
Aristotle reminds us, alters the nature of both citizenship and the citizen.400 Simultaneously, the 
societal impact of constitutions resides in what Hanna Ziadeh refers to as their capacity to embody 
                                                     
398 Henry McMahon was the British High Commissioner in Cairo between 1915 and 1917. His correspondence with 
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110 
 
the ‘ideals’ and ‘characteristics’ of the constituents within the state.401 As such, Ziadeh and 
Aristotle reveal the framing and regulatory functions of constitutions with regard to citizenship 
that is of axiomatic relevance to Jordan. With this in mind it is of indispensable significance to 
state categorically that the Constitution does not define citizenship (jinsiyyah). Nor does it 
articulate with precision the parameters for membership within the Jordanian political community. 
Chapter 2 Article 5 stipulates this is to be the prerogative of legislation, and it is for this purpose 
that Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (amended 1987) was promulgated.402 At the same time it 
would be a mistake to claim that the constitution vacates the field of relevancy, leaving it to the 
dominion of law-making. Rather, it serves as noted, the function of a framing mechanism, 
outlining in a structural sense, the space in which citizens may operate as part of the political 
system. Consequently, the following analysis is focused in this direction. 
 
Article 6 in Chapter 2 is especially germane in this regard. Its five clauses scaffold the 
environment of the citizen, beginning with the statement that all Jordanians are equal before the 
law, with ‘no discrimination between them as regards to their rights and duties on the grounds of 
race, language or religion’.403 Thus, in-principle, Jordanians exist in relation to each other on a 
Euclidian basis, that is to say if things (citizens) are equal to the same thing (the law) they are equal 
to each other. However there is a combination of overt and altogether more covert determinants. 
Within the category of overt determinants, the most glaring is an omission from Paragraph 1: 
gender. I will address this in detail in chapter five, so it suffice to say here that there is no explicit 
constitutional repudiation of gender-based discrimination, and far from producing mere 
abstractions, enables the perpetuation of discrimination in law.404  
 
Clause 1 of Article 6 is of further interest for its reference to the rights and duties of citizens 
in the Kingdom, both of which are elaborated upon in the subsequent two items. Four ‘sacred’ 
defensive duties pertaining to: ‘the homeland, its land and people’s unity and maintaining social 
peace’ are specified,405 revealing the importance of linking national identity to the existing 
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hegemonic citizenship regime. Following Mehran Kamrava’s observation that ‘legitimate political 
orders are usually built around a cohesive group and use institutions that are reflective of that 
group’s historical evolution’;406 it is crucial that an established order is able to construct the veneer 
of being natural so as to de-legitimise possible alternative orders. In the case of the Hashemites, 
this adopts further significance due to their territorial origins in the Hijaz region of present day 
Saudi Arabia. Just as the constitution outlines the duties of citizens to the state, so too are the 
state’s duties to citizens, through the vehicle of government, laid out into four key provisions. 
These are education and employment ‘within the limits of its possibilities’ on the one hand, and 
guaranteeing both equal opportunity and ‘tranquillity’ to all citizens.407 
 
The final two clauses of Article 6 meanwhile pertain to the social foundation of citizenship. 
Whereas in the Anglo-European tradition the individual citizen came to constitute the basis of 
society, in Jordan citizenship as an analogy remains socially grounded in the family unit as the 
‘foundation of the society’.408 This becomes problematic in light of the inability of Jordanian 
mothers whose children are born to foreign fathers to transmit their jinsiyyah to their children. 
According to Article 3 of Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (amended 1987), only children born 
to Jordanian fathers acquire jinsiyyah automatically in the eyes of the state.409 Female citizens 
therein have the power-to, power-over and power-with facilities of their jinsiyyah restricted in 
contrast to their male co-citizens. Hence only male citizens can “have” families and act as the 
prime conduit for the transmission of citizenship. They are therefore central in the reproduction of 
the state and are located at the foundation of society. Ramifications emerge resultantly in terms of 
the imaginary, the images of what ideal citizenship looks like both in practice and principle. Lina 
Ejeilat reflects as much in her observation that if you are Jordanian Muslim man, you have a higher 
level of citizenship regardless of whether you are of Palestinian or East Bank origin than if you 
are a non-Muslim man or a woman whether Muslim or not.410  
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Hence, the case elucidates what Hisham Sharabi refers to the ‘schizophrenic’ nature of 
neopatriarchy, being neither traditional nor modern, but claiming its essential essence from both.411 
No one should not be deluded into thinking that this institutionalised differentiation is a 
consequence of mere oversight. As a gear in the machinery of Jordan’s citizenship regime, it 
speaks of latent power relationships that influence the wider structure of Jordanian politics and the 
relations between citizens and between citizens and the state. Elaborating on this foundation, 
Jordanian society is established on three pillars: religion, morals and patriotism. With a chief 
function of law being to strengthen societal ‘ties and values’ while preserving its legal status.412 
The fifth clause continues this protectionist theme, establishing motherhood, childhood and the 
elderly are sectors of the community to be protected by law.  Young and disabled Jordanians are 
similarly to be cared for and protected from abuse and exploitation.413  
 
Expounding on the stipulations of Chapter 2 Article 6 reveals the linkage between citizen 
and national, citizenship and national identity. If the Hashemites are successful in positioning 
themselves within the hegemonic narrative of Jordanian national identity, then they are 
simultaneously situated within the realm of popular patriotism expressed towards the Jordanian 
national community. If patriotism is an accepted and socially reproduced pillar of society, and 
bounded by the constitution, it therein becomes integral to citizenship within that society. By 
extension then, the Hashemites have strategically located themselves within the sphere of 
citizenship, giving the impression as a result that they are indispensable to it. Success in this 
enterprise is crucial for regime longevity because it is ‘through citizenship’ and not amorphous 
national identity, that states ‘provide a status packaged with common legal standing, rights and 
responsibilities designed to insure one’s security and to maintain the state’s ability to continue 
providing a secure environment’.414  
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3.5.2 : Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (amended 1987) 
 
Laws are indispensable mechanisms in the institutional construction of subjects both within and 
without states. Their operation, illuminates Migdal, is one of constituting ‘the rules of conduct that 
prescribe proper behaviour of its members and the control implied by the enforcement of the 
codes’.415 With this in mind, Jordan’s Nationality Law of 1954, along with its 1987 amendments, 
provides not only an image as to who is a Jordanian, but at the same time produces a portrait of 
the nation-state. The significance of this is not to be underestimated in lieu of the often contested 
relationship between Arab nationalism and smaller state-bounded nationalisms. One denies 
legitimacy to a state system which falls short of complete unity, and the other whose resilience 
cannot be denied.416 On top of this, Arabism as an ‘umbrella’ of political and cultural identity has 
and continues to be a key element in the reproduction of bordered state nationalisms across the 
region, let alone in Jordan.417 
 
The Nationality Law identifies four categories of person: Jordanian, foreigner, emigrant 
and Arab.418 A foreigner denotes any person who is not a Jordanian, while an emigrant refers to 
an individual born in either Jordan or the ‘usurped’ territory of Palestine who has since left these 
locations. The children of these persons are analogously categorised.419 As a category, an Arab is 
                                                     
415 Ibid, p. 13. 
416 Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998). 
417 Christopher Phillips, Everyday Arab Identity: The daily Reproduction of the Arab World (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2013), pp. 9-11; recent Israeli incursions on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount compound in Jerusalem saw Jordan 
involved directly as the Hashemite king is the official custodian of the site, see: Anonymous ‘Jerusalem leaders hail 
Jordan’s role in ending Al Aqsa crisis’, Jordan Times, August 16, 2017. 
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jerusalem-leaders-hail-jordan%E2%80%99s-role-ending-al-aqsa-crisis 
(accessed August 17, 2017). Hashemite custodianship is an integral pillar to the regime’s Arab nationalist and 
domestic credentials and legitimacy: See King Abdullah II of Jordan, ‘Ra ‘āiyah al-Muqadasāt’, 
https://kingabdullah.jo/ar/page/the-hashemites/%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA, (accessed November 03, 2017). In 
February 2018 an art exhibition commemorating the birth of King Abdullah II was organised in the Abdali Boulevard. 
Titled “Jerusalem in the Heart of the Custodian”, the exhibition in a very explicit way seeks to convey the continuing 
links between the Hashemite Jordanian monarch and the capital of the Palestinian people. See Muath Freij, ‘King’s 
Custodianship of Jerusalem Holy Shrines to be Celebrated in Art Exhibition’, Jordan Times, February 3, 2018, 
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/king%E2%80%99s-custodianship-jerusalem-holy-shrines-be-celebrated-
art-exhibition (accessed February 5, 2018).   
418 Law No. 6 of 1954 (amended 1987) on Nationality, Art. 2. 
419 Ibid. 
  
114 
 
defined in patrilineal terms, an individual whose father is of Arab origin and holds citizenship 
(jinsiyyah) of another Arab state.420 Defining who is a Jordanian citizen meanwhile is predicated 
on one or a combination of the following six explications. First, a Jordanian is anyone who 
possesses citizenship or a passport according to the stipulations of the 1928 Citizenship Law 
(Qanun al-Jinsiyyah al-Urduniyyah) and its 1954 replacement. Second, any non-Jewish holder of 
Palestinian citizenship before 15 May 1948, who resided in the Kingdom between 20 December 
1949 and 16 February 1954, is recognised as a citizen.421 
 
This clause is particularly noteworthy in light of the widespread allegations and proven 
cases of Jordanians having their citizenship rescinded following the 1988 Disengagement from the 
West Bank. Chapter five addresses the conditions under which citizenship may be removed. 
Article 18 stipulates that entry into a foreign civil or military service is one such set of conditions, 
and Article 19 accompanying this states that if a citizen engages or attempts to engage in an act 
considered harmful to the state’s security, they too may lawfully be stripped of their status.422 In a 
number of cases documented by Human Rights Watch however Jordanians of Palestinian origin 
have had their citizenship rescinded arbitrarily in violation of the protections offered the Law and 
its statutes.423 It serves to illuminate the flexibility of law as an instituting mechanism, and in so 
doing highlights the presence of intervening forces in the actual application of it in day-to-day 
contexts. Thirdly, any individual whose father holds Jordanian citizenship is automatically 
regarded to be Jordanian, while children born to Jordanian mothers and whose fathers are either 
stateless or of unknown nationality are recognised as citizens. Fifth, children born in, or assumed 
to have been born in Jordan to parents whose citizenship status is unknown (wālideen mujahaleen) 
are taken to be citizens. In these previous two cases, the status of the citizenship holder is 
precarious, as any later information about their parents being non-Jordanians may result in a 
disqualification of their citizen status. Finally, citizenship is extended to all individual members of 
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the northern Bedouin tribes mentioned in Article 25 of the Provisional Election Law, No. 24 of 
1960, who reside in territory annexed since 1930.424 
 
Attention is brought back then to the second emphatic consequence of the Nakba, that of 
demography, chiefly the rapid increase in Jordan’s population and the struggle by successive 
monarchs to address its consequences. Specifically, that Abdullah I had ‘acquired’ and needed to, 
Hisham Sharabi argues, integrate ‘new subjects who did not share the Transjordanians’ loyalty to 
their king’ into the polity.425 Hence, analogous with the geographic facet discussed above, the 
importance of demography is best appreciated via recognising the meanings that are given to it 
and subsequent modes of behaviour. By extension, identifying and critiquing the implicit 
assumption of loyalty on the part of the Trans-Jordanian or East Banker populations in Sharabi’s 
argument becomes elemental. In essence his study suffers from what Tell labels as a reductionist 
reading of socio-political conditions in Jordan from Ottoman times forward, in which the 
idiosyncrasies of the East Bank are neglected.426 Such analyses tend to assume the loyalty of the 
East Bank to the Hashemite family and its monarchical head without contextualising it adequately. 
Subsequently, certain degree of naturalism is bestowed upon a regime, whose origins do not reside 
in the territory of the Kingdom. Yet, if it is true that ‘a social structure is not institutions but what 
animates them - a set of allegiances, stresses and tensions’;427 then the 1950s indicated acutely to 
the young King Hussein and those around him, that the established order required vigilance for its 
security.  
 
 
3.5.3 : From Elections to Martial Law 1956-1958 
 
With the maturing of political life and civil society after the union, away from the ‘ceremonial and 
artificial’ disposition of parliamentary life, the necessity for monarchical vigilance only 
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increased.428 The regional environment, at that time shaped by Nasser’s vision on Arab socialism, 
also contributed to this trend. Domestic maturation and regional ideological fervour improved the 
organisational capacity of opposition movements, including the Jordanian Communist Party, 
which culminated in the 1956 elections, considered to this day the freest in the Kingdom’s 
history.429 And while Hussein’s pre-1956 governments were led by prime ministers prominent 
during the reigns of Abdullah I and Talal, such as Abu al-Huda and Sa’id al-Mufti, the latest Prime 
Minister, Suleiman Nablusi, was appointed from the largest elected bloc in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Composed of forty seats, the Chamber post-elections was filled with members of the 
National Socialist Party 11 seats, Muslim Brotherhood affiliated candidates 4 seats, the 
Communist Party 3 seats, the Ba'ath Party 2 seats and the Liberation Party with a single seat. The 
remaining seats were filled with so-called independent candidates.430 
 
It is noteworthy that Hussein’s first 8 governments from May 1953 to October 1956 lasted 
little more than a handful of months. Phillip Robbins has posited that an expectation versus reality 
scenario was at the heart of this rapid recycling of Prime Ministers and Cabinets. By way of which 
he asserts that one of the ramifications of government ‘short-sightedness’ was in effect ‘to drive 
their more liberal opponents into the camp of the radicals, who became increasingly strident in 
their calls for systemic change’.431 Over time, such would contribute to the development of a 
general perception that holistic change to the political architecture of the state was necessary in 
order for domestic politics to be more accountable to citizens, particularly given the growing 
inequalities observable in urban centres.432 Hence, appointing Nablusi was important for Hussein 
in terms of demonstrating his responsiveness to citizens. Within a few short years after “unity”, up 
to two-thirds of the citizen population were of Palestinian origin, and for a majority of them 
redressing the occupation of Palestine was the issue above all others. Thus, argues Sharabi, the 
liberation of Palestine, rather than freedom or justice, became the central point of coalescence for 
the political opposition.433  
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In-part because of Nasser’s mellifluous employment of Palestine in his Pan-Arabist 
discourse, the centrality of Palestine brought Jordan and its citizenship regime into the gambit of 
regional power struggles and the Cold War. The 1955 Baghdad Pact was especially relevant, as it 
brought into sharp relief questions concerning Jordan’s place in the region and within or without 
the Arab consensus, artfully wielded by Nasser.434 Citizens voted accordingly, with a Leftist 
coalition winning the most seats in the 1956 elections.435 It is at this point that domestic 
considerations converged with regional outlook in the policy platform of Suleiman al-Nablusi, the 
newly appointed socialist Prime Minister. In the little over five months that he headed government, 
Jordan pursued a more pro-Egyptian and anti-British agenda with the rescinding of the 1948 
Anglo-Jordanian treaty; the signing of a tripartite agreement with Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, 
facilitating a replacement of Britain’s annual subsidy with a thirty six million ($US) per annum 
payment; combined with efforts to reach out to the USSR and China,436 to the chagrin of the United 
States, who were keen to see Jordan part of the Eisenhower Doctrine.  
 
Some scholars, including Robbins, frame these policy initiatives as emanating primarily 
from the throne, an exercise of a king ‘keen to show his Arab nationalist colours’.437 Yet, digging 
deeper brings two facets to light. Firstly, even if these were throne-driven, and there is every 
indication given the Parliament’s make-up to suggest otherwise, all legislation requires 
parliamentary approval. Thus, the role of al-Nablusi as Prime Minister should not be immediately 
cast aside. Secondly, there is still the matter of locating citizens’ collective power-over the 
established status quo. Hussein’s need to demonstrate his pan-Arab colours was predicated on the 
domestic momentum behind Arab nationalism. Thus, Beverly Milton-Edwards and Peter 
Hinchcliffe argue that the young king was forced via the critical mass of public opinion to attempt 
‘a policy of appeasement’.438 Had Jordanians expressed little or no interest in it, or Nasser’s 
discursive constructions in-particular, then it is probable that Hussein and those around him would 
not have had their choice repertoire constrained. As the situation between al-Nabulsi’s government 
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and Hussein became increasingly tenuous from April 1957, the central question, writes Betty 
Anderson, was ‘which national identity, and its concomitant social and political structure, would 
“win”’ and come to dominate the country’.439 For our purposes, the issue is not whether this is true 
or not, rather it is identifying the point at which nationalist perspectives lose their capacity to 
(without a citizenship viewpoint), adequately elucidate and critique the logic and structure of 
power relations between ruler and ruled. 
 
An allusion to this appears when she highlights al-Nabulsi’s agenda to see the monarchy 
retreat from rule, and therein allow the parliament as an elected assembly take over the rump tasks 
of government.440 That Hussein refused, initiating the dissolution of both government and 
parliament, speaks, I contend, more to the substance of citizenship than to narratives of national 
identity. Precisely because it concerns, as Butenschon iterates, the architecture of Jordanian power 
relations within the state. More of the same emerges in the post-1958 settlement, which in many 
ways constituted the foundation of Jordan’s citizenship regime for the next twenty years. Anderson 
refers to ‘a bargain’,441 a classic authoritarian bargain,442 through which the loyalty of the citizen-
subject population was traded in exchange for resource distribution. Implicitly then, Anderson’s 
investigation lends credence to the function citizenship performs in providing for ‘a stronger sense 
of belonging, conveying loyalty to the social group’ whom the state through its national borders 
makes a claim to represent.443   
 
The politics of this representation underline why it took time before Hussein responded 
with coercion, specifically, utilising his constitutional ability to dismiss the Prime Minister, the 
government, dissolve parliament and declare the rule of emergency law, including a prohibition 
on public demonstrations and political parties.444 Each of these initiatives unsurprisingly targeted 
explicit aspects of citizen practice that had come to be associated with muwātanah, and impeded 
the ability of the citizenry to act. The corollary being that they could no longer participate in 
government processes. Coercion performed a central function in compelling citizens to accept the 
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new state of affairs. It is of no surprise that it is from this point that the internal security service 
(Mukhabarat) was expanded and its funding increased, media outlets were pressured and 
contained, political opponents were arrested, and the army was purged.445 In a rather blunt 
assessment Kamal Salibi reflected on how the reassertions of monarchical power-over the 
institutional avenues of the citizenry ultimately meant democracy was ‘sacrificed for stability’ 
pending royal favour.446 Yet more than this, the episode demonstrated that when parliament was 
buttressed by a supportive cabinet ‘the de facto authority of the king was seriously challenged’,447 
a lesson Hussein would hold close for the rest of his reign.   
 
 
3.6 : The Swinging 1960s and 1970s towards Trans-Jordanian Nationalism 
 
‘The loss of the West Bank in 1967 set in motion a process that prompted Jordanians to 
contemplate the question of national identity in a new way’.448 
 
With the establishment of the Palestinian liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 and the 
subsequent politicisation of Palestinian activism, discussions of Jordanian national identity and 
questions concerning who belongs to the political community entered a new phase. While a major 
variable in the evolution of Jordanian politics, it is not the only one of relevance in this period. 
Following the resignation of Wasfi al-Tell from the Prime Ministership in 1963, his replacement 
Ziad al-Rifai found his mandate cut short by the parliament, which refused to vote in his 
confidence. This was the first time a parliament had used its constitutional right to deny the Prime 
Minister their commission. Demonstrating how even after the 1958 events, the parliament 
maintained its capacity to act against the royal agenda. ‘An angered monarch’ reintroduced 
emergency law and dissolved the parliament in response.449 The twin decades of the 1960s and 
1970s were transformative in the development of the Hashemite compact and subsequently 
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Jordanian citizenship. Economically, the country witnessed an unprecedented degree of 
development, which, aside from the predicable social shifts, produced a certain set of expectations 
amongst the population of citizens, as to the proper role of the state. Socially, the state increased 
its infrastructural and penetrative capacities through the expansion of roads, and public education 
being but two.450  
 
Geopolitically, by the end of the 1967 Six Day War, the Kingdom would be smaller, as 
Israel came to occupy the West Bank. Concerning narratives of national identity, the emergence 
of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1964 and the wider politicisation of the Palestinian 
struggle would see Jordan compete for the representation of Palestinians and Palestine.451 This 
competition would lead to a dramatic recalibration of Jordanian national identity, leading to a 
contraction of a plural Arab-Islamic Hashemite model of Jordanian identity, and a concomitant 
expansion of an East-Bank specific Trans-Jordanian national narrative of identity. Newly 
established, the PLO used Jordan’s defeat in the Six Day War to pursue their claim to being the 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian cause. With the migration of 300, 000 displaced 
Palestinians on the East Bank and settled in what would become eleven permanent camps,452 the 
PLO and forces under its umbrella, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front (PDF) had a healthy spring from which to draw water. 
The militarization of these camps quickly led to friction between the Palestinian militias 
(Fedayeen) and the Jordanian military, and clashes between them became recurrent from 1968 
onwards.453 More than sporadic and random acts of violence, the clashes underscore how the Six 
Day War ‘arrested’ in Asher Susser’s words, ‘the process of “Jordanization” of the Palestinians 
and “re-Palestinized” the Arab-Israeli conflict’.454 Such produced what some have identified as a 
Palestinian ‘dilemma’, in which the emergence of the PLO in combination with Jordanian 
performance in the 1967 war shed light on a new reality: the existence of at least two forms of 
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Palestinian identity: one focused on liberation and national exclusivity, and the other on a dual 
‘Jordanian-Palestinian’ identity under the Hashemite crown.455  
 
The complications that this represented in the Jordanian – Palestinian relationship and 
Hussein’s calculations are reflected in the changes to his policy towards the West Bank as part of 
the kingdom. In the wake of Israel’s occupation, Jordan endeavoured by whatever means to reclaim 
it under its sovereignty. Indicating as much was Amman’s policy of continuing to ‘issue licenses, 
permits, loans, and grants in order to aid private and public organizations’ there.456 However, 
Jordan’s weakened position post-1967 in-conjunction with the presence of the PLO meant that a 
return to the old order was impossible. By 1972 Hussein had formally recognised this situation 
with the release of the United Arab Kingdom (UAK) plan. Under which, the West Bank would go 
from being a governorate to an autonomous region within a federal constitutional monarchy. In 
the end however, the decision of the Arab states at the 1974 Rabat Summit to recognise the PLO 
as the ‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians’,457 proved its undoing.  
 
That this was the case is intriguing, given the earlier 1970/71 civil war, sometimes referred 
to as Black September, between the Jordanian army and Fedayeen units of the PLO, demonstrating 
the normative power and value attached to the union of the two banks, and Hussein’s commitment 
to it. This civil war was to have other ‘far-reaching implications for Jordan’s domestic politics 
over the next two decades’.458 For one, any sense of Jordanian guilt towards the Palestinians 
following 1967 was ‘eradicated’, assisting considerably in what Abu Odeh refers to as the 
‘mopping-up process’, which witnessed substantial purges of Jordanians with Palestinian origin, 
and some Trans-Jordanians with Palestinian sympathies from the security services and wider 
public sector.459 Beginning in a limited and targeted fashion, the process over time once taken over 
by the mukhabarat acquired a broader brush, becoming a means of ‘de-Palestinianization’. For 
another, this contributed to the developing of closer bonds between some Trans-Jordanian 
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nationalists and the intelligence service, which became an ‘embodiment of Trans-Jordanian 
nationalism’.460 Resulting in a change in atmosphere in the way in which Jordanian citizens from 
the East Bank conceived of their relationship to domestic (the monarchy, fellow citizens of 
Palestinian origin) and external (Palestinians on the West Bank and the PLO) actors. 
 
Nevertheless, the King did not give up on his historical role as a representative of the 
Palestinians, which naturally included those numbered as citizens of the Kingdom. This desire on 
the part of Hussein not to relinquish the legacy of his grandfather Abdullah I persisted through the 
1974 Rabat Summit of the Arab League. The Summit is significant for Jordan’s citizenship regime 
for at least two reasons. First, it acted as a catalyst for a deepening of Jordanisation, which had 
begun in a targeted manner following the end of the 1970-71 hostilities. Second, the Summit and 
its resolution revealed the extent to which citizenship in Jordan is shaped by external phenomena, 
and as such serves to question the applicability of Westphalian sovereignty in the MENA more 
broadly, and in the absence of a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict particularly. The 
wording of the Summit’s resolution appears to challenge the ability of the Jordanian monarch to 
legitimately act as a representative of those citizens of Palestinian origin residing on the East Bank, 
to say nothing of those on the West Bank, who had previously, and indeed presently -if one adopts 
a strict reading of the constitution and nationality law-, were and are Jordanian citizens subject to 
Jordanian law. In light of external pressure, Hussein convened a special meeting of parliament, so 
as to amend the constitution and relevant laws so as to remove West Bank Palestinian 
representatives from the parliament. I reiterate however that this in no way altered the citizenship 
status of these now former representatives and their constituents.  
 
3.7 : The 1980s and the Road to “Liberalisation” 
 
The 1980s was a pivotal decade in Jordanian political decision-making, and subsequently on the 
development of citizen expectations of the state, and their role in it. During this period, the old 
economic conventions sustained by the boom between 1974 and 1982, that had underpinned the 
expansion of the state since independence, and with it, the Hashemite Compact, fell away, 
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necessitating a change in the international relations of the Kingdom. In-particular, Jordanian 
remittances from the Gulf states, which accounted for over 35% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in 1977, were cut in half by 1984.461 Jordan’s rent-based economic and socio-political architecture 
was under unsustainable pressure. A rentier state according to Beblawi and Luciani is a ‘sub-
system associated with a rentier economy’, which they define in two ways. Either an economy 
‘substantially supported by expenditure from the state, while the state itself is supported from rent 
accruing from abroad’; or, in more general terms ‘an economy in which rent plays a major role’.462 
 
In both instances rent income must predominate over other income streams, it must be 
external in origin, and while a minority of the population is involved in the generation of rent 
income, the majority is involved ‘only in the distribution and utilisation of it’.463 There are further 
typologies used to understand rentier dynamics in state economies, which is especially important 
for Jordan, given that its pivot towards a liberalised economy did not reduce its dependency on 
rent income. According to Warwick Knowles, Jordan pre-1989 was an ‘induced rentier state 
economy’, before changes after this time led to a gradual shift towards what he characterises as a 
‘private sector rentier economy’.464 Unlike ‘pure’ rentier state economies, whose rent income is 
derived from sources not aligned with a third party (oil or resources rent), economies of the induced 
variety obtain rent income from a third party, who may choose to place conditions on their 
largesse.465 Consequently, if the state, in this case Jordan, wants to continue to receive aid-based 
rentier income, then it must enact policies that meet the interests of the donor/s, which may diverge 
from the interests of local constituents, especially the wider citizenry.  
 
Wherever they are found, induced rentier state economies share at least six features. They 
are all aid dependent, experience chronic trade deficits, both of which contribute to high levels of 
state expenditure ‘resulting in continual budget deficits’ when rent income is excluded. Further, 
the sectors of the domestic economy are grossly imbalanced with generally weak productive 
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sectors and a privileging of the service industry. Consumption when compared to GDP is high, 
and ‘the state follows a two-dimensional policy of maintaining control of and access to rent and 
pursuing a politically motivated expenditure policy’.466 Pure rentier state economies are able to 
largely ignore broad-based citizen discontent by distributing largesse as the need arises. This 
capacity is facilitated by the state’s existence as ‘the prime economic power’ and hence, as is 
observable in the Gulf states, broad approaches to distribution can be adopted.467 Regimes in 
induced rentier economies, such as Jordan, are unable owing to financial constraints and 
population heterogeneity to do so in the same way. Thus, they construct ‘a series of distributive 
institutions—usually at the expense of economic development—in order to maintain a highly 
disparate regime coalition’.468 
 
Jordan’s high tide, insomuch as its acquisition of external rents is concerned, was between 
1973 and 1980, following the spike in oil prices in the wake of the OPEC embargo. During this 
period this ‘petromonarchy assistance’ to the Kingdom was on average approximately 30% of 
gross domestic product (GDP), going as 86% in 1979. As a consequence of that, the observation 
has been made that this ‘budget support in the purest sense of the word’ allowed Hussein and his 
governments ‘to expand state economic intervention through employment, state-owned 
enterprises, and subsidies’.469 However, it was to be short lived. By 1983 Jordan experienced a 
series of acute reductions of international capital transfers, to which the government responded 
with external and domestic borrowing, rather than contract spending.470 The failure of this measure 
to curb the accelerating “debt trap” is indicated in the Kingdom’s per capita debt increasing to 
more than 1,900 ($US) by 1988. In light of this chapter’s analysis up until this point it is interesting 
to note how all available measures to improve the fiscal balance were taken that did not rupture 
the internal fabric of citizen expectations.  
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Yet, with external debt double Jordan’s GDP by 1989, decision makers had little choice 
but to approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for a stabilisation loan. 
Unlike the assistance the Kingdom had received from the Gulf States in the previous decade, this 
support was conditional on reforms being made to the domestic economic system according to 
precepts set out by the donors.471 Acceptance of which seems evidential of a regime that could 
neither use coercion to sustain supremacy while altering the established politico-economic order, 
nor maintain the status quo itself. Necessitating therefore, the concomitant program of political 
liberalisation to provide a semblance of citizen involvement in decision making; and through this 
involvement enhance the legitimacy of the regime. What is especially interesting about Jordan 
however is how, despite acquiescing to a series of demands in the Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs) administered by the IMF, the Kingdom ‘explicitly contradicts the rentier proposition that 
a decline in foreign aid should lead to political liberalization or democracy’.472 
 
This was achieved by controlling both processes of economic and political liberalisation, 
so that neither risked the privileged position of key members of the Hashemite winning coalition. 
Simultaneously however, the political opening in-conjunction with the worsening socio-economic 
conditions emboldened sectors of the citizenry – the so called East Bank bedrock of the regime 
especially – who had learnt to expect more from ruling elites, the King chief among them. This 
would go on to have repercussions on liberalisation both in the 1990s and beyond: a testament to 
Ashton’s reflection that ‘liberalisation during this period probably went further than Hussein 
himself wished’, given his own ‘paternalistic’ view of domestic politics.473 
 
If there was one unexpected shock Hussein did not need during the 1980s it is arguably the 
1987-1988 Intifada of Palestinians against the Israeli occupation. Not only did it come at a difficult 
time financially, it additionally rendered more problematic the “Jordan option” to the conflict with 
Israel withdrawing and the Kingdom resuming partial control of the West Bank.474 Instead, writes 
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Joseph Nevo ‘fear of the impact of the Intifada on the Palestinians in the East Bank and 
apprehension that their loyalty might be put to the test, was the ultimate incentive for his 
(Hussein’s) decision to give up Jordan’s claim to the West Bank’ on 31 July 1988.475 Furthermore, 
Hussein was equally concerned about the possibility of Israel moving to force further dispossession 
and migration of Palestinians from the West Bank to the East Bank.476 A number of scholars have 
asserted that the royal decision ‘signalled’ the abandonment of Jordan’s ‘quest to reunify the 
banks’, therein ‘reflecting a deep reorientation in its identity’.477 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 
go a step further, stating it amounted to ‘relinquishing all Hashemite claim to the territory’;478 
while Lynch focuses on it symbolising an end to Jordanian claims to sovereignty over the territory 
and efforts to compete with the PLO for influence.479  
 
In order for Hussein’s decision to be appreciated more comprehensively, a citizenship-
focused perspective is enlightening, for it reveals that the disengagement cannot be registered 
either holistic or complete. Jordan to this day constitutionally and legally in terms of its nationality 
law still possesses a technical claim over the West Bank. By extension therefore, residents of the 
West Bank, who prior to 1988 were recognised as citizens, remain citizens if only on paper. In the 
absence of constitutional amendments being drafted and bills put before the parliament, the 
decision is little more than a glorified thought bubble. It is hence in this context that the National 
Committee of Retired Army Personnel declares in their 2010 statement to the Jordanian people 
that ‘it is now time to bestow constitutional status on this decision by issuing the necessary 
legislation to put it into law, and to end all overlap of citizenship rights with the Palestinian 
areas’.480 Enabling therefore the emergence of distinct political communities – legally recognised 
in Jordanian law- on both banks of the Jordan River. Be that as it may, disengagement, in concert 
with the need to make more palatable the austerity measures designed by the Kingdom’s donors, 
gave the King a unique opportunity to reset parliamentary politics and citizen engagement. The 
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result being the twin processes of political and economic liberalisation which would shape 
Jordanian politics beyond the subsequent decade. 
 
3.8 : The “Liberal” 1990s? [Or Shackled Citizenship] 
 
Socially, the decade following disengagement was punctuated by increased contestation over the 
substance of Jordan’s national identity and, through that, the fabric of its citizenship, now that the 
Kingdom had contracted to the East Bank of the Jordan River. In-conjunction with debates around 
national identity, the decade witnessed several pivotal events that continue to leave an indubitable 
mark on the practice of citizenship. In the following analysis I consider three such events: the 
creation and acceptance of the National Charter in 1991, the introduction of the single non-
transferrable vote (SNTV) in the lead up to the 1993 elections, and the 1994 Wadi Araba peace 
treaty between Jordan and Israel. Each of these windows reveals important insights into the 
practice of citizenship, namely, that the entire experience of political liberalisation and associated 
democratisation was ordered so as to be inherently limited, and ergo, maintain the privileged 
position of the monarchy and the key members of its winning coalition. Yet this is but one 
perspective from which to view Jordan’s political trajectory during the 1990s. Another which is 
equally valid requires further excavation. Taking Mahafzah’s notion of “shackled” democracy,481 
our starting point is to ask who, rather than what (democracy in this case) is being shackled? If it 
is supposed that all forms of democracy (demos – kratos: rule of the people) involves a degree of 
popular involvement in decision-making, then a shackling of this is at its heart a shackling of the 
demos, of citizens.  
 
Jinsiyyah, as the diviner determining between national and foreigner, is a device that 
establishes, as articulated in chapter 2, between those recognised as members of the nation-state 
by the state, and those who are excluded. It is thus the pre-eminent mechanism through which this 
shackling occurs, and therein illuminates the importance of national identity debates. Their 
significance or insignificance is tied to the extent to which their implications are able to make 
themselves felt on the practice of citizenship, and hence of power. In this light then, successfully 
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utilising jinsiyyah endowed with particular normative characteristics may have the impact of 
restricting the possibilities of the democratic window and thus shape/control the expectations 
associated with citizenship. With regards to jinsiyyah this is relatively straightforward, as the state 
has the arbitrary power to determine the rules of the game vis-à-vis who is included/excluded at 
any given time. Nahed Hattar alludes to this capacity in reflecting on the unchanging nature of the 
governing regime in contrast to the Jordanian citizenry.482 Muwātanah however is more 
problematic and difficult for ruling elites to contain, because the citizen acts that are derived from 
it do not necessarily fit so easily into categorisation and control by the state. Opposition to the 
naturalisation of the Wadi Araba treaty with Israel is exemplary in this regard. Citizens do not 
challenge the existence of the peace treaty so much as its ability to influence their lives and the 
society in which they live. 
 
In the previous sections of this chapter I illuminated a fundamental facet of the Hashemite 
compact being the trading of material benefits for political loyalty. The National Charter is 
interesting in how it seeks to institutionalise this loyalty, establishing it as the condition for 
legitimate participation in the emerging political system. It does so through its contractual function 
establishing the acceptable limits of action within the new democratic window. Drafted by a sixty 
member Royal Commission in 1990 and approved at a national conference held in June 1991, 
attended by two-thousand Jordanians from across the political spectrum; the Charter above all else 
reaffirms the centrality of the Constitution as organisational basis of the Kingdom’s governing 
system, stipulating that it is both a parliamentary and hereditary monarchy in essence.483 As if to 
remove any doubt, Article 1 of Chapter One, adduces the way for unity ‘between the people and 
the rulership’ is via shared respect for the constitution and the law emanating from it.484 
 
Parolin’s study on what he labels the ‘Big Bangs of constitution making’ in the wake of 
the 2011 uprisings in North Africa contains a pertinent lesson here. The ‘radical change sought by 
revolutions’ he argues persuasively via examples in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt ‘has very little 
chance of being attained in constitutional processes imbued with liberal legality, especially when 
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these come to be controlled by forces pursuing continuity rather than change’.485 In the present 
instance I am not referring to constitutional change so much as a potentially profound change in 
Jordan’s political life - keeping in mind that Jordan had been governed under martial law since 
1967 - a framework is produced to divine a trajectory forward. That this framework was both 
orchestrated by the King, while simultaneously securing his institutional position and effective 
powers as head of the state links it in substance to Parolin’s constitutional discussion.  
 
The Charter’s eighth, tenth and eleventh articles further emphasise the importance of 
stability, national security and domestic unity in the Jordanian polity. Article 8 for instance 
enunciates while Jordanians have no distinctions regarding the exercise of their rights and 
obligations, any practice of these rights shall adhere to the higher interests of the nation (al-watan). 
Peculiarly it also states that all Jordanians whether male or female are equal before the law without 
distinction; a proclamation the constitution categorically does not make.486 Article 10 builds on 
Article 8 notably in underlining that ‘political, party and intellectual pluralism’ as the avenue of 
democracy serves ‘to guarantee national unity and the construction of a balanced civil society’.487 
In both pre-eminence is clearly given in favour of the nation’s security, which is unsurprising 
considering the four duties to ‘the homeland, its land and people’s unity and maintaining social 
peace’ outlined in Article 6 of the Constitution. In this manner, the Charter served as the foundation 
for citizen engagement in parties, demonstrations, elections and other forms of political activity. 
Correspondingly, if culture may be understood as being ‘composed of potentially contested codes 
and representations, as designating a field on which are fought battles over meaning’,488 then the 
National Charter is a bold effort in restricting such contention within the overlapping networks of 
Jordan’s political culture. As such it served, much like the constitutions in Parolin’s study, an 
additional purpose: control and within that, predictability. 
 
Attempts to ascertain this objective coalesce around constructing a particular subject to the 
state; in a word a certain kind of citizen. An identity of any variety ‘can only be established’ 
                                                     
485 Gianluca Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World, pp. 31-32. 
486 Jordan: Jordanian National Charter of 1991, Chap 1, Art. 8. 
487 Ibid, 10. 
488 Jutta Weldes (et al.), ‘Introduction: Constructing Insecurity’ in Jutta Weldes (et al.) Cultures of Insecurity: States, 
Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 2.  
  
130 
 
proposes Jutta Weldes, ‘in relation to what it is not – to difference’ and subsequently this difference 
however constituted, ‘in turn, is constituted in relation to identity’.489 Jinsiyyah then is not merely 
a demarcation between national and foreigner, but more profoundly is a category indicative of a 
certain identity and through that identity a relationship to and with power. In establishing who is 
within and who is without the political community, jinsiyyah is a powerful device, and one that is 
intrinsically relational because it cannot exist without a corresponding other. Power is never static, 
and resultantly the construction of boundaries between members both internal and external to the 
political community in question is similarly fluid rather than fixed. They are malleable to 
intervention ‘in ways that privilege certain conceptions of a community over others’.490 The clout 
of Hattar posing the question “who is the Jordanian?” then resides precisely in his recognition of 
the fluidity of the official endeavour, of which the National Charter performs its role, to produce 
a certain kind of citizen-subject. 
 
This citizen-subject according to the Charter, is concerned with, and acts in the interests of 
national unity. Unity’s pervasive presence alludes to its counterpoint, disunity, and its emergent 
insecurity. How this relates to jinsiyyah is as follows: if it is accepted that ‘the cultural production 
of insecurities implicates and is implicated in the cultural production of the identities of actors’,491 
then the construction of jinsiyyah and those under its umbrella are similarly constituted by a 
positive and negative identification dialectic. In this instance, the underlining insecurity behind the 
positive image of a unified body politic is that which concerns the disunity of the nation and by 
extension, disloyalty to the nation as already constructed, conveniently, by the regime. With this 
in mind, the timing of the Charter is significant considering the recent history of political upheaval 
in the Kingdom in 1986 and 1989. Many volumes of ink have been expended on referring to 
particular East Bank communities and tribes as the so-called ‘bedrock’ of the regime.492 Yet, the 
events of the two aforementioned years highlight the innate peril of assuming its permanence.493 
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Permanence, or rather the next best thing, predictability is important in the cost-effective 
maintenance of political orders, and especially so when authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes 
undertake political openings. Into this context, elections are a particularly important battleground. 
Voting processes for parliamentary elections in 1989, working off an amended 1986 elections law, 
allowed voters to cast as many votes as there were parliamentary seats in their particular electoral 
district. The parliament that subsequently convened was diverse with representatives from across 
the political spectrum present, despite the reality that political parties remained banned. Muslim 
Brotherhood affiliated candidates won 22/80 seats, with a further 12/80 going to independent 
Islamists. Leftists and Liberals acquired 11/80 and so-called regime loyalists won the remaining 
35/80 seats.494 When elections were next held in 1993 political parties were able to contest, 
however citizens could cast only one vote (SNTV) though multiple seats per district remained. The 
results are striking in what they reveal about the make-up of the Lower House. Brotherhood 
candidates, competing now under banner of the Islamic Action Front/IAF (Jubhat al-‘Amal al-
Islami), the most organised of the country’s political parties gained 16/80 seats a reduction on the 
22 previously held. Independent Islamists meanwhile lost half their seats, with Pan-Arabists 5/80 
and Leftists 7/80 stable. Finally, Jordanian Nationalists acquired 10/80 and 36 seats went to 
independent tribal candidates.495 The opposition therefore lost its working majority.  
 
I do not wish to imply that the SNTV alone is to blame for the reversal in the opposition’s 
fortunes. Rather if it is true that ‘the social fabric’ of the kingdom ‘relies heavily on family bonds 
and informal wasta networks’;496 then the SNTV may be understood as a means of institutionally 
accentuating this character. An implication of which is the rendering of ‘political opposition a 
difficult task’.497 Such was essential to King Hussein for domestic and international relations. On 
the domestic front, the 1989 parliament had proven itself capable of action independent from, and 
at times in opposition to the royal agenda. For example in 1992, Laith al-Shubeilat, President of 
the Engineer’s Syndicate, who had been elected as an Amman deputy in 1989, was heading a 
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parliamentary investigations committee into ministerial corruption. During the course of the 
investigation, then Prime Minister Zaid bin Shaker came under scrutiny for alleged corrupt 
practices. The allegations were especially serious as bin Shaker was a cousin and confidante of 
King Hussein, thus any negative findings would potentially reverberate considerably. The 
Committee was about to indict the Prime Minister when, as Shubeilat explains ‘one month later, I 
was in prison for a “plotting a coup d’etat”. Four months later, I was condemned to death. Two 
days after that, the king gave a general amnesty’.498 The amnesty was a sign of power from the 
King not only to Shubeilat but to other would-be independent reformists including contemporary 
Toujan Faisal that there were lines that they as citizens and the parliament as the law-making 
chamber could not cross. Commenting on both Faisal and Shubeilat, Tariq Tell states ‘they were 
very careful not to create movements because the game is you create a lot of noise and then you 
then get benefits in other ways but don’t create a movement’.499 
 
Regarding international relations, the electoral law needed to be changed to pave the way 
for the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel. The treaty would need to be approved by the 
parliament in order for it to take effect, and thus in order to prevent an untenable embarrassment, 
the SNTV was implemented under the calculations that it would reduce the Islamist presence in 
parliament, and thus not only remove the opposition’s majority, but quieten vocal opposition. In 
other words, the institutional mechanism of citizen practice – elections and voting – derived from 
jinsiyyah, was manipulated so as to increase the probability that the elected parliament would when 
the time, demonstrate loyalty to the throne and state through support for peace. But this came with 
an unforeseen cost of generating alienation between the population at large and ruling elites 
precisely because citizenship crystallised through muwātanah produces a different set of identities, 
therefore interests and subsequently actions. 
 
Peace with Israel, one of the two historic others, in relationship with whom Jordanian 
identity had developed and understood itself in its regional context, brought this debate further into 
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the public sphere where it has remained since. On 26 October 1994, King Hussein and Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Wadi Araba treaty, bringing hostilities between the two 
states to a conclusion. Owing to the ‘perennial tumult’ of the region, Hassan Barari argues that 
Hussein endeavoured to nourish peace as a ‘strategic choice’.500 Simultaneously, the wider 
objective was to institute a “warm” peace, understood as ‘full normalization of relations at the 
political, economic and social levels enabling easy transfer and flow of people, goods and ideas’.501 
Writing twenty years after the historic signing however, Barari affirms that a relationship capable 
of being characterised in this way remained ‘far from reality’.502  
 
To contextualise this is it appropriate to outline some of the key Jordanian rationales for 
peace, aside from it being a strategic geopolitical manoeuvre. Two stand out: expectations for a 
so-called ‘peace dividend’ on the one hand,503 coupled with a belief that the Oslo Accords would 
result in the materialisation of a Palestinian state that would preclude the possibility of a de-facto 
Palestinian takeover of Jordan.504 Allow me to note here that this fear of a Palestinian takeover is 
an umbrella under which at least two distinct arguments reside. The first is the argument, 
propagated with increased fervour during the 1980s in Israel, that ‘Jordan is Palestine’.505 In 
essence this argument takes demographic dynamics within the Kingdom and suggests that on the 
basis of them, there is no need to settle the Palestinian question west of the Jordan River. A second 
argument, which exists irrespective of the Israeli contention, is also grounded in a reading of 
demography. Its wellspring is Trans-Jordanian apprehension about being a minority in their own 
state, a sensation currently magnified by the presence of over one million Syrian refugees in the 
Kingdom.506 As a concept Trans-Jordanian nationalism may be unique in the region for its manner 
of coming into being had little to do with the leadership of the nation-state.  
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Adnan Abu-Odeh, a former Royal Court chief and Jordanian of Palestinian origin notes for 
instance that there is ‘no serous evidence’ that the propagation of a distinctly East Bank national 
identity was of any real concern to Abdullah I.507 In some respects it was not until the 1970 civil 
war that the regime, then led by Hussein became more interested in propagating a trans-Jordanian 
nationalism. Although following Valbjǿrn, this was not premised on an exclusion of the broader 
Hashemite narrative of unity across the River. Yet, as illustrated in the first half of this chapter, it 
was a consistent concern for local elites. 
 
 
3.9 : Conclusion 
 
Citizenship in Jordan as it evolved over the course of the 20th Century is grounded in what Tariq 
Tell refers to as the Hashemite Compact. This is more than an unwritten and informal code framing 
the bargain of loyalty for social and economic security, but is furthermore, implicated in the very 
political subjectivity of Jordanians. Over the course of this chapter I charted the development of 
the relationship between Jordanians and political authority, first of the Ottoman Empire, then the 
Mandate, and finally the Hashemite monarchy. Through each period Jordanians demonstrated a 
willingness to challenge decisions and test the boundaries of the extant political authority.  
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Chapter Four 
 
4. An Absence of Ownership and Accountability  
 
‘Citizenship (muwātanah) means equal rights for all and equality before the law in accordance 
with the constitution in which rights are political, economic and social and’.508 
 
‘Citizenship in Jordan is a very vague term, perhaps not on paper but in reality it is’.509 
 
‘Here in Jordan citizenship means almost nothing’.510 
 
‘I’m talking about garbage but it’s very important because it’s political and it’s also cultural. And 
when I talk about citizenship this is part of citizenship’.511 
 
4.1 : Garbage in the Streets 
 
It is 2016, and across Amman and Jordan as a whole, whether it be a popular picnic spot in the 
Ghor (Jordan Valley), the roadside of the King’s Highway or popular locales in Amman and Irbid 
it is difficult to not notice the waste. Empty cigarette packets, ethereal plastic bags, and vacant 
bottles converse with the dust of a dry summer. This is not uniquely Jordanian. In the same year, 
logistical and political failures would see mountains of uncollected garbage lie rotting in streets 
across Lebanon. Nor is this exceptionally Arab or regional, with residents of and visitors to places 
as varied as New York, Paris, New Delhi and Beijing confronting pollutants in their 
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neighbourhoods and wider environment. But in this case, garbage in the streets of Jordan suggests 
something specific; that the prevailing status and practice of citizenship is absent from ownership 
and accountability. 
  
As a lived experience, the question of what is done with our domestic waste is a universally 
human one, and has much to do with our individual and collective interpreting of the meaning and 
through it, acceptable use of space. This specifically concerns the uses of shared public space 
outside of the confines of a private residence. Central to which is a shared perception of 
accountability borne out as an expression of feeling individual and collective ownership. Each of 
these is critical to citizenship, and it is through their absence, manifested in the act of littering that 
particular complexities of Jordanian citizenship can be observed. ‘For me’, observes local 
journalist Rana Sweiss, ‘it is one of the signs, the profound signs of people not feeling that they 
are part of a community that this is theirs and you need to take care of it. You cannot throw garbage 
in your neighbour’s house you cannot steal your neighbour’s water’.512  
 
She continues that, for her, citizenship (muwātanah) in Jordan ‘means Jordanians feeling 
that they have ownership, that they have responsibilities towards their country and they feel that 
they are part of the decision making process as well’.513 They as individuals, and as members of 
the national community, have a deciding stake in the political process, sufficient enough to make 
decision-makers accountable to the citizenry. As was enunciated in chapter two, this is critical in 
the evolution of the subject into the citizen-subject who becomes subject to law as opposed to an 
individual. The first of the epigraphs listed above from Abla Abu-Elbeh confirms this, recognising 
muwātanah’s unique carrying capacity (in contrast with jinsiyyah) as the vessel for individual 
rights. A concomitant recognition of obligations is implicit here, and is expressed in greater deal 
by economic researcher Wael Abu Anzeh who argues citizenship fundamentally ‘means you as a 
person having the nationality of a certain country and from there you are subject to that country’s 
rules, cultural norms and heritage’.514 
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In referencing the connections between rules, norms and heritage, Abu Anzeh conveys the 
subjective nature of citizenship, which may generate, according to Sweiss, a ‘feeling like you can 
make an impact on the decision making process’.515 This is undertaken via the political rights 
citizenship theoretically guarantees as a matter of principle. However, there is a disparity between 
the theoretical promises of citizenship and the lived experience of its application in Jordan. At its 
centre are ownership and accountability. One political analyst who wished to remain anonymous 
links the present state of these, or rather their precariousness to two factors mirroring Abu Anzeh’s 
observations: conventional ways of individual and collective identification on the one hand, and 
the role of the state in promulgating and enforcing rules on the other.516  
 
She suggests that because ‘when Arab people identify with something we identify with a 
group of people not with a territory’ the very idea of a territorial identity embodied in the nation-
state becomes a challenge in the Jordanian context.517 This relates to not only its establishment, 
which was detailed in chapter three, but equally, to the depth of citizenship as an institution of 
identity within it. Remembering that depth refers to how demanding citizenship is, comparative to 
the other identities that individuals simultaneously possess, and act in accordance with. If 
citizenship, especially jinsiyyah, in the context of the nation-state is predicated on territory, than it 
may struggle to integrate itself into a normative milieu which favours identity construction within 
groups rather than space. Using herself as an example she elaborates: 
 
‘I was born in Amman and have lived all my life in Amman but if asked I never say that I 
am from Amman; I say I am from Irbid the town where my father was born. My mother 
wasn’t born there, I have never lived there as a matter of fact I hate going there and when 
I do go I am a stranger: I don’t know the people and I don’t know the area’.518 
 
Demonstrably, identity is conveyed through ties to networks, and therefore space becomes 
relevant when it is directly associated with personal (especially familial) networks.  There is a stark 
contrast between the family home, which is spotlessly clean, and the garbage filled neighbourhood: 
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to one accountability and ownership, the other comparatively neither. From this extrapolation 
muwātanah appears conceptually as a function/product of human interaction. Perhaps, answering 
why early exponents of Arab nationalism focused on language as the unifying variable par 
excellence.519 When taken in this way, the territorial element of muwātanah appears to be 
secondary yet, not insignificant. Indeed, given that all Jordanians interviewed between 2016 and 
2017 identified muwātanah as the vessel of rights and obligations, it is important to recognise its 
inherent territoriality in contemporary political discourse. Especially given the uprisings of 2011 
and 2012, which analogous with their counterparts in other parts of the Arab world owed much of 
their existence to ‘the emergence of a discourse of rights which united the different groups, 
tendencies and classes against the factors that hindered change’ in the previous decades.520 
 
This connects with the second facet referred to by our Jordanian analyst: ‘the way people 
react to the idea of the public good’.521 Because notions of the public are bounded territorially by 
the nation-state, it performs a seminal role in shaping reactions. In this regard, the interviewee 
reflects on the necessity for further civic education in Jordan to improve the perception of 
ownership and accountability in the public sphere. Stating, if citizens feel ‘I pay my taxes at least 
that will go to cleaning my town, my street, my neighbourhood, ok I can see where the money is 
going and I am in charge of it’ (albeit indirectly)’.522 Once more ownership and accountability 
come into play, and involves the institutions of the state being responsive and accountable to the 
expectations and needs of citizens. However she is concomitantly aware that ‘this is not the way 
the relationship [between citizens/residents and state authority] has been constructed where you 
have a state which claims that they are cleaning their streets not my streets’.523 
 
Privilege and dispensation have by this logic been important components of Jordanian 
state-building, an argument enunciated in chapter three. Its continuing relevance in the twenty-
first century is attested to in Tariq Tell’s observation that citizenship in the Kingdom is more ‘an 
                                                     
519 See for illustration Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, p. 260; A.A. Duri, The 
Historical Formation of the Arab Nation: A Study in Identity and Consciousness (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 
221. 
520 Roel Meijer, Citizenship Rights and the Arab Uprisings: Towards a New Political Order (Amsterdam: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2015), p. 20. 
521 Anonymous, (Political analyst and researcher), interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016. 
522 Ibid. 
523 Ibid. 
  
140 
 
idea of being a beneficiary rather than having rights. So it’s about your right to a job and the trouble 
is that the state runs into crises when it has been unable to deliver these [benefits]’.524 In his account 
citizens vie with each other over access to resources distributed by the state. As these resources, 
in his example employment opportunities, are finite, this automatically presupposes the existence 
of hierarchies whether officially institutionalised or not. Furthermore, because access is facilitated 
by individuals in relative positions of power, familial and extra-familial social networks become 
especially important vehicles through which the individual’s relationship with the state is 
negotiated, performed and navigated. 
 
Over time, this has produced in Jordan, a scenario in which ‘familial ties have provided a 
substitute for properly functioning institutions’ in the relations between citizens and the state.525 
Their ongoing contemporary relevance is affirmed by journalist Farah Maraqa, who poignantly 
notes, ‘if you are a citizen (of Jordan) you will have a passport and be able to represent the country 
in the world, but you will do so without any other services unless you have someone who, you 
know, here called wasta’.526 Instrumental in Jordanian politics since its establishment,527 wasta’s 
origins reside in modes of tribal social organisation as means of conflict resolution, reflected 
etymologically in its root structure. Derived from the root wa-sa-ṭa, form II meaning to place an 
entity in the middle of, or between two things, whereas form V refers to something or someone 
being positioned between two extremes on the one hand, or the act of mediating between these 
dual extremes;528 wasta, context dependent, may refer to a noun (an individual) or a verb (the 
action of mediation undertaken). 
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In its historical context of inter-tribal relations, it served an ‘intermediary’ function, being 
employed to de-escalate conflict whether inter-personal of inter-collective in nature.529 The arrival 
of centralised government with the nation-state did not result in wasta’s social eradication so much 
as its evolution from a vehicle of intermediation to one of intercession. An individual seeking 
anything in the modern marketplace from employment, legal assistance, entry into an education 
institution such as a university, a contract or negotiating a bureaucratic procedure such as obtaining 
a driving license may call upon wasta to intercede on their behalf to streamline the process.530 
Because wasta as both a noun and a verb, is utilised by citizens in this manner, it can be said that 
the state is implicated in the persistence of such practices. Consequently, the contemporary as well 
as the historical state is implicated (in more ways than one) in the construction of the present 
citizenship regime. Furthermore, where the state has been involved it has seemingly more often 
than not either been unwilling to foster the civic identity of citizens, or has been detrimental to it. 
Affirmed by Hamid Qahwi’s observation that whether ‘in the school, university, administrative 
apparatus [of the state] or workplace, real citizenship is not practiced’.531  
 
Tell’s outlining of Jordanian citizen-state relations in-conjunction with the other views 
provided here falls under the umbrella of Cynthia Weber’s understanding of legitimation. Namely, 
the citizenry ‘submits itself to the authority of the state so long as the state performs as the 
reflection of the will of its citizens’.532 Recalling his associated claim that the Jordanian state 
becomes marred in crises when this performative equation is ruptured, it is useful to frame the 
2011 and 2012 demonstrations as evidence of this rupture similar with their predecessors in 1989. 
A moment in which the distribution mechanisms of the Jordanian state failed to operate in-
accordance with either the expectations of citizens, or their networked ability (via wasta for 
example) to overcome the negative repercussions.  Regime precariousness emerges from the 
contraction of citizen participation in the economic, political and social life of the state. Resulting 
in a concomitant withdrawal of support for the status quo, through which, the state is experienced 
by citizens. This is precisely what made the events of 2011 and 2012 a watershed in Jordan and 
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beyond, because ‘people really did have moments where they felt they can make an impact on 
decisions in Jordan. Political decisions, social decisions and labour decisions’.533  
 
Given this, how may the uprisings, and the political developments that followed be 
situated? Chapter three provided an historical consideration of the evolution of citizenship as an 
institutional category associated with the Jordanian nation-state spanning the twentieth century. 
With this and the above information in hand it is now appropriate to pivot focus onto this century. 
Doing so highlights the absence of ownership and accountability in the political and economic 
decision-making of the period which has contributed to increased apathy amongst Jordanians. 
Apathy towards both the political class composed of individuals and families close to the regime, 
and the institutions of the state including but limited to the parliament and the monarchy; resulting 
in the unprecedented uprisings from 2011 onwards. From the perspective of 2016 Rana Sweiss 
reflects that this situation, along with the garbage ‘has gotten much worse maybe since the 2000s… 
In the 80s it was unheard of’.534 Ergo, the first decade of Abdullah II’s reign is pivotal in 
illuminating practices of contemporary citizenship. 
 
This chapter illustrates how existing avenues of citizen participation in decision-making 
between 1999 and 2010 provided an insufficient degree of citizen ownership, and hence, power-
over the process. By consequence, those involved in economic and political decision-making were 
not made accountable to the citizenry. In the subsequent divisions of this chapter I consider each 
in turn, mindful of their interconnections.  
 
 
4.2 : Competition and its Discontents 
 
On the economic front, two initial and distinct but related points are made. First is that there has 
been a contraction of state resources over the course of the decade or so in question. This has meant 
that established tools used by citizens when interacting with the state such as wasta have become 
less effective for the majority of citizens in the middle and working classes; rendering their 
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deteriorating socio-economic situation increasingly untenable. Secondly, because decision-makers 
are by-and-large unaccountable to citizens, these same citizens have little recourse when it comes 
to desiring changes to the Kingdom’s economic trajectory. A reality made harder by the nature of 
transnational capital flows and the need by states to compete with each other in order to attract 
foreign investment and capital inflows. Within a year of ascending to the throne it was clear that 
Abdullah II’s ‘primary concern’ was to prepare Jordan for post-Cold War globalisation and 
‘presumably’ a post-peace era of regional relations.535 This included a further distancing of Jordan 
from the West Bank and the Palestinian question politically, and an accelerating of market oriented 
reforms to boost Jordan’s competitiveness, the two constituted an advancement of an existing 
trajectory initiated by King Hussein in 1989.536 While it may be true that already by 2000 these 
twin policies could be recognised as fuelling ‘a power struggle between the "old guard 
traditionalists" and "the new guard reformists”’;537 worthy of attention is how they may have 
influenced the theory and practice of citizenship at the level of citizens.  
 
To begin, it is worthwhile outlining that the global order is socially constructed, producing 
hierarchies. This is significant in relation to the MENA, which as Raymond Hinnebusch has 
argued, was converted ‘under imperialism into a periphery of the Western dominated world 
system’.538 Hierarchical status and cross-border flows do not just exist in the terms of movement 
from periphery to metropole,539 but in an era of globalisation have been tied to the production, 
consumption and accumulation of capital. Engendering what Cerny calls the emergence of the 
‘competition state’ whose rationale, is to attract an increasing market share of available global 
capital flows.540 In light of the historical development of Jordan’s citizenship regime, the shift in 
state behaviour from resource distribution to capital attraction and accumulation would have a 
profound impact on established citizen expectations; and therefore citizen – state relations. Tariq 
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Tell elaborates, the trouble for Abdullah II’s endeavour to prepare Jordan for an era of embedded 
globalisation is that the logic by which the state operates ‘has to be a logic of distribution rather 
than accumulation, and the problem of Abdullah II is that he is interested in accumulation. So this 
is why he has ended up in a lot of trouble, and ended up with such a legitimacy problem’.541 
 
There are substantial indicators that the Kingdom’s economic developments since 
Abdullah II’s ascension are leaning in the direction towards those of a competition state. The first 
of these concerns the King’s early travel itinerary declaring Jordan open for business, and 
resituating the Kingdom within the ambit of states and international financial organisations (IFOs) 
recognised as critical for budget and regime security. Chief among them the World Bank and IMF, 
whose intervention in the Kingdom had been ongoing since 1989, and a number of regional and 
more distant states including Egypt, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members Saudi Arabia chief 
among them, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Spain and the United States (US). 
 
Relations between Jordan and the GCC had soured demonstrably during the last decade of 
Hussein’s reign, and tensions had arisen in Jordan’s other inter-Arab relations via the Kingdom’s 
support for Iraq in the first Gulf War, and Hussein’s pursuit and eventual acquisition of peace with 
Israel. Beyond these geo-strategic manoeuvres, a number of Arab leaders were critical of Hussein’s 
ambition.542 Having not come of age politically in the midst of the Cold War and episodes of inter-
Arab rivalry, Abdullah II was well placed to turn the page on these relations.543 Resetting Jordan’s 
external relations was a fundamental component of improving budget security and not merely so 
as to acquire further loans and financial aid. Abdullah II was a strong believer in deepening his 
country’s linkages with the prevailing currents of global capital flows. It was with equal 
enthusiasm that he approached Jordan’s relations with non-Arab states. 
 
At a May 1999 banquet hosted by the Mayor of London, the King opened with a statement 
of intent: ‘my government asked me to convince all of you, in five minutes or less, that Jordan is 
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the ideal place for your investments’.544 Putting the humour aside, it is clear that Abdullah II was 
serious about attracting foreign investment as a way of stimulating domestic employment growth. 
But in order to do so, Jordan’s economic environment needs to be attractive to foreign investors. 
Globally then, Jordan must compete with other states for investment contracts and foreign capital. 
This process of competition is at the heart of what Philip Cerny identifies as the ‘transformation 
of the nation-state into a “competition state”’ in the face of accelerating globalisation.545 Cerny is 
chiefly concerned with what he calls ‘political globalisation’, a form of structuration directly 
influencing ‘the shaping of the playing field of politics itself’.546 This means that ‘complex 
congeries of multilevel games played on multilayered institutional playing fields, above and 
across, as well as within, states boundaries’ are having a greater effect on state behaviour than 
outdated models of unitary state action.  
 
Citizenship within the state is affected insofar as globalisation ‘involves reshaping political 
practices and institutional structures in order to adjust and adapt to the growing deficiencies of 
nation-states as perceived and experienced by such actors’.547  This includes the economic activity 
of states whose trade relations become less about exporting domestic surplus, than situating them 
within the context of global political contestation over access to capital. For Jordanians this has 
meant a contraction of the state as a distributor of largesse and resources, which was at the heart 
of the Hashemite compact. Hence, ‘rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of 
the market, to “decommodify” them as the welfare state was organized to do, the competition state 
has pursued increased marketization in order to make economic activities located within the 
national territory, or which otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in 
international and transnational terms’.548  
 
While in London, Abdullah II made certain to inform his audience of potential investors 
that Jordan had already, and was continuing to, accelerate its pursuit of marketization, listing the 
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privatisation of the railway system and Jordan Telecom Group as evidential, with Royal Jordanian 
Airlines on the way.549 Further, he nominated that his and his government’s ‘job’ would be ‘to do 
what we can within our capabilities to make these offers for foreign investors as smooth as 
possible’, a point reiterated later that month during an official visit to Canada.550 In both instances 
the government is referred to as the King’s rather than belonging to the country itself. Instead of 
being taken as isolated policies, these and others like them ought to be comprehended as part of a 
program enacted by state, non-state and market actors who ‘in seeking to adapt to a range of 
complex changes in cultural, institutional and market structures…are attempting to reinvent the 
state as a quasi-“enterprise association”’.551 And do so in a context in which the wider citizenry 
has increasingly little input.  
 
It is this process of pseudo-reinvention which has produced an increasing disconnection 
between Jordanians and the nation-state under the Hashemite umbrella. ‘We are running into 
trouble’ argues Rana Sweiss, inasmuch as the central ‘trade-off’ of the Hashemite Compact, ‘you 
(the regime) provide us (citizens) with jobs in the state and we will cooperate with you’ has since 
1999 become increasingly unsustainable.552 This is true not only in terms of the state’s ability to 
afford it, but also for citizens themselves to earn a living from it.553 She continues outlining how 
in the past you could provide employment in the military, the Mukhabarat, the Royal Court, 
government ministries and institutions and within the local municipalities. Each of these would 
have a budget and assign salaries accordingly, often reliant on foreign aid and financial assistance. 
‘The problem’ Sweiss identifies:  
 
‘Is that in the last thirty years without exaggeration, even 1000 dinars is not enough to live 
in Jordan. These people are still taking 200 dinars for five, six, seven people in a family. 
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The government cannot keep up nor increase the salaries. So you end up with a bloated 
bureaucracy, you cannot fire them, you have low pay, and for example in the Amman 
Municipality, so many mayors – who are appointed by the way – have wanted to fire people 
and they were literally threatened. Every time you ask “why do you have so many people?” 
they respond “we can’t fire anyone”. They are afraid of riots from the tribes. And if you 
listen, the Prime Minister is always trying to reassure people that the price of bread is not 
going to go up. You know these are the red lines’.554 
 
Situations like these are not isolated phenomena in Jordan. ‘So much of the population is 
dependent upon the state’, with some forty-two percent of the population employed in the military, 
security apparatus and other public sector agencies.555 Although the public sector remains bloated, 
the depreciation in its service provision to citizens, and the apparent embrace of private sector 
investment seeking rhetoric by decision-makers, is evidence of the state repositioning itself. In a 
move away from ‘the development and maintenance of a range of “strategic” or “basic” economic 
activities’ promoting self-sufficiency, towards a focus on ‘competitive conditions’ within a 
growing international (and increasingly transnational) marketplace. A shift that is occurring 
without citizen involvement in its agenda, and one often framed in terms of ‘competitive 
advantage’ superseding the pursuit of ‘comparative advantage’ in the minds of policymakers.556 
In an address to the Confederation of Spanish Industry, for example, Abdullah II alludes to this 
very modification in explicating how Jordanian decision-makers ‘have identified the competitive 
advantages in our economy: in mining, tourism and services’ in addition to adopting information 
technology (IT) ‘as our new national sector’.557 
 
To this end governments had initiated a multi-pronged policy with an eye to increasing 
FDI through improving the Kingdom’s competitive advantage via: protecting intellectual property, 
sector regulation, ‘taking a “liberal” stance on controlling information flows and content in 
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cyberspace’, and harnessing human capital within the workforce among others.558 Despite some 
forward advances, by 2002 the Kingdom still lagged behind competitors Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Bahrain. Cunningham puts part of the reason at the feet of the 
leadership who appeared to be ‘pursuing a "managed" IT strategy that may prompt the regime to 
limit, in whole or in part, elements of the IT program’.559 Furthermore, on the question of freedom 
online, by the middle of the decade bloggers had begun to feel the pressure of censorship and 
monitoring by the mukhabarat;560 suggestive that the “liberal” stance on internet activity had its 
limits.  
 
Two things about economic agenda-setting and policy application when it comes to citizens 
become discernible. First, the citizenry has little if any active input over economic agenda-setting. 
Jordan is not alone in this globally however, its particular combination of historical development 
and geographical characteristics, in-concert with current patterns of globalisation means that its 
citizens feel the limitations of their place in the political decision-making hierarchy acutely. It is 
with little irony that Nahed Hattar argues that of the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ in Jordan, it is the 
general population who comprise the latter, with decisions made in the interests of cabals and 
business at the expense of the individual citizen.561 A second observation to be made about 
citizenship here is the fear with which its free practice is meant by the regime as a whole. IT 
development could contribute substantially to Jordan’s economic sustainability over time. 
However advancing the Kingdom to that stage would foreseeably require a loosening of internet 
censorship, and a facilitation of greater Intra-Jordan networking and entrepreneurship. An 
unintended consequence of which would be allowing greater citizen expression and possibly 
critique of the governing status-quo. Hence Oreib al-Rantawi’s reflection ‘there is no interest for 
the regime to weaken its vertical [social] structures and strengthen the horizontal counterpart in 
general because there is a belief, especially in the security apparatus, that they can serve better as 
a tool to strengthen and consolidate the regime’.562 
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An irony emerges here in which the ability of citizens to practice their citizenship in the 
public sphere is tightly monitored and regulated, whereas the Kingdom’s industrial and 
deregulation policies are, according to successive reports from the Bertelsmann Institute’s 
Transformation Index (BTI), among the least protected in the MENA region.563 Such is part of a 
wider process of relocating ‘the focal point’ of domestic government and political activity on the 
part of citizens including parties ‘away from the general maximization of welfare within a nation 
(full employment, redistributive transfer payments and social service provision) to the promotion 
of enterprise, innovation and profitability in both private and public sectors’.564 While incomplete 
as of 2018, the abject absence of any meaningful alternative has meant that opposition has focused 
on isolated policies rather than the framework itself.  
 
Demonstrations over plans to remove subsidies on commodities since before the ascension 
of Abdullah II are illustrative. The Islamists led by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and their 
associated party the Islamic Action Front (Jubhat al-‘Amal al-Islami) have frequently called bread 
subsidisation a red line, part of the government’s moral responsibility to ensure a basic level of 
subsistence for citizens for decades.565 However, to this day come election time, their electoral 
fliers, pamphlets and public addresses suggest no indication of developing an alternative vision for 
the Kingdom’s economy in a systemic sense.566 Evidence of an implicit acceptance of Abdullah 
II’s stance, that in the face of ‘the globalisation of international economic affairs’, there is ‘no 
room for narrow differences among nations to obstruct the process of establishing a new mode of 
regional economic cooperation and development’.567  
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In practical terms this means the nation-state, the vessel of modern citizenship, is becoming 
increasingly dependent on external dynamics beyond its direct control.568 Citizen ownership over 
decision-making and the subsequent accountability of decision-makers to the citizenry becomes a 
difficult proposition for a so-called democratising nation to enact. Instead answers to questions of 
economic, social, technological and political development are sought abroad irrespective of the 
public perspective. The King enunciates as much in advancing the prevailing (neo)-liberal opinion 
that ‘political and social dimensions of the internal stability required to face the future challenges 
are mere extensions of the economic factor’.569 While all states are interdependent inasmuch as 
none, including North Korea are successfully self-sufficient, globalisation is changing not only the 
goalposts but the entire field of international/transnational/global politics. Via increasing tensions 
between the principles of economic globalisation on the one hand, and ‘embedded state/society 
practices’ on the other. The ‘terrain of political conflict’ is increasingly a three-level rather than 
two-level game.570 
 
Royal rhetoric at the international level has been supported by alterations at the domestic 
level. Andre Bank and Oliver Schlumberger have conducted some important research in this area, 
examining changes in what Volker Perthes calls the ‘politically relevant elite’ (PRE).571 PRE in 
any polity, consists of those are capable of wielding influence and power politically through their 
role in decision-making and norm setting.572 It is represented in a model of three concentric circles, 
with power in the central circle emanating outwards. Those in the inner circle constitute the state’s 
‘core elite’;573 the next circle contains an ‘intermediate elite’ who do possess the institutional 
capacity to make strategic decisions for the polity on the whole unless such capacity is first 
delegated to them.574 Their ability to influence decision-making occurs therefore on a floating basis 
dependent upon the interests and needs of the core elites. The final circle in the model consists of 
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the ‘sub-elite’ who role in the exercise of power extends to contributing to an agenda through 
newspaper editorials for instance, or influencing decision-making albeit in an indirect manner.575 
 
According to Bank and Schlumberger, Jordan’s neo-patrimonial character is significant 
when it comes to alterations to the PRE’s membership. Although leaders of neo-patrimonial 
political networks, in this case the king, possess considerable unilateral decision-making 
capability, loyalists are required so that the king is able to sustain his position above the fray of 
day-to-day contestation.576 There is an important implication here regarding the role of every-day 
citizens in economic decision-making. Practically no space given for citizen participation in 
agenda-setting, nor is there space for them to, in an influential way, consent to draft agendas, 
outside of a parliament whose operations are tightly monitored. If the parliament could serve as 
such an institutional mechanism its deputies are effectively removed from the process by the 
establishment of the extra-parliamentary Economic Consultative Council (ECC). Tasked with 
developing frameworks for ‘activating the role of the private sector in decision-making processes’, 
the ECC in-effect further isolates citizens from decisions which dramatically affect their standard 
of living.  
 
The first ECC’s members included Ghassan Nuqul of the Nuqul Group, Fadi Ghandour 
cofounder of Aramex, Suhayr al-Ali Dabbas General Manager of Citibank Jordan and Bassem 
Awadallah,577 a former head of the economic bureau of the Royal Court who in 2016 would go on 
to seal the heralded Cooperation (tansiq) agreement between Jordan and Saudi Arabia.578 Their 
chief commonality of coalescence was their embodying of Jordan’s ‘economic “success stories”, 
symbolizing young, self-confident “winners” in globalization and have internalized the currently 
fashionable neoliberal jargon’.579 They are thus the avant-garde of Jordan’s linkage into the world 
economy, and as business leaders and policy advisors and makers, engage in what Cerny calls 
‘internalizing globalization’. The processes via which individuals ‘accelerate’ and further ‘embed’ 
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152 
 
the norms and practices of globalisation ‘in their own institutions and practices’.580 The king 
himself is among this group and seminal in Jordan’s internalising of globalisation. Bassem 
Awadallah in a 2003 report for the Washington Institute echoes the role of Abdullah II in 
accelerating the pace of reform by becoming directly involved in it as a matter of national 
priority.581  
 
Yet, some of the central methods to address this national priority were undertaken without 
citizen involvement. Accelerating privatisation and expanding the Qualifying Industrial Zones 
(QIZs) rank among these. As a concept and geo-economic reality on the ground, Jordan’s 
experience with QIZs sees the 1994 Wadi ‘Araba peace treaty with Israel as their catalyst. Their 
political essence ‘against the backdrop of the “peace process” as an incentive scheme to promote 
exchanges between Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israeli businesspersons’ is hence readily 
discernible.582 Rules governing the production to export process within the QIZs establish that in 
order to qualify for tariff-free export to the US market, a product’s material input must be 
composed of a minimum of 35% of local content. Of this, 11.7% must be Jordanian and 8% Israeli. 
The remaining 15.3% could come from Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, Israel or the United 
States.583 Unsurprisingly, Imad al-Anis refers to the QIZ concept as a ‘cornerstone’ of bilateral 
trade between Jordan and the US post-1994 with three key objectives: assisting in the 
normalisation of the Jordanian-Israeli peace by encouraging economic cooperation, increasing 
employment creation and FDI attractiveness, and finally, providing sectors including textiles 
‘unfettered access to the US market’.584 
 
Though covering a range of industries, it is the textiles and clothing (T&C) sector which 
dominates the Jordanian QIZs in value terms, encompassing almost 90% of all QIZ-based exports 
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to the US.585 The wider export field is impressive. In 2003 alone, exports from the QIZs amounted 
to 587 million ($US) out of Jordan’s total 2.4 billion ($US) worth of exports.586 At the same time, 
Al-Anis provides an intriguing and significant reflection on the Jordanian Government’s view of 
QIZs, stating how initially they received little attention at the level of decision-makers.587 What 
changed minds in Amman was the steady increase in exports, coupled with a realisation that they 
could be utilised as a way of FDI accrual. Subsequently, the exponential increase in exports in 
dollar value, from 6.9 million ($US) in 1997, to in-excess of 1 billion ($US) by 2007, makes for 
interesting reading in this light.588 
 
Apart from their value as export generators, part of official interest around economic 
processing zones (EPZs) is their employment creation capacities. Yet it is here where their value 
to unemployed citizens is questionable. Writing in 2003, Aaron Glantz stated, that more than forty 
thousand employees were operating in over sixty factories within the zones.589 However, less than 
half of these employees by his figures are Jordanian nationals.590 Ergo, although export oriented 
industries have enjoyed substantial growth since the mid-1990s, Jordan’s stubbornly high rates of 
unemployment remain intact, suggesting that while some economic policies are improving some 
key indicators, some which directly impact the day-to-day lives of citizens, are not being 
addressed. Concerning this non-Jordanian workforce, there is a compounding factor, a number of 
the QIZ-based factories house their employees on site,591 limiting of the circulation of currency 
earned by employees in the wider domestic economy.  
 
Furthermore, availability of capital has been curtailed since 2004 when the al-Fayez 
Government, in an effort to improve competitiveness, decreased by half the fees businesses are 
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required to pay in order to hire foreign staff in the QIZs from 300 to 150 Jordanian Dinars (JD).592 
Decreasing the incentives for businesses to hire local employees, elucidates an important paradox 
of economic growth in Jordan and the region. While employment opportunities and export 
statistics make QIZs attractive elements of economic strategy, ‘the actual impact on Jordan’s 
economy’, reminds Mary Nazzal, is primarily to be ‘determined by the effect on wages paid to 
Jordanian workers and on domestic investment through profits re-invested’ in the wider 
economy.593 According to these indicators, QIZs are in and of themselves, no panacea to Jordan’s 
structural weaknesses or to consistently high unemployment which in the final quarter of 2017 
reached 18.2% according to the Jordanian Department of Statistics; the highest in twenty-five 
years.594 
 
Like the QIZs, privatisation emerged as one of the key policy mechanisms in Jordan’s 
economic liberalisation following the fiscal crisis of 1988-1989. However, it only began ‘in 
earnest’ a decade later in 1998,595 and the Kingdom’s first Privatisation Law was drafted in 1999 
and ratified in 2000. According to the Law, privatisation is understood as ‘the adoption of an 
economic methodology which enhances the role of the private sector in the economy to include 
public sector enterprises the nature of which requires that they be managed on commercial 
bases’.596 It is thus registered as a mechanism for the introducing of market relationships into ‘the 
bureaucratic production of public services’.597 In-conjunction with the National Privatization 
Strategy (NPS), the Law provides the necessary legal architecture for privatisation to take place, 
establishing six avenues for the privatising of public enterprises.598 
 
Privatisation entails a sort of ‘rebalancing the role and scale of the public sector in the 
economy by reducing the government’s stake in industrial sectors’ which hitherto it had 
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dominated.599 The results have been impressive, with more than 70 transactions completed by the 
end of 2009. Successive governments have sold shares in 54 public sector firms with total proceeds 
equating to approximately 2.6 billion ($US) with associated foreign direct investment (FDI) 
exceeding 850 million ($US).600 There has been a not inconsequential dividend, although, at the 
same time, from the perspective of citizenship in the kingdom, it is important to consider this 
information from different perspectives other than accounting balance sheets. A rebalancing of the 
public sector is not only an economic manoeuvre, but rather is accompanied by a simultaneous 
reshaping of the country’s citizenship regime because of the alienation these policies have 
generated. It is worth recalling here from chapter three, how the state developed and garnered 
legitimacy through the distribution of goods and services. In this way it penetrated the societies of 
steppe and sown, transferring to a considerable yet not total extent, the dependency of the 
population to itself away from pre-state sources of authority and distribution. But, the economic 
model on which this was founded became increasingly unsustainable from the 1980s onwards, and 
its remnants producing what Schlumberger referred to as ‘patrimonial capitalism’,601 are sustained 
to this day through externally sourced rents and aid agreements. 
 
 
4.3 : Spectators in the Stands? Citizens in the Political Game  
  
The absence of citizens in economic decision-making has developed as the prerogative of closed 
groups of individuals, whose decisions receive little parliamentary oversight. Citizen ownership 
of decisions, and subsequently the accountability of decision-makers to the citizenry remain 
minimal. This deserves further analysis in the political system itself, which has experienced a 
decade or more of de-accelerated political liberalisation, in contrast with accelerated economic 
liberalisation. 
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Jordan is a constitutional monarchy with a powerful monarch at the head of the executive, 
who is also directly influential in the legislative and judicial spheres. Being a hereditary monarchy 
means that political leadership in Jordan is not open to competition, and hence, there is no recycling 
of decision-making power, only of personnel who are charged with executing the predetermined 
agenda.602 This is undertaken in a tightly controlled model of shackled delegation, in which the 
Royal Court and Mukhabarat wield considerable influence. So much so that one former MP argued 
that the government citizens see is little more than a cover for a ‘shadow government’ in the Royal 
Court.603 Whether the truth of the matter is as profound as this is not the point. Rather, it is to assert 
that what emerges, in any event, is the following: first, decision-making is tightly controlled and 
wielded only by individuals loyal to the regime, and subsequently, all positions of any significance 
are royal appointees rather than citizen selections. The ECC discussed in the previous section, is 
one illustration of this. Second, political power is exercised within institutions characterised by a 
high degree of opacity, and subsequently little if any civilian oversight. Finally, this opacity 
extends to elections whose only transparent facet is that they are designed to preclude any 
meaningful challenge to the status quo.  
 
Illuminating the institutions involved in the legislature is a useful way of considering all 
three contextually. Legislative power is, according to the constitution vested in the parliament 
(both houses together referred to as the National Assembly) and the King.604 There is no set number 
of deputies or senators that are required to sit in the National Assembly, yet the number of senators 
must be half the number of elected deputies.605 This dynamic has remained consistent in Jordanian 
parliamentary life since then, although there has been considerable variation across time in other 
aspects, which serve to highlight the changing nature of royal power-over the parliament and its 
members. Until the promulgation of the 1952 Constitution, parliament was not able to question 
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executive decision makers as neither the King nor the Cabinet were constitutionally accountable 
to it. 
  
This extended to budget scrutiny as cabinets did not require a parliamentary vote of 
confidence. Thus, the King (officially through his government of appointees) could pursue his 
agenda irrespective of Lower House support or opposition.606 Therein it was the 1952 successor 
that improved parliamentary efficacy and the extent to which the Executive became accountable 
to it.607 First, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet had to now acquire the approval of the Chamber 
of Deputies in the form of a confidence motion before they could assume their roles.608 Second, in 
accordance with Articles 53 and 54, confidence could be rescinded at any time with a two-thirds 
majority vote of the parliament’s members.609 Third, ministers could now be impeached following 
Articles 55 and 56. Fourth, the Executive could no longer engage in law-making without 
parliamentary approval. All draft legislation had to be submitted to the Lower House for debate, 
amendment, approval or rejection.610 This procedure must be followed for all legislation in order 
for bills to become laws. So-called temporary laws, produced by cabinets during periods of 
parliamentary suspension, are not exempt; they must receive majority approval at the nearest 
opportunity. 
 
Amendments made to the constitution in 2011, after civilian pressure in streets across 
Jordan, closed this loophole whereby cabinets could operate after the King, for whatever reason, 
dissolved the parliament and/or suspended parliamentary life. This had previously been an 
allowance utilised by Abdullah II between 2001 and 2003. Under present conditions the 
dissolution of parliament must be paired with the dissolution of the siting government.611 Thus the 
1952 constitution established the current procedure for the passage of bills. All drafts must be 
approved by the Chamber of Deputies before proceeding to the Senate where they are reviewed 
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and if accepted, passed on to the king for ratification. In addition, if the king does not ratify a bill, 
a two-thirds majority vote in the parliament can be applied to veto the decision.612 Finally, although 
treaties and foreign relations remained in the Executive – that is to say the Monarch’s hand – if 
any of these entailed a financial commitment on the part of the Treasury, then parliamentary 
approval was now required.613  
 
Ergo, while Jordan is officially a constitutional monarchy, the actual divisions and 
subsequent independence of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary from each other is 
nebulous. Therein resides the contention between principles of constitutional monarchy and semi-
authoritarian practices observable in the Kingdom. In terms of the Legislature, Jordan possesses a 
bicameral parliament composed of a directly elected Majlis al-Nuwāb via universal suffrage, and 
a Senate (Majlis al-‘Ayan), whose members are appointed unilaterally by the King. Royal 
prerogative extends to government formation in that the Prime Minister who shares executive 
authority with the King in accordance with the constitution is an appointee of the monarch. Further 
the king may, and indeed does, appoint prime ministers irrespective of the parliament’s 
composition. Once appointed, the prime minister nominates a Cabinet of ministers, none of whom 
need to be sitting parliamentary representatives. Citizen power-to elect decision-makers who will 
debate and govern on their behalf is subsequently delimited by the very structure of the system. 
  
The exact method of voting, turning candidates into MPs is subject to legislation rather 
than constitutional dictate. As a consequence, debates both within and external to the parliament 
about the substance of election laws are often hotly contested, and the Opposition has regularly 
employed the threat of boycotts as a leverage device.614 Senators contrastingly are appointed 
unilaterally by the reigning monarch. Outlined within Article 36, the King appoints both the 
senators and the Senate Speaker, granting him considerable clout over that Chamber’s agenda. In 
this manner it functions as the King’s Chamber with no popular participation in the senatorial 
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selection process. In addition, it is worth highlighting here the Constitution’s poignant desideratum 
pertaining to candidate qualities: 
 
‘In addition to the requirements prescribed in Article 75 of the present Constitution, a 
Senator must have completed forty calendar years of age and must belong to one of the 
following classes: Present and former Prime Ministers and Ministers, persons who had 
previously held the office of Ambassador, Minister Plenipotentiary, Speaker of the 
Chamber of Deputies, President and judges of the Court of Cassation and of the Civil and 
Sharia Courts of Appeal, retired military officers of the rank of Lt. General and above, 
former Deputies who were elected at least twice as deputies, and other similar 
personalities who enjoy the confidence of the people in view of the services rendered by 
them to the Nation and the Country’.615   
 
All prospective senators are to have had a long and consistent relationship with the regime. 
A corollary hypothesis is that the Senate cannot be expected to behave in a manner considerably 
divergent from the interests of the regime itself. Implications arise therefore on the question of 
their accountability to the wider citizenry. Further, the Senate Speaker, unlike his/her Lower House 
equivalent is royally appointed rather than elected.616 Such lends credence to the image of this 
institution as a modern-day King’s council, underscoring the reality that while all senators are 
citizens they owe their position to the monarch not to the citizenry. The Lower House and its MPs 
are comparatively more connected to the citizenry in terms of being accountable. However the 
King’s influence here too can be felt. All candidates for the Chamber of Deputies must: be a 
Jordanian as defined by Law No.6 of 1954 on Nationality (the Nationality Law); have been 
‘rehabilitated’ if bankrupt in the past; have any past interdictions removed from their record; be 
pardoned if they have spent a term in jail exceeding a year ‘for a non-political offence’; be of 
sound mind, and not be related to the King according to the directives of the relevant special law.617 
This means however that activists from Tujan Faisal and leith al-Sheibailat to scores of youth 
arrested in the wake of the 2011 and 2012 demonstrations, are precluded from taking their activism 
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into the halls of parliament. Consequently, these citizens are denied the available institutional 
avenues for political expression. 
   
Parliamentary terms in Jordan run for four calendar years.618 Yet in the reality their duration 
is often (especially in recent history) determined by the King who has the ability to dissolve the 
institution. Be that as it may, when elections are called, candidates run via an open-list system, that 
has been in place with a few alterations since 1989.619 This list system incorporates quotas for 
Christians, Chechen/Circassian minorities and women. The former two groups have had quota-
based representation available since the 1986 elections Law was implemented, whereas women 
have had a parliamentary quota since 2003.620 The exact number of quota seats has changed over 
time, and at present women, Christians, and Chechen/Circassians are allocated 10, 9 and 3 seats 
respectively. Both Christian and Chechen/Circassian minorities are demonstrably over-
represented in the quota system, and arguments have subsequently been made that the existence 
of quota allocations does more to serve the political ends of the regime than the interests of the 
communities in question.621 But more than this, the quotas influence the development of 
citizenship and an associated civilian identity that is separate from ethnic or religious identity.  
 
In actuality, while they provide a degree of guaranteed representation, they simultaneously 
serve ‘as a ceiling’ of the ‘maximum allowed representation’ for the groups involved.622 The 
quotas funnel the participation of Christian, Chechen and Circassian minorities into specific 
limited seats. If two Chechens wanted to run on the same list in a district, they could only do so if 
there were two quota seats available in that district. The same applies for Christians, irrespective 
of the actual number of votes a candidate is able to attract. ‘Suppose’, argues Lina Ejeilat, that 
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‘three Christian men on a list received the highest number of votes in the Amman Third District 
only one of them would win a seat’.623  
 
Concerning citizen involvement in the 2003, 2007 and 2010 elections it is noteworthy to 
consider both the method of voting and the distribution of parliamentary seats per district across 
the country. In all three cases voting was undertaken according to the SNTV outlined in chapter 
three. Despite opposition arguments in parliament and the public sphere, including a wide-ranging 
boycott of the 2010 elections led by the IAF, successive governments maintained the sawt wahad. 
A single exception to this occurred in the 2013 elections, which introduced a floating national list 
to voters. Instead of casting the single vote tied to their district of registration – not necessarily 
residence – citizens could cast an additional vote for candidates on the national list. While not the 
rescinding of the SNTV the opposition had demanded, the national list’s inclusion was seen as a 
positive step forward inasmuch as it allowed citizens to vote for a kinship relation in their district, 
and for a party or ideological platform on the national list.  
 
International obligations concerning equal suffrage for citizens delimit in theory the ways 
in which electoral districts are designed and available parliamentary seats allocated to them. Ergo, 
although ‘fair electoral district or constituency-delimitation procedures will take into account a 
range of information, including available census data, territorial contiguity, geographic and 
topographic accessibility, and communities of interest’, 624 the principle of equality between votes, 
that is to say their weight, must be maintained. In Jordan the relative weight of a citizen’s vote and 
the method by which the variables listed above are evaluated in to create districts and assign seats 
is devoid of transparency and independence. Until the creation of the Independent Election 
Commission (IEC) in 2012, organising elections including seat allocation was handled by the 
Ministry of Interior, who gave recommendations to the Cabinet who in turn decreed the substance 
of the electoral map for a given election in a by-law.625  
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To date no elections law approved by parliament during the reign of Abdullah II has 
specified the terms by which districting takes place. And as the 2016 case indicates,626 the Cabinet 
to this day sustains this function. Suggesting that, even with the IEC in place, the procedure is not 
managed from start to finish by an independent auditor who could balance the sometimes-
competing demands of demography with development in under-privileged areas. For example, in 
2001 the number of districts for general elections was increased from 22 to 45, and was maintained 
until the 2016 elections when it was reduced to 23.627 Similarly, the number of deputies has 
fluctuated, from 110 between the 2003 and 2007 polls, 120 between 2010 and 2013, and 150 
between 2013 and 2016. It has since been reduced to 130. Changes to districts were based on the 
Ministry of Interior’s evaluation of geographical and demographical variables.628 To this day the 
exact formula or equation utilised for this evaluation remains unknown publicly. Expanding the 
quota system accounts for some but not all of the alterations to the number of elected deputies. 
 
The opacity surrounding the electoral system is not the result of chance. Elections are not 
so much a vehicle of genuine competition for decision-making power, as they are one of increasing 
a citizen’s stake in the game of patronage acquisition. In this way elections serve to ‘reinforce 
rather than undermine authoritarian regimes’, through a process Ellen Lust refers to as 
‘competitive clientelism’.629 From the position of MPs, they can use the influence of their position 
‘to pressure ministers and bureaucrats into dispensing jobs, licenses, and other state resources to 
their constituents’.630 Pressure may be supported with threats to make public accusations against 
particular bureaucrats or ministers if requests are denied. In 2016 a case of this was made public 
involving then Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour and Lower House Speaker Atef al-Tarawneh. It 
came to light that of 109 recent appointments to positions servicing the parliament 15 were given 
                                                     
626 Mohamed Ghazal, ‘Government Ready with By-law on Distribution of Constituencies’, Jordan Times, March 29, 
2016, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/gov%E2%80%99t-ready-law-distribution-constituencies (accessed 
March 30, 2016).  
627 Mohamed Husseiny & Paul M. Esber, Position Paper – 2016 Election Law (Amman: Identity Center, 2016). 
Available at: http://haqqi.info/check_1.php?t=research_paper&f=IdentityCenterElectionLawPositionPaperfinal  
628 The Carter Center, Mission Report on Jordan’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections, p. 11. 
629 Ellen Lust, ‘Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East’, Journal of Democracy 20:3, (2009), p. 122. 
630 Ibid. p. 124. 
  
163 
 
to sons of sitting MPs and the majority of the remainder were relatives.631 MP Tarek Khoury who 
was critical of the appointments stated when interviewed that a number of MPs had been pressuring 
the Speaker to approve the appointments, concluding ‘MPs cannot risk rejecting “wasta” requests 
from people in their constituencies, because they fear losing them as voters’.632  
 
Besides being evidence that some MPs are more concerned with constituent expectations 
than with the state of the national budget, the episode supports earlier research on the prevalence 
of clientelism. Based on surveys conducted between 2000 and 2005, one study reported a majority 
of participants ‘believed that they would need wasta in order to succeed in conducting business 
with government agencies or to obtain public-sector employment’.633 Consequently, that citizens 
would vote in ways they feel may increase the probability of accessing benefits is unsurprising, 
given the difficult economic climate. This includes voting for candidates with whom they have an 
established relationship through kinship. Therein the existence of the SNTV in concert with the 
absence of competition for power encourages what some in Jordan call ‘service MPs’ - ‘helping 
constituents to gain access to health, education, and other services, to get jobs, or to navigate (and 
if need be, to bypass) the sprawling state bureaucracy is what being an MP is really all about’.634 
 
 
4.4 : Conclusion 
 
When asked about citizenship (muwātanah) Bassām al-Badreen replies it is about the rights and 
obligations of citizens to each other and the state, grounded in a fundamental equality between 
them as individuals, in addition to the necessity of the state to respect the rights of citizens. 
Contrastingly, when it comes to Jordan, he asserts there is ‘no possibility’ of equating the present 
                                                     
631 Omar Obeidat, ‘Jordanians Angry at House, Government over Spread of Wasta’, Jordan Times, April 14, 2016. 
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordanians-angry-house-gov%E2%80%99t-over-spread-wasta (accessed 
April 20, 2016).  
632 Omar Obeidat & Raed Omari, ‘Hundreds of MPs’ Relatives Appointed as Administrators at Chamber’, Jordan 
Times, April 11, 2016. http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/hundreds-mps%E2%80%99-relatives-appointed-
administrators-chamber (accessed April 11, 2016).  
633 Sa’eda Kilani & Basem Sakijha, Wasta: The Declared Secret—A Study on Nepotism and Favouritism in Jordan 
(Amman: Press Foundation, 2002), p. 126. 
634 Ellen Lust, Sami Hourani & Mohammad El-Momani, Jordan Votes: Election or Selection? Journal of Democracy 
22:2 (2011), p. 120. 
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circumstances of citizenship with this definition.635 This chapter has endeavoured to elucidate this 
contrast in terms of the absence of ownership and accountability in Jordanian citizenship. I began 
by contemplating the act of littering in public as an indication of citizens recognising whether 
consciously or unconsciously that the physical spaces of the public sphere did not belong to them. 
They thus felt unencumbered about discarding their wrappers, cigarette packets and other such 
unwanted material in the streets of their residences and their cities.  
 
This was subsequently linked with the policy framework fostered and enacted since the 
ascension of King Abdullah II in 1999, with particular reference to the acceleration of economic 
liberalization and the de-acceleration of political liberalization.636 In both spheres I highlighted the 
threadbare (if existent) role citizens performed in designing, drafting and consenting to economic 
policies and reform of the political system. The two spheres must be considered in-tandem, in 
order to show that demonstrations in streets and the occupation of public spaces in urban centres 
that would be so indispensable during 2011 and 2012 were, in essence, the only viable option for 
citizens because of the working nature of formal institutionalized political participation in the 
Kingdom. These uprisings were not the only expressions of this. Between 2010 and 2015 there 
were over three thousand instances of labor strikes according to the Amman based Phenix 
Center.637 These built on previous labor action undertaken between 2006 and 2009 as the impact 
of privatization deals began to negatively impact Jordanian workers and families,638 suggesting the 
actions to be in response to the Palace’s decade long program of neoliberal economic development. 
  
Underpinning which was the ‘unspoken assumption’ that annual increases in GDP would 
in aggregate terms beneficial to ‘the population as a whole’.639 Closer examination of other 
variables, reveals Adam Hanieh, illuminates a decidedly different reality. The food consumer price 
                                                     
635 Bassām al-Badreen (Editor, Rai al-Youm), interview with the author, Amman, September 11, 2016. 
636 See for instance, Curtis Ryan & Jillian Schwedler, ‘Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?’ 
637 The Phenix Center, Report: Labor Strikes in Jordan 2015 (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016), p. 7. 
http://www.labor-watch.net/en/paper/20350 (accessed August 14, 2016). Established in 2003, the Phenix Center for 
Economics and Informatics Studies is a non-governmental and independent research centre in Amman. Focused on 
policy analysis, its reports and publications seek to contextualise economic, social and political drivers in Jordan. 
638 Fida Adely, ‘The Emergence of a New Labor Movement in Jordan’, MERIP 42 (2012), 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer264/emergence-new-labor-movement-jordan (accessed August 14, 2016); see also 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Report: Labour Protests in Jordan (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung , 2010), 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/10104.pdf (accessed August 14, 2016). 
639 Adam Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago: Haymarket 
Books, 2013), p. 145. 
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index for example between July 2007 and July 2009 rose by twenty percent in Jordan, not only 
applying fiscal pressure on the budget to continue to fund subsidization schemes, but also 
contributed to an increase in the number of families living below the poverty line.640 For many 
citizens therefore, the policies that were supposed to lead to greater economic opportunity and 
sustainability have had the opposite effect. Additionally, these citizens were asked to participate 
in, and therefore bestow their consent on continuing such frameworks through formal institutions 
whose members were unaccountable and unresponsive to them and their needs. That this had an 
indubitable influence on the outbreak of demonstrations from January 7 2011 is asserted by Nahed 
Hattar, who links the uprisings in the South with the plight of Jordanian labor in the face of rampant 
privatization undertaken for the benefit of what he refers to as the ‘comprador class’.641 The 
distance between the way citizenship is framed by institutional discourse and the lived experience 
of the citizens themselves, is a product of immediate and less recent history. In the absence of 
accountability and ownership, Jordanians have the need to search for these two principles of 
citizenship beyond the confines of formalized politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
640 Ibid, p. 146: notes that a in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the Yemen and Syria, 1.1 million additional people were living 
below the poverty line before the onset of the global financial crisis.  
641 Nahed Hattar, ‘Khiṭwat Tanẓim Min Ajal Fahm al-Ḥirak al-Urduni’, Ammonnews, June 11, 2011, 
www.ammonnews.net/article/89725 (accessed October 23, 2017). 
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Chapter Five 
 
5. In Search of Ownership and Accountability 
 
‘On the idea of citizenship and rights, they (Jordanians) are subjects’.642 
 
‘It is not a balanced relationship. The Executive is the hegemon that encroaches on everyone else. 
The problem of course is that the constitution provides for a parliamentarian system, which means 
that the government should come from the people and the parliament. This is not the case 
however’.643   
 
 
5.1 : Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I sought to shed light on the absence of ownership and accountability in 
the Jordanian citizenship regime, illustrated via the economics and politics of Jordan during King 
Abdullah II’s first decade on the throne. This chapter provides an analysis of Jordan’s experience 
of the 2011 and 2012 uprisings, as a search on the part of citizens, for ownership and 
accountability, and therein re-adjust the balance of power between rulers and the ruled in the 
Kingdom. The chapter aims to elucidate the contrast between the citizen search for accountability 
and ownership, with the regime’s simultaneous attempt to sustain a political subjectivity of 
passivity for citizens.  
 
By this however, I do not mean to imply that all participants in the uprisings shared the 
same interests, agendas or identities. Indeed, it is hoped the opposite will emerge, underscoring 
the differing visions of citizenship on display in the Kingdom. Which in turn emphasises some of 
the challenges citizenship faces as one of many socio-political identities in Jordan. In this manner, 
                                                     
642 Tariq Tell, (Associate Professor American University Beirut), interview with the author, Amman, March 25, 
2016. 
643 Sufian Obeidat, (Constitutional lawyer), interview with the author, Amman, September 07, 2016. 
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although the so-called Arab Spring was in many regards about citizenship and the newly visible 
citizen,644 this is not to say that its depth was and is equally shared and understood. Remembering 
that citizenship depth refers to how demanding it should be as an identity influencing and 
mobilising individual and collective behaviour on the one hand and when, on the other, should it 
be prioritised above other identities.  
 
Succeeding the examination of the uprisings, I present an analysis of the first five of the 
King’s Discussion Papers, released progressively between 2012 and 2016. Their content coalesces 
around the themes of political reform, citizenship, democratisation and national unity, and they 
hence function as an excellent window into the King’s thinking on these subjects. These subjects 
were also central to the protest movements of 2011 and 2012, making our analysis germane. The 
prime importance of the papers therefore, is as a comparative foil, demonstrating a stark contrast 
to the citizen search for ownership and accountability powerfully manifested in the unprecedented 
protests and demonstrations of 2011/2012. The acts of citizens in mobilising, occupying and 
reclaiming public space speak profoundly of substantial inadequacies in the institutional 
framework linking citizens to decision-makers. However, the Discussion Papers at times imply 
and at other moments state outright that citizen ownership and decision-maker accountability 
already exist within the architectural framework of Jordan’s political system. By extension the 
message conveyed is that any deficiencies are the result of citizen in-action and apathy, rather than 
characteristic of the institutional avenues themselves, or the individuals who occupy positions of 
authority. This particular discussion is buttressed by examining the series of constitutional 
amendments passed by the parliament with record speed in 2014 and 2016. These are relevant here 
insofar as they further concentrate political authority in the hands of the King.  
 
 
 
                                                     
644 Marwan Bishara, The invisible Arab: The Promise and Peril of the Arab Revolutions (New York: Nation Books, 
2012); Nils A. Butenschøn, ‘Arab Citizen and the Arab State: The “Arab Spring” as a Critical Juncture in 
Contemporary Arab Politics, Democracy and Security 11:2 (2015), pp. 111-128, engages with this in the Egyptian 
context. 
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5.2 : Jordan 2011-2012 - Scouring the Streets (for Ownership and Accountability) 
 
Meditating on political liberalisation as an instrument of socio-political control impressed on 
Jillian Schwedler four key provisions, which in light of chapter four’s discussion, are perspicuous 
in our an inquiry into Jordan’s recent wave of demonstrations in 2011 and 2012. The prime 
objective of political liberalisation, she notes, ‘is to seem to move toward democratization’, while 
simultaneously preventing these novel openings of either new or existing institutions from 
allowing citizens to perform influential roles in decision-making. Such a process of delimiting the 
citizen combines with the third and fourth facets, involving a channelling of opposition, whether 
inside or outside formal institutions, into acceptable conduits. These are necessarily ‘controlled by 
the state’, so as to function as a mechanism for either ‘managing or deflating threats’.645 Political 
liberalisation thus, operates as a strategy to sustain status quo hierarchies of authority and power. 
 
The emergence of uprisings across the Arab world from December 2010 is, considering 
Schwedler’s reflection, evidence of both the successes and failures of Arab ruling elites in 
collectively applying political liberalisation over the past thirty or so years. Success inasmuch as 
these rulers whether in Tunisia, the Yemen, Jordan or Egypt had implemented these policies for 
over three decades before oppositional critical mass emerged. Yet concomitantly failure in so far 
as ruling elite strategies, and here I am referring specifically to Jordan,646 were able to manage but 
not deflate threats to established vertical political and economic hierarchies. Ergo, the Jordanian 
demonstrations owe more to domestic factors than to the example set by Tunisians and Egyptians. 
In-particular the emergence of al-Ḥirāk al-Shabābi al-Urduni (the Hirāk) can be traced at least to 
2009, with the movement of Aqaba Port workers demonstrating against the effects of privatisation 
on their employment conditions and security.647 Some younger activists however push these 
beginnings back further to 2006, corresponding with Muhammad Sneid’s labour activism with the 
                                                     
645 Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 34. 
646 It is difficult to make generalised comparative statements about the various trajectories that culminated in the 
2011 uprisings. In order to do justice one must recognise the specificities not only of each country, but equally of the 
currents within each country in question. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake as much here. Hence 
while we may make reflections on cases outside of Jordan, we naturally focus attention there.  
647 Nahed Hattar, ‘Khitwa Țanẓim min Ajal Fahim al-Ḥirāk al-Urduni’, ammonnews.net, June 11, 2011, 
www.ammonnews.net/article/89725 (accessed November 03, 2016); Muhammad Sneid began organising labour 
demonstrations from 2006. Muhammad Sneid, (Seminar address: closed seminar, Amman 2016). 
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Day Wage Labour Movement which ‘gave hope’ to many employees in sectors targeted by 
privatisation schemes.648  
 
The beginning of the Jordanian 2011 uprisings preceded both the resignation of Tunisian 
President Zine Abidine Ben Ali (January 14) and the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in the wake of the 
Egyptian Revolution (January 25). On January 7 demonstrations were held in Dhiban, a small-
town in the Madaba Governorate. Organised with the assistance of Muhammad Sneid, the 
participants, who were mainly students, workers and farmers held banners aloft calling for the fall 
of the government while congregating with up to one thousand others.649 Hence, similar to the 
Tunisian revolution, demonstrations in the Kingdom began away from the geopolitical centre of 
the country, before promptly proceeding in that direction. Additionally, they were youth lead, 
conveying not only the volatility in inter-generational politics, but moreover expressing the 
specific concerns of younger Jordanians. Specifically, their belief as to the inability of ruling elites 
to create an environment that would allow them to pursue their individual and collective goals.  
 
Consider for illustration a key catalyst for the uprisings was the government’s decision to 
raise fuel prices without a corresponding increase in salaries for public sector workers. After a 
second week of protests in Dhiban, government representatives approached the protestors offering 
to increase salaries by twenty dinars per month. The movement’s representatives rejected this 
proposal in the absence of the Cabinet’s resignation, desired due to the prevailing perception that 
it was a cabinet representing elite interests. One activist expressed it in historical terms, arguing 
that in the past regime legitimacy derived from social distributive policies attached to state 
expansion. Once this became financially unsustainable however, the pillars of legitimacy began to 
change as a coalition of economic elites and security personnel materialized, resulting in a 
contraction of the constituencies the state seeks to serve in order to sustain itself.650 It is little 
surprise then that those sectors of the Jordanian polity who are neither economically privileged, 
nor high ranking security personnel, feel abandoned and isolated from decision-making; with a 
corresponding sense of the devaluation of their citizenship. Consequently, clarity is given to the 
                                                     
648 Anonymous Youth activist, (Seminar address: closed seminar), Amman June 07, 2016. 
649 Muhammad Sneid, (Seminar address: closed seminar), Amman June 07, 2016. 
650 Anonymous Youth activist, (Seminar address: closed seminar), Amman June 07, 2016. 
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importance of mobilising in, and occupying public space from busy intersections to ministerial 
buildings. When formal channels of expression such as elections and parliamentary debates are 
closed, constrained or, through personal and collective experience found to be inadequate; public 
spaces become crucial in attracting attention towards citizen plight. 
 
By mid-January the reform movement had materialized in Amman with over three 
thousand participants congregating in the capital’s downtown calling for the resignation of Prime 
Minister Samir al-Rifai.651 The Amman protests are significant not only because they are a symbol 
of the uprisings’ diffusion from periphery to centre, but equally because it is in Amman that the 
established opposition movements and parties intersected with newer collectives, namely local 
cells of the Hirāk. It is important to note here that the Hirāk is not a unified movement, but is rather 
better recognised as a broad umbrella under which various collectives, often regionally based, are 
gathered.652 The Dhiban Youth Committee from the central Governorate of Madaba for example 
has at the top of its agenda both local and national objectives. On the local level these include 
overturning the dearth of economic development projects in the district, bringing corrupt officials 
to trial, and repatriating the resources they usurped. On the national level this branch of the Hirāk 
has sought a codification of Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank.653 This agenda is distinct 
from the Free People of Kharja Movement from the northern Irbid Governorate. This Movement’s 
demands are less regional and economic, and more procedural and political. Amongst their 
demands were an elected, rather than one royally appointed senate, and a constitutional amendment 
specifying that the government is responsible for the day-to-day running of the state; therein 
making it subject to the citizenry.654 
 
While this intersecting increased the momentum of the initial protest movement, it opened 
a wider space in which distrust and antagonism developed between what Hisham al-Bustani refers 
to as the ‘official’ and ‘alternative’ opposition on at least two critical fronts: domestic priorities, 
                                                     
651 Al-Jazeera, ‘Thousands Protest in Jordan’, Aljazeera.com, January 29, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/2011128125157509196.html (accessed December 06, 2017).  
652 Muhammad Bani Salamah, al-Ḥirāk al-Shabābi al-Urduni fi Ẓal al-Rabi‘a al-‘Arabi (Amman: Markaz al-Badil, 
2013), pp. 155-157, argues the movement lacks a unifying identity. 
653 Identity Center, Map of Political Parties and Movements in Jordan 2013/2014 (Amman: Netherlands Institute for 
Multi-Party Democracy, 2014), p. 65. 
654 Ibid. p. 67. 
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and regional identities.655 The official opposition ‘comprised of the legalized opposition parties 
and professional associations’ consisting of three main currents: the Islamists ( chiefly the Muslim 
Brotherhood, its affiliated party the Islamic Action Front, al-Fursan and smaller groups of 
politically active Salafists), Leftists (such as the Jordanian Communist Party, the Popular Unity 
Party and the People’s Democratic Party), and Nationalists (including two Baath parties – each 
connected to the Syrian and Iraqi factions  respectively). Meanwhile, the alternative opposition, 
consisted of a similarly broad assortment of associations, some new others established, from across 
the social and ideological spectrum.656 Pre-eminent amongst them are the National Committee of 
Military Veterans, the National Progressive Current, the Jordanian Writers Association, the 
Jordanian Social Left Movement and the Jordanian National Initiative.657 Cumulatively these 
organisations formed the Jordanian Campaign for Change, or the Jayeen (we are coming) coalition. 
 
For simplification, two divisions can be made here: one broad and general between official 
and alternative umbrellas, and another more specific, between the currents, parties and factions 
under each banner. Underpinning each division are the unique sets of interests, priorities and 
identities held by the members of each collective based on their experience with the state. The 
Islamists prioritised reforms of a political as opposed to economic nature in their participation in 
the demonstrations. In-particular, seeking the rescinding of the SNTV and the reintroduction of 
multiple votes per voter at elections in order to better reflect their organizational strength in 
Jordan’s main urban centres: Amman, Irbid and al-Zarqa. Members of the alternative opposition 
contrastingly, generally advanced an agenda prioritising economic reform, revolving around ‘a 
more dirigiste alternative to neoliberal reform and a development policy that preserves the public 
sector and diverts wealth and resources from Amman’.658 This is true of groups as diverse as the 
Military Veterans and labour-oriented Hirāk activists, for whom political reform was viewed 
chiefly as means to an economic end. Principally, addressing perceptions of systemic corruption, 
                                                     
655 Hisham Bustani, ‘The Alternative Opposition in Jordan’. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Tariq Tell cited in: Ziad Abu-Rish, ‘Jordan's Current Political Opposition Movements and the Need for Further 
Research: An Interview with Tariq Tell (Part 2)’, Jadaliyya, August 24, 2012,  
http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/26936/Jordan%60s-Current-Political-Opposition-Movements-and-the-Need-for-
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undermining a model of economic development which had neglected the hinterlands,659 and 
reducing ‘the perceived influence’ of Queen Rania and her extended family in economic decision-
making.660  
 
Alongside the division between economic and political priorities, the currents and factions 
involved in the demonstrations were also divided over Jordan’s role in the region. In 2010 the 
Veterans, concerned about possible Israeli plans to resurrect the watan al-badil (the alternative 
homeland) solution to the Palestinian question; released a manifesto calling on the regime to 
complete the process of disengaging from the West Bank, and settling from Jordan’s end, the status 
of Palestinian non-citizens in the Kingdom.661 The Muslim Brotherhood, who because of their ties 
with Hamas in the Occupied Territories, has not been as supportive of final disengagement, joined 
Ahmad ‘Ubaydat’s 2010 pan-Jordanian coalition, asserting the constitutionally sanctioned unity 
of East and West Banks.662 This coalition included Baathists, a handful of former ministers and 
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) among others, and under 
normal conditions, would not interest the Brotherhood as potential political allies. This wider point 
is affirmed by Sami Hourani, founder and director of the civil society organisation Leaders of 
Tomorrow. Commenting on the state of the ideological spectrum in the domestic political system, 
he educes:  
 
‘You have to remember that the Islamists were able to develop their own platform based 
on service provision so by the time the system was opened up, the rise of the secular liberal 
became impossible. If this was intentional I think this is the smartest regime ever because 
you created an environment a status quo that can never be challenged, and you have 
Islamist parties that are too weak to move too close to the centre of power, and yet it cannot 
accept any ideological competition.663 
 
                                                     
659 Jillian Schwedler, ‘Amman Cosmopolitan: Spaces and Practices of Aspiration and Consumption’, Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 30:3 (2010), p. 548. 
660 Tariq Tell cited in: Ziad Abu-Rish, ‘Jordan's Current Political Opposition Movements…(Part 2)’. 
661 National Committee for Retired Army Personnel, ‘Statement on Defending State, identity against Israel's 
'Alternative Homeland', ammonnews.net, March 5, 2010, 
http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=7683#.WhNenFWWaUm (accessed November 21, 2017). 
662 Tariq Tell cited in: Ziad Abu-Rish, ‘Jordan's Current Political Opposition Movements’. 
663 Sami Hourani, (Founder & Director Leaders of Tomorrow), interview with the author, Amman, May 18, 2016.  
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Initially though, there was a considerable degree of consensus amongst protestors about 
objectives and red lines. Mohammed Hussainy who took part in demonstrations and marches in 
Amman educed ‘we were rational enough not to call for the fall of the regime and not to use 
violence. These two things were agreed upon by all participants’.664 Given the regional climate, 
King Abdullah II moved quickly to address the publicly declared objectives of the demonstrators, 
accepting al-Rifai’s resignation on February 1 and replacing him with Marouf al-Bakhit. The move 
was a clever one. Al-Bakhit of the influential ‘Abbadi tribe is a well-known regime loyalist, and a 
member of the so-called ‘old guard’ of politicians whose influence had been partially offset by the 
new generation of business elites close to Abdullah II.665 Some of this old guard were close to the 
members and factions of the Hirāk, and hence a division emerged both within the Hirāk and 
between the Hirāk and the official opposition, as some Hirākis supported the change in leadership 
and were prepared to give the new Prime Minister time to implement policies addressing their 
concerns.666 The official opposition did not share this perspective and did not want to see the 
poignancy of the moment lost.667 
 
Compounding these divergences over domestic priorities were similar fractures over 
Jordan’s role in the region and the regional affiliations of domestic actors. In this context argues 
Lina Ejeilat, Syria became ‘very divisive in the Hirāk because it was a fault line’, as a number of 
prominent Leftists and Ba’athists declared support for President Bashar al-Assad, some having 
travelled to Syria to do so.668 The Brotherhood and other Hirāk activists contrastingly supported 
the Syrian peoples’ uprising. This made it increasingly difficult over time to build and sustain 
strong coalitions capable of focusing on an agreed set of objectives. As Ejeilat recalls: ‘you 
suddenly realised that these Leftists in Jordan, these ancient Leftists, the Ba’athists and whatever 
these anti-imperialists what political reform are you after [in Jordan] when you went to pay 
allegiance to Assad?  Who is going to go into the streets together to demand political reform when 
you see there is this huge divergence?’669  
                                                     
664 Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development), interview with the author, 
Amman, September 29, 2016. 
665 Referenced in the discussion of the ECC in chapter four. 
666 Nahed Hattar, ‘Khitwa Țanẓim’. 
667 Ali Mahafzah, ‘Jordan: The Difficult Path towards Reform’, Aljazeera.net, December 19, 2012, 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/12/2012121995612798705.htm (accessed April 19, 2016). 
668 Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016. 
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Analogous with Hourani, Ejeilat refers to the problem of pre-existing ideological 
commitments in building and sustaining the critical mass necessary to challenge established 
political and economic hierarchies in Jordan. This speaks to a broader issue of civic and citizen 
identity in the Kingdom. In other words, the depth of citizenship comparative to other social and 
political identities is weak. This in turn influences the power-to (act) and power-over (decision-
makers) capacities of citizens because it reduces their ability to act in-concert, or in Pansardi’s 
terms to have power-with each other.670 Collective power is at the heart of citizen action because 
it is through citizen identity that different, sometimes conflicting interests and ideas about the 
common good may be aggregated into an agenda capable of acquiring and sustaining consensus. 
In-turn, consensus is significant as the vessel of collective ownership.  Much of this underpins 
what Asma Khudar argues concerning democratic values in Jordan. They are she states: 
 
‘Not embedded in life, in family, in schools, in any structures. So, it is so difficult to build 
democratic political parties who are committed to laws and by-laws, to the rules (of the 
game) and accept diversity and rotation of leadership all of this. The whole (totality of) 
democratic values are not embedded in our lives. Civil or political in fact - it’s the culture. 
It needs time, and you need to build it’.671 
 
Her observation, made in 2016, highlights the continuing problem of collective action in 
Jordan, and provides some clues as to why the largest demonstrations in 2011 attracted 10,000 
participants and not more given the hardships confronting citizens. February 25 was especially 
significant, and it lent momentum into March, which saw the creation of the “Youth of March 24” 
movement, named in reference to the day of a sit-in at Amman’s Gamal Abd al-Nasser Square, 
known locally as Duwar al-Dhakliyyah (the interior circle). Following the effective model of 
Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the up to two thousand participants hoped to use their occupation of both a 
visible (the circle is one of the city’s busiest), and strategic (the official news agency Petra and the 
office of the Amman Governor overlook the circle) location to sustain impetus for reform through 
their presence. In this way, the gathering can be interpreted through the lens of what Andrea Khalil 
                                                     
670 Amy Allen, The Power of Feminist Theory, p. 126. 
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calls ‘subversive political crowds’ as the objective was to ‘dismantle existing hierarchies of power’ 
through disruption.672 
 
In composition, the sit-in was heterogeneous, comprising of Jordanians from different 
origins, social classes, places of residence, religion and gender.673 If it is true that ‘being in a crowd 
is becoming human, becoming oneself’,674 and more importantly that this becoming is innately 
social; then the significance of the sit-in becomes transparent. In that it carries the capacity to 
imagine and embody new social, that is to say a new collective self, in contrast to prevailing 
narratives of national identity and citizen behaviours. What began as a peaceful demonstration 
became violent on March 25. Groups of youths and thugs (baltijah), believed to be associated with 
the regime, or at the very least in possession of pro-government sympathies moved against the 
demonstrators using blunted instruments to break-up the sit-in.675 A number of these were 
associated with Shabāb kulna al-Urdun (The Youth arm of “We are All Jordan”) and Nidā’ al-
Watan (Call of the Nation) who had organised counter demonstrations in al-Hussein Park before 
moving on to Duwar al-Dhakhliyyah. In response, the police and security forces, which were on 
hand did not prevent the violence from occurring, but were themselves engaging in the beating 
participants.676 
 
The afternoon and evening reports had framed this as a clash between demonstrators and 
police, when in reality to those on the ground ‘it was one group attacking the other’. Of particular 
interest here was the role of identity politics. The members of Shabāb kulna al-Urdun and Nidā’ 
al-Watan, having ‘liberated’ the circle, went off into the evening to celebrate, ‘attacking all of 
these traitors who thought they could turn Jordan into Egypt or whatever’.677 The regime had been 
                                                     
672 Andrea Khalil, Crowds and Politics in North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria and Libya (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), p. 
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673 Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016; Curtis Ryan, 
‘Identity Politics, Reform and Protest in Jordan’, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11:3 (2011), p. 570. 
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successful in rehabilitating the old cleavage between Jordanians of East Bank and Palestinian 
origins. ‘I think’ meditates Lina Ejeilat, who was present at the Circle, ‘that was a serious blow to 
the protestors’ insofar as ‘the regime played it as Jordanian-Jordanians versus Palestinian-
Jordanians which was not true at all. Anyone who was there knows it was not true. But that was 
the narrative’.678 The essence of this situation, in which a collective action is imbued with a 
meaning associated with debates about Jordanian identity, is not novel.  
 
Jillian Schwedler observed a similar dynamic at play in the 1997 protests against the first 
Israeli trade fair. The riot police who were tasked with guarding the fair went from performing a 
role dictated to them by their superiors, to having their loyalty to the nation questioned by 
protestors. The riot police responded unorthodoxly by engaging in spontaneous traditional dances 
in front of the demonstration which enabled them to perform their loyalty and job 
simultaneously.679 Although the demonstrators assembled at Duwar al-Dhakhliyyah carried 
Jordanian flags, shamags and chanted loyalist slogans, there was no such reprieve for their display 
of national identity. In the aftermath spokespeople for the March 24 Movement blamed 
mukhabarat chief Muhammad Riqad for the clashes and the forcible dislodging of the sit-in.680 
Then Interior Minister Yahya Surour declared in the aftermath that he ‘will not tolerate sit-ins at 
Jamal Abd al-Nasser Square’.681 Amid tensions Abdullah II stepped in with a letter published in 
the Jordanian newspapers the following week, calling on Prime Minister al-Bakhit to push on with 
the reform program. Despite royal intervention however marches persisted into April, though this 
time the police intervened to prevent violence between rival demonstrations in Amman,682 and al-
Zarqa. The atmosphere was different after March 24/25 however, as citizens who continued to 
demonstrate were looked on by some in society as disloyal.  
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Ejeilat notes that these protestors were verbally abused on morning radio talk shows for 
months afterward, and street sellers across the Kingdom almost like magic began selling 
(successfully too!) flags en masse. It was ‘as if the country had been under attack’ she says. ‘It was 
like after the Irbid raids or when the Mukhabarat headquarters in al-Baq’a was attacked and there 
was this over-expression of nationalistic feeling with flags and what-have-you’.683 The events are 
indicative of how domestic priorities and regional affiliations were weakening the ability of the 
reform movement to sustain a united front. In al-Zarqa skirmishes erupted between police officers 
and Salafi participants armed with sticks, knives and clubs. They had congregated in front of the 
main mosque, denouncing Jordan’s ties to the US, while calling for the implementation of the 
Shari’a.684 The ensuing events resulted in injuries to 83 police, and the arrest of 17 individuals, 
later expanding to 120. 
  
By April 20 the Mukhabarat’s military prosecutor had filed charges of ‘terrorism, 
disturbance, assault, and unlawful gathering’ against a total of 230 citizens.685 Commenting in the 
aftermath of the clashes, Prime Minister al-Bakhit argued that the available evidence indicated that 
the individuals arrested were part of an ‘experienced armed organisation whose goal is to blow up 
the democratic process’.686 By the end of the year this would evolve into the largest terrorism trial 
hitherto in Jordan’s history. One hundred and fifty citizens (all of them members of the opposition 
with Islamists especially targeted) were charged under anti-terror legislation for their 
involvement.687 Christoph Wilcke, of Human Rights Watch (HRW) articulated concern not only 
with the sheer scale of the trial and its happening within the State Security Court to which there is 
no appeal, but with the imprudent use of evidence. Evaluating the prosecution, he states: 
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‘Could not substantiate charges of terrorism, let alone identify individual Salafi defendants 
as aggressors. Nonetheless, the prosecution contended that participation in a 
demonstration linked to violence— even if some time and distance away from the scene of 
the fight—was a terrorist offense, and it highlighted prior arrests or particular defendants’ 
admissions that they indeed belonged to a “jihadi-Salafi” strand of Islam’.688 
 
An almost casual application of what constitutes terrorist activity, he argued ‘casts doubts’ 
on Jordan’s publicly declared commitment to the protection of citizen rights and freedoms, 
particularly of assembly, association and expression.689 In this light the flexibility with which 
accusations of terrorist activity could be employed is an early indication of the regime positioning 
itself so as to control the ongoing demonstrations more effectively; and by extension expressions 
of citizenship. Be that as it may, with protests continuing, the King was forced to address the 
nation, offering concessions including an acknowledgment that elected cabinets would be part of 
Jordan’s reform agenda.690 Public frustration however was not so easily supplicated, as evidenced 
by an incident in the southern city of Tafileh in which the King’s motorcade was hit by stones.691 
  
It was during this period that the al-Bakhit government established the National Dialogue 
Committee (NDC), which, under the direction of former Prime Minister Taher al-Masri, met 
between March and June 2011. Composed of 52 members from across Jordan’s political spectrum, 
the NDC was charged with developing a program of political reform.692 Phase one involved 
internal debate over potential reforms to three key laws: the electoral, municipal and political 
parties; that frame much of citizen involvement in the political process. Following this, NDC 
members were dispatched to local communities across all the governorates to acquire public 
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suggestion, with the ultimate declared aim of reaching a consensual trajectory forward. One of its 
innate limitations however was that the NDC existed strictly on an advisory only basis, and thus 
its final recommendations remained in essence proposals that could be rejected. 
 
This was fundamental to the design of the process, to make it one of dialogue rather than 
action. Taher al-Masri was overheard saying at a latter event that the regime never wanted to take 
the process too far, and hence the committee was established in order to discuss solutions without 
having the necessity to at the end enact them.693 Perhaps this is why another limitation of the 
dialogue process concerned the division of labour following the King’s inauguration of a Royal 
Committee to reform the constitution in April 2011.694 All ten members of this Committee were 
royal appointees, and were answerable to the King rather than to citizens. As such, there was no 
citizen involvement in the process of selecting which articles ought to be amended. Ergo, the 
citizenry was excluded from the process. 
  
The Committee announced its findings on 14 August, which were subsequently sent to the 
parliament for approval.695 All were passed via majority except for a handful, including the 
suggestion to lower candidacy age for general elections from 30 to 25. If the government was 
serious about engaging young Jordanians in formal institutions this was a lost opportunity. Former 
minister and reform advocate Marwan Muasher, in analysing the subsequent recommendations 
highlighted six of particular significance: the creation of a constitutional court; establishing an 
Independent Election Commission (IEC) to take over the running of the electoral process from the 
Ministry of Interior; placing restrictions on the jurisdiction of the State Security Court (SSC) to 
espionage, terrorism and high treason cases; general strengthening of civil liberties, including 
prohibition on torture; tying the dissolution of the government with the dissolution of parliament; 
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and lastly, reducing the scope for governments to enact temporary legislation following the 
dissolution of parliament.696 
 
Establishing a constitutional court is significant in institutionalising distinction between 
the legislative and judicial branches of government. Prior to its creation, matters pertaining to the 
interpretation of law were handled by a high tribunal headed by the siting Senate Speaker. This 
situation, Muasher notes, was ‘widely considered less than totally independent’.697 The Senate 
Speaker, like his co-senators, is royally appointed and accountable to the monarch, not to the 
government or the wider citizenry. Analogously, a key function of the IEC was to take electoral 
disputes out of parliament, and into the realm of the judiciary to act as the sole arbitrator. Over 
time this will improve confidence in the electoral system because the Interior Ministry, which 
historically has been involved in vote fraud,698 will no longer have an organisational role in 
elections. Yet at the same time, the reforms were indicative of some profound limitations. With 
regards to gender discrimination, the Royal committee’s recommendations stopped short of 
nominating gender as a category to be added to Article 6 of the constitution which forbids 
discrimination based on religion, language and ethnic origin, ‘for religious and political 
reasons’.699   
 
In terms of the locus of power within the political architecture, the recommendations 
stopped short of limiting the King’s hold over the executive, as he may still appoint and dismiss 
prime ministers along with the entirety of the Senate at will. Although he has spoken of consulting 
parliament and in time appointing prime ministers from among the largest party or bloc represented 
in the parliament, there remains no detailed time-line of when this will be implemented, and what 
milestones need to be acquired in order for this to become standard practice. It would come to light 
in time that ‘the amendments failed to protect government and parliament from interference from 
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unelected institutions such as the intelligence apparatus or the Royal Court’.700 While consisting 
of a substantial revision of the constitution, the changes did little to address the socio-economic 
demands of demonstrators, underscoring the complexity of the Jordanian uprisings and the struggle 
to aggregate disparate opposition groups and their agendas. 
 
For Larbi Sadiki, the situation resembled a King’s dilemma, giving Abdullah II two 
options. He could either lead an agenda of deep systemic reform, or risk being overtaken by the 
march of popular demands for genuine reform. Predicated on two assumptions, Sadiki elaborates 
that unilateral top-down reform is no longer a possibility for regimes, owing to the internal ‘rot’ 
within them, which has reduced their capacity to respond with any real adequacy to their people.701 
A ramification is that honesty and subsequently trust remain enduring obstacles, because of the 
absence of citizenship ownership and accountability, which are supplanted by regime expediency. 
For example, Sadiki refers to the passing into law of Law No.23 of 2012, which was drafted as a 
sign of the government’s addressing widespread concerns about rampant corruption. Although the 
law demonstrates some promise, it simultaneously comes with a sting. If a defamation case can be 
sustained by one accused of corruption, the journalist or the individual who brought the allegation 
to life can find themselves facing a thirty to forty thousand Jordanian Dinars fine.702 This is a 
substantial impediment to investigative journalism, and therefore, of the media’s ability to inform 
and empower the citizenry. 
 
This utilising of existing legal and bureaucratic channels reflects continuity with the ‘web 
of disincentives’ identified by Wiktorowicz at the beginning of the century.703 Vogt, although not 
referencing king’s dilemma in his analysis, reveals a sympathetic perspective. According to which, 
Abdullah II retains the ability to shape political outcomes through managing the reform process, 
that at this stage of 2011 appears credibly to be inevitable. A key part of the dilemma is, as 
highlighted above, that the opposition is a kaleidoscope of organisations and currents ‘whose 
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extremely divergent positions, demands and expectations are hard to merge’ into a coherent 
national agenda.704 It is unsurprising that protests continued across the country, resulting in the 
King intervening for the second time in 2011 to remove a sitting Prime Minister. 
  
Al-Bakhit’s exit ushered the entrance of Awn al-Khasawneh, who had previous served as 
an elected member of the International Court of Justice. Ideologically, while al-Bakhit was a 
known regime loyalist and conservative, al-Khasawneh was considered more progressive, and his 
legal background gave reformers hope of further advancements in that area. Despite this, the year 
ended much like it began with marches and rallying calls including in the northern towns of 
Ramtha and Mafraq.705 By comparison, the first half of 2012 was if not quieter than its predecessor, 
at the least more predictable. Protests persisted in localities across the Kingdom. And yet what 
became clear as the year advanced was how in the face of the worsening situation in Syria and the 
increasing number of displaced Syrians crossing into Jordan, a discourse of stability and security 
began to overwhelm the voices of reform.706  
 
Within the government there emerged a factional interplay, which resulted in the 
resignation of Prime Minister al-Khasawneh on April 26 after only six months in the role. Of 
particular interest was that he tendered his resignation while abroad, believing his authority to have 
been undercut by more conservative forces (believed to be) aligned with the Palace. At the centre 
of the circumstances were differences concerning Jordan’s reform trajectory, its speed, and the 
extent to which citizens should be allowed to participate in elections.707 Since becoming Prime 
Minister, al-Khasawneh had been in negotiations with the opposition, especially with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, over proposed changes to the electoral law. The Brotherhood would not contend with 
anything less than the total rescindment of the SNTV, which was unacceptable to the government 
(and by this I also include the broader regime). Al-Khasawneh’s compromise was to replace the 
SNTV with a new model of three votes per voter, and he sought to utilize the full extent of his 
prime ministerial mandate to negotiate consensus.  
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The King however, who later criticized al-Khasawneh for the sluggish pace of reform 
during his tenure, desired an expeditious solution. The Palace summoned the deputy Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Interior, calling on them to sign a royal decree extending the 
parliamentary session so that the draft election law (sustaining the SNTV) could be approved. 
Their signature was required, given the presence of the Prime Minister abroad, and it was reported 
in the Press that the two ‘were given a dire choice of either sign the document or choose their boss 
(al-Khasawneh) over the King’.708 They chose the former. In the vacant role, Abdullah II appointed 
Fayez al-Tarawneh, a known conservative and anti-reformist, to his second tenure as Prime 
Minister. The appointment was indicative of the regime’s growing confidence in being able to 
control the reformist movements in the Kingdom. 
 
Analogous with the role of price increases in January 2011 as a catalyst for the uprisings’ 
beginning, so too did proposed increases to fuel prices result in calls for al-Tarawneh’s resignation. 
On September 1 activists in Amman and Ma’an demonstrated, calling for the resignation of the 
Prime Minister following the introduction of a 10% increase on prices. Although not targeting the 
monarch directly, participants aimed their frustration at the Palace, chanting ‘the Royal Palace is 
standing between the people and their rights’.709 Facing the opposition, and the increasing 
frequency at which the Palace and individuals close to the monarchy were becoming targets of 
resentment, Abdullah II moved to suspend the full implementation of the increase. But in a move 
highlighting the connections between socio-economic conditions and political mobilization in 
Jordan, sit-ins and marches persisted into the following week. One such occurrence in Tafileh was 
stormed by riot police after it was reported that participants were chanting slogans against the 
king.710  
 
Nevertheless, the decision by the King to hold elections in January 2013 without any 
significant changes to the election law demonstrated the persistence of confidence on the part of 
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decision-makers that popular disgruntlement could be managed. What was concerning for 
decision-makers however was the state of the budget, with an estimated 3.5 billion ($US) being 
added to the total deficit for 2012.711 In the face of pressure from the IMF, and indirectly from 
domestic constituents whose pieces of the budgetary pie could not be touched, the government 
began to propose ways of tackling the debt crisis by either devaluing the dinar, therein removing 
its “pegged” status with the US dollar, or cancelling the program of gas and commodity 
subsidies.712 Annually, Jordan had been allocating almost a quarter of its budget to subsidisation 
schemes,713 and the IMF for its part was refusing to release the next stage of a loan agreement 
worth 2 billion ($US) until the government had demonstrated a commitment to subsidy removal. 
Turbulence in the Sinai, resulting in the bombing of a crucial gas supply line to Jordan, in-
conjunction with Saudi Arabia’s declination to gift the country a further capital boost of 1.4 billion 
($US), meant that wholesale fuel subsidisation was proceeding to beyond untenable. Therefore, 
on November 13, Prime Minister Ensour, who had replaced al-Tarawneh in October, announced a 
lifting of commodity subsidisation, securing the IMF funds. In percent terms the consequent 
increases were substantial, with bottled gas increasing 50%, diesel and kerosene 33%, and lower 
quality petrol 14%.714 
 
As early as that evening, demonstrations against the price increases materialised across the 
country in Ajloun, Amman, Aqaba, Dhiban, Irbid, Karak, Mafraq, Shobak and Tafileh. In each 
locality demonstrators in the spontaneity exhibited several commonalities in terms of the locations 
within the cities/towns where they congregated, and the targets of their frustrations. In Salt and 
Tafileh for example, police vehicles were torched, In Karak and Ma’an roads were blockaded, 
including the desert highway, and a petrol station was set ablaze in Irbid.715 Where government 
buildings were present, marches moved towards them, and in Salt’s cases these included the house 
of Prime Minister Ensour. The Gendarmerie forces for their part sought to set-up positions in front 
of or around key buildings in order to prevent the demonstrators from reaching them, and used 
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rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse them.716 Actions of this variety were not novel in the 
Jordanian experience of 2011/2012. What was novel however was articulation of frustration 
targeting the King as much as the sitting government. One demonstration in front of the Interior 
Ministry remembered by an activist for illustration demonstrates the speed with which the security 
services, followed by the law act in the face of royal criticism:  
 
‘I can’t remember exactly but it was in 2012 in front of the Ministry of Interior to protest 
against the arrest of these activists. And there is this one guy, who was you know I would 
say he was stupid because that protest barely had 30 or 40 people, and if you were unable 
to gather more than 40 people to protest the arrest of activists you don’t stand up there 
and say yasqut isqut hukm ‘ada’iy you’re going straight to the king when you have nobody 
to take your back. He said that and there were police and gendarmerie surrounding the 
protest and all of a sudden there was this tension, the police closed and said in effect “ok 
everybody time to go home”…and as the protest was winding down – this is amazing – you 
had this big gendarmerie van park close by and just as people were starting to leave – it 
was very surreal - they grabbed the guy super quickly and that was it he was arrested. This 
was the guy who was charged with attempting to change the constitution’.717 
 
Of interest here is the affirmation made in public about the centrality of the monarch not 
only in decision-making, but equally by implication in corrupt practices. This is significant 
inasmuch as it illuminates a key problem facing political parties and other associations within the 
opposition, whether official or alternative, in discussing ‘the legitimacy of political authority in 
Jordan’.718 Both have generally operated on the assumption that ‘the head of the political system 
to be some sort of moderating sage. This is despite the fact that constitutionally he is indeed the 
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head of three centers of power’.719 Protests persisted over the following two days in Irbid, Salt, 
Amman, Karak and Ma’an with a range in the number of participants from several hundred to an 
estimated 2000 participants in Amman.720 Similar with the previous day, police stations and other 
symbols of government control were targeted. This was not without consequences, as the death of 
Qais Omari in Irbid attests. Local police argued he was a gunman who had used the demonstrations 
at a police station to cause trouble, an accusation vehemently denied by his family.721 Once more, 
the King became a target of derision for his role in the trajectory of the Kingdom over the past 
decade, underscoring that although only articulated by a minority of demonstrators, was 
nonetheless not isolated to a single locality.722  
 
A week later a congregation formed in front of the Royal Court in Amman, and slogans 
including ‘we are no longer slaves’ and ‘overthrow the regime’ were chanted.723 Alongside this, a 
new youth led movement, called “The November Uprising” emerged, calling for the wider public 
to join the demonstrations in order to end the ‘era of absolute monarchy’.724 Similar with the 
previously quoted passage, it is important to note the content of the utterance in-conjunction with 
the location. Illuminating the links between public recognition of what goes on in their country, 
and the relative absence of accountability with the citizen-subject dialectic along the spectrum. 
Late in the month, the Brotherhood had attempted to establish a semi-permanent sit-in at the 
Dakhliyyah Circle, similar to the one attempted by the March 24 Youth. The regime responded by 
installing military personnel, barriers and vehicles on location, while the Interior Ministry 
announced that all protest action there would be banned.725 Demonstrations planned for November 
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30, to which momentum appeared to be indicating would prove decisive for the leverage of the 
opposition specifically, and citizens more generally, proved a disappointment. Insofar as the 
critical mass which many opposition advocates including the Brotherhood had be endeavouring to 
draw onto the streets failed to materialise.  
 
 
5.3 : Constitutional Amendments & Royal Discussion Papers – Reapplying the 
Shackles? 
  
‘Citizenship can be both domination and empowerment separately or simultaneously’.726 
 
‘Selective inclusion and exclusion’ argues Schwedler, ‘are tried and true mechanisms for regime 
preservation’ regardless of regime type. Subsequently, she continues ‘one of the most powerful 
mechanisms for structuring public political space is drawing the boundary between inclusion and 
exclusion, a practice dominated by state elites’.727 In light of the previous discussion I now wish 
to consider some of the ways in which the dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion has been 
utilised for the purposes of regime consolidation, rather than addressing the legitimate demands 
for greater ownership and accountability by citizens. The two nominated here: the royal discussion 
papers of Abdullah II, and a series of constitutional amendments enacted in 2014 and 2016, aside 
from being unequivocally part of the regime response to the uprisings, both involved citizenship 
and the search by citizens for ownership and accountability directly.  
 
The discussion papers, the first five of which are the focus here due to their reform-focused 
content, were published between 2012 and 2016. Although receiving a generally muted response 
from a public that has become increasingly apathetic to royal public relations campaigns,728 the 
papers are nevertheless worthy of analysis as a foil of comparison with the acts of citizenship 
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detailed above. Published in Arabic before being translated into English, the papers were designed 
for domestic consumption. And I argue, are optimally read as an attempt at (re)framing the post-
uprisings discussion about political reform, for they ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and 
make them more salient in a communicating text…through repetition or by associating them 
culturally familiar symbols’.729  
 
In light of the muted response some of the papers received in the public sphere, questions 
may be raised concerning the success of these papers in this enterprise. However, they remain 
useful subjects of analysis in the way they frame and advance the analogy of citizenship. In so 
doing, the papers convey the impression that it is citizen inaction and use of subnational identities 
that is the chief impediment to Jordan’s democratic trajectory, a suggestion seemingly contradicted 
by the events of 2011/2012. Subsequently, although neither policies nor laws, but rather calls to 
action, the papers indicate something of a continuation of the very policies of political 
liberalisation described by Schwedler. 
 
Abdullah II’s first discussion paper ‘Our Journey to Forge Our Path Towards 
Democracy’,730 published 29 December 2012, came in the wake of three important developments: 
Abdullah Ensour’s appointment as Prime Minister in October, replacing Fayez al-Tarawneh in the 
process; the November demonstrations against the Ensour Government’s decision to remove 
subsidies on commodities; and the decision to hold elections in January 2013, concerning which 
the Muslim Brotherhood had already signalled its decision to boycott. Befitting this immediate 
context against the wider background of the uprisings initiated the year before, the King focuses 
his attention on the upcoming election campaign. Specifically, elaborating on four ‘essential’ 
principles and practices that are necessary in order to develop a democratic order in the Kingdom: 
respect of difference in opinions, the exercise of accountability, understanding that dialogue and 
consensus constitute ‘a persistent national duty’, and recognition that all citizens are ‘partners in 
sacrifice and gain’.731 
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In articulating the necessity for respect of different opinions within the public sphere, the 
King employs a combination of familial and civic discursive analogies. For instance, he asserts all 
Jordanians (jinsiyyah holders) are ‘equal brothers and sisters’ within the one family, using a trope 
with substantial historical pedigree in Hashemite discourse.732 Abdullah II has over the course of 
his reign regularly spoken of the Jordanian family with himself positioned as the metaphorical 
father. This has importantly -when necessary- adopted a tribal flavouring, with the Jordanian 
nation likened to a tribe, with the King its paramour sheikh.733 Simultaneously, the familial is 
contextualised by the nation-state, for the brothers and sisters of the family ‘are all Jordanians and 
all of us are Jordan’.734 Although as in a family each member performs different functions to 
varying degrees of proficiency, all are united in their kin-based partnership; so too are citizens in 
Abdullah II’s Jordan. Hence, ensuring the unity of the political community (the state) is more 
important than the differences that exist between citizen members.735  
 
As such the use of familial symbols and language underscores, or at least indicates, why 
consensus and dialogue are conceived of as incessant national duties. In so-called transitioning 
societies from one form or another of overtly centralised or authoritarian rule to democracy, the 
transition can be problematic.  Fissures and disagreements over decision-making that can be 
contained within democratic institutions may not be so easily balanced and accommodated in 
situations where established patterns of behaviour within and between institutions and actors are 
being altered.736 And the Kings alludes to this by recognising that ‘the circle of respect and mutual 
trust’ between citizens must be expanded.737 
    
This is not disputed by political and civil society activists. Muhammad Hussainy 
instructively notes ‘there is a mutual fear in Jordanian society, different groups are afraid of each 
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other…that is why we didn’t go too far with our demands’.738 He explains that the existence of 
mutual suspicions underpins domestic support for the monarchy which is seen ‘as the safety key 
or network’.739 Outside of institutional politics, these fears and suspicions operate additionally on 
a more societal level. In mid-2016 a car accident on Amman’s airport road tragically cut short the 
life of a young Jordanian boy. This boy had recently been starring on the latest season of a popular 
television talent show in which he had been performing guitar to the live audience. Ru‘yia TV 
which owned the license to the show ran a news story on the tragedy. When it soon came to light 
that the boy was Christian, ‘it started this argument’ said Rana Sweiss: ‘do we [as Muslims] send 
condolences or not?’ it soon developed into ‘a whole discussion all over social media: no, we don’t 
send condolences, no we do send condolences; is it allowed is it not allowed? This was something 
that had not been discussed before’.740 
 
The state, and by extension the regime is implicated in this development argues Sweiss 
through ‘decades of a deteriorating education system and an increasing lack of tolerance’, creating 
‘a belief that diversity is a bad thing’. This, intersecting with the widespread availability of 
anonymity facilitated by social media made it easier for thoughts and ideas harmful to the body 
politic to be disseminated, to the extent that Jordan’s Mufti was forced to publicly declare that 
sending condolences was permitted.741 Thus the King is correct in arguing that the citizenry has 
some ground to cover internalising the respect/dialogue dyad and reproducing it socially producing 
compromise in turn resulting in ‘agreeable solutions’ (ḥaloul al-tawāfiqiyyah) to collective 
concerns.742 However completely absent is any suggestion that the architecture of the state directly 
influences the kind of political and social subjectivities that have encouraged the production and 
reproduction of mutual suspicions and fears.  
 
Marwan Muasher recognises this point, expounding how in both Arab republics and 
monarchies including Jordan, ‘a culture of allegiance’ rendered diversity and disagreement in 
negative terms, resulting in the creation of a generation ‘raised on the notion that allegiance to the 
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country meant allegiance to the party, system, or leader; and suggesting that diversity, critical 
thinking, and individual differences were treasonous’.743 In contemporary Jordan, Rana Sweiss 
affirms ‘people here in Jordan…created a citizenship with loyalty today which means that security 
trumps everything, it’s the most important thing and that’s it. Loyalty means you keep your 
thoughts to yourself, you keep anything that is critical to yourself because now is not the time’.744 
Our discussions however argue this conception of loyalty has run its course, especially as to an 
increasing number of Jordanians the state to which they are citizens has ceased being responsive 
and attentive to their needs and expectations. Becoming unaccountable to them in the process and 
inducing a corresponding reciprocity of apathy on their part, towards the state.  
 
Given the exegesis on citizenship in chapter two, accountability, while appearing self-
evident at first glance, cannot in reality, be assumed owing to the existence of Citizens as 
hyphenated subjects. Accountability manifests itself in various ways in Abdullah II’s argument. 
Requiring on the one hand, a ‘questioning of those who occupy positions of responsibility’, 
combined with civic engagement and partnership on the other. So that via ‘purposeful discussions 
and dialogue’ issues faced by families, communities and the nation itself may be resolved.745 Each 
of these however means little in the absence of reciprocity from state institutions. When Farah 
Maraqa states ‘citizenship in Jordan means almost nothing’ it is largely because the capacities of 
citizens to perform their citizenship, without resorting to subnational identities, is profoundly 
restricted by the nature of state institutions.746  
  
At the heart of the matter is how to define citizenship and the acceptable behaviours 
associated with it. The King developed a model of ‘attentive/conscious and responsible citizens’ 
(al-muwātanun al-wā‘aun wa al-mas’ulun) to describe those Jordanians who engage in the 
following practices. They ‘follow (yatāba‘aun) the media bearing in mind truth and objectivity’ 
when evaluating the content of news messages regardless of media platform. In association, they 
‘interact’ (yatafā‘ilun) with their fellow citizens in expressing different opinions, maintaining the 
familial cordiality already outlined as requisite for respecting diversity of opinion. More than intra-
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citizenry debate, responsible citizens ‘communicate’ (yatawāsilun) actively with their 
parliamentary representatives, ‘following’ and evaluating answers to given questions. Armed with 
these, citizens are called to take the initiative ‘to organise themselves on the local level’, adopting 
‘unified’ or consensual positions in their efforts ‘towards solutions to local problems’.747  
 
This is what Abdullah II refers to when he speaks of citizens exercising accountability, 
without which their citizenship is incomplete. Within this articulation, consent is implicitly 
projected as a precondition for the exercise of accountability. In order to interact respectfully with 
fellow citizens irrespective of origin, class or religion, requires a consenting to the principle that 
you and they share a fundamental status and identity within the political community. 
Communicating with members of parliament similarly requires not only consent to the existence 
of a parliament, but also to the processes, such as elections, through which individuals become 
members of that institution. Respect for these processes will in turn engender confidence in the 
practice of asking and critiquing MPs on their performance. Inextricably, this is conditional on the 
realities of institutional performance and the perceptions they generate on the ground.  
    
Each of these is significant in facilitating inter-citizen trust and on a wider scale a civic 
national culture. However, when considered as they are by Abdullah II in isolation from existing 
institutional arrangements, which over decades have produced and continue to reproduce 
behaviours and mutual suspicion antithetical to civility, they remain hollow. Lending further 
support to Maraqa and Sweiss’ contention about the absence of reciprocity, which is a clear signal 
that citizens do possess a sufficient degree of power-over their representatives in order for these 
actions (following, communicating etc.) to lead to tangible changes in their livelihoods in the 
absence of contentious politics. 
 
The King’s second discussion paper ‘Making Our Democratic System Work for all 
Jordanians’ was released a week prior to the January 23rd poll, and understandably continues the 
thematic focus of its predecessor, but with an acute focusing in on the transition to parliamentary 
government. However, it does so in context of voter disillusionment with electoral politics,748 
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justifiable in light of the details of the 2012 Elections Law, which was viewed as a step-backward 
from the rhetoric of reform espoused in August 2011. The August recommendations suggested 
reducing the candidacy age from thirty to twenty-five, in order to allow younger Jordanians to 
better access the political system. However, Article 10 of the 2012 Law preserved the minimum 
candidacy age of thirty, and whenever reducing the age has been put before parliament since, it 
has been rejected.749 More demonstrably is the maintenance (in essence) of the SNTV, which was 
an instrumental reason behind the Muslim Brotherhood’s boycotting of the elections.750 The 
government did however allow voters a second vote in a general national list, alongside their 
district-bounded vote.751 
 
The King dedicated time to the role of political parties in the transition to democracy and 
specifically to a model of parliamentary government. He begins by emphasising the centrality of 
the Constitution to the process of democratisation as ‘the foundation of political and democratic 
life’ in the Kingdom, maintaining that it guarantees the separation of powers and ‘safeguards’ the 
rights of citizens.752 Jordanian analysts however, have commented that this so-called guaranteed 
separation has been rendered precarious by the 2014 and 2016 constitutional amendments. Recent 
history of policy-making pours water over any suggestion of a rigid separation between powers 
and institutions. Explicitly, ‘policy is decided by the Royal Palace, but in the past policy making 
used to be in the hands of the Prime Minister and ministers with communication and understanding 
with the King. Now no, I don’t think so’.753 
 
Such has repercussions on the short and mid-term opportunities to develop political parties 
capable of performing a meaningful role in government decision-making, operating as a conduit 
between decision-makers and the voting citizenry to whom they would be accountable. Since 1993 
when they were legalized once more in Jordan, political parties have been organised more around 
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individuals than ideologies or policy programs, with a possible exception being the Islamic Action 
Front.754 A shift in the way parties are established, organised and are mobilised, is essential to 
Jordan’s reform trajectory, because ‘the essential principle of modern democracies’ is the practice 
of citizens choosing their representatives who partake in decision making on their behalf.755 Parties 
perform a significant function in aggregating interests into a policy program, the merits of which 
can be debated internally through party structures and forums, and externally via elections. 
 
In order for this to happen, the environment needs to be receptive, requiring action not only 
at the citizen, but additionally the government and regime levels. It is here where once more the 
citizen search for ownership and accountability is impeded. A particularly bright light is shone on 
this via a brief comparison between civil society organisations and political parties in Jordan. 
When asked about the reasons for choosing to pursue youth activism via a civil society 
organisation instead of existing channels of institutional politics, Sami Hourani presents a 
forthright rationale: flexibility. In order to develop Leaders of Tomorrow into ‘an entity for young 
educated Jordanians to have the freedom to express themselves and serve their communities’,756 
civil society despite its limitations offered more options than the route of a political party: 
 
‘Once you are registered as a political party it goes straight to the Mukhabarat and you 
will be obstructed at every turn. Agents will be with you from the beginning. As a civil 
society organisation, you do not receive the same attention. At least you can move. For 
instance, what we do with Diwaniyyah it is a purely political party thing, and would be 
great for political parties to hold such public debates. If you look at Forsa it is a great 
platform that political parties could adapt. All of our main platforms are like that. But then 
the Mukhabarat would get involved’.757  
 
This is not to say that interference from the intelligence services does not occur. In recent 
years Diwaniyyah has proven to be increasingly difficult to host and a number of planned events 
in 2016 were cancelled with permission revoked in the hours beforehand. Diwaniyyah is a forum-
                                                     
754 Wael Abu Anzeh, (Economic researcher), interview with the author, Amman September 03, 2016. 
755 Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘Making Our Democratic System Work for all Jordanians’. 
756 Sami Hourani (Founder & Director Leaders of Tomorrow), interview with the author, Amman, May 18, 2016. 
757 Ibid.  
  
195 
 
style event in which speakers are invited to address crowd of young Jordanians (some up to three 
hundred strong), and field questions from them about a range of topics on which they are versed. 
It aims ‘to develop citizenship through social engagement at the grassroots and advocates for the 
rights of the citizen to hold decision-makers to account’. Subsequently it is designed to be ‘very 
confronting’ for the speaker because ‘we want an MP, a minister or university head to be 
accountable to the grass roots in that space’.758 Unsurprisingly then, the platform and its organisers 
have been banned, faced interrogation and had permission (required to hold such a gathering a 
public place) revoked.759  
 
This stands in stark contrast to the implication that underpins the King’s argument 
concerning the reasons behind party weakness. In it, the wider institutional environments in which 
political parties operate is currently sufficient in facilitating the aforementioned movement away 
from character-centric organisation, towards policy platforms and ideas on a national level. By 
extension, fault for the poor health of party politics in Jordan is levelled at the citizenry. 
Accordingly, this carries airs of a pseudo-Tocquevillian position in that it appears as though it is 
the calibre ‘of the people as citizens which ultimately determined the quality of public and political 
life’.760  
 
Principles established as necessary for democratisation in the first discussion paper return 
in the third paper ‘Each Playing Our Part in a New Democracy’, published a few months after the 
January poll. In it the King outlines in some detail the roles he envisages political parties, the 
parliament, Ministers and Cabinet, the Monarchy, and citizens having in Jordan’s democratic 
transition. The role of the monarch is to guarantee that nothing either internally or externally 
undermines national unity (al-wiḥdah al-wataniyyah), pluralism (al-ta’dudiyyah), openness (al-
infitaḥ), moderation (al-‘itidal), and tolerance (al-tasameḥ), which for the King ‘fundamentally’ 
shape the Jordanian political community.761 Parliament meanwhile functions to hold the 
governments to account, denoting in theory that governments are accountable to the parliament, 
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which for its part is accountable to the citizens who elected its members.762 Within this context, 
the sitting government has a ‘constitutional authority’ and responsibility to implement its agenda, 
thus requiring MPs to operate in a such a way so as to ‘balance’ the requirement of supporting a 
government’s mandate on the one hand, and opposing particular elements and bills of the agenda 
if it is in the national interest.763 
 
The elephant in the room is that if this were so, and, if it met the expectations of citizens, 
then the 2011 uprisings would not foreseeably have occurred. Although the citizenry is accorded 
the character of ‘the essential brick in constructing our democratic system’, whose ‘engagement’ 
(inkhirāt) in political life ‘is necessary in order to develop ‘an active party system’;764 the practice 
of their citizenship is framed more passively than what appears in Balibar’s citizen-subjectivity. 
Three such practices constituting ‘active citizenship (al-muwātanah al-fā‘ilah) are outlined. One 
is ‘their awareness’ in ‘persistently searching for the truth’, through which they become informed 
of local and national events and act accordingly ‘based on facts not rumours’.765 The second and 
third practices concern what to do with this acquired knowledge and when. One outlined by the 
king is voting in elections. Here citizens have a responsibility to cast votes for representatives with 
an eye to the national interest alongside the perhaps more immediate local interest. Again this is 
predicated on the assumption that the political environment encourages nationally oriented 
campaigns and voting patterns, a point refuted by those in civil society who point out that ‘in day-
to-day life you will find immediately that people are suffering because of exclusion from certain 
sectors of the government and the state’.766 It thus becomes exceedingly difficult to engage in the 
third mode of participation outlined by Abdullah II: suggesting ‘alternative ideas and solutions’ to 
those proposed by governments.  
 
Active citizenship constitutes the locus of coalescence for the fourth paper, ‘Towards 
Democratic Empowerment and Active Citizenship’, released on June 2 2013. A response in part 
to increasing scepticism from Anglo-European observers of the MENA regarding post-2011 
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democratisation probabilities on the one hand, and as part of the launch of a new Royal initiative 
for democracy empowerment ‘Demoqrati’, funded by the influential King Abdullah II Fund for 
Development on the other. The paper confirms again the centrality of citizen action in Jordan’s 
transition. At its heart, active citizenship is proposed to have three principle foundations: ‘the right 
to participate, the duty to participate and the responsibility to participate’, where participation is 
understood as being ‘committed to peaceful means and mutual respect’.767 These pillars are 
significant in light of the reform objective of ‘strengthening popular participation in decision-
making through a deepening model of parliamentary governments’.768 Emphasis is placed on the 
duty and responsibility to participate in specific ways is of primary significance in the construction 
of political subjectivity. A point repeated in the fifth in the series ‘Goals, Achievements and 
Conventions: Pillars for Deepening Our Democratic Transition’, circulated in late 2014. In which 
the King addresses the progress of Demoqrati, reflecting on milestones reminding Jordanians that 
progress had been made, including a doubling of civil society organisations to more than six 
thousand countrywide.769  
 
He once again reaffirms the values required for a flourishing democracy outlined in the 
third paper in the series, calling on citizens to acknowledge and respect the reciprocity of rights 
and obligations to each other and the state. Abdullah II is silent however on the progress towards 
parliamentary governance in addition to the obligations of the state and its architecture to citizens. 
This would have to assume the existence of a model of parliamentary government. Yet, because 
‘parliaments simply can’t make policy’770 there is instead something of a kleptocratic system of 
Amman based networks with no public accountability that attracts the services of parliamentarians. 
‘Many of the people’ reflects Tariq Tell, ‘who are most successful in parliament have joined them 
rather than thinking about their constituents’.771 According to some, this situation has become 
worse since Abdullah II ascended the throne. While his predecessor Hussein indisputably ruled 
and reigned, he had a tendency to ‘give a huge margin’ of manoeuvrability to prime ministers who 
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although never elected ‘were real prime ministers’.772 To the extent, states Sufian Obeidat that they 
had the latitude to decide on the Cabinet members, policy agendas and their implementation. The 
current monarch in comparison ‘likes to see himself as a president’.773 
 
 
5.3.2 : Constitutional Amendments & Royal Discussion Papers – Reapplying the 
Shackles? 
 
The central thread running through each of the five discussion papers was not only that it was up 
to Jordanians to activate their citizenship, but equally that the institutions of state, pre-eminently 
the parliament, were ready for such activation, needing only their participation to reach their 
democratic potential. In other words, Jordanians already possess power-to and power-over via 
power-with. They have power-to engage and for this engagement to wield tangible results; power-
over the parliament so long as their engagement functions to keep MPs accountable for their 
decisions; power-with inasmuch as their collective participation in elections and civil society is 
critical in building the desired society.  
  
When regarded from this perspective, the power-with advanced by the King stands in 
contrast to the power-with enacted and embodied by Jordanians in marches and sit-ins across the 
country. A contradistinction confirmed in his first discussion paper where he argues that, although 
demonstrations and strikes are ‘constitutionally protected’ they should not be quickly adopted as 
it results in a stalling of dialogue and a closing of communication.774 The logic embedded here 
applies only if dialogue and communication are understood from a particular and rather limited 
position conceiving of such terms as operational and legitimate only within certain identified 
contexts such as elections, forums and parliament. Engin Isin comments that this ‘active 
citizenship…has become a script for already existing citizens to follow already existing paths’, 
which are by definition associated with government practices and hence existing hierarchies of 
power and authority.775  
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However, what if protests are a form of communication or even citizenship? If so then they 
constitute a dialogic structure between those participating and the object of their frustration, in this 
instance readily understood as the regime as the prevailing hegemon. When social analogies like 
dialogue are broadened in this way, exposed is the reality that all the decisions made within its 
ambit are responses to the decisions of the other actors involved. It is not the closing of the door 
mentioned by the King, rather than being interpreted as pseudo-natural in occurrence, in actuality 
is a choice made by the regime?  
    
It is into this argument that the uprisings reveal illuminating insights on the status of 
citizenship in the Kingdom. The very existence of the demonstrations with their spatial and 
temporal scope denotes forcefully that the hitherto conventional modes of citizen participation in 
domestic politics were not yielding sufficient results to the citizenry; necessitating a new, less 
institutionalized and more unpredictable form of citizen activism and political participation. At the 
same time, the very fact that Jordanian protesters demanded reform rather than revolution suggests 
equally that the institutions of the country maintain a degree of legitimacy sufficient enough to 
preclude the active consideration of radical alternative models. Having established this, the 
argument of the chapter now turns away from textual analysis, towards realities on the ground in 
order to evaluate Abdullah II’s propositions. While the discussion papers have much to 
recommend them thematically, whatever role they accord the citizen is placed into sharp relief 
when compared with the constitution and its amendments from 2011 to 2016. 
 
Across the discussion papers, the King reiterates frequently that the constitution guarantees 
the rights of all Jordanians, and this assumption serves as the basis on which the subsequently 
ruminated democratic reform agenda is predicated. But is this true? It ought to be borne in mind 
that the present constitution was promulgated in 1951/1952, almost forty years before 
democratisation became first a concern, and then a policy umbrella of the Hashemite regime in a 
post-Cold War world. For the majority of this time, Hussein ruled and reigned in tandem with 
unelected governments, and between 1967 and 1989 did so under martial law in the absence of 
any meaningful parliamentary life. In Chapter three I noted that the constitution itself does not 
define citizenship (jinsiyyah), but rather leaves that task to legislation. Analogously the 
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constitution does not define the rights possessed by citizens, but frames them as principles whose 
explicit details are formally designated, as is the extent of their application, in legislation. Two 
examples serve to demonstrate. Article 15 section 1, which addresses freedom of opinion, 
including expression, publication etc. stipulates that ‘the state guarantees/secures (kafala) freedom 
of opinion, and all Jordanians may express their opinions freely in speech, writing, 
photography/portrayal, and other means of expression’.776   
 
So far, the stipulation is unconditional, and would therefore be able to constellate a blanket 
guarantee of this particular freedom. It finishes however with the declaration – ‘bishrt inna la 
yatajāwaz hadud al-qānun’ – ‘on the condition that it does not exceed the limits of the law’.777  
Therefore the applicability of the first half of the sentence is contingent on the interpretation of the 
second in legislation. Section 3 of the same aticle similarly asserts that ‘the state guarantees/secures 
(kafala) freedom of the press, printing, publication and information media’ provided that such 
activity is properly situated ‘within the limits of the law’ – ‘ḍamina hadud al-qānun’.778 Article 
16’s three paragraphs are simiarly reinforcing. Section 1 states ‘Jordanians have the right of 
association within the limits of the law’, ergo repeating the pattern observable in previous and 
subsequent, articles. This is elaborated on in paragraph 2 with regards to forming (tālif) unions and 
political parties, provided they are lawful and peaceful. Further conditionality is provided in 
paragraph 3 explicating that ‘the law structures the way by which the establishment of groups, 
unions and political parties’.779  
 
Resultantly, although the constitution enables the creation of citizen organisations, the 
actual composition of these rely on laws to regulate their day-to-day operations. Citizens therefore 
according to Mohamed Husseiny deal with regulation rather than laws specifically in many of their 
regular interactions with the state, arguing: 
 
‘When I want to do something related to my rights for example, issuing me a passport or 
something like that, I don’t deal with the law, I deal with the relevant regulations: bring a 
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copy of this paper, bring a certain number of photos; and here the government is playing 
with it because regulations are not approved by the parliament. The laws are but the 
associated regulation is totally under the mandate of the government’.780 
 
These articles suggest that the constitution itself, unlike a bill of rights, in isolation does 
little if anything to safeguard the practice of citizen-based rights. Instead it must operate in-
conjunction with parliament, which as the site of legislative activity has the power to apply 
constitutional principles in law and regulation. Recent Legislation concerning press freedoms in 
the Kingdom is indicative of this dynamic, and further reveals that while the King implores citizens 
to become socially and politically engaged, laws have been passed curtailing the freedoms 
necessary to facilitate this. The significant role of parliament in the sustaining of authoritarian 
governmental practices emerges here, and hence, illuminates the need of the regime to control it.  
 
The constitutional amendments which were passed by the 17th Parliament in 2014 and 2016 
in record time lend further weight to the continuity of political liberalisation as a means of regime 
consolidation rather than change. Principally, by centralising executive authority in the figure of 
the monarch, and thereby reducing the scope for the Legislature to hold the Executive accountable. 
In August 2014, the King wrote to then-Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour, directing his government 
to address two areas of concern. The first concerned a division of labour between the executive, 
the legislative and the military in which the Prime Minister was charged with ‘beginning a process 
of activating the Ministry of Defence’. Secondly, the King stipulated the need to bolster the 
institutional scope and reach of the IEC.781 Abdullah Ensour responded with an official missive, 
articulating the relevant steps the government would take involving the passage of two 
constitutional amendments through parliament. The first entailed giving the Head of State (the 
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King) unilateral right of appointment for the head of General Intelligence Department and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
 
Prior to parliament’s acceptance of the amendment on 28 August, the King appointed 
individuals to both of these positions on recommendations from Cabinet, and the decision was 
counter-signed.782 Cabinet involvement in the process however is now no longer required. 
Justifying this, the Prime Minister acknowledged the challenging environment facing Jordan, and 
the necessity of ensuring the ‘professional and apolitical’ nature of the Armed Forces and the 
GID.783 Ensour proceeded to articulate that isolating such sensitive appointments in the hand of 
the King was a measure essential ‘in preparation for democratic reforms’. Categorically, ‘if a leftist 
or an Islamic party formed the government in the future, this amendment would prevent them from 
causing instability in the army’.784 
 
The second amendment referenced in Ensour’s response concerned Article 67 and the 
expansion of the IEC’s organisational prerogatives from its then present jurisdiction over general 
elections, to all elections at the governorate, municipal and local levels.785 There was nothing 
innately surprising or controversial about this aspect of the directive. The same could not be said 
however of the first area highlighted by the King. Critics claimed that the amendments served to 
alter the very nature of Jordan’s political system. Amman based lawyer Omar Aṭouṭ argued that 
the King, instead of occupying the role of ‘referee’ in the system, had now become ‘a player’ in 
the political game.786 The risk explicit in this change of position is that it calls into question Article 
30 of the Constitution, which is unequivocal in its assertion that the King is ‘immune from 
liability’.787 More forthrightly, Muhammad Hammouri argued that the changes amount to a tacit 
approval of converting Jordan’s political architecture ‘from constitutional to presidential 
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monarchy’ (malikiyah dustouriyah ila malikiyah rai’siyah).788 Mohammed Hussainy for example 
is less concerned insofar as the constitution irrespective of the amendments precludes the King 
from legal responsibility.789 
 
Yet, disconcertion persisted in the wake of a second round of amendments in 2016. Local 
analysts were concerned with, on the one hand, the behaviour of the parliament in approving the 
alterations and, on the other, with the implications of the amendments on future parliamentary 
activity.790 Obeidat explains the process as follows: ‘the council of ministers were summoned in 
the morning and these substantial amendments were put on the table for them to sign. They just 
signed it and immediately within the hour sent it to the parliament. No objections’.791 Such 
accentuates the accountability of the Cabinet to the Monarch rather than the citizenry. The process 
was similarly opaque and unaccountable, given that the Ministers were unaware of the 
amendments before they were summoned to sign their approval.792 
 
Analogous with their 2014 predecessors, the 2016 amendments were acutely focused on 
the state’s judiciary and the security apparatus. The reigning monarch now has the unilateral 
prerogative to appoint and remove the Kingdom’s Chief Justice and all sitting judges on the bench 
of the Constitutional Court. Similarly, in the sphere of security, the head of the Gendarmerie is 
now appointed without consultation and ministerial counter-signing; both of which were previous 
necessities. Ministers are no longer engaged directly in the process of appointing key roles in the 
Kingdom’s Judicial-political architecture. Further, if this individual was an elected member of 
parliament, it means that the electorate (through its elected representatives) has no role in the 
process. A careful reading of Abdullah Ensour’s rationale justifying the amendments reveals 
something of the profound nature of the reforms. When taken together, both stages appear to be 
part of a process disaggregating parliament from sensitive spheres of government, and locating 
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these spheres in the monarchy. A ‘Nice justification’, sighs Hussainy, if on the assumption that 
facilitating parliamentary government is the objective. However, he continues, ‘we still have not 
seen any parliamentary government! I mean Hani al-Mulki (the current Prime Minister) was 
appointed without consultation nothing!’793 
 
 
5.4 : Conclusion 
 
‘One of the worst things’, writes Rashid Khalidi in a general commentary on the nature of 
authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, ‘was the contempt the rulers showed for their 
peoples…immature, dangerous and unready for democracy’.794 In this chapter I began by 
examining the trajectory of the Jordanian experience over the course of the 2011/2012 uprisings, 
emphasising it as a search for ownership and accountability on the part of citizens. It was necessary 
to advance this search into the streets, because the formal avenues of citizenship practice had been 
for too long constrained, excoriated of value, and proven inadequate in meeting the needs and 
expectations of Jordanians. I suggested that the present ordering of Jordan’s political architecture 
reveals much about the nature and limitations of Jordanian citizenship.  
 
Following the uprisings, I endeavoured to contrast the citizen search for ownership and 
accountability with the efforts of the regime to re-establish a political subjectivity of passivity. 
This was undertaken via a delimiting of the rights, sites, scales and acts in which citizen 
subjectivity is produced and reproduced, both through ideas and discourses as suggested by the 
discussion papers, and through constitutional amendments, structuring the capacities of citizens 
and decision-makers within the Jordanian polity. The assumption, that the only variable in question 
is the desire for all Jordanians to put the national interest first, completely blindsides the 
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architectural arrangements (political, social and economic) that preclude alternative and potentially 
disruptive action capable of changing the nature of citizen within the domestic political scene.  
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Chapter Six 
 
6. Between Nationalities & Expediency: ‘My Mother is Jordanian and Her Citizenship 
is My Right’ 
 
‘For me citizenship is a legal relationship in which your obligations and your privileges are 
determined. It is the basis by which you become part of the political community that the state is 
meant to encompass. In Jordan it is a tricky subject. Citizenship and nationality are not aligned 
neither legally nor in people’s perceptions. I think the reasons for this are quite complex – some 
relate to the politics of the region and of Jordan. But also a lot of it is cultural and the way people 
identify’.795 
 
‘If you are a Jordanian man of Palestinian origin and a Jordanian man of East Bank origin if you 
are Muslim Jordanian man regardless of your origin, let’s say you have the higher reference point 
in terms of citizenship. Everybody else suffers a particular kind of discrimination. So obviously if 
you are a woman it’s not equal citizenship, if you are a Christian it’s not equal citizenship, 
particularly if you are a Christian woman, and also a Christian man. Obviously there are all these 
intersections…there is this very disturbing notion that there is a certain Jordanian-ness that 
merely having a passport or citizenship or a national ID number does not grant you’.796  
 
 
6.1 : Introduction 
 
In part two (chapters 4 and 5) I argued that one of the profound characteristics of citizenship in 
contemporary Jordan was the absence of ownership and accountability. Now, our attention turns 
to some of the ways in which this reality is negotiated and at times contested by Jordanians. This 
is the preeminent occupation of part three. The present chapter considers the gendered hierarchies 
of Jordan’s citizenship regime. Specifically focusing on the campaign My Mother is Jordanian 
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and Her Citizenship is My Right, which has been ongoing over the past decade. The campaign 
addresses the plight of Jordanian mothers bearing children with non-Jordanian fathers irrespective 
of marriage status, who are categorically unable to automatically transfer their citizenship to their 
children like their male counterparts. The state simply does not recognise them, and consequently, 
a key aspect of Jordanian mothers’ agency as citizens is in this situation non-existent. 
 
Not only does the campaign bring to light the conjunct roles of constitutions, law-making 
and social norms in gendering citizenship, but furthermore links with our discussion of jinsiyyah 
and muwātanah from chapter two. I advanced an enunciation of muwātanah claims founded on 
individual ties to territory, and the struggle that exists between the bottom-up potential of 
muwātantah on the one hand and the top-down structuration of jinsiyyah on the other. Furthermore 
there is another facet involved here concerning the definition and practice of jinsiyyah. The 
campaigners involved in the coalition are using their statuses as both muwātanah and jinsiyyah 
holders in an endeavour to influence the way the state defines the latter; therein seeking a degree 
of ownership over a process that has historically been the preserve of the state alone. In so doing, 
this illustration illuminates the power relations implicit in the politics of gender and citizenship 
regimes, and highlights the import of altering the ways in which citizenship practice is structured 
to encourage or produce particular results. Hence regime is the optimal word here, in referring to 
efforts to change rules (laws and constitutional articles), which for their part, ‘“give” any regime 
its scope and coherence by demarcating roles’.797 Onuf’s identification of the relationship between 
rules and roles here is important in the case of the social production and re-production of gender 
roles, not merely in Jordan but across the region and the world. 
 
Although the constitution might theoretically guarantee Jordanians a range of rights, the 
practicalities of accessing and applying these are determined through legislation and regulation, 
undergirded by socially constructed and reproduced normative arrangements. Social norms cannot 
therefore be ignored. Laws and legislative alterations are no panacea to the ills of gender and 
citizenship imbalances. As poignantly explained by Valentine Moghadam, ‘the nature of the 
political system, objectives of state managers, elites constitute crucial factors in the equation that 
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determines positions of women’.798 All of which, constitute, and are constituted by, normative 
arrangements. Extrapolating from Onuf, it becomes apparent that a substantive power of law and 
law-making reside in the ways in which it shapes and frames the political community/s within the 
state. Through this process, laws create borders between: the permissible and impermissible, inside 
versus outside, and included as opposed to excluded.  
 
This is of particular significance in the Jordanian context for the reason Amira El-Azhary 
Sonbol enunciates, whereby change, even of laws, ‘has been gendered by holding on to traditional 
patriarchal relations and a state-controlled legal system that continues to reflect tribal 
patriarchy’.799 Social realities are predicated on these constructions, an assertion conveyed in 
Lapid’s postulate that ‘borders (and bordering) are absolutely indispensable to any notion of 
linguistic or social order’.800 In this way, a better contextualisation of Moghadam’s assertion that 
‘Variations in the application of Muslim family content depend principally on the type of political 
regime and the strength of modern social classes’ may be appreciated.801 Reform is consequently 
a necessary part of structuring more equal citizenship and gender relations, regardless of its 
difficulty as an undertaking. This directs our present focus to what specific elements of the 
constitution and legislative canon that needs to be addressed. A key factor here is the absence of a 
definition of Jordanian citizenship in the constitution, for it is in the nationality law that the 
normative acceptance of patrilineal citizenship truly emerges.  
 
 
6.2 : Gendered Readings of the Constitution 
 
Here it is pertinent to begin with Article 6 Paragraph 1 of the constitution stating ‘Jordanians are 
equal before the law without distinction in terms of their rights and obligations whether they differ 
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in race, language or religion’.802 The absence of gender assists in the perpetuation of inequality in 
law.803 I do not mean to suggest that all Jordanian women experience inequality of the same variety 
in their everyday life. Intersectionality is central to understand the lived experience of masculine 
and feminine citizenship constructions. Even in Jordanian law, there are different levels of 
equality. If the constitution ignores gender/ is gender blind, in the civil code ‘all women are 
considered ostensibly equal to all men’, and in the personal status law women and men ‘are 
unequal (in terms of rights and duties)’.804 Additionally, within this duality, the status of Bedouin 
women is complicated by a third element, namely the historically constituted legal distinction 
between them and their urban dwelling counterparts.805  
 
A further intersection is religious affiliation, which despite Article 6 does have an influence 
over the practice of citizenship. Although Jordanians are able to practice their religious traditions 
freely, this is not synonymous with a state and socially recognised equality of faiths. Constitutional 
Article 2 of Chapter 1 for example establishes Islam as the religion of State806 and this, in-
conjunction with the necessity of the King being an adherent of Islam, and a Sharif – a descendent 
of the Prophet Muhammad,807 creates an image of an ideal citizen as one who shares in that faith.808 
None should be surprised therefore, if the categories of citizen and believer become at times 
intertwined. Rania Maktabi has found that in a number of instances ‘family law embodies the 
clerical imprint of religious law which principles male guardianship over females’.809 Having said 
that, it is the normatively constructed understandings of religious stipulations that are, arguably, 
of greater weight than the stipulations themselves. Consider for example, the Islamic justification 
for children belonging to the father. El-Azhary Sonbol’s statement in Islamic fiqh that “the child 
belongs to the marital bed” (al-wild lil-firash), meaning that he belongs to those who conceived 
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him’, has no gender attribute, and ‘yet it is taken to mean the child belongs to the father without 
dispute’.810 
 
The push-and-pull factors of one institution are in a dialogic relationship with their 
counterparts from a second institution (the nation-state). Article 3 of the Nationality Law for 
example enunciates that a child is automatically conferred Jordanian citizenship if their father is 
recognised as a citizen,811 echoing traditional norms regarding the masculine construction of the 
family. This is indicative of the seminal significance of legislation, in performing a deciding role 
in the status and agency of female citizens. Where a marriage is recognised, the state assumes that 
children born in the context of it will become members of a national community through patrilineal 
association. In circumstances where a marriage union is either non-existent or not recognised by 
the state, the situation Samar Muhareb, General Director of the Jordanian based organisation Arab 
Renaissance for Democracy and Development (ARDD) elucidates is more problematic: 
 
‘By law, a child born out of wedlock cannot be registered, is not recognised by the state 
and the government can forcibly remove the child from the mother. This may create a 
situation where women who were raped, or had a child out of wedlock, will marry the man 
simply to ensure that the child can be registered, gain nationality and other associated 
rights’.812 
 
Without any doubt, women find themselves doubly discriminated in such situations. 
Mothers lack the institutional (state-sanctioned) capacity, as individual citizens, to properly care 
for their children in a context not attached to marriage in either the union itself or divorce. This is 
on top of their existence in marriage as an unequal partner to the husband as far as the state is 
concerned. From the state’s perspective marriage is deemed necessary for at least two reasons. 
First, the family as an institution is constitutionally designated as ‘the foundation of the (Jordanian) 
community (al-Usrat asās al-Mujtima’).813 Subsequently being part of a family is a prerequisite 
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for participation in the Jordanian community as a citizen. If, following Suad Joseph, the 
constitution ‘assumes that the family is the basic unit of society, as opposed to the citizen subject’ 
then this reality is problematic for female citizens as a result of the patriarchal construction of the 
family. By way of this construction, women ‘can never aspire be the conduits into family units and 
therefore to citizenship’.814 
 
Second, through a marriage union the father’s citizenship is transferred to the children via 
the patrilineal connection, and the children will be bestowed the institutional necessities for 
membership in Jordanian society. Simultaneously, the mother is given rights via her partnership 
in the marital union. One could say that marriage functions as a guard against the state’s capacity 
to coercively remove the child from the custody of the mother. Pivotally, marriage is not required 
on an institutional basis, for men in the same manner. If a Jordanian man recognises a child born 
out of wedlock as his, (and has the financial capacity to make transition comparatively seamless) 
the right of blood provides an opportunity for the child to be absorbed into his family. The right of 
blood however has not always been privileged legally. Suad Joseph highlights that in Ottoman law 
there exited the ability for citizenship to be transferred on the basis of relationship to land. If an 
individual was born on land falling under the jurisdiction of the Sultan, then in practical terms the 
child in question could inherit their mother’s Ottoman citizenship.815 
 
However, whether through the influence of Anglo and European legal codes or other local 
customs privileging blood, automatic transmission through relationship to land retreated as a 
principle following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. A further indication of this manifested 
itself in the now rescinded Article 308 of the Penal Code, which in paragraph 1 explicated: ‘If a 
correct marriage contract is concluded between the perpetrator of one of the crimes stipulated in 
this section and the victim, any pursuit shall be stopped; if a judgment was issued in the case, 
execution of penalty shall be suspended’.816 By this section it is referred to articles 304-307, which 
include crimes of rape and sexual harassment. Thus, if a woman is raped and becomes pregnant 
there was an option available to the perpetrator to offer a marital contract to avoid prosecution. 
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The idea was that, from the perspective of the victim’s survival, an offer of marriage however 
insincere it may be, could have reduced the social backlash against her on the one hand, and 
provide the unborn child a direct pathway to citizenship.  
 
The notion that a reparatory marriage was nothing but a perpetuation of the violence was 
not contemplated, confirming that gender imbalances are embedded within Jordan’s citizenship 
regime, as indeed many such regimes globally. Enunciated eruditely by Laurie Brand, the very 
‘evolution of the Jordanian state has played a central role in shaping the political, economic and 
social opportunities and constraints Jordanian women face’.817 The second Camp David 
negotiations had an indubitable influence on this evolution. Surrounding the momentum towards 
a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, questions were being raised in Jordan regarding the 
fate and status of children born to Jordanian mothers and non-Jordanian fathers. The rationale 
being that the majority of unions of this nature are between Jordanian women and Palestinian 
men.818 In the midst of the discussion, the government of Prime Minister Ali Abu-Ragheb 
announced in November 2002 plans to review a number of relevant articles within the Nationality 
Law. However, as journalist Rana Husseini reported, no more than five months after the 
announcement was made, Samir Habashneh, then Minister of Interior, signalled a change of 
direction, asserting that amending the Law was ‘no longer possible’.819  
 
Given that the announcement was made in the wake of failed peace negotiations, and the 
continuing Second Intifada, its substantive essence is unsurprising. The issue is intertwined, as is 
Jordan itself within the regional conflict and its search for resolution.820 Recognising this reality, 
Husseini commented that the change of heart on the matter indicated that ‘the government had no 
intention of granting citizenship to children of Jordanian women married to Palestinians until a 
settlement is reached in the Palestinian conflict’.821 This cuts to the heart of the matter. As the 
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majority of children born into citizen limbo have Palestinian fathers,822 the state either implicitly 
or explicitly recognises them to be Palestinians. Absorbing them into the Jordanian citizen-body 
would therefore amount to increasing the number of Jordanians of Palestinian origin in the 
Kingdom. A central corollary of this is that the struggle for equal citizenship rights is a thread in 
the Gordian knot of identity and demographic politics in the Kingdom, and the fear held by some 
of the watan al-badil, the alternative homeland proposal to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Dr. 
Aida Essaid, one of the leading advocates of the civil society coalition ‘My Nationality is the Right 
of My Family’, and director of the Research and Information Center of the King Hussein 
Foundation, affirms this notion.823  
 
The precise number of women affected by their inability to transmit citizenship to their 
children has grown over the past decade from at least sixty thousand in 2002 to almost ninety 
thousand in 2016.824 Statistics of this nature are but one illustration of the integration that exists 
socially within the Kingdom. Yet, during the first decade of this century the status of Jordanian 
citizens of Palestinian origin became increasingly tenuous in the face of arbitrary withdrawals of 
citizenship by the government. Human Rights Watch reported that between 2004 and 2008 nearly 
three thousand citizens of Palestinian origin had their citizenship rescinded.825 Besides being in 
violation of the law, rescinding citizenship has tangible social ramifications as all rights associated 
with citizenship, including to work, were no longer accessible. Jordanian women married to 
spouses who hitherto had been recognised as Jordanians felt the impacts of these measures doubly, 
because they were unable to protect their children from having citizenship withdrawn. The 
following testimony recounted by ‘Abbas’  from the West Bank  in the 2010 Human Rights Watch 
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report: Stateless Again Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality, elucidates as 
such:  
 
‘In 2005 my wife renewed her passport, and was sent to the Follow-up and Inspection 
Department, which sent her to the Ministry of Interior's Legal Department. There, they told 
her that she had to add our six children to my Israeli permit and that we had to renew it. 
This is despite her being fully Jordanian’.826 
 
The Ministry of Interior required that the children of Abbas and his wife be legally 
recognised as non-Jordanians despite the mother’s unquestioned citizenship status. Had the roles 
been reversed, and Abbas been the Jordanian with origins on the East-Bank, this situation in all 
likelihood would not have eventuated. 
 
 
6.3 : Campaigning for Citizenship 
 
It is in this environment that Nima Habashnah, a Jordanian woman with six children born to a non-
Jordanian (Moroccan) father, began an individual campaign in 2007 to raise awareness of the 
citizenship imbalance, with the ultimate objective of aligning Jordan’s legislative environment 
with the rights promised by the Constitution. Habashnah’s campaign coalesced around local 
personal networks of women who shared her predicament, although initially she had difficulty 
encouraging these women to attend organised demonstrations.827 In a sign of the sensitive nature 
of the issue, Habashnah received threatening messages, and her first Facebook page ‘My Mother 
is a Jordanian and Her Citizenship is My Right’ was hacked. Experiencing this opposition did not 
prevent her from persevering in both online and offline advocacy. The Second Facebook page 
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‘MomJordanian’ replaced its compromised predecessor,828 and the public demonstrations 
continued. 
 
The utilisation of social media in the advocacy of this issue is illustrative of the potential 
of social media to operate as a vehicle of information, dissemination, and network building within 
a public sphere that is increasingly virtual, as it is offline. The pertinence of this to citizenship is 
observed by Linda Herrera and Rehab Sakr, noting in the midst of the 2011 uprisings that the 
region’s younger generations ‘had been experiencing novel forms of “wired citizenship” through 
their engagement with and connectivity across online platforms.829 The allusion to practicing 
citizenship activity virtually has a number of implications, of which two are especially relevant for 
our present discussion. Firstly, because practicing citizenship requires the production and 
reproduction of associated norms in an online space, an inevitable development is that this space 
becomes educative in nature. Habashnah’s Facebook page is no different, serving as a space in 
which information can be exchanged, and a sense of community constructed around a shared 
experience or response to the plight of Jordanian mothers. It is illustrative of Christou & 
Ioannidou’s contention that ‘citizenship education today is not limited to being within classroom 
walls: it is conducted on the Internet, debated in blogs, and exchanged on social networking 
sites’.830 By virtue of the educative foundation on which understandings of citizenship are based, 
new models of performing citizen functions may develop.  
 
Therefore, while citizen activism has, according to Boutieri, been ‘impoverished’ by its 
conventional situation within ‘the sphere of oppositional politics’, the very politics the King 
appears intent on advancing: one cannot ignore the profound ways in which a ‘broader everyday 
reconfiguration of the actual social fabric in virtual environments’ is occurring.831 Because a rigid 
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demarcation between online and offline social worlds cannot realistically be made, the two will 
naturally inform each other. Hence, in the context of Habashnah’s efforts to increase awareness, a 
sense of community and subsequently momentum, the utilisation of social media as a virtual 
citizen space, buttressed the movement’s grassroots foundation. Her campaign subsequently was 
able to carry the issue at its heart with a high degree of. 
 
By September 2010 the issue had begun to generate local and regional attention. Adnan 
Badran’s intervention as President of the General Council of the National Centre for Human Rights 
was the first time a figure of his stature had publicly addressed the issue and the campaign. He 
declared the discrimination against women in this matter ‘inconsistent with the Constitution’,832 a 
position not universally welcome though not without support either. One commentator reflected 
‘yes the issue is a complex one’, and the costs associated with extending citizenship to the children 
at the centre of this issue are ‘exorbitant’; however Jordanian women should not be the ones 
carrying the burden when their rights are theirs to have irrespective of socio-political cost.833 
Owing to momentum generated in the public sphere, it was around this time that a coalition of 
civil society organisations began to crystallise around Habashnah’s campaigning. One of them was 
the Information and Research Center of the King Hussein Foundation, which despite its name is 
an NGO that does not receive government funding. One of the key ways in which the Center 
contributed to the campaign was by conducting research whose outcomes challenged and 
discredited a number of myths surrounding the issue.  
 
A cost-benefit analysis study conducted between 2010 and 2012 in collaboration with 
Jordanian economist Dr Yousef Mansour was particularly influential. Its results were significant 
given the at-the-time ‘main argument’ of those opposing the extension of citizenship rights, which 
as Essaid elaborates, ‘used to be in the past that Jordan can’t afford to give everyone nationality, 
that there are too many of them’.834 Countering this position, the study calculated that ‘the costs 
the government would bear (residency permit fees, work permits, subsidies to education in schools 
                                                     
832 Ammonnews, ‘Dr. Badrān: ‘Adam Manḥ Abnā’ al-Urduniyāt al-Jinsiyyah Mukhālif lil-Dustour’, ammonnews.net, 
December 13, 2010, http://www.ammonnews.net/article/75624 (accessed November 20, 2016). 
833 Jamāl Abdullah, ‘‘Adam Manḥ Abnā’ al-Urduniyāt al-Jinsiyyah Mukhālif lil-Dustour’, 7iber.com, December 26, 
2010, https://www.7iber.com/2010/12/right-to-pass-citizenship/ (accessed November 20, 2016). 
834 Aida Essaid, (Director Information and Research Centre King Hussein Foundation) interview with the author, 
Amman, September 04, 2016. 
  
218 
 
and universities and public health care) were slightly higher than 49 million JD’. The payoff 
however in direct benefits was calculated at approximately 59 million Jordanian dinars, a net 
advantage of 10 million dinars.835 Resultantly, the assumptions on which cost/benefit justifications 
for not granting full citizenship were made were eliminated. However, in its place another rationale 
became increasingly expressed: demography.  
 
Described by Essaid as ‘the unofficially said but the officially unsaid argument’,836 
demographic fears at once encompass both apprehensions from some Trans-Jordanians regarding 
a default Palestinian take-over of the state, and a belief in Israel’s covert plan to establish the watan 
al-badil on the East Bank. Both trepidations are necessary in order to understand the fluid nature 
of the demographic argument. At its heart, the alternative homeland concept revolves around 
Jordan being forced through Israeli and eventually international pressure to become the repository 
of the global Palestinian refugee population. Accordingly, this pressure, would materialise if it 
became apparent that the overwhelming majority of Jordan’s population was of Palestinian origin. 
Whether through direct or indirect labelling, the state would then become Palestinian by default. 
By implication such would facilitate an abrogation of the rights of Palestinian refugees to return 
to their homeland. Under such circumstances, Jordan because of its embedded economic ties with, 
and debt dependency on the United States could be forced into accepting a transfer of Palestinians 
from territory currently occupied by Israel. However, the Center’s report argues because of the 
special status of The United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) 
‘the Palestinian refugee enjoys a special legal status that is different from any other refugee. This 
status cannot be ceded’.837  
 
Confidence in this status appears to be held by Jordan’s judiciary, demonstrated in the 
Kingdom’s signing and ratification of a number of international covenants of relevance to the 
citizenship powers of Jordanian women. In one illustration, the government decided in 2009 to 
drop its opposition to Article 15 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Paragraph 4 of the Article stipulates all signatories 
‘shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement 
of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile’.838 Although a positive step 
forward, Jordan maintained its reservations regarding Article 9 Paragraph 2, which asserts ‘parties 
shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children’.839 This 
opposition seems to convey something of the prevailing apprehension about demographic 
dynamics. Or more specifically, the issue of transferring citizenship to children of non-Jordanian 
fathers is ‘always whispering and disappearing under the scarecrow of the Alternative 
Homeland’.840 Suggestive here is Joseph’s erudite observation that despite questions of state 
efficacy as a site of identity production produced by globalisation discourses, ‘citizenship is an 
increasingly active site of negotiations’ over the demarcation and practice of personhood in its 
legal and social dimensions.841 
 
The Kingdom has ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which calls on Arab 
legislators to empower children, and to guarantee as much as is possible that the interests of 
children be paramount in legislation, including the capacity to acquire their mothers’ citizenship.842 
Thus the coalition campaigning for Jordanian mothers while claiming ownership of citizen rights 
irrespective of gender, is equally demanding that the State be accountable for its own agreed to 
commitments. Since 2006 Jordan has been a signatory to the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (ratified by Law No. 50 of 2006), which makes further claims on states to 
support children.843 Consequently, the Center’s report notes ‘we can safely assume that the 
Jordanian judiciary gave the international conventions, ratified by Jordan through legal channels, 
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a greater value than domestic legislations’.844 Therefore, despite the position articulated by former 
Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour that ‘[changing nationality laws] could change the demographic 
balance and might lead to depopulating Palestine’,845 it has to be recalled that a hypothetical does 
not abrogate the responsibility of the state to citizens. What is revealed by extrapolation is the 
gendered component of the present citizenship regime that reduces the state’s accountability 
towards female citizens. Dr Essaid’s observations are incisive: 
 
‘At the end of the day “yes” the Palestinian issue is used as an excuse but let’s say there 
was no Palestinian issue, and let’s say that most Jordanian women weren’t married to 
Palestinian men; are we saying that then we would be giving Jordanian (citizenship)? That 
is the real question. Would we then be giving Jordanian nationality to the children of 
spouses the same way it’s given to men? And I know that’s a theoretical question but in my 
opinion, I still don’t think we would be. Because I think the root of the problem is gender 
discrimination; we don’t see Jordanian women as equal citizens to Jordanian men’.846 
 
2011 proved something of a turning point for the campaign as its advocates were involved 
in the wider Kingdom-wide demonstrations led by the Hirāk, and in August the campaign under 
the banner ‘My Mother is Jordanian and her Citizenship is My Right’ was officially launched.847. 
But unlike instances of public protest involving marches and speeches, characteristic of those in 
down-town Amman, Habashnah and her supporters used almost exclusively sit-ins in highly 
visible areas such as the Fourth Circle (Duwār al-Rāba‘a). After taking up a position, the 
participants use slogans and banners for instance ‘we are citizens (fem) and we will not accept that 
we are half citizens’ to attract attention and convey messages to passers-by.848 In light of the Kings’ 
discussion papers it is interesting to note that the advocates and participants in the campaign were 
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engaged in the very kind of local action advocated for in the analogy of active citizenship. 
Subsequently the involvement of civil society and members of parliament in the campaign 
highlights the existing possibilities and limitations of Jordan’s institutions in responding and being 
accountable to citizen action.  
 
In her capacity as director of the King Hussein Foundation Research and Information 
Center, and member of the coalition supporting full citizen rights, Dr Essaid approached nine to 
ten MPs, seeking meetings to acquire their support. Six of them acquiesced, and her reflection was 
that ‘they were responsive, they took the time to meet with me, and not just me but with other 
members of the coalition, some working in their offices, others outside; they accommodated us’.849 
Parliamentarians then do at times, adopt advocacy roles. In the context of the coalition’s aims, 
receiving parliamentary support is crucial for at least two reasons. One, the process of legislative 
change requires action from the members of the legislature. And two, because parliamentarians 
and the government itself possess agendas with a hierarchy of objectives, effort needs to be exerted 
to bring an issue that might not exist on either agenda into the parliament as an item of business.  
 
One of the MPs who met with and advised the coalition was Mustapha al-Hamarneh, the 
leader of the Initiative Bloc (al-Mubadara) in the 17th parliament. His advice centred on the need 
for the coalition to divide the end goal – full citizenship rights – into a series of outcomes that 
could, given the environment, be achieved within parliamentary sitting periods.850 To this end, his 
advocacy in the parliament on behalf of the coalition was focused on prosecuting the case for civil 
rights to be awarded to the children in question. Despite the best efforts of al-Mubadara however, 
the goalposts on the issue and the intra-parliamentary debate kept shifting.  ‘In the end’ Dr Essaid 
recalls, ‘what they (the parliament) delivered was what they were called privileges; however, if 
you look at them they are more services as opposed to privileges’.851 At the very least, this 
demonstrates that sustained activity on the part of citizens can influence debates and decisions in 
the parliament. The accumulated impact of informal and formal political engagement yielded some 
constructive outcomes: after more than a year of sit-ins, and some parliamentary negotiating, the 
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government announced in November 2013 the establishment of a ministerial committee to 
examine the possibility of extending civil rights. Khaled Khaladeh, then Minister of Political and 
Parliamentary Affairs and member of the committee reported in August 2014 the committee’s 
recommendation that regulation, rather than laws be used to address the issue, saying that 
improvements were ‘only a matter of time’.852 In practical terms this meant that the children of 
Jordan mothers and non-Jordanian fathers would receive privileges (mazāyāt) including free 
access to public health and education providers. When asked about the possibility of acquiring 
citizenship, Khaladeh was upfront asserting that it ‘will not be granted to children of these families 
because of its political implication’.853  
 
This is despite an earlier constitutional review committee in 2011 suggesting that Article 6 
of the Constitution should be amended so as to preclude gender discrimination.854 It took a further 
three months for details of the regulation to be released and their benefits distributed to families. 
Then Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour and Interior Minister Hussein al-Majali announced that the 
package, estimated to cost sixty-two million Jordanian dinars would assist 355, 923 children and 
88,983 mothers.855 Soon afterward, Nima Habashnah lost her battle with cancer,856 but this did not 
prevent others from the coalition continuing the work of the campaign she initiated a decade 
before. What was changing however was the object of demonstration. In addition to the wider 
absence of equal citizenship, advocates and participants found themselves demonstrating (often in 
front of the Prime Minister’s departmental offices), in opposition to the execution of government 
policy. Part of the government’s response involved the issuance of identification documents to the 
children and parents who for the reasons outlined above could not claim (and receive) citizenship. 
By December 2015 the Civil Status and Passports Department (CSPD) had issued 56,000 
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certificates, needed for adolescents to acquire drivers’ licenses, access health and education 
services, and for their parents to enter the property market and obtain work permits. The problem 
for many who had received these was that they were not being accepted by civil employees. 
Illuminated is the reality that for citizens, accountability is not just about parliamentarians or 
government promises, but equally concerns the performance and response of the civil service.   
 
Carriers of identity papers were being told at police stations, clinics and other such 
government sites across the country that their identification could not be accepted. Many felt they 
had returned to square one.857 Despite government assurances that their grievances would be 
addressed, many continued to struggle to access the promised privileges. Of seminal concern here 
is the extent to which accountability of government to citizens exists in practice. Mayada 
Barghouti, a participant in the movement, married to an Egyptian citizen, alludes to as much, 
recognising the differing pace with which governments respond to various policy areas. Arguing: 
‘the government is quick in applying Mulki’s (the Prime Minister as of May 2016) instructions 
when it comes to raising the prices of commodities. But when it comes to our rights, it is totally 
ignored. We do not want privileges. We want citizenships for our children’.858 Having said that, 
the power of citizens to extract concessions from government and to force an issue onto the 
government’s agenda is equally represented in the tireless advocacy and utilisation of both formal 
(MPs and civil society) and informal (sit-ins) channels of participation.  
 
In March 2017 in a joint-session of parliament, a majority of MPs voted to centralise the 
authority of the Interior Minister so that he/she alone now possessed the sole authority to issue and 
residency permits to the children in question. A practical outcome for parents and their children 
was that from now on they need only visit the single government agency, instead of proceeding 
through a bureaucratic quagmire of multiple agencies in order to obtain and renew their 
residency.859 Simultaneously, although privileges are beneficial in alleviating day-today living 
                                                     
857 Rana Husseini, ‘Protesters Want Full Rights for Children of Jordanian Women Married to Foreigners; Picket 
Prime Ministry’, Jordan Times, March 29, 2016, http://jordantimes.com/news/local/protesters-want-full-rights-
children-jordanian-women-married-foreigners-picket-prime (accessed March 29, 2016). 
858 Ibid.  
859 Rana Husseini, ‘Activists welcome decision on children of Jordanian women married to foreigners’, Jordan 
Times, March 27, 2017, http://jordantimes.com/news/local/activists-welcome-decision-children-jordanian-women-
married-foreigners (accessed March 28, 2017). 
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pressures on families, they constitute a bandaid solution. For the children at the centre of the 
maelstrom, their ability to participate in the social, economic and political life of their society 
structured by the state is curtailed in the absence of citizenship. They retain their status as persona 
non-grata and, consequently, are barred from active participation in Jordanian society regardless 
of whether Jordan is the only home they have ever known.  
 
More than this, they may be prevented from re-entering the country. A case reported in the 
Jordanian Press involved Zamam Ahmad, whose husband is a Syrian national. After visiting his 
family her twenty-year-old son was barred from entering the Kingdom and was forced to return to 
Idlib in Syria to await approval of entry by Jordanian officials. He was killed in a rocket attack; 
his mother erudite in reflecting ‘my son was killed because his father is not Jordanian’.860 Ergo, 
this is not an issue of abstract privilege or rights, but one of life and death for the individuals and 
families involved. Jordan’s reform trajectory suffers additionally from this state of affairs. 
Accepting Adnan Hussein’s contention that democratic practice is only possible through the 
individual citizen,861 what kind of democratic practices and principles are being developed in 
Jordan where constitutionally sanctioned (through its silence) discrimination occurs? 
 
 
6.4 : Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I endeavoured to illustrate and analyse one of the ways in which the realities of 
Jordanian citizenship is contested and negotiated. The women at the centre of the campaign: ‘My 
Mother is Jordanian and Her Citizenship is My Right’, in attempting to acquire the same 
citizenship-based capacity to transfer citizenship as their male counterparts, are challenging the 
gendered hierarchies of Jordan’s contemporary citizenship regime. Their actions are, I argued, 
illustrative of a search for both ownership and accountability. Regarding the former, the example 
of Nima Habashnah and her co-campaigners is one of an endeavour seeking ownership of rights 
provisioned by citizenship, but denied to them because of their gender. This concerns 
accountability in two important ways. Firstly, of citizens demanding the state to which they are 
                                                     
860 Rana Husseini, ‘Protesters Want Full Rights for Children of Jordanian Women Married to Foreigners’. 
861 Adnan el-Said Hussein, ‘Al-Muwātanah fi al-Watan al-Arabi’, p. 18. 
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associated is accountable to them, therein requesting a degree of ownership of, and in, the state. 
Secondly, the appeal of these citizens is for the state to be accountable to its own agreed to 
commitment to domestic and international conventions. 
 
Within this there is perhaps a more profound element at play. In seeking ownership of their 
right as citizens to transmit their citizenship like their male counterparts, the women of the coalition 
are requesting that the state adopts, and enforces, equality of citizens irrespective of gender. They 
are demanding that the central mechanism, through which the state distinguishes those within its 
borders, be one of citizenship (jinsiyyah) holders and non-citizenship holders. By virtue, the issue 
strikes at the core of the theory and practice of citizenship, and of national identity. If the two are 
not aligned, as in this case, ‘you will be excluding people who should not be excluded’.862 
Therefore, the expectation that citizenship override other considerations and identities such as 
gender, religion and national identity, reveals that the issue is ultimately about citizenship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
862 Anonymous, (Political analyst and researcher) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
7. Nahed Hattar, Freedom of Expression as an Act of Citizenship 
 
 
7.1 : Introduction 
In preceding chapter, our focus coalesced around the negotiated and contested gendered realities 
of citizenship in Jordan through the example of the ‘My Mother is a Jordanian and Her Citizenship 
is My Right’ Coalition. Within which I elucidated different elements of ownership, accountability 
and their absence. Our present chapter retains this interest in the contested and negotiated facets 
of citizenship, but approaches the notions of accountability and ownership in a more indirect and 
conceptual manner. Taking contestations surrounding freedom of expression in Jordan as its key 
point of coalescence, this chapter focuses on the events leading up to and the aftermath of the 
assassination of Jordanian intellectual Nahed Hattar in September 2016. In the wake of Hattar’s 
assassination, debate raged anew about the present and future nature of the Jordanian state.863  
 
Thus his murder re-energised a long standing discussion, whose latest manifestation had 
emerged un-expectantly during the recent election campaign leading up to the 20 September 2016 
poll. The Ma’an (Together) Electoral List from Amman’s Third District initiated their campaign 
with orange banners positioned around the city emblazoned with the words ‘Together for a Civil 
State’ (Ma’an lil-dawlah al-Madaniyah).864 Thus, I argue, when analysed in light of its 
contemporary and historical context, the murder of Nahed Hattar illuminates some intriguing 
facets of Jordan’s citizenship regime. This is especially so given that the King responded to it 
directly. He personally visited the family to pay his condolences, and released his sixth discussion 
                                                     
863 Jumana Ghunaimat, ‘Huwiyah al-Dawlah min al-Jadid’, al-Ghad, October 17, 2016, 
http://www.alghad.com/articles/1194532-%D9%87%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D
9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF (accessed October 17, 
2016). 
864 ‘Ma‘an’ (Together): Ma‘an: Qā’imat al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah: al-Barnāmej al-Intikhābi (Amman, 2016). 
 
  
227 
 
paper: ‘The Rule of Law - the Foundation of the Civil State’ (al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah) in the 
immediate aftermath. Its contents, which shall be discussed in this chapter, is distinct from the 
previous five in that it does not focus on reform so much as citizenship in the context of the civil 
state.   
 
Demonstrably, the assassination of Hattar opens a window into some vitally significant 
discussions about contemporary citizenship in Jordan. That Hattar was a member of Jordan’s 
Christian minority complicated the scenario, by bringing sectarian discourse to the fore, especially 
on social media platforms.865 One of the aspects raised concerns the dualism implicit in the 
Hashemite regime’s image construction of Jordan: one abroad to an external audience, the other 
internal to domestic constituencies. The case examined below compares the different responses 
from the regime led by the Monarch, to the Charlie Hebdo shootings of 2015, with those of the 
Hattar affair. Through this I assert that the production and strategic employment of both of these 
images limits the ability for Jordanians to relate with the state as citizens. Precisely because the 
images engender a hierarchical structure of constituencies in vertical relation to the state, its 
institutions and political authority, while simultaneously weakening the capacity for horizontal 
relations grounded in citizenship to emerge.  
 
To be clear, this manifests itself in numerous ways. Regarding political parties for example, 
although the King declares publically his support for the development of parliamentary 
government with active parties, these same parties remain shackled by the legal parameters of the 
electoral system; with the method of voting and district allocations chief among them. This has led 
observers including Oreib al-Rantawi to disclose ‘there is no interest for the regime to weaken its 
vertical [social] structures and strengthen the horizontal counterpart in general because there is a 
                                                     
865 Rana Sweiss & Peter Baker, ‘Writer Charged with Insulting Islam is Killed as Extremism Boils Over in Jordan’, 
New York Times, September 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/26/world/middleeast/nahed-hattar-
jordanian-writer-killed.html?_r=0 (accessed September 26, 2016); Anonymous, ‘Watch What You Say: 10 
Jordanians to be Sued for Hate Speech on Social Media Following Hattar Assassination’, al-bawaba.com, 
September 26, 2016, http://www.albawaba.com/news/watch-what-you-say-10-jordanians-be-sued-hate-speech-
social-media-following-hattar-assassinatio (accessed September 27, 2016); Suha Maayeh, ‘Jordan Police Make 
Arrests Over ‘Social Media Hate’, The National, September 27, 2016, http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-
east/jordan-police-make-arrests-over-social-media-hate (accessed September 27, 2016). 
  
228 
 
belief, especially in the security apparatus, that they can serve better as a tool to strengthen and 
consolidate the regime’.866 
 
Similar arrangements, as I shall explore, constrain freedom of expression in the Kingdom. 
A consequence being a withdrawal of trust in state processes and institutions (including in this 
instance, the rule of law), without which a citizen, as opposed to subject based political order, 
necessary for any transition away from authoritarian governance cannot emerge.  More than this 
however, the withdrawal of trust, negatively affects the depth of citizenship as an identity 
competing with others individual and collective actors possess concomitantly. The inability of 
citizenship to aggregate the naturally disparate identities and interests of those living within the 
boundaries of its theoretical influence, reduces the capacity for citizen-subjects to live cohesively 
as a community of citizens irrespective of the natures of their other identities.  
 
 
7.2 : The Assassination of Nahed Hattar 
 
On Thursday 22 September 2016 I made a call to request an interview. I had planned to do this a 
month earlier, but events that had transpired precluded me from doing so. Through a mutual friend 
I suspected the individual I was calling would be busy, and so it was. A pending court case 
scheduled to begin in three days’ time meant I would have to wait for my interview. This did not 
bother me, I understood, and felt I had sufficient time in reserve before leaving Jordan. I was 
wrong. On Sunday morning 25 September as was my daily routine, I opened the webpages of 
Jordan’s daily newspapers. Emblazoned on the homepage of al-Ghad, I read ‘Aājil – Urgent. 
Nahed Hattar it read had been shot on the steps of the Palace of Justice (courthouse) in Amman 
while entering to commence his trial for blasphemy and disrupting social cohesion. He was dead. 
Hattar, a noted Trans-Jordanian nationalist and leftist intellectual was no stranger to controversy 
in Jordan. He had been jailed for “offences” in the past, and amongst other things, gained some 
notoriety after having engaged with the late King Hussein in a war of words during the mid-nineties 
over his article Min Huwe al-Urduni?  
                                                     
866 Oreib al-Rantawi, (Director al-Quds Center for Political Studies) interview with the author, Amman, September 
19, 2016. 
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Tariq Tell remembers the exchange, emphasising its location within a post-Oslo and 
Jordan-Israel peace context, in which there was ‘a lot of critical conjuncture and the King was a 
bit shocked I think by some of the opposition’. Recalling an address Hussein gave to a group of 
military generals, Tell explains ‘he was trying to batten down. So what he said is you say who is 
a Jordanian? What is Jordan without us [the Hashemites]? We built it…of course with your help. 
So the idea is that we built Jordan and we tell you what its boundaries will be, and we will give 
you certain dispensations, but in return you give us loyalty. That is the equation’.867 More than two 
decades later, it seems appropriate, albeit in a macabre way, that in death Hattar would continue 
the debate around the questions of who is a Jordanian and what is her/his relationship to the regime 
and the state. 
 
But beforeapproaching that aspect in detail it is necessary to ask how this situation, which 
led Hattar to the Courthouse that Sunday morning, materialised. On August 12 Nahed Hattar 
reposted a cartoon titled “the Lord of ISIS” on his personal Facebook page. He was neither the 
first nor the last Jordanian to share this caricature on social media. According to his family this act 
generated a near immediate campaign against him, orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood, their 
public mouthpiece the Assabeel newspaper, and several prominent former parliamentarians.868 
Central to the campaign was the claim that Hattar had insulted the divine, a punishable crime under 
the Jordanian Penal Code. In response to this, Hattar released a detailed clarification to Ammon 
News regarding his reasoning: 
  
‘I have shared a post that contained a cartoon entitled ‘the lord of ISIS,’ to which I have 
no connection whatsoever, as claimed by the Brotherhood. The cartoon mocks terrorists 
and their image of God and heaven, and does not offend the divine being in any way, shape 
or form. In fact, it rids the concept of divinity of what the terrorists promote. There are two 
types of people who were angered by this image: good people who did not understand the 
                                                     
867 Tariq Tell, (Associate Professor American University Beirut) interview with the author, Amman, March 25, 
2016. 
868 ‘Statement from the Family of Nahed Hattar’, available at: https://eng.nahedhattar.net/statement-from-the-family-
nahed-hattar/ (accessed March 17, 2018). 
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meaning, which is to mock the terrorists and see divinity as devoid of what is attributed to 
it in the terrorist mind; and these people I respect and appreciate. And ISIS-supporting 
Muslim Brothers, who themselves possess this sick imagination concerning the 
relationship between humans and the divine. The latter have exploited the caricature to 
settle political feuds which have nothing to do with their claims’.869 
 
The debate and with it the dissemination of misinformation continued. Hani al-Mulki, then 
care-taker Prime Minister, who had been the target of Hattar’s particularly sharp pen in June,870 
sanctioned Hattar’s arrest in the wake of increasingly heated online discussions.871 The police, 
under the directive of then Interior Minister Salamah Hamad, went to Hattar’s Amman residence 
to take him into custody. Finding him absent, the Governor of Amman publically labelled the 
writer ‘a fugitive from justice’.872 Upon hearing of this, Hattar turned himself in to police and was 
arrested the following day 13 August. The Government responded further by imposing a media 
gag on the events while Hattar was held in Marka Jail, located in Amman’s Eastern suburbs. No 
further action was taken by the government to counter the misinformation circulating in the public 
sphere. The family reported that the defamatory campaign pursued against Hattar continued after 
his arrest. Several complaints were directed at the writer from different sources ‘from the Attorney 
General of Karak, to South Amman, to the Palace of Justice’.873 But, they argue, each of the 
complaints was ‘filed by lawyers with known affiliations to the Brotherhood movement’, which 
only increased their suspicion at the direct involvement of the Brotherhood in the campaign.874 
 
While in custody there were concerns for Hattar’s safety from both the campaign outside 
the jail, and the actions of state officials inside. Regarding the former, it continued unabated on 
                                                     
869 Ibid.  
870 Nahed Hattar, ‘Hal Tajāwaz al-Mulki Ḥadudo?’, Ammon News, June 20, 2016 
https://www.ammonnews.net/article/272765 (accessed March 17, 2018). 
871 Al-Ghad, ‘Istoda‘ā’ Hattar Lil-Taḥqiq Ḥawwal Manshour al-Dhāt al-Ilahiyah’, al-Ghad, August 12, 2016 
http://alghad.com/articles/1066992 (accessed August 13, 2016). Al-Mulki according to Hattar’s family acted 
unlawfully in this action by wilfully usurping the role of the Attorney General. 
872 Arab Times, ‘al-Muḥariḍ ‘ala Qatil Nahed Hattar…Yunāqish waraqah al-Malik Ba‘ad Qalil’, Arab Times, 
October 23, 2016, http://www.arabtimes.com/portal/news_display.cfm?Action=&Preview=No&nid=22599&a=1 
(accessed March 18, 2018). The Hattar family added: ‘The Ministry of the Interior has also usurped the role of the 
General Prosecution Office, the only institution with the legal right to decide whether an individual is a fugitive or 
not, as stated in Article 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure’. See ‘Statement from the Family of Nahed Hattar’. 
873 ‘Statement from the Family of Nahed Hattar’. 
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social media, which was not bound to the media gag in the same way as news producers whether 
news-based websites or print media institutions were. Some more odious commentary from the 
online public sphere included calls for his execution or for torturous methods to be used in 
punishment; all of which expressed in the absence of any court verdict, and in an environment 
devoid of factual information as a consequence of the media gag. In jail, Hattar was branded a 
dangerous criminal and had his hands and feet shackled. When taken to the al-Bashir hospital for 
treatment he was fettered to his bed, and was not released from this state despite a doctor’s 
request.875 His family additionally documented instances of wilful neglect, and what they 
considered ‘torture’.876 After almost a month, on September 8, he was released pending trial for 
‘insulting the Divine’ (Isā’t lil-dhāt al-Ilahiyah); a Charge derived from two articles in the 
Jordanian Penal Code 1960 (amended 2011).877 Article 150, in chapter two, addresses crimes 
against ‘national unity’, and thus enables the criminalisation of ‘any writing or discourse’ that 
incites sectarian or racial tensions. Article 278 meanwhile, criminalises actions which ‘insults’ 
(Ihānah) ‘religious sentiments’ and/or the ‘religious beliefs of others’.878 
 
Given the social climate surrounding Hattar, his family asked for police protection, similar 
to that given to Toujan Faisal and Laith al-Shubailat decades earlier.879 These were denied. In the 
morning of Sunday August 25, Nahed, accompanied by two of his sons and his solicitor arrived at 
the Palace of Justice in Amman to initiate the trial proceedings. As they approached the entrance 
to the courthouse, the gunman, who would be later identified as Riad Ismail Ahmed Abdullah 
intercepted the group and shot Hattar three times. One of the sons, Mutaz, recalled that the cadre 
of attendant police officers did not appear to show any urgency while his older brother chased the 
assassin, who was later remanded in custody.880 A 49-year old citizen of Jordan, residing in the al-
Hāshami al-Shamāli neighbourhood of Amman, Ismail had been employed by the Ministry of 
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Education as a computer engineer, in addition to being an Imam in two local mosques.881 He was 
known to have been abroad prior to the trial, returning to Jordan after having participated in Haj.882 
Information gathered by Hattar’s family suggests he had spent some of his time abroad fighting in 
Syria against the forces of President Bashar al-Assad, potentially indicative of his sectarian 
radicalisation.883 
 
Questions emerged from those close to Hattar about how Ismail knew about the time and 
date of the trial, the details of which had not been publically listed. It was later learned that the 
newspaper Assabeel had leaked the details. Khaled Hattar, Nahed’s brother is adamant that the 
Government was responsible for leaking the details to the paper.884 The manner of his death, 
gunned down in front of the courthouse before his trial could commence shocked Jordanians, and 
representatives of political currents across the political spectrum including the Democratic 
People’s Party (HASD) and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) condemned the assassination.885 
Hamza Mansour, former Secretary General of the IAF, for example condemned it as ‘criminal 
offence’, adding that ‘no one has the right to injure the spirt of a man save the Judiciary’.886 The 
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Government for its part labelled it a ‘reprehensible crime’ (al-Jarimat al-Nakrā’),887 and vowed 
to use ‘an iron fist’ against anyone who threatens Jordanian unity.888  
 
Similar themes were publically affirmed by King Abdullah II during his visit to Hattar’s 
family five days later. Over the course of this visitation, the King condemned the assassination, 
referring to it as both heinous and foreign to ‘our authentic Jordanian people and our culture’.889 
He additionally promised the establishment of an independent inquiry to investigate the murder. 
To this day the government has not followed through on this promise, contributing further to 
Hattar’s family’s belief that the government was involved in the murder. The assassination 
ruptured the long-held image of Jordan by Jordanians and the state itself as an oasis of stability 
and relative predictability in a neighbourhood often characterised by the opposite. This was not 
because the assassination ushered in a period of lynching and inter-communal violence. Rather, it 
elucidated the extent to which sectarianism and the bigotry of tightly held opinions had permeated 
into Jordanian society, challenging the “unity” narrative of the nation fostered discursively but 
perhaps neglected in practice by the regime. In this way the Hattar affair is demonstrative of the 
same intercommunal disassociation that made it possible to question whether it was permissible to 
give condolences to the young boy whose tragic death was raised in chapter four. In other words 
the depth of citizenship was revealed to be comparatively shallow next to other identities such as 
religion, sect and tribe extant in the community.  
 
  
7.3 : Citizenship in the Crucible – Nahed Hattar & Charlie Hebdo 
 
At first glance, there may not appear to be sufficient similarities between the murder of Nahed 
Hattar and the January 07 2015 shootings at the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris to warrant beneficial 
comparison. One is domestic to Jordan, the other external involving no Jordanians directly. 
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However, an inspection of the official regime response to both provides an advantageous point of 
comparison insofar as it stands as an intriguing window into the relationship between Jordanians 
as citizen-subjects and political authority. Specifically, it suggests that the regime is more willing 
to meet and perform to the expectations of external partners than to citizens. A key component of 
this is a willingness to support freedom of expression as a right given to citizens of other countries, 
but in practice, not accord the same to Jordanians in the face of political expediency. Together the 
two make a question of consistency, or rather the inconsistency and arbitrary nature of the 
application of law when it concerns citizen rights instead of national security.  
 
In the wake of the shooting murder of twelve people, including employees, at the offices 
of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, King Abdullah II and Queen Rania marched with other world 
leaders through Paris in solidarity with France and in support of freedom of expression.890 In an 
interview, the Queen commented that their participation ‘sent a very important message of world 
unity against ideological extremism’. Elaborating that the message of global unity is ‘exactly what 
they do not want’ to emerge out of so public an attack.891 Royal participation therefore appeared 
justified on the basis of combating ideological extremism on the global, regional, and one would 
anticipate domestic levels. The Queen constructs a clear link between support for freedom of 
expression and the struggle against the dogma of fanaticism. More than this her statement is lucid 
in declaring that fanaticism anywhere is a threat to freedom everywhere.  
 
The struggle against fanaticism, especially of the Islamic variety has been one in which 
Jordan has been active ‘way before September 11th’,892 and more than that has been integral to 
Jordan’s foreign policy. In the case of the solidarity march, the Doha Institute reflected that the 
royal couple’s involvement ‘served to highlight the security-enhancing role of the Kingdom in the 
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international war on terrorism’. The presence of the Jordanian King and Queen served to 
consolidate ‘the image Jordan has long sought to promote of itself in the West, of a “moderate” 
Sunni Islam, rooted in historical and symbolic legitimacy, through its Hashemite lineage’.893 
Projecting this image abroad has been historically advantageous to Jordan. However, 
comparatively less cogitation has been spent on how, in an era of globalisation, the twenty-four 
hour media cycle and social media, this projected image of Jordan has been received at home, and, 
how this representation might differ from the one projected to the domestic audience. In addition, 
if there are differences and inconsistencies between the representations, what impact does this have 
over time on state-society relations and the practice of citizenship? 
 
Criticism of the royal presence in Paris expressed by Jordanians via social media was 
audible. One, associated with the Hirak, was excoriating of the King in a post on Facebook 
exclaiming, ‘as a Jordanian your solidarity with Charlie (Hebdo) does not honour or represent 
me’.894 Another, close to the Islamic Reform Movement (al-Hirāk al-Iṣlaḥ al-Islami) mocked the 
King’s attendance in Paris by contrasting it with his absence from a demonstration in support of 
al-Aqsa and the Palestinian resistance ten days previous.895 Both cases illustrate at best a degree 
of disappointment with the royal response, compounded no doubt by their own experience of the 
regime at home during the 2011/2012 uprisings. The Hirak in-particular as noted in chapter five, 
was subject to crack-downs and instances of police and gendarmerie brutality. 
 
Extrapolating from these responses, two observations then may be made about the King 
and Queens’ participation in the Charlie Hebdo march. First, the demonstration was in support of 
a magazine that had made a habit of inflaming (whether intended by the editors or not) the 
dispositions of Muslims globally, and therefore the royal action was unlikely to win open support 
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at home.896 Second, by marching with world leaders in Paris a degree of support was lent to a 
variety of freedom of expression that was not – and is not - available in Jordan.897 Furthermore, 
based on the commentary from the second critic, while the King is quick to attend a solidarity 
march in Paris, such initiative does not extend to supporting an issue close to many Jordanians 
regardless of whether they are of East Bank or Palestinian origins. A double standard then emerges 
between behaviour at home and abroad, which indubitably weakens the relationship between 
citizens feeling increasingly powerless, and the state as represented by its leadership. 
 
Another example of this at home and abroad dichotomy was the arrest of citizens Bassem 
al-Rawabedah and Thabet Assaf for their part in a peaceful demonstration against the first Charlie 
Hebdo magazine printed in the attacks’ aftermath.898 Both men, who were associated with the 
Islamic Reform Movement, were held incommunicado for two weeks in the headquarters of the 
GID before being tried by the State Security Court for crimes of incitement against the regime, 
derived from Article 149 of the Penal Code. In May 2015 this charge was changed to one of 
‘insulting the King’ under Penal Code Article 195. Al-Rawabedah and Assaf were later that month 
sentenced to five and three months in jail respectively.899 Abdullah II meanwhile responded to the 
magazine’s front page cartoon, by labelling it ‘irresponsible, reckless and thoughtless’. At the same 
time, he asserted that a key element of freedom of speech was respect for religions, whereas the 
latest magazine edition was little more than a deliberate effort at insulting religion and people of 
faith.900  
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Let us recount this episode. Jordan’s monarch responds to the tragedy of the Charlie Hebdo 
shootings by joining world leaders in a march defending free speech, while simultaneously 
sanctioning the tightening of freedom of expression laws domestically.901 When the satirical 
magazine released its first post-attack edition, the King criticised it as an exercise of freedom of 
expression, labelling it irresponsible, while at the same time, the state acted to detain, charge and 
sentence through a security tribunal, protesters who to an extent held congruent opinions with the 
King’s condemnation. Their error in this instance was to highlight the hypocrisy of the state’s (the 
King’s) position. In the wake of Hattar’s arrest and death, this dynamic manifested itself once 
more, with state described as engaging in an attempt at pleasing everyone, with the end result of 
pleasing no one.902 
 
A concerning development that this dynamic vitalises is ‘political alienation’ (al-Ightirāb 
al-Siyāsi), whereby citizens feel powerless with no sense of control over the state.903 At the root 
of this alienation, argues Halim Barakat, is a situation in which ‘the people’ have become – either 
through perception or material reality – ‘servants to the state’, rather than the state serving the 
people. The extent to which this manifests itself is evident in the requirement for citizens to ‘protect 
themselves from the ruling regime’, when the opposite should be the convention.904 More 
explicitly, the citizen in the Arab world ‘sees a sword hanging above his neck’, and collectively, 
‘lives under the boot of the ruler’.905 Barakat’s exegesis provides a general overview of the 
pervasive existence of alienation through multiple levels (family, societal, religious as well as 
political) of Arab society. Where he and the above discussion intersect is on the point of 
recognition: Arab citizens, whether intellectuals like Barakat or activists including Assaf and al-
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Rawabdeh recognise – and have done so for some time – both the hypocrisy of ruling elites, and 
the undesirability of their domestic political circumstances. 
 
This contributes to the reason why press laws have been utilised as a means for 
consolidating regime security in the face of potentially vocal opposition, a point emphasised by 
Russel Lucas and Joel Campagna have demonstrated.906 During the first decade of this century it 
has however become increasingly important as internet-based connectivity improved in terms of 
speed and geographical dissemination.907 Further, a number of studies have correlated links 
between Internet access and mobilization during the 2011 uprisings.908 Amendments to the 1998 
Press and Publications Law (PPL) approved by parliament in August 2012 are emblematic in this 
regard. These amendments, rumours of which had been circulating in the public sphere for almost 
a year, ought not to be understood as an isolated occurrence, but as the continuation (even an 
acceleration) of successive government (and therein regime) endeavours to restrict the practical 
application of citizen freedoms and rights.  
 
In 2010 for example, the parliament passed an amendment to the 1998 law allowing 
charges against journalists, bloggers and other such individuals to be heard by the State Security 
Court (SSC).909 Enabling what hitherto was a matter for civil courts to be judged by the SSC is 
indicative of the kind of environment which the regime felt itself to be in even before the uprisings 
of 2010, and underscores the challenges before Jordanian journalists especially in publishing news 
stories that may appear critical in certain circles. Thanks to the revisions, the law defines an 
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electronic publication as ‘a website with an electronic address on the worldwide web that offers 
publication services including news, reports, investigations, articles, and comments’.910 In so 
doing, it considers Internet publications equivalent to print publications. Therefore, domestic 
online news providers are rendered subject to the same regulative environment as their print media 
counterparts, including the necessity of registering with the Press and Publication Department of 
the Ministry of Culture.911 To be clear this is not merely a procedure of appearing on a government 
list, therein obtaining official recognition and through that legitimacy. However much this is true, 
registration also came with material costs in licensing fees of up to one thousand Jordanian dinars 
- at the time a little more than 1,400 $US – which imposed substantial obstacles on individual and 
independent webpage creators.912   
 
Moreover, amendments made to Articles 48 and 49 bestow upon the Press and Publications 
Department authority to close offices and block website addresses of those online platforms who 
are either unlicensed irrespective of the reason, or who have been perceived to have published 
material interpreted as ‘defamatory’.913 By June 2013 more than three hundred websites had been 
blocked.914 That this authority exists without needing to acquire a court’s permission, accentuates 
the capacity for the state security apparatus to operate unilaterally and without transparency. 
Demonstrating how legislation and regulation can be applied seemingly antithetically to the 
constitution itself.  
 
In a more bureaucratic manner, registered publications are required to have editors-in-chief 
who are members of the Jordanian Press Association (JPA), and have been so for at least four 
years.915 Though sounding innocuous, the JPA has a history of excluding working journalists,916 
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thus membership to it is not guaranteed, and is not without potential costs to independence. To be 
clear however, in general terms successive governments have been more interested in targeted 
application of the more restrictive facets of laws. Such encourages a culture of self-censorship on 
the one hand, while additionally ensuring that the international reputation of the Kingdom is not 
sacrificed to ham-fisted securitisation.917 At the same time, the influence of the amendments is one 
of ‘a chilling effect on expression online’,918 as online news owners, content writers and bloggers 
frequently complain of direct or indirect interference in their work, especially with concern to so-
called red line issues outlined in detail in Article 37.919  
 
The chilling effect is especially true when the PPL amendments are considered alongside 
the existing Penal Code. In 2013 for example, the Chief Editor and Publisher of Jafra News, an 
online news website, were arrested and charged on September 17 under Article 118 of the Penal 
Code, under which it is illegal for anyone to engage “in acts, writings, or speeches not approved 
by the government that would subject Jordan to the danger of violent acts or disturb its relations 
with a foreign state”. The pair was arrested for their role in publishing a video on a YouTube page 
connected with Jafra News, which reportedly showed the brother of Qatar’s Emir dancing and 
showering with a number of women. The video which had been posted more than a year earlier 
during July 2012 and according to staff was produced by a third party with no connection to the 
website. An alarming development in the case was its referral by the prosecution to the SSC, whose 
jurisdiction, as stated previously, had apparently been reduced to instances of alleged treason, 
terrorism and espionage. They were held for one hundred days before being released on bail.920  
 
Subsequently, the al-Fara’nah and Mu’alas’ case highlights the following: firstly, the 
capacity for cases seemingly unrelated to terrorism, espionage or treason to be referred to the SSC, 
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to which there is no appeal. Secondly, the extent to which the 2012 amendments to the PPL can 
be used to hold online publishers and chief editors responsible for all content and commentary 
posted on their webpages irrespective of who produced it. A related case involves 7iber.com 
(7iber) an Amman based online magazine. The website began its life in 2007 as a blog whose 
content came from volunteer contributions. Receiving an honorary award at the third annual Jordan 
Web Awards in 2008,921 the organisation came of age similar with much of the Jordanian 
blogosphere during the uprisings of 2011, becoming a professional internet-based magazine in 
2012. The PPL amendments of that year have been influential on 7iber’s development, with one 
of the more observable being the requirement for all websites identifiable as news providers to be 
registered, a requisite 7iber founder and current editor Lina Ejeilat likens to a state-sanctioned 
baptism.922  
 
Rather than succumb to the curtailing of its independence that the registration process 
would entail, 7iber engaged in a form of online nomadism, relocating from a dot.com address to 
dot.org, dot.net, and dot.me before returning to dot.com, with three of these domain relocations 
occurring between June and August 2014 as each was successively blocked by the Jordanian 
Media Commission. After being taken to court by the Commission and required to pay a fine for 
the charge of ‘managing an unlicensed media organization’, 7iber obtained its operating license 
from the Commission at the end of 2014.923 
 
As a threat to regime stability, this situation can be illuminated via constructivist 
understandings of the security/insecurity dyad. Diana Saco for example posits that ‘the process of 
describing “the threats we face” not only helps to construct those threats; it also brings a particular 
identity (a “we”) into existence, creates interests for that identity, and provides rationales for 
particular actions’.924 In accepting this, it is plain to see that recognition, knowledge is a potential 
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threat to the status quo. I concur with Bueno de Mesquita that all regimes are founded on a web of 
relations involving an at time intricate balancing of forces of inclusion and exclusion, advantage 
and disadvantage (Bueno de Mesquita). This inclusion/exclusion doublet itself produces an 
accompanying we/us and them/others deuce. On this basis, the threat of knowledge/recognition to 
the status quo is that the regime finds itself disaggregated from the population at large. In other 
words, excluded from Saco’s ‘we’. In such a situation, a regime becomes a threat, a source of 
insecurity to wider political community within the state.  
 
To use Bueno de Mesquita’s terminology, the selectorate and the disenfranchised recognise 
their role in propping up the winning coalition, and by extension the regime, while simultaneously 
being excluded from the winning coalition. Adopting Partha Chatterjee’s insights can assist us in 
illuminating this further by bringing citizenship back in. Specifically, his contention that the 
‘functions and activities’ of modern governments generate expectations that in turn facilitate the 
establishment and reproduction of ‘certain relations between governments and populations’.925 
Citizenship evidently enough is one such product of these evolving relationships. And which, 
following Peter Nyers has developed as a central institution in shaping how populations (now 
organised as citizens) collectively imagine the boundaries of an acceptable model of political 
subjectivity.926 Political subjectivity is essential because it is what imbues citizenship with its 
content; the material poured into Laclau’s empty signifier. To reference our previous examination 
of citizenship, it is unsurprising therefore that as an analogy or status, citizenship will demonstrate 
substantial variability.   
  
Of this variability Chatterjee mentions there being at least ‘two different shapes…the 
formal and the real’.927 Considering all that has been advanced thus far in relation to citizenship in 
Jordan, I assert the applicability of this dichotomy – despite its natural limitations. As witnessed 
in chapter three, Tariq al-Tell has persuasively situated the establishment and reproduction of 
Jordanian political subjectivity within the Hashemite compact. This order has been under pressure 
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since before the events of 2011/2012, which have only underscored the extent to which old political 
subjectivities old models of citizenship are in need of revision. 
 
7.4 : Discussion Paper VI – Advocating Citizen Passivity?  
 
Three weeks after the assassination of Nahed Hattar, Abdullah II released his sixth discussion 
paper. While not mentioning Hattar by name, by virtue of the paper’s main subject being the rule 
of law, it is linked directly to the murder, insofar as his murderer very publically took the law into 
his own hands; denying the state both its claim to the monopolisation of violence, and its capacity 
to act as the overarching arbitrator through the legal system. The paper is interesting therefore for 
its location at the crossroads of events (the assassination), and ongoing societal debates, with that 
revolving around citizen freedom of expression especially germane. Regarding the former, the 
paper is worthy of discussion for two interconnected reasons. Firstly it is part of the royal response 
to the murder, and is thus potentially revealing in how it situates the assassination and the events 
that led to it in its societal context. Relatedly, because of the nature of the cartoon at the centre of 
the affair, in-conjunction with Hattar being a member of Jordan’s Christian minority, the paper is 
also a royal contribution to a wider debate about the nature of the state in Jordan.  
 
Concerning societal debates, the paper is similarly a contribution to the question of the 
extent to which citizens are able to engage in freedom of expression as an accorded right. That is 
to say the content of Jordanian citizenship. In this matter, the paper shares much with its five 
predecessors in advancing a preference for loyalty and consensus over debate and contestation. 
The latter two, as the references to the immediate neighbourhood seek to confirm, readily result in 
disunity and instability. Whether intentional or not the King once more places citizens in the 
driver’s seat of ownership and accountability, it is their decisions which will make the rule of law 
stable in Jordan. Yet this is another expression of continuity in the midst of the maelstrom, a 
circular way forward which, I shall argue, risks a repetition of events that led to the maelstrom to 
begin with.  
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A key factor distinguishing the sixth discussion paper from its predecessors is its content 
owes less to reform hungry demonstrators, and more to the need for social stability than its five 
predecessors. Hattar’s murder was part of a chain of events that occurred over the course of 2016 
both within and outside the Kingdom, which rendered the content of the King’s paper pertinent. 
These included the March raids on an alleged ISIS affiliated cell in the northern city of Irbid;928 
the June lone-wolf attack on a mukhabarat office in the Baq‘a Palestinian refugee camp resulting 
in the deaths of five employees;929 and a number of attacks against Jordanian military instalments 
along its northern border with Syria.930 Thus the King categorises the context for action in terms 
of ‘external shocks’, a regional climate of ‘conflicts and wars’ encircling Jordan.931 A 
governmentality characterised by security and securitisation is subsequently of prime significance. 
Such is reflected in the explication of citizen and state duties. For the former, it is ‘necessary for 
every citizen to bear responsibility for defending and strengthening the rule of law’ in daily life. 
The latter’s responsibility meanwhile resides in the ‘applying (tatbeeq) and executing (infādth) of 
the rule of law with equality, justice and integrity’.932 It again falls on citizens to do the heavy 
lifting in actualising the rule of law. And yet this conceals the role of the regime/state in 
encouraging behaviours that are antithetical to the rule of law and the unity adherence to it is 
supposed to facilitate. 
 
This theme is encountered throughout the paper, which is divided into four sections, each 
addressing a concept or issue relevant to the consolidation of the rule of law, and familiar to 
Jordanians: ‘the Rule of Law is the Foundation of Prudent Administration’, ‘Wasta and Nepotism’, 
‘Developing the Judiciary and Strengthening the Rule of Law’, and ‘the Rule of Law is the Buttress 
                                                     
928 Muwafaq Kamāl, ‘Amn al-Dawlah Tubāshar al-Taḥqiq m‘a Muqufi Khaliyah Irbid al-Irhābiyah al-Aḥad’, al-
Ghad, March 04, 2016, 
http://www.alghad.com/articles/924208-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9
%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9
%82%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AE
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March 04, 2016). 
929 BBC, ‘Jordan Officers Killed in Attack at Baqaa Camp near Amman’, BBC News, June 06, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36459495 (accessed June 06, 2016). 
930 Jordan Times, ‘World Condemns Terror Attack on Jordan’s Border’, Jordan Times, June 22, 2016, 
http://jordantimes.com/news/local/world-condemns-terror-attack-jordan%E2%80%99s-border (accessed June 23, 
2016). 
931 Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘The Rule of Law: The Foundation of the Civil State’. 
932 Ibid. 
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of the Civil State’.933 The first two contain three arguments/counter arguments. The first, involves 
taking state administration grounded on the principles of ‘justice, transparency and equality’ as a 
prerequisite condition for the achievement of sustainable socio-political development.934 Only by 
doing so it is argued, can the ‘fruits’ of Jordan’s almost thirty years of political reform endeavours 
come into fruition. Taking this into account, the counter-claim is that a system in which wasta and 
nepotism are allowed to function and flourish ‘erodes achievements’ by undermining these very 
values, which when taken together with citizenship ‘are the enablers of development in any 
society’.935 
 
The second argument that King Abdullah II raises in relation to the consequences of 
action/inaction is that democratic transition is predicated on the existence of a state administration 
that takes the rule of law to its heart.936 By establishing this as ‘an essential requirement for a 
successful democratic transformation’, he is favourably positioned to juxtapose such a state of 
affairs with one developed on wasta and nepotism. Any social structure will encourage particular 
forms of behaviour, a postulation that is situated at the heart of the constructivist contention of the 
mutual constitution of structures to agents and agents to structures. Nicholas Onuf clarifies this 
ontology asserting that ‘people make society and society makes people’ in a continual ‘two-way 
process’ bound by rules which are the foundation of structure.937 By rules, Onuf denotes the 
‘statements’ that inform people ‘what we should do’, and how we respond and interact with them 
constitute our ‘practices’.938 Together, rules and practices are instrumental in the construction and 
occasional correction of inequalities, especially with regard to agency. 
  
Issues of equality contribute to the third argument, namely that ‘hesitation’ or 
unwillingness to see the law applied ‘in a just, transparent and competent manner leads to the loss 
of rights and weakens people’s trust in state institutions’.939 The alternative argument to this claim 
is reflected in recent ‘transgressions’ on the running of state institutions by individuals, who in 
                                                     
933 Ibid. 
934 Ibid. 
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937 Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf & Paul Kowert (eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World 
(Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1998), pp. 59-63. 
938 Ibid, p. 59. 
939 Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘The Rule of Law: The Foundation of the Civil State’. 
  
246 
 
practicing wasta and nepotism, ‘have deprived institutions from qualified personnel and 
leadership’. Both of which are integral in improving the output of these institutions and their 
subsequent ability to serve both citizen and country. 
 
The last two sub-sections of the discussion paper are titled: Advancing the Judiciary and 
Enhancing the Rule of Law and The Rule of Law: Sine Qua Non-of Civil State. Analogous with the 
first two, the arguments made in these segments feed into each other, and hence the appropriateness 
of analysing them together. Indeed, this interconnectedness emerges as a central principle. To 
illustrate, the King states that citizens ‘resort to the judiciary because they have confidence in its 
ability to deliver them justice and safeguard their rights’. Later, this initial reflection on citizens 
and the judiciary is consolidated by a model of the civil state (al-Dawlah al-Madaniyah) as one 
‘that protects rights and guarantees freedoms, where all are equal in their rights and obligations’. 
Elaborating further, it is asserted that ‘a civil state is one that is governed by a constitution and 
laws that apply to all citizens without exception’, and therefore, all citizens regardless of other 
identifiers (religion, class etc.) have a horizontal as opposed to hierarchical relationship with the 
law. The following argument is made, that all civil states are governed by the rule of law, and all 
states governed by the rule of law are civil in nature.  
 
The paper seeks to link the abiding by the rule of law on the part of citizens with patriotic 
feeling, arguing that respecting the law is ‘the true expression of our love for our country’.940 In 
this way the dictates of jinsiyyah and muwātanah are brought together. Hence, emphasis placed by 
the King on the rule of law can be readily interpreted as a counter-response to Hattar’s assassin – 
Riyad Ismail - taking the law into his own hands. Abdullah II brings together circumstantial 
premises both regional and domestic across the social, political and economic spectrum, along 
with the goals of democracy, stability and prosperity in order to justify his claim for action in the 
direction of the rule of law. Argumentatively this is underpinned by how the rule of law is 
characterised: ‘the guarantor’ of rights’ and the ‘architecture’ for the desirable safe and balanced 
society.  
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Following on from the above summary of its content and context, the paper is part of a 
royal response to Hattar’s assassination, especially with regards to the timing of its publication. A 
key way in which it contributes to the debate which became increasingly frantic following the 
Hattar’s reposting of the cartoon was to clarify and advance a definition of the civil state (al-
Dawlah al-Madaniyyah). Exactly what constitutes a civil state had been a key discussion point in 
Amman’s Third District and beyond during the election thanks to the Ma’an List and its calls for 
a civil state. The List received heavy criticism from parts of the wider electorate, including 
accusations of being atheistic. At their official campaign launch each member of the List addressed 
this criticism directly and stood behind their contentious campaign. This contention stemmed from 
confusion in Jordanian society about the differences between al-dawlah al-Madaniyah (the civil 
state) and al-dawlah al-‘Ilmāniyah (the secular state), with the former equated with the latter.941 
Naturally this generated disconcertion amongst citizens for whom religion, and its principles, as 
recent public opinion surveys show, remains significant. The Arab Transformations Project, 
Political and Social Transformations in the Arab World, consisting of a phenomenal analysis of 
public opinion undertaken between 2011 and 2014 found for example that in 2014 98% of 
Jordanians identified as being ‘at least somewhat religious’ (73- more than Egypt at 97%), and 
across both 2011 and 2014 more than 75% of the population surveyed agreed that all legislation 
and judicial law-making should be based on Shari’a (75).942 Of particular significance for the civil 
state concept, are the findings of 2014 regarding political parties, with the data suggesting a 
Jordanian preference for religious political parties of a little over 50% (74).943 
  
Evidently the King’s intervention generated public discussion. Responding to the 
discussion paper, Muhammad Abu Ruman agreed with the King that there is a distinct difference 
between a civil and a secular state.944 He argued that the Kingdom is neither a religious state (dawla 
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diniyah) nor is it a ‘revolutionary secular state’ (dawlah ‘ilmāniyah thuriyah). The former connotes 
the existence of a theocratic state, whereas the latter refers to a state that is fundamentally against 
religion, its symbols and existence in the public sphere. Jordan, he positions contrastingly, is a 
country which bestows on religion a ‘spiritual, valuable and legislative role’ in society.945 In a 
more exacerbated meditation, Jumana Ghunaimat’s article ‘The Identity of the State Again’ 
criticises the seemingly endless ability of various ideological factions in Jordanian society to 
‘redefine water with water’.946 Each clique, she writes, whether leaning towards the Islamists or 
more secular attitudes, extracts quotations from the King’s paper in order to declare it supports 
their vision for, and of, Jordan. While there is nothing wrong in principle in selective interpretation, 
Ghunaimat perspicaciously observes that it becomes a problem in Jordan when, as is now, this 
process does not advance the wider public discussion of state’s identity (and therefore of its 
citizens), but instead brings it ‘back to square one’.947 
 
Ghunaimat’s image of square one is a useful entry point into revealing how freedom of 
expression is addressed in the discussion paper. Nahed Hattar’s travails began with his exercising, 
rather innocuously, his right to express an opinion. This opinion, helped by flagrant 
misinterpretations and misassumption, became so problematic that it risked the stability of the 
social fabric, therein - assuming the family is correct in their assessment of Prime Minister Mulki 
- providing the government a useful vehicle through which to prosecute Hattar in the court of 
public opinion. In light of this, Abdullah II’s discussion paper, frames the exercising of rights 
within the bounds of citizens’ duty to maintain national unity. Unity as a value premise is 
maximised rhetorically through appeals to ethos, pathos and logos. The first of these, coalesces 
around the character of the individual (the King) seeking to persuade the audience. Empathy, 
competence and intention are important here and are demonstrated in the paper’s opening 
sentences, where Abdullah II links himself to Jordan’s political reform agenda and recognises the 
regional challenges bearing down on the Kingdom.948 
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The second element pathos concerns persuasion via emotion. Throughout the paper, love 
of country and pride in Jordan underpins the emotive side of the argument, specifically, with the 
King reflecting on ‘the tremendous respect and admiration the world has for our country’.949 In 
which the value of unity is underscored by the inclusive pronoun ‘our’. References are also made 
to the people themselves with Abdullah II conveying that ‘I find myself deeply touched by the 
kindness of Jordanians and so proud of your determination and patriotism’.950 He emphasises this 
further by way of a comparison between Jordan and its neighbours, whose ‘disintegration’ is, 
among other things, a result of the absence of unity.951 This comparison tie into the final persuasive 
component, logos, sees the King use appeals to reason and logic to buttress the value premise of 
unity.  When considering the poor state of the region the King laments ‘I see clearly that the 
absence of rule of law and its fair application was a major factor that contributed to the situation 
today’.952 The appeal to reason here is predicated on a causal link between the presence of 
established rules and adherence to them on the part of citizens with stability, security and 
democratic transformation.  
 
But what about the role of the state and its representatives in adhering to and defending 
established rules and civil norms? Although it is axiomatic that individuals rather than institutions 
make decisions, the role of institutions in directly influencing decision-making through roles 
cannot be so easily neglected. Roles, argues Michael Barnett, are the mechanism through which a 
given actor (which could be a state or individual for example), is able to participate in society and 
‘comes to modify’ their behaviour overtime accordingly.953 In other words an actor who occupies 
and identifies with a given role, will seek to organise his or her behaviour in a way that 
simultaneously meets the requirements of that role, therefore the expectations that others within 
society have for that particular role. In the present case regarding citizenship, the rule of law and 
citizen decision-making, citizenship is the institution and to be a citizen is to occupy a role within 
this institution. This is because, the requirements of a role are to a great extent directed by the 
institutional context in which the role is established, and hence an institution only comes to regulate 
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and inject predictability into political life when actors adopt a consistent set of behaviour 
applicable to a given role.954  
 
Institutions must therefore promote behaviours applicable to the consolidation of the rule 
of law, and it is in this area that the discussion circles back to square one. I suggested via my 
analysis of the royal response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings earlier, that while freedom of 
expression is defendable outside of Jordan, within the Kingdom it becomes contingent upon 
security considerations. On the assumption that insecurity and security are mutually buttressing, 
this becomes ironic. Peter Nyers vividly captures this through his analysis of risk society, that is 
to say one that bears witness to a paradoxical form of governance whereby rulers predicate their 
legitimacy on the alleviating of ‘public fears’ while concomitantly cultivating these fears because 
their rule is dependent upon them.955 As touched upon in the previous chapters, the state has 
whether willingly or not constructed and reproduced a citizenship regime that encourages certain 
behaviours on the part of citizens. A regime that interprets difference as an inherent danger to the 
sanctity of the political community, and has therefore positioned loyalty and unity as opposites, 
rather than as being able to coexist with difference.  
 
Jutta Weldes expresses a similar argument. By defining crises as socially constructed 
entities ‘fundamentally the outcome of particular social practices, including, centrally, practices of 
representation’, she identifies the centrality of representations as a mechanism for framing and 
situational understanding.956 In order for an action to be undertaken, the situation needs to be 
understood, and understanding, especially in light of complex circumstances requires prioritising 
and simplifying of identified variables in the form of categories. As she elaborates, ‘representations 
fix in place one particular set of features’ out of a litany of features, and it is this set that comes to 
constitute what is understood as the reality of the situation in question.957 All action in response to 
reality thus understood is predicated on the interpretation and knowledge derived from this set of 
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features. More than being an informal arrangement, this notion is manifested formally. This had 
profound implications for the fate of Hattar:  
 
‘Putting Hattar on trial for inciting sectarian and racial bigotry under the penal code (a 
charge whose penalty could lead to three years in prison) was not at all the appropriate 
alternative to this heinous crime [the assassination]. In effect, his trial contributed to the 
promotion of hate speech by circulating the message that there is no space for differences 
in opinion without punishment. And the victim-blaming rhetoric of “execute him by law, 
do not kill him on the street” consolidates the same foundations from which the crime 
emerges’.958    
 
Similar with Hattar’s family, the writer here refers to the prominent role of the state in 
fostering an environment in which the assassination became possible. This is something that the 
discussion paper does not address in more than a cursory fashion. It again falls on citizens to do 
the heavy lifting in actualising the rule of law, and to practice their rights. 
 
 
7.5 : Conclusion 
 
This chapter has tried to take the events leading up to and after the assassination of Nahed Hattar 
as a microcosm of a number of facets of Jordan’s citizenship regime. Working in reverse, Abdullah 
II’s sixth discussion paper is exceptional for a number of reasons. First, it is a public declaration 
of royal support (at least discursively) of the civil state as a desirable objective of the Kingdom’s 
reform trajectory. Given the confusion that has existed surrounding the secular or atheistic 
tendencies of such a state, the royal intervention is a much needed one. Second, as a product of its 
immediate context culminating in Hattar’s murder, the paper is a passionate call for faith in the 
state project as a guarantor of security in a tempestuous neighbourhood. Yet at the same time, the 
paper seems equivalent to locking the gate once the horse has bolted, knowing full well the gate 
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had been left open in the first place. The King, who given the expansion of his executive powers 
by the 2014 and 2016 constitutional amendments, has at least on paper, the power to take a more 
active role in making a citizen-based political order emerge. 
 
That opposite developments seems to have occurred over the course of his reign highlights 
the problem of a state talking about the rule of law while it actively [for expediency] pursues 
decisions that induce an environment where adherence to this is made difficult. At its heart, the 
Hashemite compact which characterised the citizenship regime for much of Jordan’s history from 
the Mandate onwards coalesced around a trade-off of economic benefits and security for loyalty 
to the state and its Hashemite rulers. The central importance of loyalty (to the state embodied in 
the individual of the monarch) as a feature of the citizenship has meant that in the contemporary 
period, it has proven difficult to manage a transition in loyalty to the state and its institutions.  
 
Transitioning in this way requires citizens who feel a sufficient degree of ownership over 
decision-making processes, through which the individual decision-makers become accountable to 
the citizenry. By considering the royal response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings I endeavoured to 
shed light on the alienation between some very public decision-making on the part of the King, 
and domestic expectations. Overtime the affect has been to fragment the political community 
rather than unify it. This makes the practice of expression, the freedom of which is right possessed 
by all Jordanians, in the public sphere a potentially precarious enterprise. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
8. Tribalism (al-‘Asha'iriyyah) and Contemporary Citizenship 
 
‘Jordan is still a very tribal country… as long as I cannot vote outside of my district the system 
will stay tribal’.959 
 
‘The system favours the elite amongst the tribe, not the whole tribe’.960 
 
 
8.1 : Introduction 
 
Extant sub-national (sub-citizen) identities, imputed deeply into the social fabric during the 
ongoing processes of state and nation building, reduce the ability of citizenship to act as an 
aggregator of interests and a common denominator of identity. This theme persists in this chapter, 
but it is directed towards tribalism and its intersections with citizenship in the Jordan. I am 
interested in enunciating how the intertwining of citizenship with tribal identities has produced 
something of a hybrid citizenship. Tribes, tribalism and their affiliated identities are readily 
employed interchangeably, and therefore I begin with meditation on what both of these mean in 
twenty-first century Jordan. It is important so as to illuminate the significance of state development 
(see chapter three) on the contemporary ways in which tribal identities intertwine with citizenship. 
Having explicated tribalism from tribes, the second section of the chapter considers how these 
interlace with a conventional practice of citizenship: elections.  
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This section focuses on two main areas: the way several tribes sought to mediate the district 
list system following the rescinding of the SNTV, and counting irregularities in the Central 
Bedouin district (Badia al-Wasaṭ). Finally, the chapter reflects on the place of tribal customs 
including jalwa in the civil law of the state. The aim is to highlight some of the ways that 
Jordanians navigate, accept, and at time contest, the lived reality of their citizenship. I hope to 
illustrate how the ability to successfully navigate the hierarchical arrangement of Jordanian 
citizenship is limited to a minority of citizens who are not only affiliated with influential families 
within tribes, but are influential with the state especially via the security, military or economic 
capital they possess. Following on from this, and in a similar manner, the analysis engages with 
the interaction that continually takes place between civil law and tribal legal norms. 
 
 
8.2 : Tribes & Tribalism in 21st Century Jordan 
 
When jinsiyyah began being used as the mechanism through which the political subjectivities of 
residents could be distinguished from those who, from a top-down perspective, did not belong 
within the borders of the Emirate/state structure, it was not applied on a blank slate. In chapter 
three, considerable energy was exerted in following the development of citizenship and how 
citizenship as an institution interacted with and was influenced by internal and external events and 
occurrences. The absence of the proverbial blank slate is crucial in reflecting on tribalism as an 
idea, which unlike the tribes themselves is relatively new to the Kingdom.961 It is necessary 
therefore to extricate tribes from tribalism. According to Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, a 
tribe is a ‘pyramidal and segmentary relationship aggregating extended families into higher orders 
of organization’ that is based on a shared understanding – real or imagined – that all are related to 
a common ancestor.962  
 
Regarding the social organisation of these ties, Layne refers to two models, one 
‘segmentary’, the other ‘concentric’. The former involves a series of political relations in which 
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local dynamics of alliance making and enmity, will, in theory become subordinated in the face of 
larger concerns or threats. Subsequently, local relations should be subordinate to the ‘greater 
loyalty commanded’ by the nation-state.963 A concentric model of organisation meanwhile situates 
the individual in a central position from which circles of kinship relations radiate outwards in a 
horizontal rather than vertical fashion. For Ahmad Oweidi, the inhabitants of these circles are 
people ‘to whom’ the man in the centre (and it is overwhelmingly a “he”) ‘owes, one way or 
another, legal obligations regarding the maintenance of justice’.964  
 
Resultantly, tribal identification is as much about perception as agnation. Whereas all 
familial networks world over possess a genetic connection, tribal members at least in theory 
‘believe in the same principles; assimilate the same values and ethos; act according to the same 
unique rules and laws; respect the same hereditary shaykh (Tribal Lord); live together; migrate 
together; defend each other; fight together, and die together’.965 Therefore, despite the speed at 
which one might wish to accentuate biology’s role in the constitution of tribes, it is critical to see 
beyond agnation to cognition, and through it, the social construction of blood and kin. As Edouard 
Conte reflects, while generations of families are recorded through ‘ascending ‘chains’ (salasil) or 
‘trees’ (shajarat al-nasab)’ this does not mean that identity is a blood born entity.966 Ibn Khaldun 
asserted more than six centuries ago that ‘humanity is the child of custom, not the child of 
nature’,967 stressing the significance of shared experience and communal perception in the 
constitution of community belonging whether tribal or otherwise. Simultaneously, the function of 
geography and environment are essential here. Surviving in an arid environment requires the 
assimilation of individual interests, a respect for the guidance of leadership, and an adherence to 
shared principles. Failure in these would result in the death of the community.  
 
What occurs when tribes enter, settle and operate in a different environment or more the 
point, within the ambit of a nation-state’s supposedly centralised authority? Here tribalism as a 
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concept becomes significant. Tribalism evolves out of agnation, social cognition, and the models 
of social organisation they encourage. It is then, a relative analogy whose practice is better 
understood intrinsically, that is to say through deeds and narratives enacted or spoken in its 
name.968 And as the Jordanian case demonstrates, in an environment which is in many ways 
divorced from the original one in which tribes developed. Contextual divorce is at the heart of 
Jordanian political analyst Ibrahim Gharaibeh’s assertion, that tribalism understood as anything 
‘other than abstract and sentimental relational ties’, no longer exists in Jordan.969 
 
As a social actor, the tribe can no longer be said to control resources independently from 
the state. Nor is it considered a legal entity in the eyes of the state which is now the supreme actor 
on the domestic stage. Resultantly, tribes cannot in the contemporary period advance the ‘social 
and legal protection which they used to extend to members other than a nonbinding moral 
solidarity’.970 This was on display in July 2017, when the Ḥuwayṭāt, one of Southern Jordan’s 
largest tribes held a conference attended by five thousand members to respond to the jailing of one 
of their own, Ma‘ārek Abu Tāyeh. Abu Tāyeh had been convicted for murdering three American 
soldiers at a military base in al-Jafr in 2016.971 In a statement released by Ḥuwayṭāt representatives 
after the conference, it declared the tribe rejected the verdict, which they charged was politically 
motivated, and dictated to Jordan by the Americans.972 However despite the large display of force, 
at the time of writing, Abu Tāyeh remains in jail.  
 
In this instance, the rule of the state is an ‘institutional alternative’ to the tribe in which 
citizens (muwātaneen) ‘are no longer bound to their tribe for purposes of work, subsistence or 
protection’.973 Private property as the exclusive domain of the state has performed a considerable 
role here in the retreat of the tribe via the acquisition and subdivision of historical diyeh (tribal 
land). Bedouin and peasants ae not to be found in Jordan today as they were historically because 
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the available ways of making a living have been altered, but not yet replaced. He elaborates 
articulating ‘the Jordanians in departing from tribalism, Bedouinism and peasantry did not turn 
themselves into civil (that is to say city-oriented) societies’.974 This statement provides a sense as 
to the half-way space, one both civil in the sense of a cityscape, but normatively rural in its outlook, 
in which tribalism may continue to function.  
 
It is an argument mediated on in an insightful essay: ‘Amman – Civic Conduct in a City 
not Truly Civil’, by Hisham al-Bustāni. In which he depicts an urban geography which, through 
intra-state migration from the hinterland to Amman, has produced something of a hybrid human 
cityscape. In which the city emerges as one populated not by civilians in the traditional sense of 
the word, but by villagers, who are no longer villagers but have not yet been shaped into new 
civilian-subjects of the city. One illustration concerns the ‘massive’ sexual harassment of women 
in the streets. This ‘civil behaviour’ insofar as it occurs in the cityscape can be followed he argues 
to its roots, beginning with government and private schools which are largely segregated and offer 
little in the way of education in ‘gender culture’.975 This in turn facilitates the development of 
normative behaviours, and expectations, that are consolidated within the family sphere via 
prevailing patriarchal norms. According to which ‘every women in the public realm not attached 
to a man is a common body’ (jasadān mushā‘iān).976  
 
In principle this is shared amongst societies and communities organised along patriarchal 
lines. Al-Bustāni contends however that in cities like New York or London, there is a civic culture 
capable of mediating or delimiting if not changing particular modes of patriarchal behaviour. In 
Amman contrastingly he argues the individuality of the city’s residents is not recognised because 
the city is ‘composed of collectives who adopt the vices of their place of origin (the countryside) 
while renouncing its virtues’.977 Hence although the city is unable to faithfully reproduce the 
modes of behaviour and conduct of the original locality, neither is it able to change them 
completely. The city then is at a disadvantage in educating residents to become civilians subject 
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to a new set of normative standards. Although the production and reproduction of civil behavioural 
norms is a community oriented enterprise, al-Bustāni is discerning in recognising that ‘when the 
state monopolizes the organization of the community and intervenes in a holistic manner, 
possesses a much deeper responsibility than does the individual’.978 Journalist Raed Omari makes 
an analogous point in relation to the persistence of tribal dynamics in Amman and elections in the 
city. The outcomes of which he notes are dominated by member of the five most influential 
collectives: ‘Abbadi, ‘Adwān, ‘Assāf, Bani Sakhr and Naimat.979 Because general elections are 
organised by and for the benefit of the state, they illustrate al-Bustāni’s position perspicaciously, 
inasmuch as tribes have adapted to new(er) political institutions and associated practices, while 
maintaining some of their pre-state coherency. Thus, in Jordan, there may be ‘cities without 
civilisation’ a rural landscape ‘without agriculture or agricultural societies and Bedouinism 
without Bedouins’.980 
 
Private property in concert with an increase in modes of production and ways of earning a 
living facilitated by the state has meant that those tribal leaders who are influential socially and 
politically are so not so much because of their tribe but because of their access to capital and 
employment. And because of this they may become useful to the state and its ruling elites in a way 
that is ‘independent’ from the tribe to which they belong. According to Gharaibeh, ‘the only 
organised tribe in Jordan’ which enjoys a degree of independence from the state is ‘oligarchical’ 
in nature, consisting of professional, economic and political elites.981 Some of these come from 
prominent East Bank families and tribes, whereas others are Palestinian in origin. Therefore, 
tribalism for Gharaibeh has evolved into a pseudo-class category irrespective of blood. One may 
therefore speak of divisions within tribes based on individuals and individual families who enjoy 
privileged relations with the Hashemite regime, as the examples below attest.  
 
However, complicating this image further is the way in which tribal norms and values have 
been integrated into the fabric of national identity and the citizenship regime. From the position of 
modernism, tribalism as an idea is often registered as threatening to solidarities anchored in the 
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nation-state (citizenship chief among them) insofar as it appears to denote ‘the placing of family 
ties before all other political allegiances’.982 Nuance is necessary given ‘the problem is not 
primordial ties versus civil attachments’, but rather the nation-state is itself ‘imagined in more than 
one style’.983 One of these styles appropriates the imagery and norms of Jordan’s Bedouin past, 
fusing the individual citizen’s identification with tribe (where applicable) and state together, under 
the umbrella of the Hashemite family. Testimony to this is the Ma’an Museum, located in the town 
of its namesake and the ground zero of the Jordanian nation. It was here that Abdullah I first arrived 
from the Hijaz and met with local dignitaries, chief among them members of the Ḥuwayṭāt tribe.  
 
It is unsurprising then that the museum, in which ‘the bonds between the monarchy and the 
state, on the one hand, and the southern tribes, on the other, find a perfect fusion’,984 emphasises 
the role of Abdullah I and the foundation of the Kingdom. Layne argues similarly in relation to the 
Martyrs memorial and museum in Amman that tribes and the values they embody are placed at the 
centre of the Jordanian state’s foundation. Through the exhibitions on display ‘the Great Arab 
Revolt, the noble deeds of tribesmen under the leadership of the Hashemites in defending Arab 
honour are portrayed’.985 The effect of which is to embed the concept of tribe within the legitimacy 
discourse that the Hashemites have self-constructed in Jordan. From here it is a brief step to 
reinterpret and reapply this unit of belonging in its post-revolt state context, resulting in the 
production of tribalism. 
 
Through a centralising ideology of nation and state building, tribes as a source of identity, 
mobilisation, and history have been given no space in which to operate unless it is within the 
framework of the particular typology of national identity being advanced from the throne at any 
moment in time. Underscored here is the significance of the 1970-71 civil war and its aftermath 
discussed in chapter three. This along with the Israeli argument “Jordan is Palestine” encouraged 
the cultivation of tribalism as a narrative with national identity. In this manner, Jordanian pride in 
Bedouin and more broadly tribal heritage ‘is not simply a nostalgic longing for a vanishing culture, 
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but also…a demonstration of national identity by which Jordan can distinguish itself from the 
Palestinian nation’.986 Illuminated by extension is the innate modernity of tribalism as a product 
of interactions with the nation-state construct. Furthermore, it complicates the binary that King 
Abdullah II seeks to convey in his sixth discussion paper between old models of interaction 
coalescing around wasta and maḥsoubiyyah, and new models organised around citizenship and the 
rule of law. He argues that the former are an impediment to the country’s transition towards the 
latter, specifying that they ‘undermine the foundation of public work in the service of our 
citizens’.987  
 
Of particular interest is the target of criticism: the practice of wasta and mahsoubiyyah in 
the context of the public good. When this is undertaken the public good is sacrificed for the sake 
of a more limited set of interests. Complicating the King’s crusade is the reality that the public 
good has been sacrificed in this manner frequently in Jordan’s history and has been encouraged by 
the palace for the sake of rewarding loyalty rather than competence. Hamid el-Said for example 
writes of how officials ‘following the footsteps of their Master’ (King Hussein in this context) 
‘practiced patronage politics in filing positions in institutions of state with relatives, members of 
their extended family and region…on the basis of loyalty’.988 Rules whether formal or informal, 
along with the various ways in which actors respond to them (practices) when repeated often 
enough often form patterns or institutions ‘suiting agents’ intentions’.989 Ergo wasta and 
maḥsoubiyyah overtime become naturalised, and when practiced within the formal institutions of 
government, impede the development of a civilly oriented public service. Abdullah II is right then 
to rhetorically ask ‘how is it possible for any generation to safeguard the rule of law or manage 
our institutions when sub-loyalties have been established at the expense of the nation?’990  
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Instead of competition between proverbial “old” and “new” modes of societal identification 
and organisation, it is more accurate to recognise the existence multiple hybrid models. To think 
otherwise, for example, of national identity being ‘among the loyalties replacing that of the 
tribe’,991 assumes both to have a closed and distinct identity. In reality the two leverage their 
coherency off each other and thus cannot be practically disaggregated.  At a public event at the 
Columbia Global Centers Amman in September 2016, a university professor in the audience spoke 
of her apprehension that students were at the present time identifying more with their sub-state 
identities (including sect and tribe) than with their national identity than at any time she could 
remember in her career.992 The professor in question did not deny the existence and practice of 
national sentiments on the part of students, but questioned their movement on the spectrum of 
identities possessed by these young citizens. Although anecdotal, it reflects a concern regarding 
the how Jordanians balance their various identities in the public sphere. This is more than a student 
issue, as revealed in celebrations commemorating the Kingdom’s 70th year of independence, also 
in 2016.  
 
In the led up to the anniversary, advertisements on television, social and print media invited 
Jordanians to purchase commemorative polo shirts with the nation’s emblems emblazoned upon 
it. Purchasers could additionally ask that their family name or that of their tribe be stitched into the 
fabric as part of the national assemblage. On Independence Day, participants in the celebrations 
could be seen proudly wearing these shirts, many with the names of the noble tribes stitched in 
gold coloured thread upon them; emblematic of the intertwining of national and sub-national 
identities in their existence as citizens. All of this serves to underline how discussions concerning 
the role of tribes and tribalism in civil and political society have circulated persistently within the 
domestic public sphere, and have done so with varying degrees of intensity over the past thirty 
years. Recently, in 2014, Mustapha Hamārnah an MP from Madaba was drawn into a heated 
argument in parliament with fellow MP Abdul Kareem Dughmi after the former made comments 
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criticising what he labelled militia-like behaviour on the part of some tribes. This Hamārnah argued 
was corroding the emergence and consolidation of a civil state built on citizenship.993  
 
One of the catalysts for MP Hamārnah’s commentary was a spate of episodic violence on 
university campuses between 2007 and 2013 attributed to tribalism.994 It is difficult to qualify the 
significance of tribalism in cases of student violence as it is inevitably not the only factor involved. 
It has been argued for example that the socio-economic conditions of students is a more important 
contributing factor, and analysts refer for example to the fact that tuition costs have risen 
consistently throughout this period.995 Others meanwhile seek answers in direct catalysts, of which 
student elections is one of the prime ones. Lawyer Sāmir ‘Ariqāt who in 2011 was a member of 
the Jordanian University’s Student Council noted that a majority of incidents involving tribal, 
regional and religious fanaticism ta‘asoub occurred during electoral periods.996 However such an 
approach risks neglecting underlying ideational factors that may make such acts of political 
engagement even at a student level subject to violent outbursts. 
 
Central to this is the formation and reproduction of identities through social interactions. 
Alexandre Wendt’s model of alter and ego (self and other) interaction, although elementary 
demonstrates succinctly how the behaviours between two actors is shaped by their self-held 
identities, which are in turn developed through interaction in the process of ‘mutual 
constitution’.997 Emerging from identities then, is both a repertoire of actions, and a mechanism 
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through which individual and collective actors judge the acceptability of these available actions in 
the context of a given situation. Reflecting as much, a student interviewed by the daily newspaper 
al-Ghad, noted that most instances of student violence he witnessed began over ‘small and 
shallow’ issues, that only later adopted a tribal and or regionalist veneer.998 The idea that these 
small and shallow issues become immersed in tribal identities and discourse is itself revealing even 
if one accepts the claim that these same identities are not directly responsible for the outbreak of 
violence.  
 
The former Minister of Awqaf Dr Muhammad al-Quda’ for illustration, refused to link 
tribalism to the violence, arguing that ‘tribalism is an integral part of the fabric of Jordanian 
society’ and therefore should not be seen as causing these evident tears in the social fabric. Instead 
he focused on the role of ‘odious ‘asabiyya’ (al-‘asabiyya al-baghida).999 Taken in light of the 
student’s observation, it is apparent that for some students using tribal discourse and their own 
tribal identities is a useful way of prosecuting their claims against others regardless of whether 
they have anything to do with tribes per se. Elucidated below, this principle of action is similar to 
that enacted in Hind al-Fayez’s response to electoral abnormalities in the Bedouin Central District 
after the 2016 elections, where an attempt was made to dress a personal grievance in the garb of 
tribe. 
 
 
8.3 : Counting Irregularities in Badia al-Wasat 2016 - From Democratic Citizenship to the 
Solidarity of Tribalism? 
  
From the above it has been argued that Jordanian citizenship is necessarily a hybrid construct, 
whose identity facets are employed contextually, rather than at all times. To be clear, this does not 
mean that all Jordan jinsiyyah holders possess the same model of this hybrid construct. The reality 
is exceeding more complex, nuanced, and is dependent on the conditions of residence that have, 
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like a crucible, formed the developmental environment of the individual citizen. Here matters of 
gender, class, family social capital, and the way the state recognises and responds to these, to name 
but a few; intersect to produce a vertically stratified citizenship regime. A recent case revealing 
this the multifaceted nature regards the controversy over the electoral outcomes in the Central 
Bedouin District (Badia al-Wasat) following the 20 September 2016 elections. Before addressing 
this situation however it is beneficial to acquaint ourselves with the precepts of the Jordanian 
electoral process. 
 
Firstly, electoral laws and regulations have been designed to ‘minimize the power of the 
opposition and to maximise the power of regime supporters’ through a number of mechanisms.1000 
These include an over-representing of minorities via generous quota allocations in comparison to 
demographic leverage, and basing electoral districts on physical geography without ensuring it 
corresponds with the demographic geographies of the Kingdom. The population of Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin is the particular target of election structuration as a consequence of 
apprehensions regarding the watan al-Badil.1001 Hence the second, principle is that electoral 
contestation is less about the potential to shape decision-making, and more about being in an 
advantageous position to benefit from decision-making. In this way elections offer an opportunity 
for a strategic employment of tribe-oriented identities within the individual’s citizenship matrix.  
 
The state can use the privilege of its hegemony to shape the electoral terrain so as to 
encourage particular behaviours. For instance, in chapter three I noted how the introduction of the 
Single Non-transferrable Vote (SNTV) resulted in the creation of a parliament whose composition 
was radically different from its predecessor. To reiterate briefly, the outcome of the 1989 elections 
was as follows: 22/80 seats to Muslim Brotherhood affiliated candidates, a further 12/80 to 
independent Islamists, Leftists and Liberals acquired 11/80, and so-called regime loyalists won the 
remaining 35/80 seats.1002 By contrast, the 1993 results evidenced a decline in support for parties. 
Muslim brotherhood candidates, competing under banner of the IAF, the most organised of the 
parties gained 16/80 seats, their independent Islamist counterparts 6/80, Pan-Arabists 5/80, Leftists 
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7/80, Jordanian Nationalists acquired 10/80 and the final 36 seats went to independent tribal 
candidates.1003 My point is not that the SNTV is alone responsible for the sharp distinction between 
the composition of the parliaments following the 1989 and 1993 elections. Rather it is to illuminate 
the absence of alternatives and the subsequent predictability of parliamentary composition since 
its introduction. This continued after the ascension of King Abdullah II. 
  
Political analyst Amal Abu-Jeries notes that the ‘service’ rather than representative nature 
parliaments in Jordan owes a lot to ‘the lack’ of political parties, and the immaturity of citizen 
participation, a condition she apportions substantial blame for on the education system. It ‘does 
not’ she elaborates, ‘help Jordanians to engage in the political scene…We don’t learn how to 
participate or how to assess the situation critically; the basics of the education system in Jordan is 
on memorising, not thinking critically or out of the box’.1004 Another issue she raises is that of 
fear, especially felt by younger Jordanians if they engage openly with political parties:  
 
‘They fear they will be excluded from positions (employment), and I have heard from many 
youths that they have been threatened by the GID (Mukhabarat). So, it is very difficult 
especially at the universities to participate in political parties, because you might lose 
being a student or lose something else. It is very difficult. It is not obvious but it is 
happening’.1005  
 
In the 2003 and 2007 elections, the first that many millennial Jordanians would have been 
able to vote in, non-party affiliated candidates unsurprisingly gained the majority of seats in the 
110 seats parliament, 87 and 98 respectfully.1006 The outcome of the next elections in 2010 did not 
diverge substantially. Once more candidates not affiliated with parties had a higher winning 
percentage than their party counterparts, winning 103/120 seats. While it is necessary to caveat 
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this by noting the boycott of the elections by the IAF, a report compiled by the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI) did reflect that ‘strong tribal allegiances induce many voters to support candidates 
selected from their own tribe or region based on promises of patronage, rather than the candidate’s 
ideology or platform’.1007  
 
One of the more colossal consequences of this has been the absence of the ‘classical 
politician’ from Jordan’s political evolution. ‘In the sense’ explains long time journalist Osama 
Sharif ‘that he/she is in a party and that party has a platform and that platform represents working 
people or middle class or the upper class or the establishment etc. We do not have that experience 
for instance that they have in Morocco which is also a monarchical polity but they do have a 
classical definition of politicians, [in that] they do have political parties’.1008 The rise of the 
classical politician was not assisted by the introduction of sub-districts within electoral districts in 
the lead-up to the 2010 elections. Candidates had to stand within one sub-district, whereas voters 
could cast their vote in any of the sub-districts located within their home district. The effect was 
to engender ‘even more localized politics than usual’.1009  
 
The government seemed to take the nationalisation of elections more seriously with the 
employment of a national list constituting 27 seats, that was designed to run alongside the district-
based single vote of citizens during the 2013 elections. In addition increases were made to the 
women’s quota from 12 to 15 seats and the parliament itself was expanded to include 150 
deputies.1010 Voters, who now had two votes, could cast one in their district analogous to 2010, 
and another on a national list whose candidates were not tied to their district. There was some hope 
that this novel addition to the electoral landscape would provide a much needed space for political 
parties to campaign and win. Yet, over 75% of those elected were considered pro-regime loyalists 
tied to tribes or influential families.1011 Sharif reflects that ‘the political environment was never 
designed for the emergence of political parties’, largely, but exclusively due to the Single Non-
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transferable Vote (SNTV). This he is adamant ‘destroyed their chances because it favoured the 
individual and tribal candidate, it favoured political money. And so they (parties) were denied the 
weaponry of actually engaging with the popular vote and to form coalitions and consensus [in the 
political process]’.1012 
 
There was hope when in August 2015 the government of Abdullah Ensour announced it 
would be rescinding the SNTV, meaning that voters would be able to cast multiple votes when 
participating in the 2016 elections. ‘But the issue’, cautions Bashar al-Khatib ‘is with the 
distribution of districts. They are not well balanced [as] demographic considerations are still 
neglected’, irrespective of the new law improving the voting process itself.1013 From other quarters 
too there was similarly poignant criticism. Sufian Obeidat for instance declared: ‘they (the 
government and political activists alike) celebrated this law because they got rid of the one man 
one vote. But actually they instituted a worse law in its place. This law allows people to run only 
in lists, not individually, and it is designed so that only one person per list can win. So, what do 
the other people do? They run individually which means they tell their voters vote for me not for 
anyone else’.1014 In other words, the list system does not allow parties to construct viable lists on 
an ideological or program basis. Electoral politics are effectively confined to individual districts, 
favouring kinship networks and voting habits, rather than facilitating national discussions and 
campaigns on issues beyond district borders.   
 
This background is essential in contextualising the different practices of citizenship on 
display following news of missing and tampered ballot boxes in the Badia al-Wasat District. After 
the close of polling stations rumours – later proven - began to spread of up to eleven boxes of 
completed ballot papers had gone missing or showed signs of having been tampered with.1015 This 
became a larger media story once it was clear that Hind al-Fayez, an outspoken member of the 17th 
Parliament, elected in 2013 on the District’s women’s quota seat, had failed to reclaim her seat. 
                                                     
1012 Osama Sharif, (Freelance journalist) interview with the author, Amman, April 29, 2016. 
1013 Bashar al-Khatib, (Freelance economic and politics researcher) interview with the author, August 30, 2016. 
1014 Sufian Obeidat, (Constitutional lawyer) interview with the author, Amman, September 07, 2016. 
1015 Khaberni, ‘‘Itiṣām Maftuḥ ‘ala Țariq al-Maṭār’, khaberni.com, September 24, 2016, 
https://www.khaberni.com/news/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%81%
D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D
9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-174931-174931 (accessed November 18, 2017).  
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Al-Fayez responded that evening with a flurry of criticisms, targeting particularly Khalid al-
Khalaldeh, the Chief Commissioner of the Independent Electoral Commission,1016 and Salamah 
Hamad the Minister of Interior for their role in what she believed was a targeted attack against her 
and democracy in the Kingdom. She passionately argued that her role in the ‘war against 
corruption’, and defence of democracy in Jordan made her a target of such an attack.1017  
 
In particular, she declared passionately, ‘I want a true parliament, a constitutional 
parliament not a parliament that is for sale’ (majlis al-nuwab al-dunaneer), not a parliament of the 
Interior Minister, not a corrupt parliament’.1018 Here al-Fayez is referring to the Interior Minister’s 
position on the board of directors of the Jordan Company for Energy Resources, in violation of 
Article 47 of Constitution forbidding ministers from sitting on company boards or being partners 
in firms during their tenure as public servants.1019 This company allegedly convinced Dr Khalid 
Touqan, Chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission to transfer the proposed site of a 
nuclear reactor to land within the Central Bedouin district without first acquiring community 
approval.1020 Hamad’s involvement in this which has been reported since at least may 2015,1021 
was later elaborated on by al-Fayez in an interview. In it, she stated that she received word from a 
trusted source in the Interior Ministry that Hamad had spoken of the impossibility of her return to 
                                                     
1016 In the wider scheme, signalling out al-Khalaldeh appears ironic as some analysts believe that the episode of 
missing ballot boxes was concocted in order to blemish what otherwise was a smooth operation by the Chief 
Commissioner, suggesting it could be that both were smaller players in a larger game. Mohammed Husseiny, 
(Director, The Identity Center for Human Development) interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016. 
1017 Jafra News, ‘Ghaḍab Hind al-Fāyez Ba‘ad Saraqat al-Ṣanādiq wa Tatahum Wazir al-Dhākhaliyah Salāmah 
Ḥamād’, Youtube.com, September 20, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3ROxjeQftw (accessed November 
18, 2017). 
1018 Mohamed al-Shalabi, ‘Hind al-Fāyez Taftaḥa al-Nār ‘Ala Salāmah Ḥamād, Youtube.com, September 20, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEu0-Pt1Mng (accessed November 18, 2017). 
1019 Jordanian Government, The Constitution (al-Dustour al-Urduni), Art. 47. 
1020 As‘ad al-‘Azouni, ‘Hind al-Fāyez: Li-Hadha al-Asbāb Lam Yusamiḥou li bil-‘awdah lil-barlimān’, Raya News, 
November 8, 2016, http://www.raya.com/Mob/GetPage/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/e60c63fa-7c74-
4711-a21d-213b3be8afc9 (accessed November 17, 2017). 
1021 Anonymous, ‘Salāmah Ḥamād wa Khālid Țouqān wa al-Shirkah aliti Tajamma‘ahumā?’,  Saraha News, May 
22, 2015, 
http://www.sarahanews.net/archive/%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A
7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86-%
D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8
%AA%D8%AC.html (accessed November 18, 2017). 
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the parliament while he was minister.1022 Her defence therefore coalesced around a discourse of 
civil citizenship, support for the Kingdom’s democracy and her own record as an MP.1023  
 
However, following the elections the discourse utilised by al-Fayez and other disgruntled 
candidates, chiefly Saleh al-Jabour, Salam al-Khadier, Muhammad al-Fayez, and Talal al-
Khareisha became increasingly tribal in an endeavour to generate momentum behind a call for a 
re-count of votes in the District. This was notable during a sit-in demonstration on the airport road 
south of Amman in the region of al-Qastal, where supporters of these candidates gathered to protest 
government inaction.1024 During the protests, Hind al-Fayez addressed the assembled participants, 
extolling the virtues and history of the Bani Sakhr, especially with regard to their role in the 
shaping and guardianship of the Kingdom.1025 Her objective therefore appeared to convert what 
was in essence personal grievance into a communally shared one, requiring a collective response. 
Mohammed Hussainy, who was the Head of the elections Integrity Commission agreed, 
commenting ‘when she (al-Fayez) found there was not public support for her statement she tried 
to go [the other way]’.1026 In any event, gone was the democratic, citizen-oriented discourse of a 
few days prior, replaced by a much narrower set of claims and justifications, tied directly to the 
history of the Bani Sakhr. The strategic shift is illustrative not so much of the fickle nature of civil 
citizenship on the part of al-Fayez and her co-candidates, but more accurately speaks to the fluid 
and innately contextual nature of Jordanian citizenship. 
 
While addressing the national audience on Election Day it was appropriate for al-Fayez to 
construct an argument along the lines of citizenship and democracy. When this was shown to not 
                                                     
1022 As‘ad al-‘Azouni, ‘Hind al-Fāyez: Li-Hadha al-Asbāb Lam Yusamiḥou li bil-‘awdah lil-barlimān’. 
1023 Al-Hayat, ‘al-Fāyez lil-Hayat: Ḥukumah al-Ẓal fi al-Diwān al-Malaki wa A‘awānha Tasiyṭar ‘Ala’, al-Hayat, 
May 06, 2016.  
1024 Zāid al-Dakhil, ‘I‘itiṣām Iḥtijāji fi al-Qasṭal ‘ala I‘timād Natā’ij Intikhābāt Badu al-Wasaṭ’, al-Ghad, September 
24, 2016, 
http://www.alghad.com/articles/1148302-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%
D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D
8%B3%D8%B7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%
AF-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%
A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7 (accessed 
November 20, 2017). 
1025 Thamer al-Zaben, ‘Kalimat Hind al-Fāyez fi Ijtimā‘a Bani Ṣakhr’, Youtube.com, September 23, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XoNhwopnR9I (accessed November 20, 2017). 
1026 Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development) interview with the author, 
Amman, September 29, 2016. 
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have had the desired effect, a new tactic was called upon. By reframing the incident as a communal 
insult against one of the Kingdom’s most significant tribes, effort was made to signal to the regime 
that there would be repercussions if it failed to authorise the re-count. Although the 
missing/tampered boxes affected directly individuals and their immediate family networks, an 
attempt was made to involve the overarching construct of the tribe as a point of coalescence and 
mobilisation. Therefore it elucidates the prevailing belief that in times of trouble, drawing on the 
support of one’s tribe is an expedient stratagem. Simultaneously however, the inability of the 
candidates, al-Fayez chief among them, to successfully orient the resources of the Bani Sakhr 
behind their campaign suggests limitation on the individual’s ability to organise tribal solidarity 
and action. This is particularly the case when larger strategic goals and interests are in play. 
Hussainy explains it this way with two interpolations: 
 
‘All of the candidates vying for seats in that district (Badia al-Wasat) are from the Bani 
Sakhr tribe, so in the end the Bani Sakhr was represented as they were supposed to be in 
the parliament. I mean they were given four seats and they got four seats. Second, she (al-
Fayez) was accusing the Minister of Interior who is Bani Sakhr too. So there is a problem 
within the Bani Sakhr tribe if you want to put it like that. There is nothing in the suggestion 
that the state is against the Bani Sakhr’.1027 
 
Reminiscent here is Jureidini and McLaurin’s hypothesis made more than three decades 
ago that the aggregate significance of the tribe ‘will give way to more restrictive familial loyalties 
long before it disappears totally in favour of Western-style identities’.1028Assuming this to be true, 
the al-Fayez case indicates that the politics of tribe and state has more to do with individual families 
and personalities within the tribal structure, rather than the relationship between the tribe as a 
unitary actor and the State. Two realities emerging from the Badia al-Wasat controversy are 
pertinent in this regard. First, all the successful candidates from the September 20 poll are members 
of the Bani Sakhr. Therefore an argument claiming that the State has done the tribe an electoral 
disservice does not make sense. It does make sense though on the level of individuals and their 
direct families. This point is denoted in the second reality, namely, the Speaker of the Senate, 
                                                     
1027 Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development) interview with the author, 
Amman, September 29, 2016. 
1028 Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, Jordan, p. 41. 
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Faisal al-Fayez is also a member of the Bani Sakhr, and a relative of Hind al-Fayez. He was neither 
vocal in criticising Khalid al-Kalaldeh or Salamah Hamad, nor did he make his presence felt at the 
al-Qastal demonstrations.  
 
It cannot be said that this is limited to the Kingdom’s formal political realm. On day-to-
day basis citizens utilise whatever tools are available within their citizen repertoire in an effort to 
navigate Jordan’s social worlds. While undertaking fieldwork in 2016 I often journeyed to the 
library of the Council of British Research in the Levant (CBRL). It was during one of these trips 
that the following interaction took place. Walking along the street in a largely residential part of 
Amman, a car having come originally from the opposite direction, pulled up next to me, and the 
driver inquired if I knew where the British Institute was. Believing at the time that he was referring 
to the one to which I was proceeding – the other larger and more well-known British Institute being 
located on the other side of the city – I gave the directions. The driver offered me a lift and I 
accepted. Once sitting down on the back seat and closing the door I realised the poor state of the 
vehicle, the passenger door had no interior handle, and once closed, the interior plastic lining of 
the door fell from position. On the way the driver introduced himself and his son to me, and I to 
them and we engaged in small talk.  
 
After arriving and entering the CBRL, I introduced the men to the receptionist and the 
father added at this time that he was a member of the ‘Adwan. This had not been mentioned in the 
car. With this information established, he then continued the conversation inquiring after the 
availability of English classes for his son. The receptionist responded that there were classes 
located at the British Institute in Jabal Amman but not here, and they would require payment. In 
response the father outlined his situation, including his scepticism about paying for classes that 
may not be effective and reaffirmed his kinship connections. What was interesting about observing 
this dialogue was how the father had seemingly used his tribal affiliation in an attempt to gain 
more from the conversation than he felt he could acquire without it being mentioned. That is to 
say, he hoped that giving the receptionist knowledge of his kinship would enable him to circumvent 
his present material limitations. To be clear I suggest as much given the state of the man’s car with 
the assumption that given the financial resources he would have fixed it. 
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One could conclude that whatever wasta his kinship network bestowed, it was insufficient 
for him to repair the vehicle at a discounted rate he could afford. Let alone receive preferential 
treatment from a non-Jordanian formal institution. But this did not stop the strategic employment 
of identity being attempted. With the stated assumptions in mind, the episode reveals albeit in a 
very small way the complexities inherent in the practice of tribal identities and the citizenship in 
which they are implanted. And furthermore, emphasises the importance of context in how 
identities within citizenship, including those associated with tribalism, are utilised. In the three 
illustrations analysed above different revealed facets of the friction that has emerged between 
jinsiyyah and muwatanah in Jordan. The former entails subjection to the state and its centralised 
authority, whereas the latter entails an ability to make claims on this authority to behave a 
particular way justified on the attachment the individual and the collective actor has to the territory 
claimed by the state. All three highlighted that the state does not necessarily need to listen and 
respond favourably to the claim making of citizens, but rather can and does do so according to 
expediency 
 
 
8.4 : Back inside the Tent of State? Tribalism and Civil Law 
 
On the subject of perpetuation, the persistence of tribalism further manifests itself in the 
manoeuvres to integrate facets of tribal law into the country’s civil law code. Officially tribal 
customary law operated in Jordan alongside the civil code between 1929, when the Bedouin 
Control Law was enacted, followed by the Law of Tribal Courts in 1936, until 1976 when this 
lattice of laws was abolished. As part of the state-building enterprise, laws such as these were 
designed to govern the Bedouins as a ‘separate category of nationals and citizens’.1029 However, 
as Massad explains, this arranged division within the citizenship order was only meant as a 
temporary, transitional arrangement until such a time as the Bedouin were sufficiently 
territorialised. So as to be fully integrated into the architecture of the nation-state ‘equal to and no 
longer a distinct species of citizen-nationals’.1030  
 
                                                     
1029 Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects, p. 52. 
1030 Ibid. 
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However, and perhaps as a consequence of the prominence of tribal identities in the 
construction and reproduction of Jordanian national identity, so-called tribal customs, the norms 
governing pre-state procedures of crime and punishment have, since 1976, permeated into the civil 
code. Citizenship as an institution is impacted. This continues into this century, which has seen a 
partial integration of tribal customs into the civil law code. One case concerns jalwa, or the forced 
relocation of a family, clan or tribe of an individual convicted of murdering a member of another 
neighbouring tribe residing in the same region. Historically, it evolved in the absence of centralised 
law and order authority as a means of conflict resolution and prevention. Placing physical space 
between the implicated families was seen as a practical means of limiting the probability of 
vendettas and future feuds. Interior Minister Salamah Hammad announced in January 2016 that, 
after a period of debate the previous year, the new Crime Prevention Law would come into effect. 
It was an important development in the practice of jalwa, because its scope was now delimited to 
the father and any children of the killer on the one hand, and authorised the chief Islamic justice 
of the Kingdom as the stipulator of diyeh (blood money) payments.1031 
 
Commenting on its drafting in late December 2015, Taylor Luck stated that the law would 
amount to a ‘streamlining’ of tribal and civil law whose practical implication was ‘the word of the 
tribes and the rule of law now both must be respected’.1032 Utopian flourishes aside like so many 
other laws in Jordan the application is the true test. An early trial of this state sanctioning of non-
state judicial procedures manifested itself in late January 2016 in the Karak Governorate. As part 
of a government sponsored atwa, or reconciliation, jalwa was enforced on the family of a man 
suspected of murdering Mutah town resident Turki Sarairah. Signifying the degree of importance 
to which the government treated this reconciliation, the delegation was led by former Deputy Prime 
Minister Mohammed Thneibat.1033 In this case the suspect’s tribe going back five generations on 
the paternal side were required to evacuate, in an apparent violation of the new law supposedly 
regulating the process. Furthermore, the agreement following the atwa stated that the victim’s 
                                                     
1031 Laila Azzeh, ‘Eviction of Entire Clan of a Murder Suspect ‘Outrageous Violation of Human Rights”, Jordan 
Times, January 19, 2016, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/eviction-entire-clan-murder-suspect-outrageous-
violation-human-rights%E2%80%99 (accessed November 25, 2017). 
1032 Taylor Luck, ‘New Tribal Law Could Bring Great Change to Jordan’, The National, December 21, 2015, 
https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/new-tribal-law-could-bring-great-change-to-jordan-1.110249 (accessed 
November 25, 2017). 
1033 Laila Azzeh, ‘Eviction of Entire Clan of a Murder Suspect ‘Outrageous Violation of Human Rights”. 
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family had the legal right (under both tribal and state law) to kill the murderer’s father, uncles, 
children and grandchildren if they returned at any stage to Mutah town.1034  
 
The decision outraged some reformists who interpreted the state’s involvement as symbolic 
of its institutional weakness and unconstitutional behaviour. Analyst Daoud Kuttab argued 
correspondingly that the atwa agreement declared ‘without trial’ the suspect’s guilt, decided on 
the suitability of capital punishment, and secured a vow from the state ‘not to pursue any effort for 
clemency’.1035 Resultantly, the very capacity for the state to arbitrate justice and security for 
citizens was outsourced. Such is particularly intriguing given Jordan’s history, and its abolishment 
of tribal law courts as mentioned in 1976. It was necessary, Massad argued, because of the 
homogenising tendencies of the state and modern governance. He argued that the dictates of 
justice’s standardisation across the community of citizens ‘could not allow a Bedouin murderer to 
get off with only one year imprisonment… when a Hadari murderer could receive up to fifteen 
years of jail if not capital punishment for a similar crime’.1036 
  
Even advocates of jalwa raised objections to the extent of its application in this instance. 
Tribal elder Barjas al-Hadid for example argued it should be applied very strictly, in cases where 
for example both families involved live on the same street, and the forced removal should only 
include the direct members of a perpetrator’s family.1037 Unsurprisingly, the law came under 
review and amendments were tabled in parliament the following month, reaffirming jalwa’s 
limitations to the perpetrator, his male offspring and his father, and adding that it should be for a 
period no longer than one year, with an option of extending further if appropriate. Additionally, 
the relocation should occur within the same governorate to reduce the impact on the wider 
family.1038 However the slow pace of the legislative process meant that until the parliament 
                                                     
1034 Ibid. A year later in 2017 another case of jalwa included family members to the third paternal ancestor. See 
Rana Husseini, ‘Clan of Alleged Police Killer to be Evicted Under “Jalwa” Agreement’, Jordan Times, January 28, 
2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/clan-alleged-police-killer-be-evicted-under-jalwa%E2%80%99-
agreement (accessed November 24, 2017).  
1035 Daoud Kuttab, ‘When Tribal Law Supersedes Civil Law’, Jordan Times, January 21, 2016, 
http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/daoud-kuttab/when-tribal-law-supersedes-civil-law (accessed November 24, 
2017). 
1036 Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects, pp. 65-66. 
1037 Laila Azzeh, ‘Eviction of Entire Clan of a Murder Suspect ‘Outrageous Violation of Human Rights”. 
1038 Jordan Times, ‘Cabinet Amends Law to Limit Scope of ‘Tribal Justice System”, Jordan Times, September 01, 
2016, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/cabinet-amends-law-limit-scope-tribal-justice-system%E2%80%99 
(accessed November 24, 2017). 
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approves the amendments, and the King ratifies them with his signature, jalwa could proceed in 
an unregulated manner. 
 
A case that circulated widely concerned the relocation of the Dawaghreh family to Irbid. 
Their situation demonstrated again the risk of integrating a practice designed in the absence of 
centralised authority into the civil law code. This is especially with regard to its bestowing 
collective punishment on citizens who were not directly involved in the crime itself; impacting 
their citizenship of the nation-state. In 2013 Asma Dawaghreh along with her cancer suffering 
husband, their six children and twenty-eight others fled their village in northern Jordan after a 
family member informed them that a paternal nephew had stabbed a cousin to death. Three years 
later and after having changed residences six times, the family remained in exile.1039 Their plight 
illuminates some significant impacts that jalwa specifically, and the attempt at integrating state 
and non-state legal practices more generally has on citizenship as membership of a political 
community. Highlighting by extension, the tensions within the relationship between jinsiyyah and 
muwātanah on the one hand, while revealing the monotonous stupidity of defining muwātanah in 
blank terms as “democratic citizenship” on the other. 
  
As of August 2016 the Dawaghreh family’s plight is ongoing despite a diyeh of 50,000 
dinars (70,000 $US) being paid to the deceased’s family in 2014. In theory that should be the end 
of the matter meaning the family could return to their village. Yet they remain in exile, and have 
been pressured by the victim’s family to sell their supermarket – their source of income – to 
them.1040 The collective punishment that jalwa enshrines however limited it may be, reveals the 
impotence of citizenship on which membership of the political community embodied in the nation-
state is theoretically constituted. Through which the individual citizen is supposed to be subject to 
the rule of law as determined by the state to the exclusion of others. The principle of collective 
punishment repudiates this, and continues to do so after the crime has been punished. As 
manifested in Mrs. Dawaghreh exclaiming ‘what is my crime? What is my son's crime ... my 
husband's crime?’1041 Apart from the social and economic dislocation that is forced upon innocent 
                                                     
1039 Jordan Times, ‘Forced Relocations Raise Doubts over Jordan’s Tribal Customs’, Jordan Times, August 24, 
2016, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/forced-relocations-raise-doubts-over-jordan%E2%80%99s-tribal-
customs (accessed November 24, 2017). 
1040 Ibid. 
1041 Asma Dawaghreh cited in ibid. 
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family members, relocation is an impediment to, if not a violation of constitutional rights. 
Considering elections at local, governorate and national levels, jalwa complicates the right of 
citizens to vote as they cannot return to the voting district to which they are registered under fear 
of death.  
 
Thus the prescriptions of state sanctioned citizenship (jinsiyyah) conflict with a tradition 
of conflict mediation developed, and in the context of contemporary Jordan, advocated for, on the 
basis of a connection to territory (muwātanah). Remember as argued in chapter two, the former 
entails subjection to the state and its centralised authority. While the latter entails an ability to 
make claims on this authority to behave a particular way justified on the attachment the individual 
and importantly the collective has to the territory claimed by the state. It is in this context that 
Omar Jazi, a constitutional law expert, comments that ‘jalwa does not make sense within a civic 
society, within the rule of law and within the type of society we are living in’.1042 Having said this, 
there may be an argument to be made in suggesting that longer term assimilating tribal codes into 
civil law may enhance the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of some of its citizens. And do so in 
a way that is not tied to the distribution of material resources similar with the integration of the 
tribes into the military during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.  
 
 
8.5 : Conclusion 
 
Citizenship is a thoroughly contextual and contestable entity wherever it is found and practiced. 
In this chapter I have endeavoured to shed light on some of the ways Jordanian citizenship 
intersects with tribal identities and norms which exist and are themselves practiced alongside 
citizenship in the country. Presented first was an explication by way of distinguishing between 
tribes and tribalism, which is important in order to come to terms with how tribal identities may 
be sustained in contemporary Jordan despite the changes in living conditions described by 
Gharaibeh and al-Bustāni. Following on from this I proceeded to examine tangible illustrations 
                                                     
1042 Ibid. 
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first in the form of violence on university campuses and then in elections, focusing in-particular 
on the aftermath of the 2016 general elections in the Badia al-Wasat district.  
 
Lastly, the chapter considered the active interconnections between tribal customs and civil 
law, demonstrating they have persisted well into the 21st century despite their supposed removal 
from the Jordanian legal code in the late 20th century. In so doing the aim was to suggest that 
tribalism in contemporary Jordan is less about tribes as confederations capable of mass collective 
action, so much as it is about how class and resources held by families within tribes are of 
importance when understanding political and social dynamics. These are the keys to 
comprehending the enduring nature of the tribes themselves in Jordanian society. 
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Conclusion 
 
‘(Jordan) seems like a very open society when you consider the speeches of the King, he talks 
about reform, he encourages the youth to participate in political life as well as to form political 
parties in order to move the country forward as well as to have in the future parliamentarian 
government. But the issue is, and you can’t hear it in the speeches, but on the ground, it is totally 
different’.1043 
 
‘What is the definition of being a Jordanian? You know it has nothing to do with citizenship 
unfortunately’.1044 
 
This dissertation has endeavoured to respond to and reflect on the question ‘who is a Jordanian?’ 
Rather than adopt an approach coalescing around national identity, the previous eight chapters 
have together pursued this question via an epistemological investigation into the practice and 
theory of citizenship in contemporary Jordan. Scholars have consistently assumed citizenship to 
function in Jordan in a similar manner to other polities. As the modern understanding of citizenship 
is contained within the nation-state, the implication seems to be that nation-states, wherever they 
are found, will possess a form of citizenship, and therefore citizens, whose typology can be 
generalised and taken for granted.  
 
In the place of this, I provided a more nuanced historically grounded understanding of 
citizenship, taking into account its jinsiyyah and muwātanah based characteristics. This was taken 
up in part one, consisting of chapters one to three, which together were designed to determine and 
project the parameters of the field, emphasising that assumptions about the nature and typology of 
citizenship abound, especially when discussions arise over the Jordan’s democratic transition, and 
the landscape of national identity in the Kingdom. I then illuminated a point of contrast between 
understandings of citizenship in an Anglo-European context, and the historical development of 
jinsiyyah and muwātanah in both abstract and specifically Jordanian contexts. Jinsiyyah, I 
highlighted in chapter two, became associated with citizenship as a state bestowed status in the 
                                                     
1043 Amal Abu-Jeries, (Program Director and analyst at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Amman) interview with the author, 
Amman, June 19, 2016. 
1044 Lina Ejeilat, (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com) interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016. 
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19th Century, as a mechanism through which centralised authorities, first in the Ottoman Empire, 
and secondly in its successor nation-states, were able to distinguish between individuals within 
and without its ambit. Muwātanah meanwhile was comparatively more recent in its development 
and practice.  
 
While its active participle, the muwātin, began to emerge in the late 19th Century, it was 
not until the 20th Century that muwātanah became more pervasive in political discourse. Unlike 
jinsiyyah, which is directly associated with a political authority, muwātanah by virtue of its root is 
tied to both individuals and territory, namely, feelings of connection, common identity and 
subsequent ownership of territory. That this is necessarily social cannot be neglected, given that, 
historically, identities in the Jordanian context owe more to relations between people constituting 
a community, than to land as a sacred space.1045 This means that land is given meaning through its 
inhabitants. Muwātanah’s epistemic development is therefore considerably distinct from jinsiyyah. 
It is through muwātanah that citizens, muwātineen, are able to make claims on the behaviour of 
the political authority which claims dominion over the same geographical space. Simultaneously, 
this highlights one of the cardinal challenges facing muwātanah in Jordan. It must compete with 
other identities, which place similar significance in networks shared by inhabitants of a territory.  
 
Finally, in chapter three, I presented an appraisal of Jordanian political history from the 
late Ottoman Empire to the dawn of the 21st Century from the position of citizenship. This brought 
the theoretical aspects of chapters one and two into relief. On the one hand, the evolution of 
citizenship in Jordan over the course of the 20th Century highlighted the problem of assuming that 
it refers to the relationship between rulers and ruled with rights and corresponding duties explicitly 
elucidated. The Jordanian experience illustrates a more nuanced development of subject-citizens 
rather than citizen-subjects. By this, I refer not only to the subjection of citizens to a ruling 
authority to which they have only a partial institutional relationship with, but also the subjection 
of citizenship to other identities, including national identity, to which, following Jordan’s twin 
processes of state and nation-building, citizenship has not developed parity in terms of its depth, 
and subsequently of its mobilising capacity. Consequently being a Jordanian has less to do with 
                                                     
1045 Anonymous. (Political analyst and researcher) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016. 
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citizenship than it does the relation of the subject to a subnational community, that community’s 
relationship with others, and with political authority under the Hashemite Crown.  
   
In practice, because jinsiyyah has little to do with shared human experience and identities, 
it cannot operate as a mobilising force. Resultantly, political regimes such as the Hashemite 
regimes of Hussein and Abdullah II must frame their claims on the muwātanah of Jordanians, 
particularly with regards to national identity. When considering the analogy of loyalty for example, 
appeals from the regime to citizens for it more often than not involve refracting loyalty to space, 
subnational identities and communities through the physical being of the monarch. In part two, 
composed of chapters four and five, the argument proceeded from 20th century historical analysis 
and theoretical mediation, to contemporary Jordan. In chapter four it was argued that a key feature 
of Jordanian citizenship in recent history has been the absence of ownership and accountability, 
which manifests itself metaphorically in public littering. Based primarily on fieldwork data, I 
advanced that this was symptomatic of a public sphere in which a muwātanah/civilian identity, 
necessary for generating mutually felt, and shared accountability between citizens, is still being 
developed. 
 
Instead, civilian identity (inasmuch as it exists) is based on a relationship between the 
citizen and the monarch, rather than between citizens themselves. This has proven to be a 
substantial impediment to sustained citizen oriented collective action. In practical terms, the 
persistence of Hashemite rule is not just a matter of authoritarian resilience, but also the resilience 
of a now outdated model of citizenship which has been unable to provide a level of civilly-oriented 
organisational capacity to not only articulate and sustain a challenge to the existing political order, 
but furthermore to provide an alternative to it. From the position of citizenship theory, this is 
precisely what made the uprisings from 2011 both tangibly and philosophically profound moments 
in the contemporary Arab political (specifically Jordanian) history. It may be true, following the 
first of the epigraphs above, that the definition of who is a Jordanian owes exceedingly little to the 
institution of citizenship.  
 
The weakness of citizenship’s depth, in comparison to other extant identities in the 
Jordanian political community, exists by virtue of the history of state and nation-building in Jordan 
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on the one hand, and the historical evolution of both jinsiyyah and muwātanah socio-linguistically 
on the other. This was central in part three, whose chapters six, seven and eight, each in their own 
distinct ways, explored some of the ways in which the current citizenship regime is experienced, 
negotiated and contested by Jordanians. In chapter six, the pre-eminent focus resided on the 
campaign of Jordanian mothers to have the constitution and nationality law changed so that they 
are able to transfer their citizenship to their children. It elucidated how the way citizenship is 
gendered routinely affects the ability of female Jordanians to practice a citizenship, which in 
neither theoretical or practical terms is considered equal to that possessed by their male 
counterparts in the eyes of the state.  
 
The chapter thus demonstrated how struggles on the part of citizens to demand 
accountability and an ability to practice ownership of their citizen status by transferring it to their 
children as freely as their male co-citizens, intersected with the politics of demography concerning 
the numerical supremacy of Jordanians of Palestinian origin over those of East Bank origin. In this 
fashion the case study highlighted the prevailing depth of national identity as a constitutive 
variable in the practice of Jordanian citizenship. Meaning, that citizenship in Jordan is by extension 
not merely a legal status denoting the relationship between those in power and those subject to it. 
Rather citizenship in this context is held hostage within debates about national belonging. The 
fears that exist amongst some members (including influential ones) of the Jordanian body politic, 
in some respects derive from the weakness of citizenship. It is, to borrow Faulk’s terminology, not 
deep enough to supplant other identities that exist alongside it. 
  
Moreover, this not the result of Arab or Jordanian exceptionalism, but rather is the product 
of history, acknowledging both its international and domestic components. It is therefore, the 
product of deliberate actions and inactions over the Kingdom’s more than seventy year history. A 
ramification of which concerns the unresolved conflict over the final status of Palestine. So long 
as the practice and theory of Jordanian citizenship remains shackled by apprehensions in the realm 
of national identity, and so long as the conflict remains unresolved, there is hope but little optimism 
of a sufficient deepening of citizenship to the extent that it becomes flexible enough to contain the 
possibility of its holders possessing additional national identities.  
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Chapter seven explored a less obvious facet of the accountability/ownership dyad through 
an analysis of the assassination of Jordanian writer and leftist intellectual Nahed Hattar in 
September 2016. It enunciated that the practice of freedom of expression is governed not so much 
by legal dictates, but by political expediency framed by a discourse of securitisation. The effect of 
which is to severely delimit the accountability of the state to citizens. Comparison with Abdullah 
II and Queen Rania’s support for freedom of expression in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo shootings 
in Paris 2015 highlighted the very different image of Jordan that citizens have to contend with. 
While the international/global community witnesses the tolerant and open face of the Kingdom, 
its citizens must mediate their own expression regardless of medium with care.   
 
Individual negotiating of Jordan’s citizenship regime was a key component of chapter 
eight, specifically, the ways in which behaviour in the civil space is influenced by tribal identities. 
One’s citizen identity is one of many held concomitantly that may be deployed strategically in 
order to maximise gains from a given situation. This includes circumstances in which the citizen 
identity, if the substance of citizenship was taken as a given, may be expected to be deployed above 
all others. The central instance analysed was the response of former MP Hind al-Fayez to the 
missing and tampered ballot boxes in the Central Bedouin District following the closing of polling 
booths during the 2016 general elections. In the immediate aftermath al-Fayez employed a 
discourse one would often associate with the civility of citizenship. She spoke of government 
corruption against the citizenry, threatening the democratic trajectory of the Kingdom amongst 
other things.  
 
Interestingly however, when the strategic use of this identity failed to generate the desired 
outcome, al-Fayez employed a different identity from her tool-kit. A few days after the elections, 
al-Fayez, along with other disgruntled candidates, organised a sit-in on the airport road. During 
the sit-in talk of democracy and citizen ownership of decision-making were replaced with a more 
exclusive tribal narrative. Al-Fayez, along with the other candidates, was a member of the Bani 
Sakhr, one of the most influential of the Kingdom’s tribes. At the sit-in, she spoke of the tampering 
of ballot boxes not as an insult to citizens and electoral integrity but as a sign of the state 
disrespecting the Bani Sakhr. That al-Fayez ultimately failed in the end to have a re-run in the 
District is not overly significant here. More important is the situation demonstrating the fluid 
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nature of citizenship in the Kingdom. Relatedly, the events also underscored the increasing class 
element in tribalism in contemporary Jordan.  
  
There are a number of future avenues of research that this dissertation’s theoretical 
substance could contribute towards. The reader is no doubt aware that the previous chapters did 
not include thorough stand-alone analyses of the Jordanian Islamist Movement or of elections and 
parliamentary reform from the perspective of citizenship. As noted in the introduction, the decision 
not to dedicate chapters to either should not be considered as a blind-spot, but as a conscious 
decision, firstly, both have been widely discussed in the literature, and secondly, on the basis of 
observations I made and discussions I had during fieldwork. When asked to comment about 
citizenship in general, and specifically in the context of Jordan, the twenty-nine interviewees who 
were interviewed in-depth all elaborated on the gap between theory and practice. The immediate 
task upon analysing my qualitative data therefore appeared to be one of coming to terms with this 
dyad. Having reflected on this, a direction of future research regarding the Islamist Movement will 
be to examine them using the approach applied in this dissertation. A benefit of which would be 
to consider Islamists without resorting to a liberal point, or other normative point of comparison. 
In doing so, comparative queries of whether Islamism is or is not compatible with either democracy 
or liberal citizenship could be better avoided. But rather, take an alternate avenue focused on 
appreciating the Movement within its own citizenship context. A potentially intriguing line of 
inquiry concerns those who Rana Sweiss refers to as ‘retired jihadis’ who rely on the stability of 
the state and its institutions to provide an acceptable standard of living for their families.1046 It may 
become necessary to widen the analysis of citizenship knowledge to include Ummah and 
Qawmiyyah, both of which were peripheral in this dissertation. Yet due to the transnational nature 
of Islam and Islamism, it will be important to include these in such an undertaking.  
 
Another area for further research concerns parliamentary reform and elections in Jordan. 
Outside of general statements of parliaments in Jordan functioning as rubber stamps for pre-
established government agendas, little in-depth research has comparatively been conducted on 
parliamentary reform from the citizen perspective. For example, to what extent does the current 
quota system for women and minorities consolidate sub-national/citizen identities, and affiliated 
                                                     
1046 Rana Sweiss, (Freelance journalist) interview with the author, Amman, June 15, 2016. 
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voting practices versus encourage cross-sectional nationally oriented voting behaviours? 
Analogously, it is well known that elections in Jordan produce neither parliamentary governments, 
nor parliaments independent from the executive. However what kind of citizenship is being 
produced and reproduced through the electoral process? To what extents are citizens able to wield 
ownership of the outcomes? And what are the costs, both on them as a citizen-body, and on the 
state itself which has a history of putting short-term survival ahead of long term goals. 
 
Overall, this dissertation has sustained an epistemological inquiry into the practice and 
theory of citizenship in Jordan. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach and making use of 
theoretical and empirical analysis it was suggested that it should not be assumed that Jordanian 
citizenship is symptomatic of a classical citizen-subjectivity. Rather it is a more nuanced and even 
hybrid institution whose production and reproduction is intimately partnered with the historical 
development of the Jordanian state. Further, while the state is semi-authoritarian in nature, citizens 
across Jordan’s history have challenged the loci of political authority in an effort to force its 
redistribution. At times, they have been successful in acquiring concessions, with the uprisings of 
2011, and the tireless campaigning of women like Nima Habashnah representing some of the latest 
illustrations. The arguments presented in the previous chapters points to the existence of a 
substantial roadblock that has prevented the shift from concession acquisition, to a greater role of 
citizens at the heart of the exercise of political authority. It is the absence of a citizen-based 
organisational capacity, capable of sustaining pressure and demands for ownership and 
accountability over time without fragmenting into smaller voices of collective actors, that may be 
co-opted by the regime, as has been historical practice.  
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